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In this paper, we examine how the institutional design affects the outcome of bank bailout decisions. In the German savings bank sector, distress events can be resolved by local politicians or a state-level association. We show that decisions by local politicians with close links to the bank are distorted by personal considerations: While distress events per se are not related to the electoral cycle, the probability of local politicians injecting taxpayers’ money into a bank in distress is 30 percent lower in the year directly preceding an election. Using the electoral cycle as an instrument, we show that banks that are bailed out by local politicians experience less restructuring and perform considerably worse than banks that are supported by the savings bank association. Our findings illustrate that larger distance between banks and decision makers reduces distortions in the decision making process, which has implications for the design of bank regulation and supervision.
In its meeting on 6 September 2012, the Governing Council of the ECB took decisions on a number of technical features regarding the Eurosystem’s outright transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets (OMT). This decision was challenged in the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) by a number of constitutional complaints and other petitions. In its seminal judgment of 14 January 2014, the German court expressed serious doubts on the compatibility of the ECB’s decision with the European Union law.
It admitted the complaints and petitions even though actual purchases had not been executed and the control of acts of an organ of the EU in principle is not the task of the GFCC. As justification for this procedure the court resorted to its judicature on a reserved “ultra vires” control and the defense of the “constitutional identiy” of Germany. In the end, however, the court referred the case pursuant to Article 267 TFEU to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for preliminary rulings on several questions of EU law. In substance, the German court assessed OMT as an act of economic policy which is not covered by the competences of the ECB. Furthermore, it judged OMT as a – by EU primary law – prohibited monetary financing of sovereign debt. The defense of the ECB (disruption of monetary policy transmission mechanism) was dismissed without closer scrutiny as being “irrelevant”. Finally the court opened, however, a way for a compromise by an interpretation of OMT in conformity with EU law under preconditions, specified in detail.
Procedure and findings of this judgment were harshly criticized by many economists but also by the majority of legal scholars. This criticism is largely convincing in view of the admissibility of the complaints. Even if the “ultra vires” control is in conformity with prior decisions of court it is in this judgment expanded further without compelling reasons. It is also questionable whether the standing of the complaining parties had to be accepted and whether the referral to the ECJ was indicated. The arguments of the court are, however, conclusive in respect of the transgression of competences by the ECB and – to somewhat lesser extent – in respect of the monetary debt financing. The dismissal of the defense as “irrelevant” is absolutey persuasive.
The Treaty of Maastricht imposed the strict obligation on the European Union (EU) to establish an economic and monetary union, now Article 3(4) TEU. This economic and monetary union is, however, not designed as a separate entity but as an integral part of the EU. The single currency was to become the currency of the EU and to be the legal tender in all Member States unless an exemption was explicitly granted in the primary law of the EU, as in the case of the UK and Denmark. The newly admitted Member States are obliged to introduce the euro as their currency as soon as they fulfil the admission criteria. Technically, this has been achieved by transferring the exclusive competence for the monetary policy of the Member States whose currency is the euro on the EU, Article 3(1)(c) TFEU and by bestowing the euro with the quality of legal tender, the only legal tender in the EU, Article 128(1) sentence 3 TFEU.
The paper traces the developments from the formation of the European Economic and Monetary Union to this date. It discusses the fact that the primary mandate of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is confined to safeguarding price stability and does not include general economic policy. Finally, the paper contributes to the discussion on whether the primary law of the European Union would support a eurozone exit. The Treaty of Maastricht imposed the strict obligation on the European Union (EU) to establish an economic and monetary union, now Article 3(4) TEU. This economic and monetary union is, however, not designed as a separate entity but as an integral part of the EU. The single currency was to become the currency of the EU and to be the legal tender in all Member States unless an exemption was explicitly granted in the primary law of the EU, as in the case of the UK and Denmark. The newly admitted Member States are obliged to introduce the euro as their currency as soon as they fulfil the admission criteria. Technically, this has been achieved by transferring the exclusive competence for the monetary policy of the Member States whose currency is the euro on the EU, Article 3(1)(c) TFEU and by bestowing the euro with the quality of legal tender, the only legal tender in the EU, Article 128(1) sentence 3 TFEU.
This paper analyzes the influence Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs) have on the operating performance of the LBO target companies’ direct competitors. A unique and hand-collected data set on LBOs in the United States in the period 1985-2009 allows us to analyze the effects different restructuring activities as part of the LBO have on the competitors’ revenues. These restructuring activities include changes to leverage, governance, or operating business, as well as M&A activities of the LBO target company. We find that although LBOs itself have a negative influence on competitors’ revenue growth, some restructuring mechanisms might actually benefit competing companies.
This Paper gives an overview of the German banking system and current challenges it is facing. It starts with an overview of the so-called ‘Three-Pillar-Banking-System’ and a detailed description of the current structure of the banking system in Germany. A brief comparison of the banking system in Germany with the ones in other European countries points out its uniqueness. The consequences of the financial crisis of 2007/2008 and further challenges for the German banking system are discussed, as well as the the ongoing debate around the question whether the strong government involvement should be sustained.
The Liikanen Group proposes contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds as a potential mechanism to enhance financial stability in the banking industry. Especially life insurance companies could serve as CoCo bond holders as they are already the largest purchasers of bank bonds in Europe. We develop a stylized model with a direct financial connection between banking and insurance and study the effects of various types of bonds such as non-convertible bonds, write-down bonds and CoCos on banks' and insurers' risk situations. In addition, we compare insurers' capital requirements under the proposed Solvency II standard model as well as under an internal model that ex-ante anticipates additional risks due to possible conversion of the CoCo bond into bank shares. In order to check the robustness of our findings, we consider different CoCo designs (write-down factor, trigger value, holding time of bank shares) and compare the resulting capital requirements with those for holding non-convertible bonds. We identify situations in which insurers benefit from buying CoCo bonds due to lower capital requirements and higher coupon rates. Furthermore, our results highlight how the Solvency II standard model can mislead insurers in their CoCo investment decision due to economically irrational incentives.
The Liikanen Group proposes contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds as instruments to enhance financial stability in the banking industry. Especially life insurance companies could serve as CoCo bond holders as they are already the largest purchasers of bank bonds in Europe. The growing number of banks issuing CoCo bonds leads to a rising awareness of these hybrid securities among life insurers as they are increasingly looking for higher?yielding investments into bond?like asset classes during the current low interest rate period. Our contribution provides an insight for life insurance companies to understand the effects of holding CoCo bonds as implied by the Solvency II standards that will become effective by 2016.
Low interest rates are becoming a threat to the stability of the life insurance industry, especially in countries such as Germany, where products with relatively high guaranteed returns sold in the past still represent a prominent share of the total portfolio. This contribution aims to assess and quantify the effects of the current low interest rate phase on the balance sheet of a representative German life insurer, given the current asset allocation and the outstanding liabilities. To do so, we generate a stochastic term structure of interest rates as well as stock market returns to simulate investment returns of a stylized life insurance business portfolio in a multi-period setting. Based on empirically calibrated parameters, we can observe the evolution of the life insurers’ balance sheet over time with a special focus on their solvency situation. To account for different scenarios and in order to check the robustness of our findings, we calibrate different capital market settings and different initial situations of capital endowment. Our results suggest that a prolonged period of low interest rates would markedly affect the solvency situation of life insurers, leading to a relatively high cumulative probability of default, especially for less capitalized companies. In addition, the new reform of the German life insurance regulation has a beneficial effect on the cumulative probability of default, as a direct consequence of the reduction of the payouts to policyholders.