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A premise of the capabilities perspective in strategy is that firm-specific capabilities allow some firms to be unusually adept at exploiting growth opportunities. Since few firms have the capacity to internally generate the quantity or variety of strategic resources needed to exploit growth opportunities, the ability to externally acquire complementary resources is critical to the acquisition of competitive advantage. However, the external sourcing of resources exposes the firm’s strategic resources to risks of expropriation. We argue this threat gives capable firms incentive to use internally generated strategic resources to pursue growth opportunities before turning to external sources. A pecking order theory of strategic resource deployment is implied. Data from a 22-year sample of cross-border investment partnership decisions made by U.S.-based venture capital firms lend support to our theory.
This paper investigates whether the overpricing of out-of-the money single stock calls can be explained by Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) cumulative prospect theory (CPT). We argue that these options are overpriced because investors overweight small probability events and overpay for such positively skewed securities, i.e., characteristics of lottery tickets. We match a set of subjective density functions derived from risk-neutral densities, including CPT with the empirical probability distribution of U.S. equity returns. We find that overweighting of small probabilities embedded in CPT explains on average the richness of out-of-the money single stock calls better than other utility functions. The degree that agents overweight small probability events is, however, strongly timevarying and has a horizon effect, which implies that it is less pronounced in options of longer maturity. We also find that time-variation in overweighting of small probabilities is strongly explained by market sentiment, as in Baker and Wurgler (2006).
This paper sets the background for the Special Issue of the Journal of Empirical Finance on the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. It identifies the channel through which risks in the financial industry leaked into the public sector. It discusses the role of the bank rescues in igniting the sovereign debt crisis and reviews approaches to detect early warning signals to anticipate the buildup of crises. It concludes with a discussion of potential implications of sovereign distress for financial markets.
Low probability events are overweighted in the pricing of out-of the-money index puts and single stock calls. We find that this behavioral bias is strongly time-varying, linked to equity market sentiment, and higher moments of the risk-neutral density. An implied volatility (IV) sentiment measure that is jointly derived from index and single stock options explains investors' overweight of tail events the best. Our findings also suggest that IV-sentiment predicts equity markets reversals better than overweight of small probabilities itself. When employed in a trading strategy, IV-sentiment delivers economically significant results, which are more consistent than the ones produced by the market sentiment factor. The joint use of information from the single stock and index option markets seems to explain the forecasting power of IV-sentiment. Out-of-sample tests on reversal prediction show that our IV-sentiment measure adds value over and above traditional factors in the equity risk premium literature, especially as an equity-buying signal. This reversals prediction seems to improve time-series and cross-sectional momentum strategies.
We investigate the effect of overreaction in the fine art market. Using a unique sample of auction prices of modern prints, we define an overvalued (undervalued) print as a print that was bought for a price above (below) its high (low) auction pricing estimate. Based on the overreaction hypothesis, we predict that overvalued (undervalued) prints generate a negative (positive) excess return at a subsequent sale. Our empirical findings confirm our expectations. We report that prints that were bought for a price 10 percent above (below) its high (low) pricing estimate generate a positive (negative) excess return of 12 percent (17 percent) after controlling for the general price movement on the prints market. The price correction for overvalued (undervalued) prints is more pronounced during recessions (expansions).
This paper investigates how biases in macroeconomic forecasts are associated with economic surprises and market responses across asset classes around US data announcements. We find that the skewness of the distribution of economic forecasts is a strong predictor of economic surprises, suggesting that forecasters behave strategically (rational bias) and possess private information. Our results also show that consensus forecasts of US macroeconomic releases embed anchoring. Under these conditions, both economic surprises and the returns of assets that are sensitive to macroeconomic conditions are predictable. Our findings indicate that local equities and bond markets are more predictable than foreign markets, currencies and commodities. Economic surprises are found to link to asset returns very distinctively through the stages of the economic cycle, whereas they strongly depend on economic releases being inflation- or growth-related. Yet, when forecasters fail to correctly forecast the direction of economic surprises, regret becomes a relevant cognitive bias to explain asset price responses. We find that the behavioral and rational biases encountered in US economic forecasting also exists in Continental Europe, the United Kingdom and Japan, albeit, to a lesser extent.
Reliability and relevance of fair values : private equity investments and investee fundamentals
(2018)
We directly test the reliability and relevance of fair values reported by listed private equity firms (LPEs), where the unit of account for fair value measurement attribute (FVM) is an investment stake in an individual investee company. FVMs are observable for multiple investment stakes, fair values are economically important, and granular data on investee economic fundamentals that should underpin fair values are available in public disclosures. We find that LPE fund managers determine valuations based on accounting-based fundamentals—equity book value and net income—that are in line with those investors derive for listed companies. Additionally, our findings suggest that LPE fund managers apply a lower valuation weight to investee net income if direct market inputs are unobservable during investment value estimation. We interpret these findings as evidence that LPE fund managers do not appear mechanically to apply market valuation weights for publicly traded investees when determining valuations of non-listed. We also document that the judgments that LPE fund managers apply when determining investee valuations appear to be perceived as reliable by their investors.
We investigate the characteristics of infrastructure as an asset class from an investment perspective of a limited partner. While non U.S. institutional investors gain exposure to infrastructure assets through a mix of direct investments and private fund vehicles, U.S. investors predominantly invest in infrastructure through private funds. We find that the stream of cash flows delivered by private infrastructure funds to institutional investors is very similar to that delivered by other types of private equity, as reflected by the frequency and amounts of net cash flows. U.S. public pension funds perform worse than other institutional investors in their infrastructure fund investments, although they are exposed to underlying deals with very similar project stage, concession terms, ownership structure, industry, and geographical location. By selecting funds that invest in projects with poor financial performance, U.S. public pension funds have created an implicit subsidy to infrastructure as an asset class, which we estimate within the range of $730 million to $3.16 billion per year depending on the benchmark.
We study the relevance of signaling and marketing as explanations for the discount control mechanisms that a closed-end fund may choose to adopt in its prospectus. These policies are designed to narrow the potential gap between share price and net asset value, measured by the fund’s discount. The two most common discount control mechanisms are explicit discretion to repurchase shares based on the magnitude of the fund discount and mandatory continuation votes that provide shareholders the opportunity to liquidate the fund. We find very limited evidence that a discount control mechanism serves as costly signal of information. Funds with mandatory voting are not more likely to delist than the rest of the CEFs in general or whenever the fund discount is large. Similarly, funds that explicitly discuss share repurchases as a potential response do not subsequently buy back shares more often when discounts do increase. Instead, the existence of these policies is more consistent with marketing explanations because the policies are associated with an increased probability of issuing more equity in subsequent periods.
Direct financing of consumer credit by individual investors or non-bank institutions through an implementation of marketplace lending is a relatively new phenomenon in financial markets. The emergence of online platforms has made this type of financial intermediation widely available. This paper analyzes the performance of marketplace lending using proprietary cash flow data for each individual loan from the largest platform, Lending Club. While individual loan characteristics would be important for amateur investors holding a few loans, sophisticated lenders, including institutional investors, usually form broad portfolios to benefit from diversification. We find high risk-adjusted performance of approximately 40 basis points per month for these basic loan portfolios. This abnormal performance indicates that Lending Club, and similar marketplace lenders, are likely to attract capital to finance a growing share of the consumer credit market. In the absence of a competitive response from traditional credit providers, these loans lower costs to the ultimate borrowers and increase returns for the ultimate lenders.