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Seit zwanzig Jahren befaßt sich die Finanzmarktforschung einerseits mit Fragen der Bewertung und des Managements von Finanztiteln auf effizienten Kapitalmärkten und mit Fragen der Managementkontrolle auf unvollkommenen Märkten. Der folgende selektive Überblick konzentriert sich auf zentrale Aspekte der Theorie und Empirie der Managementkontrolle bei asymmetrischer Information. Ziel ist die Auseinandersetzung mit der unlängst vorgetragenen These zu den Mythen der Unternehmenskontrolle (Martin Hellwig 1997). Der aktuelle Überblick wird entwickelt vor dem Hintergrund der Gutenberg’schen Position eines eigenständigen Unternehmensinteresses, losgelöst von den Interessen der shareholder oder anderer stakeholder. Diese Position von Gutenberg verbindet sich im dritten Band der „Grundlagen der BWL: Die Finanzen“ von 1969 mit der Forderung nach Einhaltung eines sog. finanziellen Gleichgewichts. Erst in jüngster Zeit werden auch kapitalmarkttheoretisch fundierte Modelle entwickelt, die auch Raum bieten für eine Autonomie des Managements gegenüber dessen stakeholders.
Wir verwenden eine neue, auf der Burr-Verteilung basierende Spezifikation aus der Familie der Autoregressive Conditional Duration (ACD) Modelle zur ökonometrischen Analyse der Transaktionsintensitäten während der Börseneinführung (IPO) der Deutsche Telekom Aktie. In diesem Fallbeispiel wird die Leistungsfähigkeit des neu entwickelten Burr-ACD-Modells mit den Standardmodellen von Engle und Russell verglichen, die im Burr-ACD Modell als Spezialfälle enthalten sind. Wir diskutieren außerdem alternative Möglichkeiten, Intra- Tagessaisonalitäten der Handelsintensität in ACD Modellen zu berücksichtigen.
The focus of this article is the analysis of the inflation risk of European real estate securities. Following both a causal and a final understanding of risk, the analysis is twofold. First, to examine the causal influence of inflation on short- and long-term asset returns, different regression approaches are employed based on the methodology of Fama and Schwert (1977). Hedging capacities against expected inflation are found only for German open-end funds. Secondly, different shortfall risk measures are used to study whether an investment in European real estate securities protects against a negative real return at the end of a given investment period.
Joseph E. Stiglitz (1943 - )
(2000)
Am 24.11.1999 gibt Joseph E. Stiglitz seinen vorzeitigen Rücktritt als Chief Economist und Senior Vice President der Weltbank zum Jahresende bekannt. Er will sich wieder ausschließlich der Forschung und Lehre widmen und kehrt auf seinen Lehrstuhl am Economics Department der Stanford University zurück. Stiglitzs Rückzug aus der aktiven Entwicklungspolitik erfolgt nicht ganz freiwillig. Er selbst kommentiert seinen Entschluß: „It has become obvious to me that it would be difficult to continue to speak out as forcefully and publicly as I have on a variety of issues and still remain as chief economist. Rather than muzzle myself, or be muzzled, I decided to leave.“ (New York Times, 1.12.1999). Seit geraumer Zeit galt seine öffentliche Kritik am Washington Consensus, dem ökonomischen Glaubensbekenntnis, auf das sich die politische Linie des US Treasury genauso stützt wie die Stabilisierungs- und Reformpolitik des IWF, als Dorn im Auge der Vertreter dieser Institutionen. Für sie war Stiglitz - so die Metapher der Financial Times vom 26.11.99 - „a veritable gadfly“, eine wahre Viehbremse, deren lästiges Summen aufgrund von Position und Intellekt nicht einfach ignoriert werden konnte. ...
Entwicklungsfinanzierung
(2000)
The extension of long-term loans, e.g. to finance housing, is adversely affected by inflation. For one thing, the higher nominal interest rates charged by the banks in response to inflation mean that borrowers have to make (nominally) higher interest payments, which unnecessarily reduces their borrowing capacity. For another, long-term loans with variable interest rates increase the probability that borrowers will become unable to meet their payment obligations. The present paper examines these two assertions in detail. At the same time, it presents a concept for substantially reducing the weaknesses of conventional lending methodologies. We start by investigating the consequences of a stable inflation rate on the borrowing capacity of credit clients, then go on to analyze the impact of fluctuating inflation rates on the risk of default.
Competition for order flow can be characterized as a coordination game with multiple equilibria. Analyzing competition between dealer markets and a crossing network, we show that the crossing network is more stable for lower traders’ disutilities from unexecuted orders. By introducing private information, we prove existence of a unique equilibrium with market consolidation. Assets with low volatility and large volumes are traded on crossing networks, others on dealer markets. Efficiency requires more assets to be traded on crossing networks. If traders’ disutilities differ sufficiently, a unique equilibrium with market fragmentation exists. Low disutility traders use the crossing network while high disutility traders use the dealer market. The crossing network’s market share is inefficiently small.
In this paper, we estimate the demand for homeowner insurance in Florida. Since we are interested in a number of factors influencing demand, we approach the problem from two directions. We first estimate two hedonic equations representing the premium per contract and the price mark-up. We analyze how the contracts are bundled and how contract provisions, insurer characteristics and insured risk characteristics and demographics influence the premium per contract and the price mark-up. Second, we estimate the demand for homeowners insurance using two-stage least squares regression. We employ ISO's indicated loss costs as our proxy for real insurance services demanded. We assume that the demand for coverage is essentially a joint demand and thus we can estimate the demand for catastrophe coverage separately from the demand for noncatastrophe coverage. We determine that price elasticities are less elastic for catastrophic coverage than for non-catastrophic coverage. Further estimated income elasticities suggest that homeowners insurance is an inferior good. Finally, we conclude based on the results of a selection model that our sample of ISO reporting companies well represents the demand for insurance in the Florida market as a whole.
At present, the question of how national pension or retirement payment systems should be organised is being hotly debated in various countries, and opinions vary widely as to what should be regarded as the optimal design for such systems. It appears to the authors of the present paper that in this entire discussion one aspect is largely overlooked: What relationships exist between the pension system and the financial system in a given country? As such relationships might prove to be important, the present paper investigates the following questions: (1) Are there differences between the national pension systems of three major European countries – Germany, France and the U.K. – and between the financial systems of these countries? (2) And if the existence of such differences can be demonstrated, is there a correspondence between the differences with respect to the various national pension systems and the differences as regards the countries’ financial systems? (3) And if such a correspondence exists, is there any kind of interrelationship between the national financial and pension systems of the individual countries which goes beyond a mere correspondence? Looking mainly at two aspects – namely, risk allocation and the incentives to create human capital – the authors of this paper argue (1) that there are indeed considerable differences between the financial and pension systems of the three countries; (2) that in both Germany and the U.K. there are also systematic correspondences between the respective pension systems and financial systems and their economic characteristics, but that such a correspondence cannot be identified in the case of France; and (3) that these parallels are, in the final analysis, based on complementarities and are therefore likely to contribute to the efficiency of the German and the British systems. The paper concludes with a brief look at policy implications which the existence of, or the lack of, consistency between national pension systems and national financial systems might have.
Although the world of banking and finance is becoming more integrated every day, in most aspects the world of financial regulation continues to be narrowly defined by national boundaries. The main players here are still national governments and governmental agencies. And until recently, they tended to follow a policy of shielding their activities from scrutiny by their peers and members of the academic community rather than inviting critical assessments and an exchange of ideas. The turbulence in international financial markets in the 1980s, and its impact on U.S. banks, gave rise to the notion that academics working in the field of banking and financial regulation might be in a position to make a contribution to the improvement of regulation in the United States, and thus ultimately to the stability of the entire financial sector. This provided the impetus for the creation of the “U.S. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee”. In the meantime, similar shadow committees have been founded in Europe and Japan. The specific problems associated with financial regulation in Europe, as well as the specific features which distinguish the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee from its counterparts in the U.S. and Japan, derive from the fact that while Europe has already made substantial progress towards economic and political integration, it is still primarily a collection of distinct nation-states with differing institutional set-ups and political and economic traditions. Therefore, any attempt to work towards a European approach to financial regulation must include an effort to promote the development of a European culture of co-operation in this area, and this is precisely what the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) seeks to do. In this paper, Harald Benink, chairman of the ESFRC, and Reinhard H. Schmidt, one of the two German members, discuss the origin, the objectives and the functioning of the committee and the thrust of its recommendations.
Auch sechs Jahre nach Einführung der Vorschriften zur Ad-hoc-Publizität nach § 15 WpHG besteht bei den Unternehmen weiterhin große Unsicherheit bezüglich ihrer ordnungsmäßigen Umsetzung. Dies gilt insbesondere für die Behandlung von ad-hoc-meldepflichtigen Sachverhalten, die sich aus der Regelberichterstattung ergeben. Der vorliegende Beitrag entwickelt hierzu Lösungsansätze im Sinne einer kapitalmarktorientierten Unternehmenspublizität.
Vorgestellt wird eine empirische Studie, welche den Zusammenhang zwischen Rendite und Risiko für ein Sample deutscher Versicherungsaktien im Zeitraum 1975-1998 untersucht. Als Methode wurde ein Multifaktorenmodell mit makroökonomischen Faktoren verwendet. Je nach Untersuchungszeitraum beläuft sich der Anteil der erklärten Varianz auf 9,29% bis 13,62%. Es konnte eine signifikanter negativer Einfluß zwischen der Veränderung des allgemeinen Zinsniveaus und den Risikoprämien von Versicherungsaktien identifiziert werden. Weiterhin ist Wechselkurses der DM zum US-Dollar signifikant.
Im Mittelpunkt dieses Beitrag stehen Verweildauermodelle und deren Verwendung als Analyseinstrumente für die Bewertung und Berechnung von Kreditausfallrisiken. Verschiedene Möglichkeiten zur Berechnung der Dauer des Nichtausfalls eines Kredites werden dabei vorgestellt. Die hier vorgestellten Verfahren werden auf einen aus Kreditakten von sechs deutschen Universalbanken zusammengestellten Datensatz angewendet. Beispiele und Interpretationshilfen zu den jeweils vorgestellten Methoden erleichtern den Zugang zu diesen Modellen. Es werden zahlreiche Hinweise auf weiterführende Literatur gegeben.
In den 1980er und den frühen 1990er Jahren waren japanische Banken die weltweit größten Finanzinstitute und galten als Inbegriff „globaler“ Banken. Der Crash der japanischen Wertpapier- und Immobilienmärkte Anfang der 1990er Jahre und die nachfolgende Rezession waren Anlass zu tiefgreifenden Reformen im japanischen Finanzsystem. Die japanischen Banken waren gezwungen, ihre internationalen Strategien zu reformulieren. Als Konsequenz zogen sie sich aus vielen Märkten zurück und strukturierten ihre internationalen Netzwerke um. Vor dem Hintergrund theoretischer Überlegungen zu der Bedeutung von „Globalität“ und einer empirischen Untersuchung der Entwicklung der Auslandsstellennetze japanischer Banken in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren stellt der vorliegende Beitrag die Globalität japanischer Banken in Frage.
Structural positions are very common in investment practice. A structural position is defined as a permanent overweighting of a riskier asset class relative to a prespecified benchmark portfolio. The most prominent example for a structural position is the equity bias in a balanced fund that arises by consistently overweighting equities in tactical asset allocation. Another example is the permanent allocation of credit in a fixed income portfolio with a government benchmark. The analysis provided in this article shows that whenever possible, structural positions should be avoided. Graphical illustrations based on Pythagorean theorem are used to make a connection between the active risk/return and the total risk/return framework. Structural positions alter the risk profile of the portfolio substantially, and the appeal of active management – to provide active returns uncorrelated to benchmark returns and hence to shift the efficient frontier outwards – gets lost. The article demonstrates that the commonly used alpha – tracking error criterion is not sufficient for active management. In addition, structural positions complicate measuring managers’ skill. The paper also develops normative implications for active portfolio management. Tactical asset allocation should be based on the comparison of expected excess returns of an asset class to the equilibrium risk premium of the same asset class and not to expected excess returns of other asset classes. For the cases, where structural positions cannot be avoided, a risk budgeting approach is introduced and applied to determine the optimal position size. Finally, investors are advised not to base performance evaluation only on simple manager rankings because this encourages managers to take structural positions and does not reward efforts to produce alpha. The same holds true for comparing managers’ information ratios. Information ratios, in investment practice defined as the ratio of active return to active risk, do not uncover structural positions.
In this paper we have developed a financial model of the non-life insurer to provide assistance for the management of the insurance company in making decisions on product, investment and reinsurance mix. The model is based on portfolio theory and recognizes the stochastic nature of and the interaction between the underwriting and investment income of the insurance business. In the context of an empirical application we illustrate howa portfolio optimisation approach can be used for asset-liability management.
Our study provides evidence on the share price reactions to the announcement of equity issues in Germany, where capital market is characterized by institutional features distinct from the U.S. market. German seasoned equity issues yield a positive market reaction which contrasts to the significant negative abnormal returns reported for the U.S. We provide evidence that these results are due to differences in both issuing characteristics and floatation methods, and in the corporate governance and ownership structures of the two countries. Our study explains much of the empirical puzzle of different market reactions to seemingly similar events across financial markets.
Real options theory applies techniques known from finance theory to the valuation of capital investments. The present paper investigates further into this analogy, considering the case of a portfolio of real options. An implementation of real option models in practice will mostly be concerned with a portfolio of real options, so the analysis of portfolio aspects is of both academic and practical interest. Is a portfolio of real options special? In order to shed some light on this question, the present paper will outline the relevant features of a portfolio of real options. It will show that the analogy to financial options remains great if compound option models are applied. As a result, a portfolio of real options, and therefore the firm as such, generally is to be understood as one single compound, real option.
Ja, der Ablauf der Lock-up-Frist ist ein kursrelevantes Ereignis. Wir untersuchen Kursreaktionen auf das Ende der Lock-up-Frist bei 142 Unternehmen des Neuen Marktes. Da der Ablauf der Sperrfrist bereits zum Zeitpunkt des Börsengangs bekannt ist, erwarten wir bei einem (semi-)informationseffizienten Kapitalmarkt durchschnittlich keine Kursreaktion. Im Rahmen einer Ereignisstudie zeigen wir aber, dass sich am Ende der Sperrfrist signifikant negative Überrenditen ergeben. Durch eine differenzierte Analyse stellen wir fest, dass firmenspezifische Faktoren (Volatilität, Performance, Free Float) die Kursreaktionen am Ende der Lock-up-Periode beeinflussen. Die Befunde unserer Untersuchung belegen die Notwendigkeit klarer Regeln für mehr Transparenz nach dem Börsengang. Bedeutsam sind die vorliegenden Ergebnisse vor allem vor dem Hintergrund der aktuellen Diskussion um eine Erweiterung der insiderrechtlichen Meldepflichen im Rahmen des 4. Finanzmarktförderungsgesetzes. This paper explores the materiality of expirations of lock-up provisions that prevent insiders from selling their shares after the initial public offering (IPO). We examine 172 lock-up agreements of 142 IPOs floated on Germany’s New Market. Since the date of the lock-up expiration is common knowledge at the IPO, we would not expect to find abnormal returns surrounding the event day, assuming that markets are informationally efficient. However, using an event-study methodology we detect statistically significant negative abnormal returns and a twenty-five percent increase in trading volume surrounding lock-up expiration. The negative abnormal returns are larger for firms with high volatility, superior performance after the IPO, and low free float. The results of our study raise important regulatory issues with respect to disclosure rules of firms going public. We argue that insiders should be legally required to disclose their sell transactions in order to protect new and less informed shareholders.
We present an empirical study focusing on the estimation of a fundamental multi-factor model for a universe of European stocks. Following the approach of the BARRA model, we have adopted a cross-sectional methodology. The proportion of explained variance ranges from 7.3% to 66.3% in the weekly regressions with a mean of 32.9%. For the individual factors we give the percentage of the weeks when they yielded statistically significant influence on stock returns. The best explanatory power – apart from the dominant country factors – was found among the statistical constructs „success“ and „variability in markets“.
Versicherungsunternehmen haben bei der Auswahl ihrer Vermögensanlagen die gesetzlichen Restriktionen des Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetzes einzuhalten. Neben einer strukturierten Darstellung der zahlreichen Regulierungstatbestände werden aus Sicht der Finanzierungstheorie sowie den empirischen Verhältnissen an den Kapitalmärkten die im VAG enthaltenen Rahmenbedingungen einer kritischen Bewertung unterzogen.
To resolve the IPO underpricing puzzle it is essential to analyze who knows what when during the issuing process. In Germany, broker-dealers make a market in IPOs during the subscription period. We examine these pre-issue prices and find that they are highly informative. They are closer to the first price subsequently established on the exchange than both the midpoint of the bookbuilding range and the offer price. The pre-issue prices explain a large part of the underpricing left unexplained by other variables. The results imply that information asymmetries are much lower than the observed variance of underpricing suggests.
Who knows what when? : The information content of pre-IPO market prices : [Version March/June 2002]
(2002)
To resolve the IPO underpricing puzzle it is essential to analyze who knows what when during the issuing process. In Germany, broker-dealers make a market in IPOs during the subscription period. We examine these pre-issue prices and find that they are highly informative. They are closer to the first price subsequently established on the exchange than both the midpoint of the bookbuilding range and the offer price. The pre-issue prices explain a large part of the underpricing left unexplained by other variables. The results imply that information asymmetries are much lower than the observed variance of underpricing suggests.
We propose a new framework for modelling time dependence in duration processes on financial markets. The well known autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) approach introduced by Engle and Russell (1998) will be extended in a way that allows the conditional expectation of the duration process to depend on an unobservable stochastic process, which is modelled via a Markov chain. The Markov switching ACD model (MSACD) is a very flexible tool for description and forecasting of financial duration processes. In addition the introduction of an unobservable, discrete valued regime variable can be justified in the light of recent market microstructure theories. In an empirical application we show, that the MSACD approach is able to capture several specific characteristics of inter trade durations while alternative ACD models fail. Furthermore, we use the MSACD to test implications of a sequential trade model.
Banking and markets
(2001)
This paper integrates a number of recent themes in the literature in banking and asset markets–optimal risk sharing, limited market participation, asset-price volatility, market liquidity, and financial crises–in a general-equilibrium theory of the financial system. A complex financial system comprises both financial markets financial institutions. Financial institutions can take the form of intermediaries or banks. Banks, inlike intermediaries, are subject to runs, but crises do not imply market failure. We show that a sophisticated financiel system–a system with complete markets for aggregate risk and limited market participation–is incentive-efficient, if the institutions take the form of intermediaries, or else constrained-efficient, of they take the form of banks. We also consider an economy in which the markets for aggregate risks are incomplete. In this context, there is a rolefpr prudential regulation: regulating liquidity can improve welfare.
Executive Stock Option Programs (SOPs) have become the dominant compensation instrument for top-management in recent years. The incentive effects of an SOP both with respect to corporate investment and financing decisions critically depend on the design of the SOP. A specific problem in designing SOPs concerns dividend protection. Usually, SOPs are not dividend protected, i.e. any dividend payout decreases the value of a manager’s options. Empirical evidence shows that this results in a significant decrease in the level of corporate dividends and, at the same time, into an increase in share repurchases. Yet, few suggestions have been made on how to account for dividends in SOPs. This paper applies arguments from principal-agent-theory and from the theory of finance to analyze different forms of dividend protection, and to address the relevance of dividend protection in SOPs. Finally, the paper relates the theoretical analysis to empirical work on the link between share repurchases and SOPs.
Untersuchungsgegenstand ist der empirische Gehalt der ökonomischen Theorie eines Hedgings auf Unternehmensebene. In den USA wurde die Hedging-Theorie in einer Reihe von empirischen Studien aufgegriffen. Die Befunde sind zumeist konsistent mit dem Erklärungsansatz von Froot/Scharfstein/Stein (1993), wonach eine Verringerung der Cashflow-Volatilität – unter der Annahme steigender Außenfinanzierungskosten – zu einer Reduzierung von Unterinvestitionskosten führt. Bei deutschen Unternehmen besitzt dieser Ansatz bemerkenswerterweise jedoch nur einen geringen Erklärungsgehalt. Die Ergebnisunterschiede können auf unterschiedliche Kapitalmarktverhältnisse zurückgeführt werden: Die unterstellten steigenden Kosten der Außenfinanzierung besitzen für deutsche Unternehmen aufgrund der Dominanz des Bezugsrechtsverfahrens sowie der Rolle der Hausbank als Mechanismus zur Überwindung von Informationsproblemen eine vergleichsweise geringere Bedeutung. Die Managerinteressen erweisen sich bei deutschen Unternehmen als eine wesentliche Hedging-Determinante. Zwischen der Höhe des gebundenen Managervermögens und der Hedging-Wahrscheinlichkeit besteht entsprechend der Hedging-Theorie ein signifikanter positiver Zusammenhang. Entgegen den amerikanischen Befunden kann jedoch eine disziplinierende Wirkung von Großaktionären auf die Hedging-Entscheidung nicht beobachtet werden. Zur Berücksichtigung der spezifischen deutschen Kapitalmarktverhältnisse wird der Einfluss von Bankenbeteiligungen und Familienunternehmen auf die Hedging-Entscheidung untersucht. Ein Bankeneinfluss auf die Derivateeinsatz-Entscheidung kann jedoch nicht festgestellt werden. Entgegen Diversifikations- und Kapitalmarktüberlegungen besteht bei Familienunternehmen interessanterweise eine signifikant geringere Hedging-Wahrscheinlichkeit.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, it has been widely expected that the implementation of the European Single Market would lead to a rapid convergence of Europe’s financial systems. In the present paper we will show that at least in the period prior to the introduction of the common currency this expected convergence did not materialise. Our empirical studies on the significance of various institutions within the financial sectors, on the financing patterns of firms in various countries and on the predominant mechanisms of corporate governance, which are summarised and placed in a broader context in this paper, point to few, if any, signs of a convergence at a fundamental or structural level between the German, British and French financial systems. The German financial system continues to appear to be bank-dominated, while the British system still appears to be capital market-dominated. During the period covered by the research, i.e. 1980 – 1998, the French system underwent the most far-reaching changes, and today it is difficult to classify. In our opinion, these findings can be attributed to the effects of strong path dependencies, which are in turn an outgrowth of relationships of complementarity between the individual system components. Projecting what we have observed into the future, the results of our research indicate that one of two alternative paths of development is most likely to materialise: either the differences between the national financial systems will persist, or – possibly as a result of systemic crises – one financial system type will become the dominant model internationally. And if this second path emerges, the Anglo-American, capital market-dominated system could turn out to be the “winner”, because it is better able to withstand and weather crises, but not necessarily because it is more efficient.
In this paper we study the benefits derived from international diversification of stock portfolios from German and Hungarian point of view. In contrast to the German capital market, which is one of the largest in the world, the Hungarian Stock Exchange is an emerging market. The Hungarian stock market is highly volatile, high returns are often accompanied by extremely large risk. Therefore, there is a good potential for Hungarian investors to realize substantial benefits in terms of risk reduction by creating multi-currency portfolios. The paper gives evidence on the above me ntioned benefits for both countries by examining the performance of several ex ante portfolio strategies. In order to control the currency risk, different types of hedging approaches are implemented.
Wenn man untersuchen möchte, ob sich die Finanzsysteme verschiedener Länder im Verlauf der letzten Jahre aneinander angeglichen haben oder demnächst angleichen werden, braucht man ein Konzept zur Beschreibung von Finanzsystemen, durch das wesentliche Strukturen, deren Unterschiede und Veränderungen erkennbar werden, ohne dabei in "Systemgeschwafel" (D. Schneider) abzugleiten. Wir haben dafür das Konzept der Komplementarität als nützlich identifiziert. Der Beitrag stellt dieses Konzept vor und soll und seine Eignung belegen. Letztlich geht es dabei auch um die Frage, ob reale Finanzsysteme konsistente Systeme mit komplementären Elementen darstellen. Nach der Vorstellung der formalen Konzepte der Komplementarität und der Konsistenz wird "das Finanzsystem" auf seine Komple mentarität untersucht. Dazu wird ein Finanzsystem aus der Sicht von Unternehmen des nichtfinanziellen Sektors als ein System gekennzeichnet, das aus drei Teilsystemen besteht. Das erste Teilsystem ist das Finanzierungssystem einschließlich Finanzsektor und Mustern der Unternehmensfinanzierung, das zweite das Corporate Governance-System und das dritte das Unternehmens-Strategie-System. Für alle drei Teilsysteme wird – allgemein und mit Bezug auf die Finanzsysteme Deutschlands, Japans und der USA - gezeigt, inwieweit die Elemente der betreffenden Teilsysteme untereinander komplementär sind, und geprüft, ob sie in ihren Ausprägungen auch konsistent sind, d.h. wirklich "zueinander passen". Untersucht wird auch die Komplementarität und Konsistenz zwischen den Teilsystemen selbst. Der Beitrag endet mit Überlegungen über die Anwendung des Komplementaritätskonzepts. Dass ein Finanzsystem die Eigenschaft der Komplementarität aufweist, hat nicht nur weitreichende Implikationen für die Methodik der Analyse von Finanzsystemen, sondern auch für die Vorhersehbarkeit der Entwicklung von Finanzsystemen und damit für die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Konvergenz von Finanzsystemen, für deren Effizienzeigenschaften und für die Möglichkeiten, Finanzsysteme durch gestaltende Eingriffe zu verbessern.
Financial development and financial institution building are important prerequisites for economic growth. However, both the potential and the problems of institution building are still vastly underestimated by those who design and fund institution building projects. The paper first underlines the importance of financial development for economic growth, then describes the main elements of “serious” institution building: the lending technology, the methodological approaches, and the question of internal structure and corporate governance. Finally, it discusses three problems which institution building efforts have to cope with: inappropriate expectations on the part of donor and partner institutions regarding the problems and effects of institution building efforts, the lack of awareness of the importance of governance and ownership issues, and financial regulation that is too restrictive for microfinance operations. All three problems together explain why there are so few successful micro and small business institutions operating worldwide.
In der heutigen Theorie der Optionsbewertung wird davon ausgegangen, daß die Markterwartungen genau berechenbar sind. Die Unsicherheit besteht lediglich darin, welcher Aktienkurs sich letztlich realisiert, die Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeiten sind bekannt. Dabei treten jedoch erhebliche Probleme auf, denn theoretisch erwartete Preise entsprechen oft nicht den am Markt beobachteten. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, zu untersuchen, ob auch dann eine Optionsbewertung möglich ist, wenn die Unsicherheit nicht nur auf die Stochastik reduziert wird, sondern wenn zusätzlich angenommen wird, daß Marktteilnehmer nur unscharfes Wissen über künftige Preisentwicklungen haben. Hierbei dient die Fuzzy Set Theorie zur Modellierung der nur größenordnungsmäßig bekannten künftigen Aktienkurse. Es wird in dieser Arbeit zwischen der Optionspreistheorie und der Fuzzy Set Theorie eine Verbindung geschaffen, die es zukünftig erlauben wird, die Unsicherheit im Markt besser zu modellieren, als dies mit heute dominierenden Methoden der Optionsbewertung möglich ist.
We analyze incentives for loan officers in a model with hidden action, limited liability and truth-telling constraints under the assumption that the principal has private information from an automatic scoring system. First we show that the truth-telling problem reduces the bank’s expected profit whenever the loan officer cannot only conceal bad types, but can also falsely report bad types. Second, we investigate whether the bank should reveal her private information to the agent. We show that this depends on the percentage of good loans in the population and on the signal’s informativeness. Though we had to define different regions for different parameters, we concluded that it might often be favorable to not reveal the signal. This contradicts current practice.
We investigate the suggested substitutive relation between executive compensation and the disciplinary threat of takeover imposed by the market for corporate control. We complement other empirical studies on managerial compensation and corporate control mechanisms in three distinct ways. First, we concentrate on firms in the oil industry for which agency problems were especially severe in the 1980s. Due to the extensive generation of excess cash flow, product and factor market discipline was ineffective. Second, we obtain a unique data set drawn directly from proxy statements which accounts not only for salary and bonus but for the value of all stock-market based compensation held in the portfolio of a CEO. Our data set consists of 51 firms in the U.S. oil industry from 1977 to 1994. Third, we employ ex ante measures of the threat of takeover at the individual firm level which are superior to ex post measures like actual takeover occurrence or past incidence of takeovers in an industry. Results show that annual compensation and, to a much higher degree, stock-based managerial compensation increase after a firm becomes protected from a hostile takeover. However, clear-cut evidence that CEOs of protected firms receive higher compensation than those of firms considered susceptible to a takeover cannot be found.
Individual financial systems can be understood as very specific configurations of certain key elements. Often these configurations remain unchanged for decades. We hypothesize that there is a specific relationship between key elements, namely that of complementarity. Thus, complementarity seems to be an essential feature of financial systems. Intuitively speaking, complementarity exists if the elements of a (financial) system reinforce each other in terms of contributing to the functioning of the system. It is the purpose of this paper to provide an analytical clarification of the concept of complementarity. This is done by modeling financial systems as combinations of four elements: firm-specific human capital of an entrepreneur, the ability of a bank to restructure the borrower's firm in the case of distress, the possibility to appropriate private benefits from running the firm, and the bankruptcy law. A specific configuration of these elements constitutes one financial system. The bankruptcy law and the potential private benefits are treated as exogenous. They determine the bargaining power of the contracting parties in the case that recontracting occurs. In a two-stage game, the optimal values for the other elements are determined by the agents individually - by investing in human capital and restructuring skills, respectively - and jointly by writing, executing and possibly renegotiating a financing contract for the firm. The paper discusses the equilibria for different types of bankruptcy law and demonstrates that equilibria exhibit the sought-after feature of complementarity. Three particularly significant equilibria correspond to stylized accounts of the British, German and the US-American financial system, respectively.
The paper presents an empirical analysis of the alledged transformation of the financial systems in the three major European economies, France, Germany and the UK. Based on a unified data set developed on the basis of national accounts statistics, and employing a new and consistent method of measurement, the following questions are addressed: Is there a common pattern of structural change; do banks lose importance in the process of change; and are the three financial systems becoming more similar? We find that there is neither a general trend towards disintermediation, nor towards a transformation from bank-based to capital market-based financial systems, nor for a loss of importance of banks. Only in the case of France strong signs of transformation as well as signs of a general decline in the role of banks could be found. Thus the three financial systems also do not seem to become more similar. However, there is also a common pattern of change: the intermediation chains are lengthening in all three countries. Nonbank financial intermediaries are taking over a more important role as mobilizers of capital from the non-financial sectors. In combination with the trend towards securitization of bank liabilites, this change increases the funding costs of banks and may put banks under pressure. In the case of France, this change is so pronounced that it might even threaten the stability of the financial system.
Nationale rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen beeinflussen die Möglichkeiten für wirtschaftliche Aktivitäten multinationaler Unternehmen (MNU) in einem Gastland und der Koordination zwischen den Unternehmensteilen in verschiedenen Ländern. Sie sind damit wichtige Bestimmungsfaktoren für Standortentscheidungen von MNU. Die Bedeutung von Recht und Standortwahl unterscheidet sich aber je nach verfolgter MNUStrategie. Seit etwa 10 Jahren verändern MNU ihre strategische Ausrichtung. Gleichzeitig gab es wesentliche Fortschritte bei der Forschung über Geschäftsfeld- und Gesamt-unternehmensstrategien von MNU. Aufbauend auf diesen beiden Entwicklungen wird in diesem Aufsatz die These vertreten, daß heute - im Zeitalter integrierter MNU-Strategien - Einfachheit, Flexibilität und Verläßlichkeit des relevanten nationalen Rechts in einem Land und seine Ähnlichkeiten mit dem Recht anderer Länder eine zentrale Bedeutung erlangt haben. Dies stellt einen wesentlichen Unterschied zu einer – allerdings noch nicht gänzlich überwundenen – Situation dar, in der MNU mehr an einer rechtlichen Situation interessiert sind, die ihnen eine maximale Anpassung an die jeweiligen lokalen Umstände der einzelnen Gastländer erlaubt, worin der Kern von ”multi-domestic” MNU-Strategien besteht. Die Veränderung von MNU-Strategien bietet auch eine Erklärung für die in jüngster Zeit zu beobachtende Veränderung der Lobbyingaktivitäten von MNU bezüglich der rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen in ihren jeweiligen Gastländern.
Hackethal and Schmidt (2003) criticize a large body of literature on the financing of corporate sectors in different countries that questions some of the distinctions conventionally drawn between financial systems. Their criticism is directed against the use of net flows of finance and they propose alternative measures based on gross flows which they claim re-establish conventional distinctions. This paper argues that their criticism is invalid and that their alternative measures are misleading. There are real issues raised by the use of aggregate data but they are not the ones discussed in Hackethal and Schmidt’s paper. JEL Classification: G30
US investors hold much less foreign stocks than mean/variance analysis applied to historical data predicts. In this article, we investigate whether this home bias can be explained by Bayesian approaches to international asset allocation. In contrast to mean/variance analysis, Bayesian approaches employ different techniques for obtaining the set of expected returns. They shrink sample means towards a reference point that is inferred from economic theory. We also show that one of the Bayesian approaches leads to the same implications for asset allocation as mean-variance/tracking error criterion. In both cases, the optimal portfolio is a combination the market portfolio and the mean/variance efficient portfolio with the highest Sharpe ratio.
Applying the Bayesian approaches to the subject of international diversification, we find that substantial home bias can be explained when a US investor has a strong belief in the global mean/variance efficiency of the US market portfolio and when he has a high regret aversion falling behind the US market portfolio. We also find that the current level of home bias can justified whenever regret aversion is significantly higher than risk aversion.
Finally, we compare the Bayesian approaches to mean/variance analysis in an empirical out-ofsample study. The Bayesian approaches prove to be superior to mean/variance optimized portfolios in terms of higher risk-adjusted performance and lower turnover. However, they not systematically outperform the US market portfolio or the minimum-variance portfolio.
We analyze exchange rates along with equity quotes for 3 German firms from New York (NYSE) and Frankfurt (XETRA) during overlapping trading hours to see where price discovery occurs and how stock prices adjust to an exchange rate shock. Findings include: (a) the exchange rate is exogenous with respect to the stock prices; (b) exchange rate innovations are more important in understanding the evolution of NYSE prices than XETRA prices; and (c) most (but not all) of the fundamental or random walk component of firm value is determined in Frankfurt.
In contrast to the United States and the United Kingdom, little empirical work exists about the distributional characteristics of appraisalbased real estate returns outside these countries. The purpose of this study is to fill this gap by focusing on Germany. In line with other studies, this paper offers an extensive investigation into the distribution of German real estate returns and compares them with and U.S. and U.K. data in the same period. Furthermore, the comovements with bonds and stocks are also examined. In the core, the distributional characteristics for German real estate are comparable to that for the U.S. and U.K.
U.S. investors hold much less international stock than is optimal according to mean–variance portfolio theory applied to historical data. We investigated whether this home bias can be explained by Bayesian approaches to international asset allocation. In comparison with mean–variance analysis, Bayesian approaches use different techniques for obtaining the set of expected returns by shrinking the sample means toward a reference point that is inferred from economic theory. Applying the Bayesian approaches to the field of international diversification, we found that a substantial home bias can be explained when a U.S. investor has a strong belief in the global mean–variance efficiency of the U.S. market portfolio, and in this article, we show how to quantify the strength of this belief. We also found that one of the Bayesian approaches leads to the same implications for asset allocation as the mean–variance/tracking-error criterion. In both cases, the optimal portfolio is a combination of the U.S. market portfolio and the mean–variance-efficient portfolio with the highest Sharpe ratio.
For the Neuer Markt year 2001 is not considered as one of its best, compared to its prior performance. Investors who once piled into the Neuer Markt have now become wary of the exchange, which was launched in 1997 as Europe’s leading growth market and answer to the U.S.‘s Nasdaq Stock Market. The Neuer Markt’s reputation has been marred by the misleading information policy from several Neuer Markt companies, publishing false annual and quarterly data. Some of these companies are responsible for having misinformed investors of their pending bankruptcies. Under these circumstances, it is time to find an explanation for the dramatic loss of credibility in Neuer Markt enterprises. Finding an answer, two aspects come under consideration: • What type of information (annual versus quarterly reports) was available for investors and • of what quality were these provided data. Interim reports can be seen as important instrument in the reporting system to inform all kinds of investors. For this reason we examine the quality of Neuer Markt quarterly reports by concentrating on the disclosure level of 52 Neuer Markt companies‘ reports for the third quarter 1999 and 2000. To enable comparison we establish four disclosure indexes that measure the report’s compliance with the Neuer Markt Rules and Regulations as well as with IAS and US GAAP interim reporting standards. The results demonstrate that the level of disclosure has increased over time. Then we aim to find typical attributes of Neuer Markt enterprises that provide high or low level of accounting information in their quarterly reports. Nevertheless the study also shows that there is not any correlation between market capitalization and the quality of interim reports. However, it can be suggested that an additional enforcement mechanism could improve quality and lure investors back. A step towards this aim is the standardization project of quarterly reports of Deutsche Boerse AG.
Open source projects produce goods or standards that do not allow for the appropriation of private returns by those who contribute to their production. In this paper we analyze why programmers will nevertheless invest their time and effort to code open source software. We argue that the particular way in which open source projects are managed and especially how contributions are attributed to individual agents, allows the best programmers to create a signal that more mediocre programmers cannot achieve. Through setting themselves apart they can turn this signal into monetary rewards that correspond to their superior capabilities. With this incentive they will forgo the immediate rewards they could earn in software companies producing proprietary software by restricting the access to the source code of their product. Whenever institutional arrangements are in place that enable the acquisition of such a signal and the subsequent substitution into monetary rewards, the contribution to open source projects and the resulting public good is a feasible outcome that can be explained by standard economic theory.
Open source projects produce goods or standards that do not allow for the appropriation of private returns by those who contribute to their production. In this paper we analyze why programmers will nevertheless invest their time and effort to code open source software. We argue that the particular way in which open source projects are managed and especially how contributions are attributed to individual agents, allows the best programmers to create a signal that more mediocre programmers cannot achieve. Through setting themselves apart they can turn this signal into monetary rewards that correspond to their superior capabilities. With this incentive they will forgo the immediate rewards they could earn in software companies producing proprietary software by restricting the access to the source code of their product. Whenever institutional arrangements are in place that enable the acquisition of such a signal and the subsequent substitution into monetary rewards, the contribution to open source projects and the resulting public good is a feasible outcome that can be explained by standard economic theory.
What constitutes a financial system in general and the German financial system in particular?
(2003)
This paper is one of the two introductory chapters of the book "The German Financial System". It first discusses two issues that have a general bearing on the entire book, and then provides a broad overview of the German financial system. The first general issue is that of clarifying what we mean by the key term "financial system" and, based on this definition, of showing why the financial system of a country is important and what it might be important for. Obviously, a definition of its subject matter and an explanation of its importance are required at the outset of any book. As we will explain in Section II, we use the term "financial system" in a broad sense which sets it clearly apart from the narrower concept of the "financial sector". The second general issue is that of how financial systems are described and analysed. Obviously, the definition of the object of analysis and the method by which the object is to be analysed are closely related to one another. The remainder of the paper provides a general overview of the German financial system. In addition, it is intended to provide a first indication of how the elements of the German financial system are related to each other, and thus to support our claim from Section II that there is indeed some merit in emphasising the systemic features of financial systems in general and of the German financial system in particular. The chapter concludes by briefly comparing the general characteristics of the German financial system with those of the financial systems of other advanced industrial countries, and taking a brief look at recent developments which might undermine the "systemic" character of the German financial system.