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This paper studies a consumption-portfolio problem where money enters the agent's utility function. We solve the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and provide closed-form solutions for the optimal consumption and portfolio strategy both in an infinite- and finite-horizon setting. For the infinite-horizon problem, the optimal stock demand is one particular root of a polynomial. In the finite-horizon case, the optimal stock demand is given by the inverse of the solution to an ordinary differential equation that can be solved explicitly. We also prove verification results showing that the solution to the Bellman equation is indeed the value function of the problem. From an economic point of view, we find that in the finite-horizon case the optimal stock demand is typically decreasing in age, which is in line with rules of thumb given by financial advisers and also with recent empirical evidence.
This paper studies a consumption-portfolio problem where money enters the agent's utility function. We solve the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and provide closed-form solutions for the optimal consumption and portfolio strategy both in an infinite- and finite-horizon setting. For the infinite-horizon problem, the optimal stock demand is one particular root of a polynomial. In the finite-horizon case, the optimal stock demand is given by the inverse of the solution to an ordinary differential equation that can be solved explicitly. We also prove verification results showing that the solution to the Bellman equation is indeed the value function of the problem. From an economic point of view, we find that in the finite-horizon case the optimal stock demand is typically decreasing in age, which is in line with rules of thumb given by financial advisers and also with recent empirical evidence.
The paper provides an overview and an economic analysis of the development of the corporate governance of German banks since the 1950s, highlighting peculiarities – as seen from the meanwhile prevailing standard model perspective – of the German case. These peculiarities refer to the specific German notion and legal-institutional regime of corporate governance in general as well as to the specific three-pillar structure of the German banking system.
The most striking changes in the corporate governance of German banks during the past 50 years occurred in the case of the large shareholder-owned banks. For them, capital markets have become an important element of corporate governance, and their former orientation towards the interests of a broadly defined set of stakeholders has largely been replaced by a one-sided concentration on shareholders’ interests. In contrast, the corporate governance regimes of the smaller local public savings banks and the local cooperative banks have remained virtually unchanged. They acknowledge a broader horizon of stakeholder interests and put an emphasis on monitoring.
The Great Financial Crisis, beginning in 2007, has led to a considerable reassessment in the academic and political debate on bank governance. On an international level, it has revived the older notion that, in view of their high leverage and their innate complexity, banks are “special” and bank corporate governance also – and needs to be seen in this light, not least because research indicates that banks with a strong and one-sided shareholder orientation – and thus with what appears to be the best corporate governance according to the standard model – have suffered most in the crisis. In the German case, the crisis has shown that the smaller local banks have survived the crisis much better than large private and public banks, whose funding strongly depends on wholesale markets. This may point to certain advantages of their governance and ownership regimes. But the differences in the performance during the crisis years may also, or even more so, be a consequence of the business models of large vs small banks than of their different governance regimes.
Under Solvency II, corporate governance requirements are a complementary, but nonetheless essential, element to build a sound regulatory framework for insurance undertakings, also to address risks not specifically mitigated by the sole solvency capital requirements. After recalling the provisions of the second pillar concerning the system of governance, the paper is devoted to highlight the emerging regulatory trends in the corporate governance of insurance firms. Among others, it signals the exceptional extension of the duties and responsibilities assigned to the Board of directors, far beyond the traditional role of both monitoring the chief executive officer, and assessing the overall direction and strategy of the business. However, a better risk governance is not necessarily built on narrow rule-based approaches to corporate governance.
Under Solvency II, corporate governance requirements are a complementary, but nonetheless essential, element to build a sound regulatory framework for insurance undertakings, also to address risks not specifically mitigated by the sole solvency capital requirements. After recalling the provisions of the Second Pillar concerning the system of governance, the paper highlights the emerging regulatory trends in the corporate governance of insurance firms. Among others things, it signals the exceptional extension of the duties and responsibilities assigned to the board of directors, far beyond the traditional role of both monitoring the chief executive officer, and assessing the overall direction and strategy of the business. However, a better risk governance is not necessarily built on narrow rule-based approaches to corporate governance.
A counterparty credit limit (CCL) is a limit imposed by a financial institution to cap its maximum possible exposure to a specified counterparty. Although CCLs are designed to help institutions mitigate counterparty risk by selective diversification of their exposures, their implementation restricts the liquidity that institutions can access in an otherwise centralized pool. We address the question of how this mechanism impacts trade prices and volatility, both empirically and via a new model of trading with CCLs. We find empirically that CCLs cause little impact on trade. However, our model highlights that in extreme situations, CCLs could serve to destabilize prices and thereby influence systemic risk.
Das Clearing von Euro-OTC-Derivaten post Brexit – eine Analyse der vorliegenden Kostenschätzungen
(2017)
Im Zusammenhang mit dem Brexit wird über die Kosten einer Relokation des Clearing des Euro-OTC-Derivate-Geschäftes auf ein EU-CCP diskutiert. Das vorliegende Papier zeigt, dass die bislang vorliegenden Kostenschätzungen, die von Kosten in Höhe von bis zu USD 100 Mrd. für einen Zeitraum von fünf Jahren ausgehen, viel zu hoch sind. Die erwarteten Kosten einer Relokation liegen vielmehr bei ca. USD 0,6 Mrd. p.a. bzw. ca. USD 3,2 Mrd. für eine Übergangsphase von fünf Jahren. Angesichts der hohen Bedeutung von systemrelevanten CCPs für die Stabilität der Eurozone sollten diese Kosten nicht entscheidungsrelevant für eine Relokation sein.
We analyze older individuals’ debt and financial vulnerability using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the National Financial Capability Study (NFCS). Specifically, in the HRS we examine three different cohorts (individuals age 56–61) in 1992, 2004, and 2010 to evaluate cross-cohort changes in debt over time. We also use two waves of the NFCS (2012 and 2015) to gain additional insights into debt management and older individuals’ capacity to shield themselves against shocks. We show that recent cohorts have taken on more debt and face more financial insecurity, mostly due to having purchased more expensive homes with smaller down payments.
Helmut Siekmann erläutert in seinem Beitrag die Einstandspflicht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für die Deutsche Bundesbank und die Europäische Zentralbank. Dabei kommt er zu dem Schluss, dass weder eine „Haftung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für Verluste der EZB noch eine Verpflichtung zur Auffüllung von aufgezehrtem Eigenkapital“ besteht.
Dieser Beitrag ist zuerst erschienen in: Festschrift für Theodor Baums zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, S. 1145-1179, Helmut Siekmann, Andreas Cahn, Tim Florstedt, Katja Langenbucher, Julia Redenius-Hövermann, Tobias Tröger, Ulrich Segna, Hrsg., Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2017
We study the impact of estimation errors of firms on social welfare. For this purpose, we present a model of the insurance market in which insurers face parameter uncertainty about expected loss sizes. As consumers react to under- and overestimation by increasing and decreasing demand, respectively, insurers require a safety loading for parameter uncertainty. If the safety loading is too small, less risk averse consumers benefit from less informed insurers by speculating on them underestimating expected losses. Otherwise, social welfare increases with insurers’ information. We empirically estimate safety loadings in the US property and casualty insurance market, and show that these are likely to be sufficiently large for consumers to benefit from more informed insurers.