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This paper analyzes the inherent dangers of paternalist economic policies associated with the newly established economic sub-disciplines of behavioral economics, economic happiness research and economic psychology. While the authors in general welcome these sub-disciplines for enriching and critically evaluating mainstream economics – especially their criticism of the Homo oeconomicus-heuristic is of great value contributing to a more realistic idea of man –, the political-economic implications as well as inherent risks of paternalist economic policies should be received with concern and thus be subject to a critical review. The paper is structured as follows: In the first step, we recapitulate Kahneman’s, Thaler/Sunstein’s, and Layard’s versions of paternalism pointing at similarities and differences alike. We contrast libertarian or soft paternalism of behavioral economics (Thaler/Sunstein) and economic psychology (Kahneman) with (Layard’s) happiness economics and its hard paternalism. In the second step, we analyze the political and economic implications and consequences of paternalism. We give an overview of the main points of criticism of paternalism from a constitutional economics perspective. The Ordnungs- vs. Prozesspolitik argument is discussed as well as epistemological, political-economic or idea of man arguments. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
Over-allotment arrangements are nowadays part of almost any initial public offering. The underwriting banks borrow stocks from the previous shareholders to issue more than the initially announced number of shares. This is combined with the option to cover this short position at the issue price. We present empirical evidence on the value of these arrangements to the underwriters of initial public offerings on the Neuer Markt. The over-allotment arrangement is regarded as a portfolio of a long call option and a short position in a forward contract on the stock, which is different from other approaches presented in the literature.
Given the economically substantial values for these option-like claims we try to identify benefits to previous shareholders or new investors when the company is using this instrument in the process of going public. Although we carefully control for potential endogeneity problems, we find virtually no evidence for a reduction in underpricing for firms using over-allotment arrangements. Furthermore, we do not find evidence for more pronounced price stabilization activities or better aftermarket performance for firms granting an over-allotment arrangement to the underwriting banks.
Option-implied information and predictability of extreme returns : [Version 24 September 2012]
(2012)
We study whether option-implied conditional expectation of market loss due to tail events, or tail loss measure, contains information about future returns, especially the negative ones. Our tail loss measure predicts future market returns, magnitude, and probability of the market crashes, beyond and above other option-implied variables. Stock-specific tail loss measure predicts individual expected returns and magnitude of realized stock-specific crashes in the cross-section of stocks. An investor, especially the one who cares about the left tail of her wealth distribution (e.g., disappointment-averse), benefits from using the tail loss measure as an information variable to construct managed portfolios of a risk-free asset and market index. The tail loss measure is motivated by the results of the extreme value theory, and it is computed from observed prices of out-of-the-money put as the risk-neutral expected value of a loss beyond a given relative threshold.
We determine optimal monetary policy under commitment in a forwardlooking New Keynesian model when nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero. The lower bound represents an occasionally binding constraint that causes the model and optimal policy to be nonlinear. A calibration to the U.S. economy suggests that policy should reduce nominal interest rates more aggressively than suggested by a model without lower bound. Rational agents anticipate the possibility of reaching the lower bound in the future and this amplifies the effects of adverse shocks well before the bound is reached. While the empirical magnitude of U.S. mark-up shocks seems too small to entail zero nominal interest rates, shocks affecting the natural real interest rate plausibly lead to a binding lower bound. Under optimal policy, however, this occurs quite infrequently and does not imply positive average inflation rates in equilibrium. Interestingly, the presence of binding real rate shocks alters the policy response to (non-binding) mark-up shocks.
We study platform design in online markets in which buying involves a (non-monetary) cost for consumers caused by privacy and security concerns. Firms decide whether to require registration at their website before consumers learn relevant product information. We derive conditions under which a monopoly seller benefits from ex ante registration requirements and demonstrate that the profitability of registration requirements is increased when taking into account the prospect of future purchases or an informational value of consumer registration to the
rm. Moreover, we consider the effectiveness of discounts (store credit) as a means to influence the consumers-registration decision. Finally, we con
rm the profitability of ex ante registration requirements in the presence of price competition.
We study the effect of weakening creditor rights on distress risk premia via a bankruptcy reform that shifts bargaining power in financial distress toward shareholders. We find that the reform reduces risk factor loadings and returns of distressed stocks. The effect is stronger for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power. An increase in credit spreads of riskier relative to safer firms, in particular for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power, confirms a shift in bargaining power from bondholders to shareholders. Out-of-sample tests reveal that a reversal of the reform's effects leads to a reversal of factor loadings and returns.
This paper shows that a capital budgeting process in which the division manager is required to engage in personally costly influence activities prior to a project approval has beneficial incentive effects: It provides the manager with incentives to acquire costly information about project prospects and helps to elicit the revelation of the acquired information. As a consequence, imposing influence costs on the manager can lead to improved capital allocations. The optimal level of influence costs, chosen by the firm, trades off ex ante incentives for information acquisition against efficient use of the acquired information ex post.
In the event of a Greek exit from the Eurozone, the stronger members of the monetary union, especially Germany, face at least two risks: First, the debt of the Greek National Bank vis-à-vis the Eurosystem of central banks will most likely be lost. Secondly, the large flow of capital from Greece and other periphery countries to Germany will accelerate inflation.
On January 29, 2014, EU Commissioner Barnier published a draft law proposing a ban for proprietary trading by big banks in Europe. In this opinion piece, published in a German newspaper on 30 January, 2014, Jan Pieter Krahnen, who was a member of the Liikanen Commission, argues that the proposal could prove to be effective in preventing systemic risk.
2008/9 sees the 60th anniversary of the German economic and currency reform of June 20, 1948, and the adoption of the Grundgesetz on May 23, 1949, which committed the country to the ideals of a socially committed market economy. Both of these events are important points along the path taken by the Federal Republic of Germany to reach the system of a social market economy. Since the term, Social Market Economy is often used in several different contexts and sometimes to mean contradictory things, we must ask: what exactly does the term social market economy entail? What economic-ethical ideas and theories are behind it? This paper will trace the origins of the social market economy (chapter 2) and explain the central characteristics of the Freiburg School of Economics (chapter 3), one of the main pillars of the social market economy. Central to this paper is the oeuvre of Walter Eucken, one of the leading representatives of the ordoliberal Freiburg School. The aim is to identify socio-political factors of influence and inspiration on his theory of economic policy (chapter 4) and evaluate similarities to the works of Kant, Smith and other economic philosophers. Chapter 5 will seek to elucidate Eucken’s “Program of Liberty”. We shall also allow ourselves a slight diversion to elaborate on the parallels between this work and Kant’s understanding of freedom and autonomy. Chapter 6 deals with Eucken’s dual requirements of an economic and social order (i.e. functioning and humane socio-economic order). In chapter 7, we seek to answer – with considerable reference to Adam Smith – to what extent it can be assumed that self-interest and the common good are mutually compatible. This paper concludes with a few remarks about the topicality of ordoliberalism in relation to modern, German-speaking economic ethics (chapter 8).
This paper explores the various personal and intellectual links between Edmund Husserl, Rudolf and Walter Eucken. Our interdisciplinary approach gives an insight into Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, Walter Eucken’s Ordoliberalism as well as in the interdependency between phenomenology and economics for which Rudolf Eucken’s philosophy of intellectual life plays an important role. Particular affiliations between phenomenology and economics can be found in the following topics: epistemology, the idea of man, the comprehension of liberty and the importance of legal or social orders, institutional rules and frameworks of regulations.
The exceptional circumstances in which the ECB has been operating in the past years are testing not only the currency union itself, but also its institutional design. While the Governing Council of the ECB was designed to mainly set interest rates optimally for the union as a whole, the recent crisis has expanded the tools of the ECB to include unconventional monetary policy actions that potentially increase the risk exposure of its balance sheet. Since each country would contribute to the losses according to its capital key, a different voting mechanism that takes into account the single country’s contribution to the ECB’s capital could be advisable.
Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoring-intensive financing (young, small, and innovative firms) have a multitude of bank lenders, where one may be special in the sense of relationship lending. However, theory does not tell us a lot about the economic rationale for relationship lending in the context of multiple bank financing. To fill this gap, we analyze the optimal debt structure in a model that allows for multiple but asymmetric bank financing. The optimal debt structure balances the risk of lender coordination failure from multiple lending and the bargaining power of a pivotal relationship bank. We show that firms with low expected cash-flows or low interim liquidation values of assets prefer asymmetric financing, while firms with high expected cash-flow or high interim liquidation values of assets tend to finance without a relationship bank.
We propose a new framework for modeling time dependence in duration processes. The ACD approach introduced by Engle and Russell (1998) will be extended so that the conditional expectation of the durations depends on an unobservable stochastic process which is modeled via a Markov chain. The Markov switching ACD model (MSACD) is a flexible tool for description of financial duration processes. The introduction of a latent information regime variable can be justified in the light of recent market microstructure theories. In an empirical application we show that the MSACD approach is able to capture specific characteristics of inter trade durations while alternative ACD models fail. JEL classification: C41, C22, C25, C51, G14
Recent empirical research suggests that measures of investor sentiment have predictive power for future stock returns at intermediate and long horizons. Given that sentiment indicators are widely published, smart investors should exploit the information conveyed by the indicator and thus trigger an immediate market response to the publication of the sentiment indicator. The present paper is the first to empirically analyze whether this immediate response can be identified in the data. We use survey-based sentiment indicators from two countries (Germany and the US). Consistent with previous research we find predictability at intermediate horizons. However, the predictability in the US largely disappears after 1994. Using event study methodology we find that the publication of sentiment indicators affects market returns. The sign of this immediate response is the same as the sign of the intermediate horizon predictability. This is consistent with sentiment being related to mispricing but is inconsistent with the sentiment indicator providing information about future expected returns.
JEL-Classification: G12, G14
This contribution draws on two recent publications in which the macroeconomic model data base (www.macromodelbase.com) is employed for model comparisons. The comparative approach is used to base policy analysis on a systematic evaluation of the different implications that a certain economic policy can have when submitted to different modeling approaches. In this manner, policy recommendations are more robust to modeling uncertainty. By extending the comparative approach to forecasting, the authors investigate the accuracy of different forecasting models and obtain more reliable mean forecasts.
This article discusses the effects of the countercyclical premium discussed in insurance supervision in the context of Solvency II. While the basic principle of introducing countercyclical elements into Solvency II is endorsed, the authors argue for a system based on market scenarios which would enforce stricter capital requirements in boom times and less strict requirements in times of crisis.
Discussions of the international dimension of the global economic crisis have frequently focused on the build-up of large current account "imbalances" since the mid-1990s. This paper examines the extent to which the U.S. current account can be understood in a purely real open-economy DSGE model, were agents' perception of long-run growth evolves over time in response to changes in productivity. We first show that long-run growth forecasts based on
ltering actual productivity growth comove strongly with survey measures of expectations. Simulating the model, we
nd that including data on U.S. TFP growth and the world real interest rate can, under standard parametrizations of our model, explain the evolution of the U.S. current account quite closely. With household preference that allow positive labor supply e¤ects after favorable news of future income, we can also generate output movements in line with the data.
This paper presents a theory that explains why it is beneficial for banks to engage in circular lending activities on the interbank market. Using a simple network structure, it shows that if there is a non-zero bailout probability, banks can significantly increase the expected repayment of uninsured creditors by entering into cyclical liabilities on the interbank market before investing in loan portfolios. Therefore, banks are better able to attract funds from uninsured creditors. Our results show that implicit government guarantees incentivize banks to have large interbank exposures, to be highly interconnected, and to invest in highly correlated, risky portfolios. This can serve as an explanation for the observed high interconnectedness between banks and their investment behavior in the run-up to the subprime mortgage crisis.