Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (2354) (remove)
Language
- English (2354) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (2354) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (2354)
Keywords
- Deutschland (115)
- USA (51)
- Geldpolitik (48)
- monetary policy (46)
- Schätzung (45)
- Europäische Union (43)
- Bank (38)
- Corporate Governance (36)
- Monetary Policy (31)
- Inflation (23)
Institute
- Center for Financial Studies (CFS) (1380)
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (1309)
- Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE) (742)
- House of Finance (HoF) (608)
- Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS) (173)
- Rechtswissenschaft (149)
- Informatik (114)
- Foundation of Law and Finance (51)
- Exzellenzcluster Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen (34)
- Gesellschaftswissenschaften (29)
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the importance of small firm growth and industrial districts in Italy became the focus of a large number of regional development studies. According to this literature, successful industrial districts are characterized by intensive cooperation and market producer-user interaction between small and medium-sized, flexibly specialized firms (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Scott, 1988). In addition, specialized local labor markets develop which are complemented by a variety of supportive institutions and a tradition of collaboration based on trust relations (Amin and Robins, 1990; Amin and Thrift, 1995). It has also been emphasized that industrial districts are deeply embedded into the socio-institutional structures within their particular regions (Grabher, 1993). Many case studies have attempted to find evidence that the regional patterns identified in Italy are a reflection of a general trend in industrial development rather than just being historical exceptions. Silicon Valley, which is focused on high technology production, has been identified as being one such production complex similar to those in Italy (see, for instance, Hayter, 1997). However, some remarkable differences do exist in the institutional context of this region, as well as its particular social division of labor (Markusen, 1996). Even though critics, such as Amin and Robins (1990), emphasized quite early that the Italian experience could not easily be applied to other socio-cultural settings, many studies have classified other high technology regions in the U.S. as being industrial districts, such as Boston s Route 128 area. Too much attention has been paid to the performance of small and medium-sized firms and the regional level of industrial production in the ill-fated debate regarding industrial districts (Martinelli and Schoenberger, 1991). Harrison (1997) has provided substantial evidence that large firms continue to dominate the global economy. This does not, however, imply that a de-territorialization of economic growth is necessarily taking place as globalization tendencies continue (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). In the case of Boston, it has been misleading to define its regional economy as being an industrial district. Neither have small and medium-sized firms been decisive in the development of the Route 128 area nor has the region developed a tradition of close communication between vertically-disintegrated firms (Dorfman, 1983; Bathelt, 1991a). Saxenian (1994) found that Boston s economy contrasted sharply with that of an industrial district. Specifically, the region has been dominated by large, vertically-integrated high technology firms which are reliant on proprietary technologies and autarkic firm structures. Several studies have tried to compare the development of the Route 128 region to Silicon Valley. These studies have shown that both regions developed into major 2 agglomerations of high technology industries in the post-World War II period. Due to their different traditions, structures and practices, Silicon Valley and Route 128 have followed divergent development paths which have resulted in a different regional specialization (Dorfman, 1983; Saxenian, 1985; Kenney and von Burg, 1999). In the mid 1970s, both regions were almost equally important in terms of the size of their high technology sectors. Since then, however, Silicon Valley has become more important and has now the largest agglomeration of leading-edge technologies in the U.S. (Saxenian, 1994). Saxenian (1994) argues that the superior performance of high technology industries in Silicon Valley over those in Boston is based on different organizational patterns and manufacturing cultures which are embedded in those socio-institutional traditions which are particular to each region. Despite the fact that Saxenian (1994) has been criticized for basing her conclusions on weak empirical research (i.e. Harrison, 1997; Markusen, 1998), she offers a convincing explanation as to why the development paths of both regions have differed.1 Saxenian s (1994) study does not, however, identify which structures and processes have enabled both regions to overcome economic crises. In the case of the Boston economy, high technology industries have proven that they are capable of readjusting and rejuvenating their product and process structures in such a way that further innovation and growth is stimulated. This is also exemplified by the region s recent economic development. In the late 1980s, Boston experienced an economic decline when the minicomputer industry lost its competitive basis and defense expenditures were drastically reduced. The number of high technology manufacturing jobs decreased by more than 45,000 between 1987 and 1995. By the mid 1990s, however, the regional economy began to recover. The rapidly growing software sector compensated for some of the losses experienced in manufacturing. In this paper, I aim to identify the forces behind this economic recovery. I will investigate whether high technology firms have uncovered new ways to overcome the crisis and the extent to which they have given up their focus on self-reliance and autarkic structures. The empirical findings will also be discussed in the context of the recent debate about the importance of regional competence and collective learning (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). There is a growing body of literature which suggests that some regional economies During the 1980s and early 1990s, the importance of small firm growth and industrial districts in Italy became the focus of a large number of regional development studies. According to this literature, successful industrial districts are characterized by intensive cooperation and market producer-user interaction between small and medium-sized, flexibly specialized firms (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Scott, 1988). In addition, specialized local labor markets develop which are complemented by a variety of supportive institutions and a tradition of collaboration based on trust relations (Amin and Robins, 1990; Amin and Thrift, 1995). It has also been emphasized that industrial districts are deeply embedded into the socio-institutional structures within their particular regions (Grabher, 1993). Many case studies have attempted to find evidence that the regional patterns identified in Italy are a reflection of a general trend in industrial development rather than just being historical exceptions. Silicon Valley, which is focused on high technology production, has been identified as being one such production complex similar to those in Italy (see, for instance, Hayter, 1997). However, some remarkable differences do exist in the institutional context of this region, as well as its particular social division of labor (Markusen, 1996). Even though critics, such as Amin and Robins (1990), emphasized quite early that the Italian experience could not easily be applied to other socio-cultural settings, many studies have classified other high technology regions in the U.S. as being industrial districts, such as Boston s Route 128 area. Too much attention has been paid to the performance of small and medium-sized firms and the regional level of industrial production in the ill-fated debate regarding industrial districts (Martinelli and Schoenberger, 1991). Harrison (1997) has provided substantial evidence that large firms continue to dominate the global economy. This does not, however, imply that a de-territorialization of economic growth is necessarily taking place as globalization tendencies continue (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). In the case of Boston, it has been misleading to define its regional economy as being an industrial district. Neither have small and medium-sized firms been decisive in the development of the Route 128 area nor has the region developed a tradition of close communication between vertically-disintegrated firms (Dorfman, 1983; Bathelt, 1991a). Saxenian (1994) found that Boston s economy contrasted sharply with that of an industrial district. Specifically, the region has been dominated by large, vertically-integrated high technology firms which are reliant on proprietary technologies and autarkic firm structures. Several studies have tried to compare the development of the Route 128 region to Silicon Valley. These studies have shown that both regions developed into major 2 agglomerations of high technology industries in the post-World War II period. Due to their different traditions, structures and practices, Silicon Valley and Route 128 have followed divergent development paths which have resulted in a different regional specialization (Dorfman, 1983; Saxenian, 1985; Kenney and von Burg, 1999). In the mid 1970s, both regions were almost equally important in terms of the size of their high technology sectors. Since then, however, Silicon Valley has become more important and has now the largest agglomeration of leading-edge technologies in the U.S. (Saxenian, 1994). Saxenian (1994) argues that the superior performance of high technology industries in Silicon Valley over those in Boston is based on different organizational patterns and manufacturing cultures which are embedded in those socio-institutional traditions which are particular to each region. Despite the fact that Saxenian (1994) has been criticized for basing her conclusions on weak empirical research (i.e. Harrison, 1997; Markusen, 1998), she offers a convincing explanation as to why the development paths of both regions have differed.1 Saxenian s (1994) study does not, however, identify which structures and processes have enabled both regions to overcome economic crises. In the case of the Boston economy, high technology industries have proven that they are capable of readjusting and rejuvenating their product and process structures in such a way that further innovation and growth is stimulated. This is also exemplified by the region s recent economic development. In the late 1980s, Boston experienced an economic decline when the minicomputer industry lost its competitive basis and defense expenditures were drastically reduced. The number of high technology manufacturing jobs decreased by more than 45,000 between 1987 and 1995. By the mid 1990s, however, the regional economy began to recover. The rapidly growing software sector compensated for some of the losses experienced in manufacturing. In this paper, I aim to identify the forces behind this economic recovery. I will investigate whether high technology firms have uncovered new ways to overcome the crisis and the extent to which they have given up their focus on self-reliance and autarkic structures. The empirical findings will also be discussed in the context of the recent debate about the importance of regional competence and collective learning (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). There is a growing body of literature which suggests that some regional economies an develop into learning economies which are based on intra-regional production linkages, interactive technological learning processes, flexibility and proximity (Storper, 1992; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Gregersen and Johnson, 1997). In the next section of this paper, I will discuss some of the theoretical issues regarding localized learning processes, learning economies and learning regions (see, also, Bathelt, 1999). I will then describe the methodology used. What follows is a brief overview of how Boston s economy has specialized in high technology production. The main part of the paper will then focus on recent trends in Boston s high technology industries. It will be shown that the high technology economy consists of different subsectors which are not tied to a single technological development path. The various subsectors are, at least partially, dependent on different forces and unrelated processes. There is, however, tentative evidence which suggests that cooperative behavior and collective learning in supplierproducer- user relations have become important factors in securing reproductivity in the regional structure. The importance of these trends will be discussed in the conclusions.
Taking shareholder protection seriously? : Corporate governance in the United States and Germany
(2003)
The paper undertakes a comparative study of the set of laws affecting corporate governance in the United States and Germany, and an evaluation of their design if one assumes that their objective were the protection of the interests of minority outside shareholders. The rationale for such an objective is reviewed, in terms of agency cost theory, and then the institutions that serve to bound agency costs are examined and critiqued. In particular, there is discussion of the applicable legal rules in each country, the role of the board of directors, the functioning of the market for corporate control, and (briefly) the use of incentive compensation. The paper concludes with the authors views on what taking shareholder protection seriously, in each country s legal system, would require.
This memorandum describes the approach of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") in monitoring and, where appropriate, regulating the use of research reports by investment banking firms in connection with securities transactions. The memorandum addresses the historical system of regulation, which continues in large measure to apply. It also examines the new initiatives taken, following a number of prominent corporate, accounting and banking scandals and a significant decline in U.S. and international capital markets, to supplement the current system in what some have dubbed the "post-Enron era".
Recent empirical work shows that a better legal environment leads to lower expected rates of return in an international cross-section of countries. This paper investigates whether differences in firm-specific corporate governance also help to explain expected returns in a cross-section of firms within a single jurisdiction. Constructing a corporate governance rating (CGR) for German firms, we document a positive relationship between the CGR and firm value. In addition, there is strong evidence that expected returns are negatively correlated with the CGR, if dividend yields and price-earnings ratios are used as proxies for the cost of capital. Most results are robust for endogeneity, with causation running from corporate governance practices to firm fundamentals. Finally, an investment strategy that bought high-CGR firms and shorted low-CGR firms would have earned abnormal returns of around 12 percent on an annual basis during the sample period. We rationalize the empirical evidence with lower agency costs and/or the removal of certain governance malfunctions for the high-CGR firms.
The corporate convergence debate is usually presented in terms of competing efficiency and political claims. Convergence optimists assert that an economic logic will promote convergence on the most efficient form of economic organization, usually taken to be the public corporation governed under rules designed to maximize shareholder value. Convergence skeptics counterclaim that organizational diversity is possible, even probable, because of path dependent development of institutional complementarities whose abandonment is likely to be inefficient. The skeptics also assert that existing elites will use their political and economic advantages to block reform; the optimists counterclaim that the spread of shareholding will reshape politics.
The venture capital market and firms whose creation and early stages were financed by venture capital are among the crown jewels of the American economy. Beyond representing an important engine of macroeconomic growth and job creation, these firms have been a major force in commercializing cutting edge science, whether through their impact on existing industries as with the radical changes in pharmaceuticals catalyzed by venture-backed firms commercialization of biotechnology, or by the their role in developing entirely new industries as with the emergence of the internet and world wide web. The venture capital market thus provides a unique link between finance and innovation, providing start-up and early stage firms - organizational forms particularly well suited to innovation - with capital market access that is tailored to the special task of financing these high risk, high return activities.
This article presents a structural overview of corporate disclosure in Germany against the background of a rapidly evolving European market. Professor Baums first makes the theoretical case for mandatory disclosure and outlines the standard, regulatory elements of market transparency. He then turns to German law and illustrates both how it attempts to meet the principle, theoretical demands of disclosure and how it should be improved. The article also presents in some detail the actual channels of corporate disclosure used in Germany and the manner in which German law now fits into the overall development of the broader, European Community scheme, as well as the contemplated changes and improvements both at the national and the supranational level.
The paper was submitted to the conference on company law reform at the University of Cambridge, July 4th, 2002. Since the introduction of corporation laws in the individual German states during the first half of the 19th century, Germany has repeatedly amended and reformed its company law. Such reforms and amendments were prompted in part by stock exchange fraud and the collapse of large corporations, but also by a routine adjustment of law to changing commercial and societal conditions. During the last ten years, a series of significant changes to German company law led one commentator to speak from a "company law in permanent reform". Two years ago, the German Federal Chancellor established a Regierungskommission Corporate Governance ("Government Commission on Corporate Governance") and instructed it to examine the German Corporate Governance system and German company law as a whole, and formulate recommendations for reform.
On April 24, 2001 the European Commission presented a proposal for a Directive1 introducing supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates (the Proposed Directive). The Proposed Directive requires a closer coordination among supervisory authorities of different sectors of the financial industry and leads to changes in the number of existing Directives relating to the supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms.