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This paper investigates the accuracy of forecasts from four DSGE models for inflation, output growth and the federal funds rate using a real-time dataset synchronized with the Fed’s Greenbook projections. Conditioning the model forecasts on the Greenbook nowcasts leads to forecasts that are as accurate as the Greenbook projections for output growth and the federal funds rate. Only for inflation the model forecasts are dominated by the Greenbook projections. A comparison with forecasts from Bayesian VARs shows that the economic structure of the DSGE models which is useful for the interpretation of forecasts does not lower the accuracy of forecasts. Combining forecasts of several DSGE models increases precision in comparison to individual model forecasts. Comparing density forecasts with the actual distribution of observations shows that DSGE models overestimate uncertainty around point forecasts.
In this study prepared for the ECON Committee of the European Parliament, Gellings, Jungbluth and Langenbucher present a graphic overview on core legislation in the area of economic and financial services in Europe. The mapping overview can serve as background for further deliberations. The study covers legislation in force, proposals and other relevant provisions in fourteen policy areas, i.e. banking, securities markets and investment firms, market infrastructure, insurance and occupational pensions, payment services, consumer protection in financial services, the European System of Financial Supervision, European Monetary Union, Euro bills and Coins and statistics, competition, taxation, commerce and company law, accounting and auditing.
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the relationship between austerity measures and economic growth. We propose a general equilibrium model where (i) agents have recursive preferences; (ii) economic growth is endogenously driven by investments in R&D; (iii) the government is committed to a zero-deficit policy and finances public expenditures by means of a combination of labor taxes and R&D taxes. We find that austerity measures that rely on reducing resources available to the R&D sector depress economic growth both in the short- and long-run. High debt EU members are currently implementing austerity measures based on higher taxes and/or lower investments in the R&D sector. This casts some doubts on the real ability of these countries to grow over the next years.
The implications of delegating fiscal decision making power to sub-national governments has become an area of significant interest over the past two decades, in the expectation that these reforms will lead to better and more efficient provision of public goods and services. The move towards decentralization has, however, not been homogeneously implemented on the revenue and expenditure side: decentralization has materialized more substantially on the latter than on the former, creating "vertical fiscal imbalances". These imbalances measure the extent to which sub-national governments’ expenditures are financed through their own revenues. This mismatch between own revenues and expenditures may have negative consequences for public finances performance, for example by softening the budget constraint of sub-national governments. Using a large sample of countries covering a long time period from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, this paper is the first to examine the effects of vertical fiscal imbalances on fiscal performance through the accumulation of government debt. Our findings suggest that vertical fiscal imbalances are indeed relevant in explaining government debt accumulation, and call for a degree of caution when promoting fiscal decentralization.
We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about how inside debt features affect the relation between credit spreads and compensation components. First, inside debt reduces credit spreads only if it is unsecured. Second, inside debt exerts important indirect effects on the role of equity incentives: When inside debt is large and unsecured, equity incentives increase credit spreads; When inside debt is small or secured, this effect is weakened or reversed. We test our model on a sample of U.S. public firms with traded CDS contracts, finding evidence supportive of our predictions. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we also show that our results are robust to using an instrumental variable approach.
We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about how inside debt features affect the relation between credit spreads and compensation components. First, inside debt reduces credit spreads only if it is unsecured. Second, inside debt exerts important indirect effects on the role of equity incentives: When inside debt is large and unsecured, equity incentives increase credit spreads; When inside debt is small or secured, this effect is weakened or reversed. We test our model on a sample of U.S. public firms with traded CDS contracts, finding evidence supportive of our predictions. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we also show that our results are robust to using an instrumental variable approach.
The Eurozone fiscal crisis has created pressure for institutional harmonization, but skeptics argue that cultural predispositions can prevent convergence in behavior. Our paper derives a robust cultural classification of European countries and utilizes unique data on natives and immigrants to Sweden. Classification based on genetic distance or on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions fails to identify a single ‘southern’ culture but points to a ‘northern’ culture. Significant differences in financial behavior are found across cultural groups, controlling for household characteristics. Financial behavior tends to converge with longer exposure to common institutions, but is slowed down by longer exposure to original institutions.
This is a chapter for a forthcoming volume Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (Oxford University Press 2014) (eds. Eilís Ferran, Niamh Moloney, and Jennifer Payne). It provides an overview of EU financial regulation from the first banking directive up until its most recent developments in the aftermath of the financial crisis, focusing on the multiple layers of multi-level governance and their characteristic conceptual difficulties. Therefore the paper discusses the need to accommodate cross-border capital flows following from the EU internal market and the resulting regulatory strategies. This includes a brief overview of the principle of home country control and the ensuing Financial Services Action Plan. Dealing with the accommodation of cross-border capital flows and their regulation necessarily require an orchestration of the underlying supervisory structures, which is therefore also discussed. In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-09 an additional aspect of necessary orchestration has emerged, that is the need to control systemic risk. Specific attention is paid to microprudential supervision by the newly established European Supervisory Authorities and macroprudential supervision in the European Banking Union, the latter’s underlying drivers and the accompanying Single Supervisory Mechanism, including the SSM’s institutional framework as well as the consideration of its rationales and the Single Resolution Mechanism closely linked to it.
Die Struktur der makroprudenziellen Politik in der Europäischen Union ist ausgesprochen komplex und für den außenstehenden Betrachter fast undurchdringlich geworden. Deshalb wurde mit den Titeln der drei Kapitel des vorliegenden Aufsatzes „Der Prozess“, „Das Schloss“ und „Das Urteil“ bewusst auf Werke von Franz Kafka angespielt. Während sich der erste Teil der Arbeit vor allem mit der Komplexität des funktionellen Transmissionsprozesses in der makroprudenziellen Politik beschäftigt, widmet sich das zweite Kapitel, also der „Schloss-Teil“, ihren institutionellen Verflechtungen. Und am Ende werden die Ausführungen in einem „Wert-Urteil“ zusammengefasst.
Am 27. März 2011 wird im Rahmen der hessischen Kommunalwahlen auch über eine Schuldenbremse abgestimmt. Diese sieht vor, dass vom Jahr 2020 an der Landeshaushalt grundsätzlich auszugleichen ist. Alfons Weichenrieder argumentiert, dass eine in der Verfassung verankerte Schuldenregel dazu geeignet ist die im politischen Prozess angelegten Anreize zur Verschuldung zu zügeln. Auf die disziplinierende Wirkung der Finanzmärkte alleine zu vertrauen reicht nicht.
Die Mehrheit der auf High Frequency Trading basierenden Strategien trägt zur Marktliquidität (Market-Making-Strategien) oder zur Preisfindung und Markteffizienz (Arbitrage-Strategien) bei. Eine ungeeignete Regulierung dieser Strategien oder eine Beeinträchtigung der zugrunde liegenden Geschäftsmodelle durch übermäßige Belastungen kann kontraproduktiv sein und unvorhergesehene Auswirkungen auf die Marktqualität haben. Allerdings muss jede missbräuchliche Strategie effektiv durch die Aufsichtsbehörden bekämpft werden.
Das deutsche Bankensystem ruht seit Jahrzehnten auf drei Säulen: den privaten Kreditbanken, den öffentlichen Banken des Sparkassensystems und den genossenschaftlichen Banken. Das Drei-Säulen-System scheint ursächlich für die Stabilität im deutschen Bankensystem zu sein. Gerade die Krise hat gezeigt, dass es für ein Bankensystem vorteilhaft ist, wenn es darin nicht nur einen Typus von Banken gibt. Wir müssen eine Pluralität von Organisationsformen im Bankwesen erhalten und weiterentwickeln.
Risiko muss wieder kosten
(2011)
Wie kann das Projekt gemeinsame Währung seine Glaubwürdigkeit wiederherstellen? Otmar Issing argumentiert, dass eine gemeinsame Währung ohne politische Union nur mit dem No-bail-out Prinzip funktionieren kann. Er warnt gleichzeitig davor, die politische Union nur als Mittel zur Krisenbewältigung voranzutreiben.
Großer Beifall
(2012)
Außerhalb Griechenlands herrscht die Ansicht vor, dass eine höhere Wettbewerbsfähigkeit gleichbedeutend ist mit Preissenkungen für Güter und Dienstleistungen. Angesichts der begrenzten Bereitschaft in Griechenland, Reformen umzusetzen, fordern die Gläubiger drastische Lohnkürzungen, um die Produktivität zu erhöhen und die öffentlichen Ausgaben zu senken. Doch mit einer Kürzungsrunde nach der anderen lässt sich Wettbewerbsfähigkeit nicht erreichen. Umfangreiche flächendeckende Lohnkürzungen reduzieren vielmehr die erwartete Produktivität, da sie die besten Arbeitnehmer vertreiben, dem Rest Anreize zur Produktivität nehmen und neue gute Leute fernhalten.
On January 29, 2014, EU Commissioner Barnier published a draft law proposing a ban for proprietary trading by big banks in Europe. In this opinion piece, published in a German newspaper on 30 January, 2014, Jan Pieter Krahnen, who was a member of the Liikanen Commission, argues that the proposal could prove to be effective in preventing systemic risk.