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Data show that sovereign risk reduces liquidity, increases funding cost and risk of banks highly exposed to it. I build a model that rationalizes this fact. Banks act as delegated monitors and invest in risky projects and in risky sovereign bonds. As investors hear rumors of increased sovereign risk, they run the bank (via global games). Banks could rollover liquidity in repo market using government bonds as collateral, but as sovereign risk raises collateral values shrink. Overall banks’ liquidity falls (its cost increases) and so does banks’ credit. In this context noisy news (announcements with signal extraction) of consolidation policies are recessionary in the short run, as they contribute to investors and banks pessimism, and mildly expansionary in the medium run. The banks liquidity channel plays a major role in the fiscal transmission.
This paper uses recent legislation in Austria to establish a link between sovereign reputation and yield spreads. In 2009, Hypo Alpe Adria International, a bank previously co-owned by the regional government of Carinthia, had been nationalized by Austria’s central government in order to avoid a default triggering multi-billion Euro local government guarantees. In 2015, special legislation retroactively introduced collective action clauses allowing a haircut on both the bonds and the guarantees while avoiding formal default. We document that legislative and administrative action designed to partly abrogate the guarantees resulted in a loss of reputation, leading to higher yield spreads for sovereign debt. Our analysis of covered bonds uncovers an increase in yield spreads on the secondary market and a deterioration of primary market conditions.
Studies employing micro price data to examine the extent of international goods market integration tend to find that borders induce arbitrage-impeding transaction costs which contribute to segment national markets. Analyzing household scanner price data from the three euro area countries Belgium, Germany and Netherlands, we document that Belgian households living in the vicinity of the border to Netherlands pay almost 10% more for the same good as their Dutch counterparts. German consumers on the other hand face prices that are on average up to around 3% smaller than those in the neighboring Netherlands. Counterfactual evidence for within-country price discontinuities provides no evidence of any existing border effects. The induced costs of crossing national borders amount to at least 13%. We also find evidence on border discontinuities in various household preference characteristics (such as demand elasticities and goods valuation) and household shopping patterns such as shopping frequencies.
Studies employing micro price data suggest that price dispersion is larger between regions in different countries than between regions in the same country. To investigate the strength of this border effect, deviations from the law of one price are used in most studies to provide statistical evidence on the effect of borders on price dispersion. I propose an alternative measure of the economic costs of borders which has an explicit welfare-theoretic foundation. Employing a unique micro price data set from households in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands I provide evidence on the economic importance of price differences for households. I find that price dispersion within countries has only small economic importance, but that price dispersion between Belgium and Germany (and Belgium and the Netherlands) has considerable economic importance.
Microeconometric evidence on demand-side real rigidity and
implications for monetary non-neutrality
(2016)
To model the observed slow response of aggregate real variables to nominal shocks, most macroeconomic models incorporate real rigidities in addition to nominal rigidities. One popular way of modelling such a real rigidity is to assume a non-constant demand elasticity. By using a homescan data set for three European countries, including prices and quantities bought for a large number of goods, in addition to consumer characteristics, we provide estimates of price elasticities of demand and on the degree of demand-side real rigidities. We find that price elasticites of demand are about 4 in the median. Furthermore, we find evidence for demand-side real rigidities. These are, however, much smaller than what is often assumed in macroeconomic models. The median estimate for demand-side real rigidity, the super-elasticity, is in a range between 1 and 2. To quantitatively assess the implications of our empirical estimates, we calibrate a menu-cost model with the estimated super-elasticity. We find that the degree of monetary non-neutrality doubles in the model including demand-side real rigidity, compared to the model with only nominal rigidity, suggesting a multiplier effect of around two. However, the model can explain only up to 6% of the monetary non-neutrality observed in the data, implying that additional multipliers are necessary to match the behavior of aggregate variables.
Mis-selling by banks has occurred repeatedly in many nations over the last decade. While clients may benefit from competition – enabling them to choose financial services at lowest costs – economic frictions between banks and clients may give rise to mis-selling. Examples of mis-selling are mis-representation of information, overly complex product design and non-customized advice. European regulators address the problem of mis-selling in the "Markets in Financial Instruments Directive" (MiFID) I and II and the "Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation" (MiFIR), by setting behavioral requirements for banks, regulating the compensation of employees, and imposing re-quirements on offered financial products and disclosure rules.
This paper argues that MiFID II protects clients but is not as effective as it could be. (1) It does not differentiate between client groups with different levels of financial literacy. Effective advice requires different advice for different client groups. (2) MiFID II uses too many rules and too many instruments to achieve identical goals and thereby generates excessive compliance costs. High compliance costs and low revenues would drive banks out of some segments of retail business.
Das Ergebnis des Volksentscheids im Vereinigten Königreich ist ein Weckruf. Alle Entscheidungsträger der Europäischen Union und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten sind aufgerufen, grundlegende Reformen der Verfassung einer Europäischen Union, möglicherweise nur noch einer europäischen „Kontinentalunion“ unverzüglich in Angriff zu nehmen. Unverzüglich bedeutet, einen Reformprozess nicht erst dann zu beginnen, wenn die Verhandlungen über ein Austrittsabkommen beendet worden sind. Eine Rückentwicklung der Europäischen Union zu einer bloßen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft dürfte dabei keine Lösung sein. Es ist jetzt angezeigt, offen und – notfalls kontrovers – zu diskutieren, wie ein künftiger Bundesstaat auf europäischer Ebene aussehen könnte.
From 1963 through 2015, idiosyncratic risk (IR) is high when market risk (MR) is high. We show that the positive relation between IR and MR is highly stable through time and is robust across exchanges, firm size, liquidity, and market-to-book groupings. Though stock liquidity affects the strength of the relation, the relation is strong for the most liquid stocks. The relation has roots in fundamentals as higher market risk predicts greater idiosyncratic earnings volatility and as firm characteristics related to the ability of firms to adjust to higher uncertainty help explain the strength of the relation. Consistent with the view that growth options provide a hedge against macroeconomic uncertainty, we find evidence that the relation is weaker for firms with more growth options.