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We consider three sets of phenomena that feature prominently - and separately - in the financial economics literature: conditional mean dependence (or lack thereof) in asset returns, dependence (and hence forecastability) in asset return signs, and dependence (and hence forecastability) in asset return volatilities. We show that they are very much interrelated, and we explore the relationships in detail. Among other things, we show that: (a) Volatility dependence produces sign dependence, so long as expected returns are nonzero, so that one should expect sign dependence, given the overwhelming evidence of volatility dependence; (b) The standard finding of little or no conditional mean dependence is entirely consistent with a significant degree of sign dependence and volatility dependence; (c) Sign dependence is not likely to be found via analysis of sign autocorrelations, runs tests, or traditional market timing tests, because of the special nonlinear nature of sign dependence; (d) Sign dependence is not likely to be found in very high-frequency (e.g., daily) or very low-frequency (e.g., annual) returns; instead, it is more likely to be found at intermediate return horizons; (e) Sign dependence is very much present in actual U.S. equity returns, and its properties match closely our theoretical predictions; (f) The link between volatility forecastability and sign forecastability remains intact in conditionally non-Gaussian environments, as for example with time-varying conditional skewness and/or kurtosis.
In this paper, we study the effectiveness of monetary policy in a severe recession and deflation when nominal interest rates are bounded at zero. We compare two alternative proposals for ameliorating the effect of the zero bound: an exchange-rate peg and price-level targeting. We conduct this quantitative comparison in an empirical macroeconometric model of Japan, the United States and the euro area. Furthermore, we use a stylized micro-founded two-country model to check our qualitative findings. We find that both proposals succeed in generating inflationary expectations and work almost equally well under full credibility of monetary policy. However, price-level targeting may be less effective under imperfect credibility, because the announced price-level target path is not directly observable. Klassifikation: E31, E52, E58, E61
We analyze governance with a dataset on investments of venture capitalists in 3848 portfolio firms in 39 countries from North and South America, Europe and Asia spanning 1971-2003. We find that cross-country differences in Legality have a significant impact on the governance structure of investments in the VC industry: better laws facilitate faster deal screening and deal origination, a higher probability of syndication and a lower probability of potentially harmful co-investment, and facilitate board representation of the investor. We also show better laws reduce the probability that the investor requires periodic cash flows prior to exit, which is in conjunction with an increased probability of investment in high-tech companies. Klassifikation: G24, G31, G32.
The question whether the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) will result in measurable economic benefits is of special policy relevance in particular given the European Union’s decision to require the application of IFRS by listed companies from 2005/2007. In this paper, I investigate the common con-jecture that internationally recognized high quality reporting standards (IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP) reduce the cost of capital of adopting firms (e.g. Levitt 1998; IASB 2002). Building on Leuz/Verrecchia (2000), I use a set of German firms which pre-adopted such standards before 2005, but investigate the potential economic benefits by analyzing their expected cost of equity capital utilizing and customizing avail-able implied estimation methods (e.g. Gebhardt/Lee/Swaminathan 2001, Easton/Taylor/Shroff/Sougiannis 2002, Easton 2004). Evidence from a sample of about 13,000 HGB, 4,500 IAS/IFRS and 3,000 US-GAAP firm-month observations in the period 1993-2002 generally fails to document lower expected cost of equity capital and therefore measurable economic benefits for firms applying IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP. Accordingly, I caution to state that reporting under internationally accepted standards, per se, lowers the cost of equity capital of adopting firms.
In this study, we develop a technique for estimating a firm’s expected cost of equity capital derived from analyst consensus forecasts and stock prices. Building on the work of Gebhardt/Lee/-Swaminathan (2001) and Easton/Taylor/Shroff/Sougiannis (2002), our approach allows daily estimation, using only publicly available information at that date. We then estimate the expected cost of equity capital at the market, industry and individual firm level using historical German data from 1989-2002 and examine firm characteristics which are systematically related to these estimates. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of the concept in a contemporary case study for DaimlerChrysler and the European automobile industry.
Despite powerful advances in yield curve modeling in the last twenty years, comparatively little attention has been paid to the key practical problem of forecasting the yield curve. In this paper we do so. We use neither the no-arbitrage approach, which focuses on accurately fitting the cross section of interest rates at any given time but neglects time-series dynamics, nor the equilibrium approach, which focuses on time-series dynamics (primarily those of the instantaneous rate) but pays comparatively little attention to fitting the entire cross section at any given time and has been shown to forecast poorly. Instead, we use variations on the Nelson-Siegel exponential components framework to model the entire yield curve, period-by-period, as a three-dimensional parameter evolving dynamically. We show that the three time-varying parameters may be interpreted as factors corresponding to level, slope and curvature, and that they may be estimated with high efficiency. We propose and estimate autoregressive models for the factors, and we show that our models are consistent with a variety of stylized facts regarding the yield curve. We use our models to produce term-structure forecasts at both short and long horizons, with encouraging results. In particular, our forecasts appear much more accurate at long horizons than various standard benchmark forecasts. JEL Code: G1, E4, C5
How might retirees consider deploying the retirement assets accumulated in a defined contribution pension plan? One possibility would be to purchase an immediate annuity. Another approach, called the "phased withdrawal" strategy in the literature, would have the retiree invest his funds and then withdraw some portion of the account annually. Using this second tactic, the withdrawal rate might be determined according to a fixed benefit level payable until the retiree dies or the funds run out, or it could be set using a variable formula, where the retiree withdraws funds according to a rule linked to life expectancy. Using a range of data consistent with the German experience, we evaluate several alternative designs for phased withdrawal strategies, allowing for endogenous asset allocation patterns, and also allowing the worker to make decisions both about when to retire and when to switch to an annuity. We show that one particular phased withdrawal rule is appealing since it offers relatively low expected shortfall risk, good expected payouts for the retiree during his life, and some bequest potential for the heirs. We also find that unisex mortality tables if used for annuity pricing can make women's expected shortfalls higher, expected benefits higher, and bequests lower under a phased withdrawal program. Finally, we show that delayed annuitization can be appealing since it provides higher expected benefits with lower expected shortfalls, at the cost of somewhat lower anticipated bequests. Klassifikation: G22, G23, J26, J32, H55 . January 2004.
This Article concerns the duty of care in American corporate law. To fully understand that duty, it is necessary to distinguish between roles, functions, standards of conduct, and standards of review. A role consists of an organized and socially recognized pattern of activity in which individuals regularly engage. In organizations, roles take the form of positions, such as the position of the director. A function consists of an activity that an actor is expected to engage in by virtue of his role or position. A standard of conduct states the way in which an actor should play a role, act in his position, or conduct his functions. A standard of review states the test that a court should apply when it reviews an actor’s conduct to determine whether to impose liability, grant injunctive relief, or determine the validity of his actions. In many or most areas of law, standards of conduct and standards of review tend to be conflated. For example, the standard of conduct that governs automobile drivers is that they should drive carefully, and the standard of review in a liability claim against a driver is whether he drove carefully. Similarly, the standard of conduct that governs an agent who engages in a transaction with his principal is that the agent must deal fairly, and the standard of review in a claim by the principal against an agent, based on such a transaction, is whether the agent dealt fairly. The conflation of standards of conduct and standards of review is so common that it is easy to overlook the fact that whether the two kinds of standards are or should be identical in any given area is a matter of prudential judgment. In a corporate world in which information was perfect, the risk of liability for assuming a given corporate role was always commensurate with the incentives for assuming the role, and institutional considerations never required deference to a corporate organ, the standards of conduct and review in corporate law might be identical. In the real world, however, these conditions seldom hold, and in American corporate law the standards of review pervasively diverge from the standards of conduct. Traditionally, the two major areas of American corporate law that involved standards of conduct and review have been the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty concerns the standards of conduct and review applicable to a director or officer who takes action, or fails to act, in a matter that does involve his own self-interest. The duty of care concerns the standards of conduct and review applicable to a director or officer who takes action, or fails to act, in a matter that does not involve his own self-interest.
This paper suggests a motive for bank mergers that goes beyond alleged and typically unverifiable scale economies: preemtive resolution of banks´ financial distress. Such "distress mergers" can be a significant motivation for mergers because they can foster reorganizations, realize diversification gains, and avoid public attention. However, since none of these potential benefits comes without a cost, the overall assessment of distress mergers is unclear. We conduct an empirical analysis to provide evidence on consequences of distress mergers. The analysis is based on comprehensive data from Germany´s savings and cooperatives banks sectors over the period 1993 to 2001. During this period both sectors faced significant structural problems and superordinate institutions (associations) presumably have engaged in coordinated actions to manage distress mergers. The data comprise 3640 banks and 1484 mergers. Our results suggest that bank mergers as a means of preemtive distress resolution have moderate costs in terms of the economic impact on performance. We do find strong evidence consistent with diversification gains. Thus, distress mergers seem to have benefits without affecting systematic stability adversely.
Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoringintensive financing (young, small, and innovative firms) have a multitude of bank lenders, where one may be special in the sense of relationship lending. However, theory does not tell us a lot about the economic rationale for relationship lending in the context of multiple bank financing. To fill this gap, we analyze the optimal debt structure in a model that allows for multiple but asymmetric bank financing. The optimal debt structure balances the risk of lender coordination failure from multiple lending and the bargaining power of a pivotal relationship bank. We show that firms with low expected cash-flows or low interim liquidation values of assets prefer asymmetric financing, while firms with high expected cash-flow or high interim liquidation values of assets tend to finance without a relationship bank. JEL - Klassifikation: G21 , G78 , G33