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The global financial crisis has lead to a renewed interest in discretionary fiscal stimulus. Advocates of discretionary measures emphasize that government spending can stimulate additional private spending — the so-called Keynesian multiplier effect. Thus, we investigate whether the discretionary spending announced by Euro area governments for 2009 and 2010 is likely to boost euro area GDP by more than one for one. Because of modeling uncertainty, it is essential that such policy evaluations be robust to alternative modeling assumptions and different parameterizations. Therefore, we use five different empirical macroeconomic models with Keynesian features such as price and wage rigidities to evaluate the impact of fiscal stimulus. Four of them suggest that the planned increase in government spending will reduce private spending for consumption and investment purposes significantly. If announced government expenditures are implemented with delay the initial effect on euro area GDP, when stimulus is most needed, may even be negative. Traditional Keynesian multiplier effects only arise in a model that ignores the forward-looking behavioral response of consumers and firms. Using a multi-country model, we find that spillovers between euro area countries are negligible or even negative, because direct demand effects are offset by the indirect effect of euro appreciation.
The recent financial crisis has led to a major debate about fair-value accounting. Many critics have argued that fair-value accounting, often also called mark-to-market accounting, has significantly contributed to the financial crisis or, at least, exacerbated its severity. In this paper, we assess these arguments and examine the role of fair-value accounting in the financial crisis using descriptive data and empirical evidence. Based on our analysis, it is unlikely that fair-value accounting added to the severity of the current financial crisis in a major way. While there may have been downward spirals or asset-fire sales in certain markets, we find little evidence that these effects are the result of fair-value accounting. We also find little support for claims that fair-value accounting leads to excessive write-downs of banks’ assets. If anything, empirical evidence to date points in the opposite direction, that is, towards overvaluation of bank assets.
In this paper we investigate the comparative properties of empirically-estimated monetary models of the U.S. economy. We make use of a new data base of models designed for such investigations. We focus on three representative models: the Christiano, Eichenbaum, Evans (2005) model, the Smets and Wouters (2007) model, and the Taylor (1993a) model. Although the three models differ in terms of structure, estimation method, sample period, and data vintage, we find surprisingly similar economic impacts of unanticipated changes in the federal funds rate. However, the optimal monetary policy responses to other sources of economic fluctuations are widely different in the different models. We show that simple optimal policy rules that respond to the growth rate of output and smooth the interest rate are not robust. In contrast, policy rules with no interest rate smoothing and no response to the growth rate, as distinct from the level, of output are more robust. Robustness can be improved further by optimizing rules with respect to the average loss across the three models.
The goal of this research is to develop an understanding of what causes organizations and information systems to be “good” with regard to communication and coordination. This study (1) gives a theoretical explanation of how the processes of organizational adaptation work and (2) what is required for establishing and measuring the goodness of an organization with regard to communication and coordination. By leveraging concepts from cybernetics and philosophy of language, particularly the theoretical conceptualization of information systems as social systems and language communities, this research arrives at new insights. After discussing related work from systems theory, organization theory, cybernetics, and philosophy of language, a theoretical conceptualization of information systems as language communities is adopted. This provides the foundation for two exploratory field studies. Then a formal theory for explaining the adaptation of organizations via language and communication is presented. This includes measures for the goodness of organizations with regard to communication and coordination. Finally, propositions stemming from the theoretical model are tested using multiple case studies in six information system development projects in the financial services industry.
CHAPTER A: THE INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUND MANAGERS I The Bright and Dark Side of Staging: Investment Performance and the Varying Motivations of Private Equity Firms II The Liquidation Dilemma of Money Losing Investments – The Impact of Investment Experience and Window Dressing of Private Equity and Venture Capital Funds CHAPTER B: THE ASSESSMENT OF RISK AND RETURN OF PRIVATE EQUITY I Venture Capital Performance Projection: A Simulation Approach II Modeling Default Risk of Private Equity Funds – A Market-based Framework
Inhaltsverzeichnis Liste der wissenschaftlichen Beiträge .................................................................................. III Inhaltsverzeichnis ..............................................................................................................IV Abbildungsverzeichnis I List of Figures ................................................................................ VII Tabellenverzeichnis I List of Tables ..................................................................................... VIII Abkürzungsverzeichnis .......................................................................................................... IX 1 Einleitung 1.1 Problemstellung .............................................................................................................. 1 1.2 Einordnung und Ergebnisse der wissenschaftlichen Beiträge ....................................... 3 Literaturverzeichnis ................................................................................................................ 9 2 Langes Leben und Wohlstand im Alter: Ein Überblick über die finanzwirtschaftlichen Alternativen zur Ausgestaltung des Ruhestandes ... 10 2.1 Einführung .................................................................................................................... 10 2.2 Produktalternativen fiir die Ausgestaltung der Entnahmephase .................................. 12 2.2.1 Leibrenten .......................................................................................................... 12 2.2.1.1 Charakteristika von Leibrenten und deren historische Entwicklung .... 12 2.2.1.2 Leibrentenmarkt und -produkte in Deutschland ................................... 15 2.2.1.3 Determinanten von Leibrentenprämien ................................................ 22 2.2.2 Entnahmepläne ................................................................................................... 28 2.2.2.1 Charakteristika von Entnahmeplänen ................................................... 28 2.2.2.2 Entnahmepläne als Instrument der Ruhestandsplanung ....................... 31 2.2.2.3 Leibrenten vs. Entnahmepläne .............................................................. 33 2.3 Forschungsergebnisse zur Ausgestaltung der Entnahmephase .................................... 36 2.3.1 Einleitende Bemerkungen .................................................................................. 36 2.3.2 Positive Literatur ................................................................................................ 37 2.3.2.1 Theoretische Arbeiten zur Bedeutung von Leibrenten ......................... 37 2.3.2.2 Vererbungsmotive als Erklärungsansatz fiir geringe Nachfrage nach Leibrenten ... 39 2.3.2.3 Kosten als Erklärungsansatz fiir geringe Nachfrage nach Leibrenten .. 42 2.3.2.4 Weitere Erklärungsansätze rur geringe Nachfrage nach Leibrenten .... 44 2.3.3 Normative Literatur ............................................................................................ 47 2.3.3.1 Untersuchungen zu reinen Entnahmeplänen ......................................... 47 2.3.3.2 Untersuchung von Entnahmeplänen unter Berücksichtigung von Leibrenten ..... 50 2.3.4 Sonstige Arbeiten ............................................................................................... 56 2.4 Schlussbetrachtung ....................................................................................................... 57 Anhang A: Berechnung von Leibrentenprämien ................................................................. 59 Anhang B: Abbildung der Biometrie ................................................................................... 62 Literaturverzeichnis .............................................................................................................. 67 3 Betting on Death and Capital Markets in Retirement: A Shortfall Risk Analysis of Life Annuities versus Phased Withdrawal Plans... 76 3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 76 3.2 The Case of Phased Withdrawal .................................................................................. 79 3.2.1 Withdrawal Plans with Fixed Benefits ............................................................... 80 3.2.2 Phased Withdrawal Rules with Variable Benefits ............ : ................................ 80 3.3 Risk and Reward Analysis of Phased Withdrawal Plans Conditional on Survival... ... 82 3.3.1 Research Design ................................................................................................. 82 3.3.2 Analysis of Expected Benefits ........................................................................... 84 3.3.3 Shortfall Risk Analysis ...................................................................................... 86 3.3.4 Analysis of Expected Bequests .......................................................................... 89 3.4 Risk-Minimizing Phased Withdrawal Strategies ......................................................... 90 3.4.1 Optimized Withdrawal Rules in a Risk-Return Context... ................................. 90 3.4.2 Comparative Results: Annuity versus Phased Withdrawal Plans ...................... 92 3.4.3 Phased Withdrawal Plans with Mandatory Deferred Annuities ........................ 97 3.4.4 Comparative Results ........................................................................................ 100 3.5 Summary and concluding remarks ............................................................................. 101 Appendix A: Determining Annuity Benefits ..................................................................... 104 Appendix B: Determining Expected Benefits, Expected Bequest and the Risk of a Consumption Shortfall for Phased Withdrawal Plans with given Benefit-to-Wealth Ratios .......................................................................................................................... 105 References .......................................................................................................................... 107 4 Leistungsgarantien in der Auszahlphase von investmentbasierten Altersvorsorgeverträgen: Entwicklung eines konditionalen Eigenkapitalsystems und Analyse seiner ökonomischen Implikationen ... 111 4.1 Einführung .................................................................................................................. 111 4.2 Altersvorsorgeverträge in der Auszahlphase ............................................................. 114 4.2.1 Gesetzliche Regelungen ................................................................................... 114 4.2.2 Entnahmepläne vs. Leibrenten ......................................................................... 115 4.3 Konditionales Eigenkapitalsystem fiir Altersvorsorgeverträge ................................. 117 4.3.1 Einleitende Vorbemerkungen ........................................................................... 117 4.3.2 Konzeptionelle Grundlagen eines konditionalen EK-Systems ........................ 119 4.3.3 Deduktion eines Eigenkapitalsystems fiir die Entnahmephase ........................ 121 4.4 Eigenkapitalanforderungen in der Entnahmephase .................................................... 126 4.4.1 Vorbemerkungen zur empirischen Untersuchung ............................................ 126 4.4.2 Ex post Analyse von Altersvorsorge-Entnahmeplänen ................................... 128 4.4.3 Untersuchung der Eigenkapitalanforderungen im ex ante Kontext ................. 132 4.4.3.1 Untersuchungsansatz und Modellannahmen ....................................... 132 4.4.3.2 Analysen auf Einzelvertragsbasis ....................................................... 135 4.4.3.3 Analysen im Rahmen eines Geschäfts- und Absatzmodells ............... 140 4.4.3.4 Robustheitsanalysen ............................................................................ 145 4.5 Schlussbetrachtung ..................................................................................................... 147 Literaturverzeichnis ............................................................................................................ 149 Lebenslauf ............................................................................................................................. 151 Ehrenwörtliche Erklärung: ................................................................................................. 154
This dissertation analyzes tax policy, corporations, and capital market effects. First, the Savings Directive, which has left a loophole by providing grandfathering for some securities, is examined. It can be shown that investors are not willing to pay a premium for bonds that are exempt from the withholding rate, so it may be concluded that the supply of existing loopholes is large enough to allow tax evaders to continue evasion at no additional cost. Second, tax neutrality towards alternative financing instruments for corporate investment is a ubiquitous demand in the political debate. However, the magnitude of possible efficiency costs of a departure from tax neutrality is hardly discussed. Against this background, this dissertation discusses the theory of capital structure and provides back-ofthe-envelope calculations of the possible efficiency cost of a tax distortion of the debt-equity decision. Third, the ex-dividend-day effect in relation to the Gennan tax reform of 2000/2001 is discussed. The abolishment of the imputation system allows reinvestigating the size of the exdividend- day effect. I find no structural break in the size of the German ex-dividend-day effect and no evidence of an ex-dividend-day price drop that exceeds the dividend paid. Fourth, an account of the quantitative development of tax legislation in post-war Germany is presented. It can be shown that the legislative output did not increase over the decades and is not affected by a split majority in the upper and lower houses. Finally, it turns out that an increasing fraction of this legislation is passed in December.
This thesis is concerned with the derivation of new methods for the analysis of nonstationary, cross correlated panels. The suggested procedures are carefully quantified by means of Monte Carlo experiments. Typical applications of the developed methods consist in multi-country studies, with several countries observed over a couple of decades. The empirical applications implemented here are the testing for trends in the investment share in European GDPs and the examination of OECD interest rates. In the first chapter, a panel test for the presence of a linear time trend is proposed. The test is applicable in cross-correlated, heterogeneous panels and it can also be used when the integration order of innovations is unknown, by means of subsampling. In the next chapter a cointegration test having asymptotic standard normal distributiun and not requiring exogeneity assumptions is derived. In panels exhibiting cross-correlation or cointegration, individual test statistics are asymptotically independent, which leads to a panel test statistic robust to dependence across units. The third chapter examines in an econometric context the simple idea of combining p-values from a series of statistical tests and improves its applicability in the presence of cross-correlation. The last chapter applies recent panel techniques to OECD long-term interest rates and differentials thereof, finding only rather week evidence in favor of stationarity when allowing for cross-correlation.
The paper explores factors that influence the design of financing contracts between venture capital investors and European venture capital funds. 122 Private Placement Memoranda and 46 Partnership Agreements are investigated in respect to the use of covenant restrictions and compensation schemes. The analysis focuses on the impact of two key factors: the reputation of VC-funds and changes in the overall demand for venture capital services. We find that established funds are more severely restricted by contractual covenants. This contradicts the conventional wisdom which assumes that established market participants care more about their reputation, have less incentive to behave opportunistically and therefore need less covenant restrictions. We also find that managers of established funds are more often obliged to invest own capital alongside with investors money. We interpret this as evidence that established funds have actually less reason to care about their reputation as compared to young funds. One reason for this surprising result could be that managers of established VC funds are older and closer to retirement and therefore put less weight on the effects of their actions on future business opportunities. We also explore the effects of venture capital supply on contract design. Gompers and Lerner (1996) show that VC-funds in the US are able to reduce the number of restrictive covenants in years with high supply of venture capital and interpret this as a result of increased bargaining power by VC-funds. We do not find similar evidence for Europe. Instead, we find that VC-funds receive less base compensation and higher performance related compensation in years with strong capital inflows into the VC industry. This may be interpreted as a signal of overconfidence: Strong investor demand seems to coincide with overoptimistic expectations by fund managers which make them willing to accept higher powered incentive schemes. JEL: G32 Keywords: Venture Capital, Contracting, Limited Partnership, Funds, Principal Agent, Compensation, Covenants, Reputation, Bargaining Power