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This paper utilizes a comprehensive worker-firm panel for the Netherlands to quantifythe impact of ICT capital-skill complementarity on the finance wage premium after the Global Financial Crisis. We apply additive worker and firm fixed-effect models to account for unobserved worker- and firm-heterogeneity and show that firm fixed-effects correct for a downward bias in the estimated finance wage premium. Our results indicate a sizable finance wage premium for both fixed- and full-hourly wages. The complementarity between ICT capital spending and the share of high skill workers at the firm-level reduces the full-wage premium considerably and the fixed-wage premium almost entirely.
Search costs for lenders when evaluating potential borrowers are driven by the quality of the underwriting model and by access to data. Both have undergone radical change over the last years, due to the advent of big data and machine learning. For some, this holds the promise of inclusion and better access to finance. Invisible prime applicants perform better under AI than under traditional metrics. Broader data and more refined models help to detect them without triggering prohibitive costs. However, not all applicants profit to the same extent. Historic training data shape algorithms, biases distort results, and data as well as model quality are not always assured. Against this background, an intense debate over algorithmic discrimination has developed. This paper takes a first step towards developing principles of fair lending in the age of AI. It submits that there are fundamental difficulties in fitting algorithmic discrimination into the traditional regime of anti-discrimination laws. Received doctrine with its focus on causation is in many cases ill-equipped to deal with algorithmic decision-making under both, disparate treatment, and disparate impact doctrine. The paper concludes with a suggestion to reorient the discussion and with the attempt to outline contours of fair lending law in the age of AI.
Previous studies document a relationship between gambling activity at the aggregate level and investments in securities with lottery-like features. We combine data on individual gambling consumption with portfolio holdings and trading records to examine whether gambling and trading act as substitutes or complements. We find that gamblers are more likely than the average investor to hold lottery stocks, but significantly less likely than active traders who do not gamble. Our results suggest that gambling behavior across domains is less relevant compared to other portfolio characteristics that predict investing in high-risk and high-skew securities, and that gambling on and off the stock market act as substitutes to satisfy the same need, e.g., sensation seeking.
Speculative news on corporate takeovers may hurt productivity because uncertainty and threat of job loss cause anxiety, distraction, and reduced collaboration and morale among employees and managers. Using a panel of OECD-headquartered firms, we show that firm productivity temporarily declines upon announcements of speculative takeover rumors that do not materialize. This productivity dip is more pronounced for targets and for firms in countries with weaker employee rights and less long-term orientation. Abnormal stock returns mirror these results. The evidence fosters our understanding of potential real effects of speculative financial news and the costs of takeover threats.
This paper examines the performance of 538 sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investments into venture capital, private equity, and real asset funds (“alternative asset funds”) from 52 countries around the world over the years 1995-2020. The data indicate SWFs are significantly slower to fully liquidate and earn lower returns from their investments, particularly from their investments in venture capital funds. The longer duration and lower performance of SWFs is more pronounced for strategic SWFs than savings SWFs. We show that venture capital fund investments are more likely to be in countries with lower quality disclosure indices. SWFs are more often in buyout funds, and in larger funds with a greater number of limited partners. SWF performance is enhanced by having different types of institutional investors in the same limited partnership. Overall, the data indicate sovereign wealth funds make large investments in alternative asset funds with a longer-term view and earn a lower financial return consistent with strategic and political SWF investment motives.
This paper examines the causes and consequences of hedge fund investments in exchange traded funds (ETFs) using U.S. data from 1998 to 2018. The data indicate that transient hedge funds and quasi-indexer hedge funds are substantially more likely to invest in ETFs. Unexpected hedge fund inflows cause a rise in ETF investments, and the economic significance of unexpected flow is more than twice as large for transient than quasi-indexer hedge funds. ETF investment is in general associated with lower hedge fund performance. But when ETF investment is accompanied by an increase in total flow and unexpected flow, the negative impact of ETF holdings on performance is mitigated. The data are consistent with the view that hedge fund ETF investment unrelated to unexpected flow is an agency cost of delegated portfolio management.
Highly interconnected global supply chains make countries vulnerable to supply chain disruptions. The authors estimate the macroeconomic effects of global supply chain shocks for the euro area. Their empirical model combines business cycle variables with data from international container trade.
Using a novel identification scheme, they augment conventional sign restrictions on the impulse responses by narrative information about three episodes: the Tohoku earthquake in 2011, the Suez Canal obstruction in 2021, and the Shanghai backlog in 2022. They show that a global supply chain shock causes a drop in euro area real economic activity and a strong increase in consumer prices. Over a horizon of one year, the global supply chain shock explains about 30% of inflation dynamics. They also use regional data on supply chain pressure to isolate shocks originating in China.
Their results show that supply chain disruptions originating in China are an important driver for unexpected movements in industrial production, while disruptions originating outside China are an especially important driver for the dynamics of consumer prices.
Der Beitrag führt in das sozialpsychologische Phänomen des Gruppendenkens ein. Kennzeichen und Gegenstrategien werden anhand von Zeugenaussagen vor dem Wirecard-Untersuchungsausschuss am Beispiel des Aufsichtsrats illustriert. Normative Implikationen de lege ferenda schließen sich an. Sie betreffen unabhängige Mitglieder (auch auf der Arbeitnehmerbank), Direktinformationsrechte im Unternehmen (unter Einschluss von Hinweisgebern) und den Investorendialog (auch mit Leerverkäufern).
This paper investigates retirees’ optimal purchases of fixed and variable longevity income annuities using their defined contribution (DC) plan assets and given their expected Social Security benefits. As an alternative, we also evaluate using plan assets to boost Social Security benefits through delayed claiming. We determine that including deferred income annuities in DC accounts is welfare enhancing for all sex/education groups examined. We also show that providing access to well-designed variable deferred annuities with some equity exposure further enhances retiree wellbeing, compared to having access only to fixed annuities. Nevertheless, for the least educated, delaying claiming Social Security is preferred, whereas the most educated benefit more from using accumulated DC plan assets to purchase deferred annuities.
The financial sector plays an important role in financing the green transformation. Various regulatory initiatives in the EU aim to improve transparency in relation to the sustainability of financial products and the sustainability of economic activities of non-financial and financial undertakings. For credit institutions, the Green Asset Ratio (GAR) has been established by the European regulatory authorities as a KPI for measuring the proportion of Taxonomy-aligned on-balance-sheet exposure in relation to the total assets. The breakdown of the total GAR by type of counterparty, environmental objective and type of asset provides in-depth information about the sustainability profile of a credit institution. This information, which has not been available to date, may also initiate discussions between management and shareholders or other stakeholders regarding the future sustainability strategy of credit institutions. This paper provides an overview of the regulatory background and the method of calculating the GAR along different dimensions. Finally, the potential benefits and limitations of the GAR are discussed.
There is much discussion today about a possible digital euro (PDE). Is this attention exaggerated? Are “central bank digital currencies” (CBDCs) “a solution in search of a problem”, as some have argued? This article summarizes the main facts about the PDE and concludes that, if the decision on adoption had to be taken today, the arguments against would outweigh those in favor. However, there may be future circumstances in which having a CBDC ready for use can indeed be useful. Therefore, preparing is a good thing, even if the odds of its usefulness in normal conditions are slim.
In order to reach climate neutrality by 2050, the European Union is taking action in the form of extensive sustainability regulations with the aim to push the private sector towards sustainable economic activities. In this context, a new instrument to finance a company’s sustainability transition has been developed: the sustainability-linked bond (SLB). This paper analyzes the SLB market’s efficiency in attracting those companies that are most crucial for a successful sustainability transition, namely carbon-intensive companies and companies that are lagging behind in their sustainability transition, defined as ESG laggards. By developing a conceptual framework for the SLB market and running a probit and logit regression estimation, this paper shows that the SLB market efficiently attracts carbon-intensive companies, but fails to attract ESG laggards. Moreover, the paper identifies four success factors for the SLB market to improve its future accessibility and credibility.
Digital platforms have become an important part of the digital economy by facilitating transactions between large numbers of users and by fostering innovation on collaborative platforms. In combination with technical platform services, some platform operators have managed to create powerful ecosystems that create network externalities and benefit from economies of scale and economies of scope. It is striking that, due to the specific economic drivers of the digital infrastructure, platform-based or platform-related services are dominated by a select number of global players. Most of the global platform operators are headquartered in the US, including Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta and Microsoft, also known as the “Big 5”. Some are located in Asia (e.g. Alibaba, Tencent). In Europe there are only a limited number of platform operators with a small market share.
Much research has been conducted on the emergence and characteristics of platforms, network externalities and platform competition. However, there has been very little research on whether or not one can idķentify common features that might explain the success of Big Tech. The following article focuses on an analysis of the Big 5 based on their strategies and development paths. The comparison reveals certain commonalities, from which several conclusions can be drawn regarding the success factors of the Big 5. These insights could be helpful for business decision-makers when shaping digital strategies. But also policy makers, especially in Europe, could benefit from these lessons learned to improve the European technology ecosystem.
A key technology driving the digital transformation of the economy is artificial intelligence (AI). It has gained a high degree of public attention with the initial release of the chatbot ChatGPT, which demonstrates the potential of generative AI (GAI) as a relatively new segment within AI. It is widely expected that GAI will shape the future of many industries and society in the coming years. This article provides a brief overview of the foundations of generative AI (“GAI”) including machine learning and what distinguishes it from other fields of AI. Furthermore, we look at important players in this emerging market, possible use cases and the expected economic potential as of today. It is apparent that, once again, a few US-based Big Tech firms are about to dominate this emerging technology and that the European tech sector is falling further behind. Finally, we conclude that the recently adopted Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Service Act (DSA) as well as the upcoming AI Act should be reviewed to ensure that the regulatory framework of European digital markets keeps up with the accelerated development of AI.
This Policy Letter presents two event studies based on the pre-war data that foreshadows the remarkable way in which Russian economy was able to withstand the pressure from unprecedented package of international sanctions. First, it shows that a sudden stop of one of the two domestic producers of zinc in 2018 did not lead to a slowdown in the steel industry, which heavily relied on this input. Second, it demonstrates that a huge increase in cost of fuel called mazut in 2020 had virtually no impact on firms that used it, even in the regions where it was hard to substitute it for alternative fuels. This Policy Letter argues that such stability in production can be explained by the fact that Russian economy is heavily oriented toward commodities. It is much easier to replace a commodity supplier than a supplier of manufacturing goods, and many commodity producers operate at high profit margins that allow them to continue to operate even after big increases in their costs. Thus, sanctions had a much smaller impact on Russia than they would have on an economy with larger manufacturing sector, where inputs are less substitutable and profit margins are smaller.
The SVB case is a wake-up call for Europe’s regulators as it demonstrates the destructive power of a bank-run: it undermines the role of loss absorbing capital, elbowing governments to bailout affected banks. Many types of bank management weaknesses, like excessive duration risk, may raise concerns of bank losses – but to serve as a run-trigger, there needs to be a large enough group of bank depositors that fails to be fully covered by a deposit insurance scheme. Latent run-risk is the root cause of inefficient liquidations, and we argue that a run on SVB assets could have been avoided altogether by a more thoughtful deposit insurance scheme, sharply distinguishing between loss absorbing capital (equity plus bail-in debt) and other liabilities which are deemed not to be bail-inable, namely demand deposits. These evidence-based insights have direct implications for Europe’s banking regulation, suggesting a minimum and a maximum for a banks’ loss absorption capacity.
Um eine grüne Transformation der Volkswirtschaft zu erreichen, werden Finanzmärkte und die mit ihnen verbundenen Banken eine wichtige Rolle einnehmen müssen. Aber allein vermögen Banken und Kapitalmärkte wenig, wenn sie nicht im Kontext einer klugen, politischen Rahmensetzung und einer transparenten Erfassung der verursachten Schäden auf Unternehmensebene gesehen werden. Diese drei Pfeiler stellen bildlich den tragenden Unterbau für eine Brücke hin zu einer klimaneutralen Wirt-schaftsverfassung dar. Ihr Zusammenwirken ist eine Voraussetzung dafür, dass die Finanzwirtschaft die benötigten Finanzmittel für die grüne Transformation bereitstellen kann.
Climate risk has become a major concern for financial institutions and financial markets. Yet, climate policy is still in its infancy and contributes to increased uncertainty. For example, the lack of a sufficiently high carbon price and the variety of definitions for green activities lower the value of existing and new capital, and complicate risk management. This column argues that it would be welfare-enhancing if policy changes were to follow a predictable longer-term path. Accordingly, the authors suggest a role for financial regulation in the transition.
Trotz der von der EZB eingeleiteten Zinswende in der zweiten Jahreshälfte 2022 als späte Reaktion auf die deutlich unterschätzte Persistenz hoher Inflationsraten im Euroraum sind die Realzinsen sowohl in der Ex-post-Betrachtung als auch in der Ex-ante-Betrachtung keineswegs als restriktiv einzuschätzen. Die Banken haben allerdings recht rasch strengere Vergaberichtlinien beschlossen, und die Nachfrage im Wohnungsbau und bei den Hypothekarkrediten ist stark eingebrochen.
Die Autoren thematisieren die Bedeutung von Zahlungsstromeffekten bei Annuitätenkrediten und analysiert hier vor allem den sogenannten Front-Loading-Effekt. Danach führen höhere Nominalzinsen selbst bei vollständig antizipierten Inflationsraten und unveränderten Realzinsen zu starken finanziellen Zusatzbelastungen in den ersten Phasen der typischerweise langen Kreditlaufzeit. Derartige Liquiditätseffekte können die Zahlungsfähigkeit bzw. die Zahlungsbereitschaft der privaten Investoren empfindlich verringern. Dies gilt vor allem bei Darlehen in Form der Prozentannuität, da hier zusätzlich ein Laufzeitenverkürzungseffekt auftritt. Solche Darlehen sind in Deutschland recht populär.
Mit Blick auf die Zukunft sehen die Autoren auch eine reale Gefahr für den Bestand an Wohnungsbaukrediten, wenn es zu einer Refinanzierung des großen Bestands an billigen Wohnungsbaukrediten kommt, ein Risiko, das auch Auswirkungen auf die makroökonomische und finanzielle Stabilität hat.
This paper studies the impact of banks’ dividend restrictions on the behavior of their institutional investors. Using an identification strategy that relies on the within investor variation and a difference in difference setup, I find that funds permanently decrease their ownership shares at treated banks during the 2020 dividend restrictions in the Eurozone and even exit treated banks’ stocks. Using data before the intro- duction of the ban reveals a positive relationship between fund ownership and banks’ dividend yield, highlighting again the importance of dividends for European banks’ fund investors. This reaction also has pricing implications since there is a negative relationship between the dividend restriction announcement day cumulative abnormal returns and the percentage of fund owners per bank.