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This paper presents a model to analyze the consequences of competition in order-flow between a profit maximizing stock exchange and an alternative trading platform on the decisions concerning trading fees and listing requirements. Listing requirements, set by the exchange, provide public information on listed firms and contribute to a better liquidity on all trading venues. It is sometimes asserted that competition induces the exchange to lower its level of listing standards compared to a situation in which it is a monopolist, because the trading platform can free-ride on this regulatory activity and compete more aggressively on trading fees. The present analysis shows that this is not always true and depends on the existence and size of gains related to multi market trading. These gains relax competition on trading fees. The higher these gains are, the more the exchange can increase its revenue from listing and trading when it raises its listing standards. For large enough gains from multi-market trading, the exchange is not induced to lower the level of listing standards when a competing trading platform appears. As a second result, this analysis also reveals a cross - subsidization effect between the listing and the trading activity when listing is not competitive. This model yields implications about the fee structures on stock markets, the regulation of listings and the social optimality of competition for volume. JEL Classification: G10, G18, G12
This paper proposes the Shannon entropy as an appropriate one-dimensional measure of behavioural trading patterns in financial markets. The concept is applied to the illustrative example of algorithmic vs. non-algorithmic trading and empirical data from Deutsche Börse's electronic cash equity trading system, Xetra. The results reveal pronounced differences between algorithmic and non-algorithmic traders. In particular, trading patterns of algorithmic traders exhibit a medium degree of regularity while non-algorithmic trading tends towards either very regular or very irregular trading patterns. JEL Classification: C40, D0, G14, G15, G20
How ordinary consumers make complex economic decisions: financial literacy and retirement readiness
(2010)
This paper explores who is financially literate, whether people accurately perceive their own economic decision-making skills, and where these skills come from. Self-assessed and objective measures of financial literacy can be linked to consumers’ efforts to plan for retirement in the American Life Panel, and causal relationships with retirement planning examined by exploiting information about respondent financial knowledge acquired in school. Results show that those with more advanced financial knowledge are those more likely to be retirement-ready.
We examined financial literacy among the young using the most recent wave of the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. We showed that financial literacy is low; fewer than one-third of young adults possess basic knowledge of interest rates, inflation, and risk diversification. Financial literacy was strongly related to sociodemographic characteristics and family financial sophistication. Specifically, a college-educated male whose parents had stocks and retirement savings was about 45 percentage points more likely to know about risk diversification than a female with less than a high school education whose parents were not wealthy. These findings have implications for consumer policy. JEL Classification: D91
This paper investigates the accuracy and heterogeneity of output growth and inflation forecasts during the current and the four preceding NBER-dated U.S. recessions. We generate forecasts from six different models of the U.S. economy and compare them to professional forecasts from the Federal Reserve’s Greenbook and the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The model parameters and model forecasts are derived from historical data vintages so as to ensure comparability to historical forecasts by professionals. The mean model forecast comes surprisingly close to the mean SPF and Greenbook forecasts in terms of accuracy even though the models only make use of a small number of data series. Model forecasts compare particularly well to professional forecasts at a horizon of three to four quarters and during recoveries. The extent of forecast heterogeneity is similar for model and professional forecasts but varies substantially over time. Thus, forecast heterogeneity constitutes a potentially important source of economic fluctuations. While the particular reasons for diversity in professional forecasts are not observable, the diversity in model forecasts can be traced to different modeling assumptions, information sets and parameter estimates. JEL Classification: C53, D84, E31, E32, E37 Keywords: Forecasting, Business Cycles, Heterogeneous Beliefs, Forecast Distribution, Model Uncertainty, Bayesian Estimation
This paper analyzes loan pricing when there is multiple banking and borrower distress. Using a unique data set on SME lending collected from major German banks, we can instrument for effective coordination between lenders, carrying out a panel estimation. The analysis allows to distinguish between rents that accrue due to single bank lending, rents that accrue due to relationship lending, and rents that accrue due to the elimination of competition among multiple lenders. We find the relationship lending to have no discernible impact on loan spreads, while both single lending and coordinated multiple lending significantly increase the spread. Thus, contrary to predictions in the literature, multiple lending does not insure the borrower against hold-up. JEL Classification: D74, G21, G33, G34
This paper shows the equivalence of applicative similarity and contextual approximation, and hence also of bisimilarity and contextual equivalence, in the deterministic call-by-need lambda calculus with letrec. Bisimilarity simplifies equivalence proofs in the calculus and opens a way for more convenient correctness proofs for program transformations. Although this property may be a natural one to expect, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one providing a proof. The proof technique is to transfer the contextual approximation into Abramsky's lazy lambda calculus by a fully abstract and surjective translation. This also shows that the natural embedding of Abramsky's lazy lambda calculus into the call-by-need lambda calculus with letrec is an isomorphism between the respective term-models.We show that the equivalence property proven in this paper transfers to a call-by-need letrec calculus developed by Ariola and Felleisen.
A logical framework consisting of a polymorphic call-by-value functional language and a first-order logic on the values is presented, which is a reconstruction of the logic of the verification system VeriFun. The reconstruction uses contextual semantics to define the logical value of equations. It equates undefinedness and non-termination, which is a standard semantical approach. The main results of this paper are: Meta-theorems about the globality of several classes of theorems in the logic, and proofs of global correctness of transformations and deduction rules. The deduction rules of VeriFun are globally correct if rules depending on termination are appropriately formulated. The reconstruction also gives hints on generalizations of the VeriFun framework: reasoning on nonterminating expressions and functions, mutual recursive functions and abstractions in the data values, and formulas with arbitrary quantifier prefix could be allowed.
Over the past few decades, changes in market conditions such as globalisation and deregulation of financial markets as well as product innovation and technical advancements have induced financial institutions to expand their business activities beyond their traditional boundaries and to engage in cross-sectoral operations. As combining different sectoral businesses offers opportunities for operational synergies and diversification benefits, financial groups comprising banks, insurance undertakings and/or investment firms, usually referred to as financial conglomerates, have rapidly emerged, providing a wide range of services and products in distinct financial sectors and oftentimes in different geographic locations. In the European Union (EU), financial conglomerates have become part of the biggest and most active financial market participants in recent years. Financial conglomerates generally pose new problems for financial authorities as they can raise new risks and exacerbate existing ones. In particular, their cross-sectoral business activities can involve prudentially substantial risks such as the risk of regulatory arbitrage and contagion risk arising from intra-group transactions. Moreover, the generally large size of financial conglomerates as well as the high complexity and interconnectedness of their corporate structures and risk exposures can entail substantial systemic risk and can therefore threaten the stability of the financial system as a whole. Until a few years ago, there was no supervisory framework in place which addressed a financial conglomerate in its entirety as a group. Instead, each group entity within a financial conglomerate was subject to the supervisory rules of its pertinent sector only. Such silo supervisory approach had the drawback of not taking account of risks which arise or aggravate at the group level. It also failed to consider how the risks from different business lines within the group interrelate with each other and affect the group as a whole. In order to address this lack of group-wide prudential supervision of financial conglomerates, the European legislator adopted the Financial Conglomerates Directive 2002/87/EC8 (‘FCD’) on 16 December 2002. The FCD was transposed into national law in the member states of the EU (‘Member States’) by 11 August 2004 for application to financial years beginning on 1 January 2005 and after. The FCD primarily aims at supplementing the existing sectoral directives to address the additional risks of concentration, contagion and complexity presented by financial conglomerates. It therefore provides for a supervisory framework which is applicable in addition to the sectoral supervision. Most importantly, the FCD has introduced additional capital requirements at the conglomerate level so as to prevent the multiple use of the same capital by different group entities. This paper seeks to examine to what extent the FCD provides for an adequate capital regulation of financial conglomerates in the EU while taking into account the underlying sectoral capital requirements and the inherent risks associated with financial conglomerates. In Part 1, the definition and the basic corporate models of financial conglomerates will be presented (I), followed by an illustration of the core motives behind the phenomenon of financial conglomeration (II) and an overview of the development of the supervision over financial conglomerates in the EU (III). Part 2 begins with a brief elaboration on the role of regulatory capital (I) and gives a general overview of the EU capital requirements applicable to banks and insurance undertakings respectively. A delineation of the commonalities and differences of the banking and the insurance capital requirements will be provided (II). It continues to further examine the need for a group-wide capital regulation of financial conglomerates and analyses the adequacy of the FCD capital requirements. In this context, the technical advice rendered by the Joint Committee on Financial Conglomerates (JCFC) as well as the currently ongoing legislative reforms at the EU level will be discussed (III). The paper finally closes with a conclusion and an outlook on remaining open issues (IV).
This study examines the legal environment of netting agreements covering financial contracts. It concludes that an international instrument should be developed capable of improving the effectiveness of netting agreements in mitigating systemic risk. To this end, two different aspects of the enforceability of netting agreements are considered: (i) the general enforceability of netting, and (ii) the possibility of precluding the operation of netting a mechanism by way of a regulatory moratorium for considerations of systemic stability. The first part of the study presents the use of netting and the various forms it may take before going on to explain the benefits and drawbacks of enforceable netting agreements. Benefits for individual firms consist in lower counterparty risk and more favourable capital requirements. Benefits for the financial market as a whole flow from greater financial market stability since the contagion of systemically relevant institutions by the default or insolvency of another institution is limited, thus helping to avoid systemic effects. Additionally, the use of netting arrangements can improve overall market liquidity. A potential drawback of enforceability of netting, in certain situations, is that the operation of a netting mechanism could actually work against the purpose of systemic stability where the transfer of parts of the business of an insolvent financial institution to a solvent bridge entity would enhance or maintain value to a greater extent than the operation of a netting agreement would. Regulatory authorities are considering under which conditions a moratorium to halt the netting mechanism until the situation is solved could avoid this threat to systemic stability. The second part of the study examines whether there is the potential to support the purpose of enhanced systemic stability by way of international harmonisation of private and insolvency law. As regards the issue of general enforceability, the global picture of netting legislation is heterogeneous. Given the great practical relevance of the matter, an international instrument could be very useful. As to the issue of private law consequences of regulatory moratoria, the absence of a harmonised framework appears to lead to actual cross-border inconsistency and legal uncertainty as regards financial contracts that are governed by a foreign law. Taking these to aspects into account, this paper recommends that work on developing an international instrument be undertaken. The final part of the study suggests a set of preliminary guidelines for the development of suchan instrument. In the light of the findings of the previous sections, a mixed, two-step approach is recommended. First, a non-binding instrument could be developed, serving as a benchmark and reservoir of legal solutions in respect of the relevant issues. Secondly, isolated aspects relating to both the general enforceability of netting and the accommodation of a regulatory moratorium in foreign private and insolvency law could be dealt with in an international Convention, in particular where cross-border situations involving netting require uniformity of applicable legal rules.