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Learning and equilibrium selection in a monetary overlapping generations model with sticky prices
(2003)
We study adaptive learning in a monetary overlapping generations model with sticky prices and monopolistic competition for the case where learning agents observe current endogenous variables. Observability of current variables is essential for informational consistency of the learning setup with the model set up but generates multiple temporary equilibria when prices are flexible and prevents a straightforward construction of the learning dynamics. Sticky prices overcome this problem by avoiding simultaneity between prices and price expectations. Adaptive learning then robustly selects the determinate (monetary) steady state independent from the degree of imperfect competition. The indeterminate (non-monetary) steady state and non-stationary equilibria are never stable. Stability in a deterministic version of the model may differ because perfect foresight equilibria can be the limit of restricted perceptions equilibria of the stochastic economy with vanishing noise and thereby inherit different stability properties. This discontinuity at the zero variance of shocks suggests to analyze learning in stochastic models.
This paper considers a sticky price model with a cash-in-advance constraint where agents forecast inflation rates with the help of econometric models. Agents use least squares learning to estimate two competing models of which one is consistent with rational expectations once learning is complete. When past performance governs the choice of forecast model, agents may prefer to use the inconsistent forecast model, which generates an equilibrium where forecasts are inefficient. While average output and inflation result the same as under rational expectations, higher moments differ substantially: output and inflation show persistence, inflation responds sluggishly to nominal disturbances, and the dynamic correlations of output and inflation match U.S. data surprisingly well.
This paper compares Bayesian decision theory with robust decision theory where the decision maker optimizes with respect to the worst state realization. For a class of robust decision problems there exists a sequence of Bayesian decision problems whose solution converges towards the robust solution. It is shown that the limiting Bayesian problem displays infinite risk aversion and that decisions are insensitive (robust) to the precise assignment of prior probabilities. This holds independent from whether the preference for robustness is global or restricted to local perturbations around some reference model.
This paper is a draft for the chapter "German banks and banking structure" of the forthcoming book "The German financial system" edited by J.P. Krahnen and R.H. Schmidt (Oxford University Press). As such, the paper starts out with a description of past and present structural features of the German banking industry. Given the presented empirical evidence it then argues that great care has to be taken when generalising structural trends from one financial system to another. Whilst conventional commercial banking is clearly in decline in the US, it is far from clear whether the dominance of banks in the German financial system has been significantly eroded over the last decades. We interpret the immense stability in intermediation ratios and financing patterns of firms between 1970 and 2000 as strong evidence for our view that the way in which and the extent to which German banks fulfil the central functions for the financial system are still consistent with the overall logic of the German financial system. In spite of the current dire business environment for financial intermediaries we do not expect the German financial system and its banking industry as an integral part of this system to converge to the institutional arrangements typical for a market-oriented financial system.
In Germany a public discussion on the "power of banks" has been going on for decades now with power having at least two meanings. On the one hand it is the power of banks to control public corporations through direct shareholdings or the exercise of proxy votes - this is the power of banks in corporate control. On the other hand it is market power - due to imperfect competition in markets for financial services - that banks exercise vis-à-vis their loan and deposit customers. In the past, bank regulation has often been blamed to undermine competition and the working of market forces in the financial industry for the sake of soundness and stability of financial services firms. This chapter tries to shed some light on the historical development and current state of bank regulation in Germany. In so doing it tries to embed the analysis of bank regulation into a more general industrial organisation framework. For every regulated industry, competition and regulation are deeply interrelated as most regulatory institutions - even if they do not explicitly address the competitiveness of the market - either affect market structure or conduct. This paper tries to uncover some of the specific relationships between monetary policy, government interference and bank regulation on the one hand and bank market structure and economic performance on the other. In so doing we hope to point to several areas for fruitful research in the future. While our focus is on Germany, some of the questions that we raise and some of our insights might also be applicable to banking systems elsewhere. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
Some of the most widely expressed myths about the German financial system are concerned with the close ties and intensive interaction between banks and firms, often described as Hausbank relationships. Links between banks and firms include direct shareholdings, board representation, and proxy voting and are particularly significant for corporate governance. Allegedly, these relationships promote investment and improve the performance of firms. Furthermore, German universal banks are believed to play a special role as large and informed monitoring investors (shareholders). However, for the very same reasons, German universal banks are frequently accused of abusing their influence on firms by exploiting rents and sustaining the entrenchment of firms against efficient transfers of firm control. In this paper, we review recent empirical evidence regarding the special role of banks for the corporate governance of German firms. We differentiate between large exchangelisted firms and small and medium sized companies throughout. With respect to the role of banks as monitoring investors, the evidence does not unanimously support a special role of banks for large firms. Only one study finds that banks´ control of management goes beyond what nonbank shareholders achieve. Proxyvoting rights apparently do not provide a significant means for banks to exert management control. Most of the recent evidence regarding small firms suggests that a Hausbank relationship can indeed be beneficial. Hausbanks are more willing to sustain financing when borrower quality deteriorates, and they invest more often than arm´s length banks in workouts if borrowers face financial distress.
The paper describes the legal and economic environment of mergers and acquisitions in Germany and explores barriers to obtaining and executing corporate control. Various cases are used to demonstrate that resistance by different stakeholders including minority shareholders, organized labour and the government may present powerful obstacles to takeovers in Germany. In spite of the overall convergence of European takeover and securities trading laws, Germany still shows many peculiarities that make its market for corporate control distinct from other countries. Concentrated share ownership, cross shareholdings and pyramidal ownership structures are frequent barriers to acquiring majority stakes. Codetermination laws, the supervisory board structure and supermajority requirements for important corporate decisions limit the execution of control by majority shareholders. Bidders that disregard the German preference for consensual solutions and the specific balance of powers will risk their takeover attempt be frustrated by opposing influence groups. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
The German financial system is the archetype of a bank-dominated system. This implies that organized equity markets are, in some sense, underdeveloped. The purpose of this paper is, first, to describe the German equity markets and, second, to analyze whether it is underdeveloped in any meaningful sense. In the descriptive part we provide a detailed account of the microstructure of the German equity markets, putting special emphasis on recent developments. When comparing the German market with its peers, we find that it is indeed underdeveloped with respect to market capitalization. In terms of liquidity, on the other hand, the German equity market is not generally underdeveloped. It does, however, lack a liquid market for block trading. Klassifikation: G 51 . Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
The experience in the period during and after the Asian crisis of 1997-98 has provoked an extensive debate about the credit rating agencies' evaluation of sovereign risk in emerging markets lending. This study analyzes the role of credit rating agencies in international finan-cial markets, particularly whether sovereign credit ratings have an impact on the financial stability in emerging market economies. The event study and panel regression results indicate that credit rating agencies have substantial influence on the size and volatility of emerging markets lending. The empirical results are significantly stronger in the case of government's downgrades and negative imminent sovereign credit rating actions such as credit watches and rating outlooks than positive adjustments by the credit rating agencies while by the market participants' anticipated sovereign credit rating changes have a smaller impact on financial markets in emerging economies.
Do changes in sovereign credit ratings contribute to financial contagion in emerging market crises?
(2003)
Credit rating changes for long-term foreign currency debt may act as a wake-up call with upgrades and downgrades in one country affecting other financial markets within and across national borders. Such a potential (contagious) rating effect is likely to be stronger in emerging market economies, where institutional investors' problems of asymmetric information are more present. This empirical study complements earlier research by explicitly examining cross-security and cross-country contagious rating effects of credit rating agencies' sovereign risk assessments. In particular, the specific impact of sovereign rating changes during the financial turmoil in emerging markets in the latter half of the 1990s has been examined. The results indicate that sovereign rating changes in a ground-zero country have a (statistically) significant impact on the financial markets of other emerging market economies although the spillover effects tend to be regional.