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Low interest rates are becoming a threat to the stability of the life insurance industry, especially in countries such as Germany, where products with relatively high guaranteed returns sold in the past still represent a prominent share of the total portfolio. This contribution aims to assess and quantify the effects of the current low interest rate phase on the balance sheet of a representative German life insurer, given the current asset allocation and the outstanding liabilities. To do so, we generate a stochastic term structure of interest rates as well as stock market returns to simulate investment returns of a stylized life insurance business portfolio in a multi-period setting. Based on empirically calibrated parameters, we can observe the evolution of the life insurers' balance sheet over time with a special focus on their solvency situation. To account for different scenarios and in order to check the robustness of our findings, we calibrate different capital market settings and different initial situations of capital endowment. Our results suggest that a prolonged period of low interest rates would markedly affect the solvency situation of life insurers, leading to relatively high cumulative probability of default for less capitalized companies.
This paper analyzes how on-the-job search (OJS) by an agent impacts the moral hazard problem in a repeated principal-agent relationship. OJS is found to constitute a source of agency costs because efficient search incentives require that the agent receives all gains from trade. Further, the optimal incentive contract with OJS matches the design of empirically observed compensation contracts more accurately than models that ignore OJS. In particular, the optimal contract entails excessive performance pay plus efficiency wages. Efficiency wages reduce the opportunity costs of work effort and hence serve as a complement to bonuses. Thus, the model offers a novel explanation for the use of efficiency wages. When allowing for renegotiation, the model generates wage and turnover dynamics that are consistent with empirical evidence. I argue that the model contributes to explaining the concomitant rise in the use of performance pay and in competition for high-skill workers during the last three decades.
We study consumption-portfolio and asset pricing frameworks with recursive preferences and unspanned risk. We show that in both cases, portfolio choice and asset pricing, the value function of the investor/ representative agent can be characterized by a specific semilinear partial differential equation. To date, the solution to this equation has mostly been approximated by Campbell-Shiller techniques, without addressing general issues of existence and uniqueness. We develop a novel approach that rigorously constructs the solution by a fixed point argument. We prove that under regularity conditions a solution exists and establish a fast and accurate numerical method to solve consumption-portfolio and asset pricing problems with recursive preferences and unspanned risk. Our setting is not restricted to affine asset price dynamics. Numerical examples illustrate our approach.
We build on previous work on operational performance evaluation of private equity portfolio companies as we are able to at least partially decrypt the black box consisting of restructuring tools these investors use and the corresponding impact on their portfolio companies. Beyond answering whether private equity improves operating efficiency we figure out which of the typical restructuring tools drive operating efficiency. Using a set of over 300 international leveraged buyout transactions in the last thirty years we find that while there is vast improvement in operational efficiency these gains vary considerably. Our top performing transactions are subject to strong equity incentives, frequent asset restructuring and tight control by the investor. Furthermore, investors experience has a positive and financial leverage a negative influence on operational performance.
Homestead exemptions to personal bankruptcy allow households to retain their home equity up to a limit determined at the state level. Households that may experience bankruptcy thus have an incentive to bias their portfolios towards home equity. Using US household data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation for the period 1996-2006, we find that especially households with low net worth maintain a larger share of their wealth as home equity if a larger homestead exemption applies. This home equity bias is also more pronounced if the household head is in poor health, increasing the chance of bankruptcy on account of unpaid medical bills. The bias is further stronger for households with mortgage finance, shorter house tenures, and younger household heads, which taken together reflect households that face more financial uncertainty.
Using fiscal reaction functions for 3a panel of actual euro-area countries the paper investigates whether euro membership has reduced the responsiveness of countries to increases in the level of inherited debt compared to the period prior to succession to the euro. While we find some evidence for such a loss in prudence, the results are not robust to changes in the specification, as for example an exclusion of Greece from the panel. This suggests that the current debt problems may result to a large extent from pre-existing debt levels prior to entry or from a larger need for fiscal prudence in a common currency, while an adverse change in the fiscal reaction functions for most countries does not apply.
Trust in policy makers fluctuates signi
cantly over the cycle and affects the transmission mechanism. Despite this it is absent from the literature. We build a monetary model embedding trust cycles; the latter emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon of a game-theoretic interaction between atomistic agents and the monetary authority. Trust affects agents' stochastic discount factors, namely the price of future risk, and through this it interacts with the monetary transmission mechanism. Using data from the Eurobarometer surveys, we analyze the link between trust and the transmission mechanism of macro and monetary shocks: Empirical results are in line with theoretical ones.
We develop a dynamic network model with heterogenous banks which undertake optimizing portfolio decisions subject to liquidity and capital constraints and trade in the interbank market whose equilibrium is governed by a tatonnement process. Due to the micro-funded structure of the decisional process as well as the iterative dynamic adjustment taking place in the market, the links in the network structures are endogenous and evolve dynamically. We use the model to assess the diffusion of systemic risk, the contribution of each bank to it as well as the evolution of the network in response to financial shocks and across different prudential policy regimes.
We develop a dynamic network model with heterogenous banks which undertake optimizing portfolio decisions subject to liquidity and capital constraints and trade in the interbank market whose equilibrium is governed by a tatonnement process. Due to the micro-funded structure of the decisional process as well as the iterative dynamic adjustment taking place in the market, the links in the network structures are endogenous and evolve dynamically. We use the model to assess the diffusion of systemic risk (measured as default probability), the contribution of each bank to it as well as the evolution of the network in response to financial shocks and across different prudential policy regimes.
This paper analyzes the equilibrium pricing implications of contagion risk in a two-tree Lucas economy with CRRA preferences. The dividends of both trees are subject to downward jumps. Some of these jumps are contagious and increase the risk of subsequent jumps in both trees for some time interval. We show that contagion risk leads to large price-dividend ratios for small assets, a joint movement of prices in the case of a regime change from the calm to the contagion state, significantly positive correlations between assets, and large positive betas for small assets. Whereas disparities between the assets with respect to their propensity to trigger contagion barely matter for pricing, the prices of robust assets that are hardly affected by contagion and excitable assets that are severely hit by contagion differ significantly. Both in absolute terms and relatively to the market, the price of a small safe haven increases if the economy reaches the contagion state. On the contrary, the price of a small, contagion-sensitive asset exhibits a pronounced downward jump.
This paper presents a theory that explains why it is beneficial for banks to engage in circular lending activities on the interbank market. Using a simple network structure, it shows that if there is a non-zero bailout probability, banks can significantly increase the expected repayment of uninsured creditors by entering into cyclical liabilities on the interbank market before investing in loan portfolios. Therefore, banks are better able to attract funds from uninsured creditors. Our results show that implicit government guarantees incentivize banks to have large interbank exposures, to be highly interconnected, and to invest in highly correlated, risky portfolios. This can serve as an explanation for the observed high interconnectedness between banks and their investment behavior in the run-up to the subprime mortgage crisis.
We analyse the coordination problem in multi-creditor relationships empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that contains detailed credit-file information on distressed lending relationships in Germany, including information on creditor pools, a legal institution aiming at coordinating lender interests in borrower distress. We report three major findings. First, the existence of creditor pools increases the probability of workout success. Second, the results are consistent with coordination costs being positively related to pool size. Third, major determinants of pool formation are found to be the number of banks, the distribution of lending shares, and the severity of the distress shock.
We document and study international differences in both ownership and holdings of stocks, private businesses, homes, and mortgages among households aged fifty or more in thirteen countries, using new and comparable survey data. We employ counterfactual techniques to decompose observed differences across the Atlantic, within the US, and within Europe into those arising from differences in population characteristics and differences in economic environments. We then correlate the latter differences to country-level indicators. Ownership across the range of the assets considered tends to be more widespread among US households. We document that shortly prior to the current crisis, US households tended to invest larger amounts in stocks and smaller ones in homes, and to have larger mortgages in older age, even controlling for characteristics. This is consistent with the high prevalence of negative equity associated with the current crisis. More generally, we find that differences in household characteristics often play a small role, while differences in economic environments tend to explain most of the observed differences in ownership rates and in amounts held. The latter differences are much more pronounced among European countries than among US regions, suggesting further potential for harmonization of policies and institutions.
Regulation of investor access to financial products is often based on product familiarity indicated by previous use. The underlying premise that lack of familiarity with a product class causes unwarranted participation is difficult to test. This paper uses household-level data from the ‘experiment’ of German reunification that (exogenously) offered to East Germans access to capitalist products (exogenously) unfamiliar to them. We compare the evolution of post-unification participation of former East and West Germans in financial products, controlling for relevant household characteristics. We vary familiarity differentials by considering (i) both unfamiliar ‘capitalist’ products (stocks, bonds, and consumer credit) and ones available in the East (savings accounts and life insurance); and (ii) cohorts with different exposure to capitalism. We find that East Germans participated immediately in unfamiliar risky securities, at rates comparable to West Germans of similar characteristics. They phased out disproportionate participation in previously familiar assets as familiarity with capitalist products grew. They were more likely to use consumer debt, partly to catch up with richer new peers. We find no signs of abrupt participation drops that could suggest mistakes or regret related to lack of familiarity.
In this paper we investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance versus a fixed wage unrelated to performance. We study detailed transaction information for more than 45,000 loans issued by 240 loan officers of a large commercial bank in Europe. We examine the three main activities that loan officers perform: monitoring, originating, and screening. We find that when the performance of their portfolio deteriorates, loan officers increase their effort to monitor existing borrowers, reduce loan origination, and approve a higher fraction of loan applications. These loans, however, are of above-average quality. Consistent with the theoretical literature on multitasking in incomplete contracts, we show that loan officers neglect activities that are not directly rewarded under the contract, but are in the interest of the bank. In addition, while the response by loan officers constitutes a rational response to a time allocation problem, their reaction to incentives appears myopic in other dimensions.
The paper analyzes the mutual influence of the capital structure and the investment decision of a bank, as well as the incentive effects of the bank executives compensation schemes on these decisions. In case the government implicitly or explicitly insures deposits and/or the banks debt, banks are incentivized to invest in risky assets and to have a high leverage. Capital regulation could potentially solve this excessive risk taking problem. However, this is only possible if the regulator can observe and properly measure the investment risks of the bank, which was called into question during the 2008-09 financial crisis. Hence, we propose a regulatory approach that is also able to implement the first best risk taking levels by the bank, but does not require the regulator to know the investment risk of the bank. The regulatory approach involves the implementation of capital requirements, which are made contingent on the management compensation.
We assess, through VAR evidence, the effects of monetary policy on banks’ risk exposure and find the presence of a risk-taking channel. A model combining fragile banks prone to risk mis-incentives and credit constrained firms, whose collateral fluctuations generate a balance sheet channel, is used to rationalize the evidence. A monetary expansion increases bank leverage. With two consequences: on the one side this exacerbates risk exposure; on the other, the risk spiral depresses output, therefore dampening the conventional amplification effect of the financial accelerator.
Euro area data show a positive connection between sovereign and bank risk, which increases with banks’ and sovereign long run fragility. We build a macro model with banks subject to moral hazard and liquidity risk (sudden deposit withdrawals): banks invest in risky government bonds as a form of capital buffer against liquidity risk. The model can replicate the positive connection between sovereign and bank risk observed in the data. Central bank liquidity policy, through full allotment policy, is successful in stabilizing the spiraling feedback loops between bank and sovereign risk.
Option-implied information and predictability of extreme returns : [Version 24 September 2012]
(2012)
We study whether option-implied conditional expectation of market loss due to tail events, or tail loss measure, contains information about future returns, especially the negative ones. Our tail loss measure predicts future market returns, magnitude, and probability of the market crashes, beyond and above other option-implied variables. Stock-specific tail loss measure predicts individual expected returns and magnitude of realized stock-specific crashes in the cross-section of stocks. An investor, especially the one who cares about the left tail of her wealth distribution (e.g., disappointment-averse), benefits from using the tail loss measure as an information variable to construct managed portfolios of a risk-free asset and market index. The tail loss measure is motivated by the results of the extreme value theory, and it is computed from observed prices of out-of-the-money put as the risk-neutral expected value of a loss beyond a given relative threshold.
We study the dispersion of debt maturities across time, which we call "granularity of corporate debt,'' using a model in which a firm's inability to roll over expiring debt causes inefficiencies, such as costly asset sales or underinvestment. Since multiple small asset sales are less costly than a single large one, firms diversify debt rollovers across maturity dates. We construct granularity measures using data on corporate bond issuers for the 1991-2012 period and establish a number of novel findings. First, there is substantial variation in granularity in that we observe both very concentrated and highly dispersed maturity structures. Second, observed variation in granularity supports the model's predictions, i.e. maturities are more dispersed for larger and more mature firms, for firms with better investment oppo
This paper explains why the collection of panel (reinterview) data on a comprehensive measure of household expenditures is of great value both for measuring budget shares (the core mission of a Consumer Expenditure survey) and for the most important research and public policy uses to which CE data can be applied, including construction of spending-based measures of poverty and inequality and estimating the effects of fiscal policy.
The Great Recession confirmed a bedrock principle of modern consumption theory: It is impossible to explain aggregate spending behavior without knowledge of the underlying microeconomic distribution of circumstances and choices across households. National accounting frameworks therefore need to be augmented by “bottom up” measures that both (a) capture the microeconomic heterogeneity (in expenditures, income, assets, debt, and beliefs) in the population and (b) sum up to statistics that have a recognizable relationship to the aggregate totals that are already reasonably well measured.
Multiple lenders and corporate distress: evidence on debt restructuring : [Version Juli 2002]
(2002)
In the recent theoretical literature on lending risk, the common pool problem in multi-bank relationships has been analyzed extensively. In this paper we address this topic empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that includes detailed credit-fie information on distressed lending relationships in Germany. In particular, it includes information on bank pools, a legal institution aimed at coordinating lender interests in borrower distress. We find that the existence of small bank pools increases the probability of workout success and that coordination costs are positively related to pool size. We identify major determinants of pool formation, in particular the distribution of lending shares among banks, the number of banks, and the severity of the distress shock to the borrower.
Wir halten das bisher in Deutschland und anderen Ländern praktizierte Krisenmanagement für ordnungspolitisch inakzeptabel. Die aktuelle Notlage 2007 und 2008, verbunden mit einem enormen Überraschungsmoment, ließ möglicherweise keine andere Wahl, als die betroffenen Banken unbürokratisch zu retten - aber nun ist es Zeit, grundlegende Lehren aus den Rettungsaktionen zu ziehen.
Dem Druck standhalten
(2013)
We develop a methodology to identify and rank “systemically important financial institutions” (SIFIs). Our approach is consistent with that followed by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) but, unlike the latter, it is free of judgment and it is based entirely on publicly available data, thus filling the gap between the official views of the regulator and those that market participants can form with their own information set. We apply the methodology to annual data on three samples of banks (global, EU and euro area) for the years 2007-2012. We examine the evolution of the SIFIs over time and document the shifs in the relative weights of the major geographic areas. We also discuss the implication of the 2013 update of the identification methodology proposed by the FSB.
We examine the effects of credit default swaps (CDS), a major type of over-the-counter derivative, on the corporate liquidity management of the reference firms. CDS help firms to access the credit market since the lenders can hedge their credit risk more easily using these contracts. However, CDS-protected creditors can be tougher in debt renegotiations and less willing to support distressed borrowers, causing some firms to become more cautious. Consequently, we find that firms hold significantly more cash after the inception of CDS trading on their debt. The increase in cash holdings by CDS firms is more pronounced for financially constrained firms and firms facing higher refinancing risk. Moreover, bank relationships and outstanding credit facilities intensify the CDS effect on cash holding. Finally, firms with greater financial expertise hold more cash when their debt is referenced by CDS. These findings suggest that CDS, which are primarily a risk management tool for lenders, induce firms to adopt more conservative liquidity policies.
We use a unique data set from the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) to study liquidity effects in the US structured product market. Our main contribution is the analysis of the relation between the accuracy in measuring liquidity and the potential degree of disclosure. Having access to all relevant trading information, we provide evidence that transaction cost measures that use dealer specific information such as trader identity and trade direction can be efficiently proxied by measures that use less detailed information. This finding is important for all market participants in the context of OTC markets, as it fosters our understanding of the information contained in transaction data. Thus, our results provide guidance for improving transparency while maintaining trader confidentiality. In addition, we analyze liquidity in the structured product market in general and show that securities that are mainly institutionally traded, guaranteed by a federal authority, or have low credit risk, tend to be more liquid.
This paper investigates the accuracy of point and density forecasts of four DSGE models for inflation, output growth and the federal funds rate. Model parameters are estimated and forecasts are derived successively from historical U.S. data vintages synchronized with the Fed’s Greenbook projections. Point forecasts of some models are of similar accuracy as the forecasts of nonstructural large dataset methods. Despite their common underlying New Keynesian modeling philosophy, forecasts of different DSGE models turn out to be quite distinct. Weighted forecasts are more precise than forecasts from individual models. The accuracy of a simple average of DSGE model forecasts is comparable to Greenbook projections for medium term horizons. Comparing density forecasts of DSGE models with the actual distribution of observations shows that the models overestimate uncertainty around point forecasts.
This paper investigates the accuracy of forecasts from four DSGE models for inflation, output growth and the federal funds rate using a real-time dataset synchronized with the Fed’s Greenbook projections. Conditioning the model forecasts on the Greenbook nowcasts leads to forecasts that are as accurate as the Greenbook projections for output growth and the federal funds rate. Only for inflation the model forecasts are dominated by the Greenbook projections. A comparison with forecasts from Bayesian VARs shows that the economic structure of the DSGE models which is useful for the interpretation of forecasts does not lower the accuracy of forecasts. Combining forecasts of several DSGE models increases precision in comparison to individual model forecasts. Comparing density forecasts with the actual distribution of observations shows that DSGE models overestimate uncertainty around point forecasts.
In this study prepared for the ECON Committee of the European Parliament, Gellings, Jungbluth and Langenbucher present a graphic overview on core legislation in the area of economic and financial services in Europe. The mapping overview can serve as background for further deliberations. The study covers legislation in force, proposals and other relevant provisions in fourteen policy areas, i.e. banking, securities markets and investment firms, market infrastructure, insurance and occupational pensions, payment services, consumer protection in financial services, the European System of Financial Supervision, European Monetary Union, Euro bills and Coins and statistics, competition, taxation, commerce and company law, accounting and auditing.
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the relationship between austerity measures and economic growth. We propose a general equilibrium model where (i) agents have recursive preferences; (ii) economic growth is endogenously driven by investments in R&D; (iii) the government is committed to a zero-deficit policy and finances public expenditures by means of a combination of labor taxes and R&D taxes. We find that austerity measures that rely on reducing resources available to the R&D sector depress economic growth both in the short- and long-run. High debt EU members are currently implementing austerity measures based on higher taxes and/or lower investments in the R&D sector. This casts some doubts on the real ability of these countries to grow over the next years.
The implications of delegating fiscal decision making power to sub-national governments has become an area of significant interest over the past two decades, in the expectation that these reforms will lead to better and more efficient provision of public goods and services. The move towards decentralization has, however, not been homogeneously implemented on the revenue and expenditure side: decentralization has materialized more substantially on the latter than on the former, creating "vertical fiscal imbalances". These imbalances measure the extent to which sub-national governments’ expenditures are financed through their own revenues. This mismatch between own revenues and expenditures may have negative consequences for public finances performance, for example by softening the budget constraint of sub-national governments. Using a large sample of countries covering a long time period from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, this paper is the first to examine the effects of vertical fiscal imbalances on fiscal performance through the accumulation of government debt. Our findings suggest that vertical fiscal imbalances are indeed relevant in explaining government debt accumulation, and call for a degree of caution when promoting fiscal decentralization.
We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about how inside debt features affect the relation between credit spreads and compensation components. First, inside debt reduces credit spreads only if it is unsecured. Second, inside debt exerts important indirect effects on the role of equity incentives: When inside debt is large and unsecured, equity incentives increase credit spreads; When inside debt is small or secured, this effect is weakened or reversed. We test our model on a sample of U.S. public firms with traded CDS contracts, finding evidence supportive of our predictions. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we also show that our results are robust to using an instrumental variable approach.
We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about how inside debt features affect the relation between credit spreads and compensation components. First, inside debt reduces credit spreads only if it is unsecured. Second, inside debt exerts important indirect effects on the role of equity incentives: When inside debt is large and unsecured, equity incentives increase credit spreads; When inside debt is small or secured, this effect is weakened or reversed. We test our model on a sample of U.S. public firms with traded CDS contracts, finding evidence supportive of our predictions. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we also show that our results are robust to using an instrumental variable approach.
The Eurozone fiscal crisis has created pressure for institutional harmonization, but skeptics argue that cultural predispositions can prevent convergence in behavior. Our paper derives a robust cultural classification of European countries and utilizes unique data on natives and immigrants to Sweden. Classification based on genetic distance or on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions fails to identify a single ‘southern’ culture but points to a ‘northern’ culture. Significant differences in financial behavior are found across cultural groups, controlling for household characteristics. Financial behavior tends to converge with longer exposure to common institutions, but is slowed down by longer exposure to original institutions.
This is a chapter for a forthcoming volume Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (Oxford University Press 2014) (eds. Eilís Ferran, Niamh Moloney, and Jennifer Payne). It provides an overview of EU financial regulation from the first banking directive up until its most recent developments in the aftermath of the financial crisis, focusing on the multiple layers of multi-level governance and their characteristic conceptual difficulties. Therefore the paper discusses the need to accommodate cross-border capital flows following from the EU internal market and the resulting regulatory strategies. This includes a brief overview of the principle of home country control and the ensuing Financial Services Action Plan. Dealing with the accommodation of cross-border capital flows and their regulation necessarily require an orchestration of the underlying supervisory structures, which is therefore also discussed. In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-09 an additional aspect of necessary orchestration has emerged, that is the need to control systemic risk. Specific attention is paid to microprudential supervision by the newly established European Supervisory Authorities and macroprudential supervision in the European Banking Union, the latter’s underlying drivers and the accompanying Single Supervisory Mechanism, including the SSM’s institutional framework as well as the consideration of its rationales and the Single Resolution Mechanism closely linked to it.
Die Struktur der makroprudenziellen Politik in der Europäischen Union ist ausgesprochen komplex und für den außenstehenden Betrachter fast undurchdringlich geworden. Deshalb wurde mit den Titeln der drei Kapitel des vorliegenden Aufsatzes „Der Prozess“, „Das Schloss“ und „Das Urteil“ bewusst auf Werke von Franz Kafka angespielt. Während sich der erste Teil der Arbeit vor allem mit der Komplexität des funktionellen Transmissionsprozesses in der makroprudenziellen Politik beschäftigt, widmet sich das zweite Kapitel, also der „Schloss-Teil“, ihren institutionellen Verflechtungen. Und am Ende werden die Ausführungen in einem „Wert-Urteil“ zusammengefasst.
Am 27. März 2011 wird im Rahmen der hessischen Kommunalwahlen auch über eine Schuldenbremse abgestimmt. Diese sieht vor, dass vom Jahr 2020 an der Landeshaushalt grundsätzlich auszugleichen ist. Alfons Weichenrieder argumentiert, dass eine in der Verfassung verankerte Schuldenregel dazu geeignet ist die im politischen Prozess angelegten Anreize zur Verschuldung zu zügeln. Auf die disziplinierende Wirkung der Finanzmärkte alleine zu vertrauen reicht nicht.
Die Mehrheit der auf High Frequency Trading basierenden Strategien trägt zur Marktliquidität (Market-Making-Strategien) oder zur Preisfindung und Markteffizienz (Arbitrage-Strategien) bei. Eine ungeeignete Regulierung dieser Strategien oder eine Beeinträchtigung der zugrunde liegenden Geschäftsmodelle durch übermäßige Belastungen kann kontraproduktiv sein und unvorhergesehene Auswirkungen auf die Marktqualität haben. Allerdings muss jede missbräuchliche Strategie effektiv durch die Aufsichtsbehörden bekämpft werden.
Das deutsche Bankensystem ruht seit Jahrzehnten auf drei Säulen: den privaten Kreditbanken, den öffentlichen Banken des Sparkassensystems und den genossenschaftlichen Banken. Das Drei-Säulen-System scheint ursächlich für die Stabilität im deutschen Bankensystem zu sein. Gerade die Krise hat gezeigt, dass es für ein Bankensystem vorteilhaft ist, wenn es darin nicht nur einen Typus von Banken gibt. Wir müssen eine Pluralität von Organisationsformen im Bankwesen erhalten und weiterentwickeln.
Risiko muss wieder kosten
(2011)
Wie kann das Projekt gemeinsame Währung seine Glaubwürdigkeit wiederherstellen? Otmar Issing argumentiert, dass eine gemeinsame Währung ohne politische Union nur mit dem No-bail-out Prinzip funktionieren kann. Er warnt gleichzeitig davor, die politische Union nur als Mittel zur Krisenbewältigung voranzutreiben.
Großer Beifall
(2012)
Außerhalb Griechenlands herrscht die Ansicht vor, dass eine höhere Wettbewerbsfähigkeit gleichbedeutend ist mit Preissenkungen für Güter und Dienstleistungen. Angesichts der begrenzten Bereitschaft in Griechenland, Reformen umzusetzen, fordern die Gläubiger drastische Lohnkürzungen, um die Produktivität zu erhöhen und die öffentlichen Ausgaben zu senken. Doch mit einer Kürzungsrunde nach der anderen lässt sich Wettbewerbsfähigkeit nicht erreichen. Umfangreiche flächendeckende Lohnkürzungen reduzieren vielmehr die erwartete Produktivität, da sie die besten Arbeitnehmer vertreiben, dem Rest Anreize zur Produktivität nehmen und neue gute Leute fernhalten.
On January 29, 2014, EU Commissioner Barnier published a draft law proposing a ban for proprietary trading by big banks in Europe. In this opinion piece, published in a German newspaper on 30 January, 2014, Jan Pieter Krahnen, who was a member of the Liikanen Commission, argues that the proposal could prove to be effective in preventing systemic risk.