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Ein Freibrief für die Notenbank bedeutet, genau genommen, die Bankrotterklärung des demokratischen Verfassungsstaates vor technokratischen Beliebigkeiten, schreibt Helmut Siekmann in diesem Namensbeitrag. Er betont, dass die Europäische Union eine unverzichtbare Einrichtung ist und ein echter Bundesstaat sein sollte. Sie sei aber im Wesentlichen (nur) ein Rechtskonstrukt, weshalb es umso wichtiger sei, dass die rechtlichen Regeln, auf denen sie beruht, genauestens beachtet werden.
Inhalt:
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Helmut Siekmann: Stellungnahme für den Haushalts- und Finanzausschuss des Landtags Nordrhein-Westfalen zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Offenlegung der Bezüge von Sparkassenführungskräften im Internet (Drucksache 16/4165) vom 10.02.2014
Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion der Piraten Gesetz zur Offenlegung der Bezüge von Sparkassenführungskräften im Internet vom 08.10.2013
Panel Sample Selection ModelsThe empirical evidence currently available in the literature regarding the effects of a country's IMF program participation on its output growth is rather inconclusive. In this paper we propose and estimate a panel data sample selection model featuring state dependence. As in this model the output growth effects of program participation can be conditional on the realization of a state variable (conditional pooling), our framework may reconcile previous empirical evidence based on models without state-dependent effects. We find that the effects of IMF program participation on output growth vary systematically with an index reflecting a country's institutional record, and that output growth effects of program participation are significantly positive only if the program participation is coupled with sufficient improvement of the institutional record.
Although oil price shocks have long been viewed as one of the leading candidates for explaining U.S. recessions, surprisingly little is known about the extent to which oil price shocks explain recessions. We provide the first formal analysis of this question with special attention to the possible role of net oil price increases in amplifying the transmission of oil price shocks. We quantify the conditional recessionary effect of oil price shocks in the net oil price increase model for all episodes of net oil price increases since the mid-1970s. Compared to the linear model, the cumulative effect of oil price shocks over course of the next two years is much larger in the net oil price increase model. For example, oil price shocks explain a 3% cumulative reduction in U.S. real GDP in the late 1970s and early 1980s and a 5% cumulative reduction during the financial crisis. An obvious concern is that some of these estimates are an artifact of net oil price increases being correlated with other variables that explain recessions. We show that the explanatory power of oil price shocks largely persists even after augmenting the nonlinear model with a measure of credit supply conditions, of the monetary policy stance and of consumer confidence. There is evidence, however, that the conditional fit of the net oil price increase model is worse on average than the fit of the corresponding linear model, suggesting much smaller cumulative effects of oil price shocks for these episodes of at most 1%.
Efforts to control bank risk address the wrong problem in the wrong way. They presume that the financial crisis was caused by CEOs who failed to supervise risk-taking employees. The responses focus on executive pay, believing that executives will bring non-executives into line—using incentives to manage risk-taking—once their own pay is regulated. What they overlook is the effect on non-executive pay of the competition for talent. Even if executive pay is regulated, and executives act in the bank’s best interests, they will still be trapped into providing incentives that encourage risk-taking by non-executives due to the negative externality that arises from that competition. Greater risk-taking can increase short-term profits and, in turn, the amount a non-executive receives, potentially at the expense of long-term bank value. Non-executives, therefore, have an incentive to incur significant risk upfront so long as they can depart for a new employer before any losses materialize. The result is an upward spiral in compensation—reducing an executive’s ability to set non-executive pay and the ability of any one bank to adjust compensation to reflect risk-taking and long-term outcomes. New regulation must address the tension between compensation and competition. Regulators should take account of the effect of competition on market-wide levels of pay, including by non-banks who compete for talent. The ability of non-executives to jump from a bank employer to another financial firm should also be limited. In addition, banks should be required to include a long-term equity component in non-executive pay, with subsequent employers being restricted from compensating a new employee for any losses she incurs related to her prior work.
We examine trust and trustworthiness of individuals with varying professional preferences and experiences. Our subjects study business and economics in Frankfurt, the financial center of Germany and continental Europe. In the trust game, subjects with a high interest in working in the financial industry return 25 percent less than subjects with a low interest. We find no evidence that the extent of professional experience in the financial industry has a negative impact on trustworthiness. We also do not find any evidence that the financial industry screens out less trustworthy individuals in the hiring process. In a prediction game that is strategically equivalent to the trust game, the amount sent by first-movers was significantly smaller when the second-mover indicated a high interest in working in finance. These results suggest that the financial industry attracts less trustworthy individuals, which may contribute to the current lack of trust in its employees.
In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis that started in 2007, policymakers were forced to respond quickly and forcefully to a recession caused not by short-term factors, but rather by an over-accumulation of debt by sovereigns, banks, and households: a so-called “balance sheet recession.” Though the nature of the crisis was understood relatively early on, policy prescriptions for how to deal with its consequences have continued to diverge. This paper gives a short overview of the prescriptions, the remaining challenges and key lessons for monetary policy.
n a contribution prepared for the Athens Symposium on “Banking Union, Monetary Policy and Economic Growth”, Otmar Issing describes forward guidance by central banks as the culmination of the idea of guiding expectations by pure communication. In practice, he argues, forward guidance has proved a misguided idea. What is presented as state of the art monetary policy is an example of pretence of knowledge. Forward guidance tries to give the impression of a kind of rule-based monetary policy. De facto, however, it is an overambitious discretionary approach which, to be successful, would need much more (or rather better) information than is currently available. In Issing's view, communication must be clear and honest about the limits of monetary policy in a world of uncertainty.
Die „Rente mit 63“ hat wieder einmal den Blick auf den Renteneintritt gerichtet. In der öffentlichen Debatte werden dabei zwei Ereignisse regelmäßig vermischt: das Ende des Arbeitslebens und der Beginn der Rentenzahlung. Dabei müssen beide nicht unmittelbar aufeinander folgen. Unter bestimmten Umständen kann es finanziell attraktiv sein, die staatliche Rente nicht sofort nach dem Ausstieg aus dem Erwerbsleben zu beantragen, sondern die Ausgaben bis zum späteren Rentenbeginn durch den Abbau von Finanzkapital zu finanzieren. Dieser Beitrag gibt einen kurzen Einblick in die neueste Studie von Olivia Mitchell, Andreas Hubener und Raimund Maurer zur Alterssicherung in den USA und stellt auch Berechnungen für Deutschland auf.
This European Policy Analysis discusses the need to strengthen the institutions underpinning the euro and makes several policy recommendations. The Stability and Growth Pact must be reinforced, have greater automaticity and entail graduated sanctions. Fiscal surveillance must be improved through the establishment of a European Fiscal Stability Agency. Finally, the European Financial Stability Facility must be made permanent.