Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (149)
- Conference Proceeding (101)
- Article (97)
- Part of a Book (15)
- Doctoral Thesis (11)
- Review (11)
- Preprint (3)
- Report (2)
- Other (1)
Language
- English (390) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (390) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (390) (remove)
Keywords
- Deutschland (14)
- Democracy (8)
- Corporate Governance (7)
- human rights (7)
- law (7)
- Internet (6)
- Law (6)
- Rule of Law (5)
- climate change (5)
- democracy (5)
Institute
- Rechtswissenschaft (390) (remove)
The bare life and (the) modern law : a journey to some key concepts or conceptions of Agamben
(2012)
This text is imitating a journey which tries to explore what is completely unknown. It starts Homo Sacer and traces some key concepts namely der Muselmann, bare life, state of exception, sovereignty and nihilism in law. Doing so, it hopes to reach a general picture of biopolitics or biopower according to Agamben. So, first part of this text generally tries to clarify some fundamental concepts or conceptions in order to use them for its aim. The second part suggests an alternative reading of Agamben, centered around his concept of der Muselmann which is the ultimate figure defined by Primo Levi and Agamben chooses the term because of its resemblance to or representation of Homo Sacer. Der Muselmann was a derogatory term in its origin and very meaning has still been unclear today. So, the second part tries to clarify the meaning of der Muselmann (and unbaptized babies) from a different outlook, not from outside but inside of the referred concept. It tries to show a Muslim’s image of a non Muslim world in order to reveal what are the very meanings of sovereignty, law and biopolitics. So at the end of the journey, this text hopes to reach a different picture of modern life and a modern law.
In this article, I examine how open borders can serve the idea of global distributive justice by asking how or how not the existing practices of immigration to rich countries may contribute to global economic redistribution. There are two observations. First, migration is not the redistributive option that anyone has an equal access. In order to make use of migration as a means of global redistribution, rich countries need to provide a chance to migrate to those who cannot afford movement by themselves. Second, as long as brain-drain problems happen, what the perspective of global distributive justice requires is the compensation for some educational cost of raising professionals or some control of their movement. Immigration admissions largely focusing on getting highly skilled professionals may not serve the idea of global redistribution.
In reconsideration of the composition and operation of European law, it is the description of its underlying mentality that may cast best light on the query whether European law is the extension of domestic laws or a sui generis product. As to its action, European law is destructive upon the survival of traditions of legal positivism, for it recalls post modern clichés rather. Like a solar system with planets, it is two-centred from the beginning, commissioning both implementation and judicial check to member states. As part of global post modernism, a) European law stems from artificial reality construction freed from particular historical experience and, indeed, anything given hic et nunc. By its operation, b) it dynamises large structures and sets in motion that what is chaos itself. It is owing to reconstructive human intent solely that any outcome can at all be seen as fitting to some ideal of order, albeit neither operation nor daily management strives for implementing any systemicity. This is the way in which the European law becomes adequate reflection of the underlying (macro) economic basis, which it is to serve as superstructure. Accordingly, c) the entire construct is operated (as integrated into one well-working unit) within the framework of an artificially animated dynamism. With its “order out of chaos” philosophy it assures member states’ standing involvement and competition, achieving a flexibly self-adapting (and unprecedentedly high degree of) conformity.
As is well known, the 2nd Spanish Republic (1931-1936) was toppled by a military uprising which, after a cruel Civil War, set up an autocratic regime led by General Franco which lasted until his natural death in 1975. According to the contemporary theory of the legal system, a legal order exists on the sole condition that it is efficient in general terms and this was the case for both the Republic and the Dictatorship. In turn, the validity of the legal norms of all legal orders is based on its respective rules of recognition. Thus, neither the existence of the legal order nor the validity of its respective legal norms depends on moral considerations. In this paper, we call this affirmation into question on the base of the fact that the compensatory methods adopted from the Transition to Democracy show an evident concern to repair the damage of taking away a person’s basic rights (life, health, freedom, expression, association etc) although the Spanish Constitution, with its catalogue of fundamental rights was not in force at that time. But these measures would not have much sense if, as Raz says, there was no shared content which is common to all legal systems. Like Nino, we claim that one must discriminate between a democratic legal order and an autocratic one to establish the level of validity of its respective legal norms. Thus it can be assigned a presumption of justice to democratic norms. Finally, we state that the criteria to weigh up the justice or injustice of legal norms, as that of legal orders, takes root in the level of respect they show towards human rights.
You wait ages for a bus, the saying goes, and then two (or three) come along at once. A similar feeling set in when Oxford University Press published two volumes on legal history in its Oxford Handbooks series within the space of four weeks last year. They are a welcome addition to the prestigious and well-established series that now boasts hundreds of volumes, including around 50 on history and over three dozen on law. The latter do not only cover established sub-disciplines of legal studies, such as jurisprudence and philosophy of law (2002), comparative law (2006, 2nd ed. 2019), international trade law (2009), the law of the sea (2015), European Union law (2015), criminal law (2014) and intellectual property (2018), but also more recent and emerging fields, including international environmental law (2007), empirical legal research (2010), behavioural economics and law (2014), international adjudication (2013), international climate change law (2016) and law and economics (3 vols., 2017). The Handbooks have become increasingly specialised with titles focusing on narrow topics such as individual national constitutions (USA, 2015; India, 2016; Canada, 2017) and important, but nevertheless discrete legal issues, for example, US health law (2017) and the sources of international law (2017). The obvious question was why, nearly two decades after the launch of the series, there was such a thing as an Oxford Handbook of American Sports Law (2018) but still no volume on the history of law. The absence of such a title was all the more striking in light of the publication of books in the series dealing with individual fields of legal history, such as the Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (2012), the Oxford Handbook of Roman Law and Society (2016), the Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt (2017) and the Oxford Handbook of English Law and Literature, 1500–1700 (2017). ...
Liberal political philosophy has two alternative options in principle: It can either stick to its original theorems such as the harm principle or the separation of law and morals and from here try to prove large parts of present social and political reality as wrong, illegitimate, dangerous etc. The other option is trying to adjust the original theorems to the apparent needs of modern societies, which is what I would prefer in the long run.
Dworkin`s political theory is characterized by the interpretative integrity of morality, law, and politics, the so-called “hedgehog’s approach”. The interpretative integrity approach functions on multiple levels. Firstly, philosophical foundations of his theory of justice are linked to his conception of just liberal society and state. Secondly, from the perspective of political morality, interpretative concepts of law and morality are internally connected, in addition to interpretative concepts of equality, liberty, and democracy. Thirdly, from the perspective of philosophical foundations, individual ethics, personal morality and political morality are mutually connected. The aforementioned ethical and moral foundations are also related – in a wider sense of philosophical foundations - with his gnoseological conception regarding value concepts in law, politics and morality, and with his episthemological conception regarding an objective truth in the field of values, in a sense that the value concepts are interpretative and can be objectively true when articulated in accordance with methodological rules and standards of a »reflexive equilibrium« and an interpretative integrity, and in accordance with the so-called internal scepticism in the context of value pluralism.
The term “ethics” in a “narrower” sense refers to individual ethics, the study of how to live well, while the “ethics” in a “broader” sense refers to personal morality, the study of how we must treat other people. The term “morality” however, is used primarily to denote a political morality, the issue of how a sovereign power should treat its citizens.
Philosophical foundations of Dworkin`s political theory of justice, his conception of two cardinal values of humanity, his concievement of individual ethics, personal morality and political morality will be in the focus of consideration.
This article is directed towards addressing the employment related issues encountered by female workers in the gig economy in the EU. It revolves around analysing ‘the switch’ from the traditional labour market to the platform economy. It subsequently explains, by drawing comparisons, that the issues of gender inequality in the brick and mortar world are still prevalent in world of the digital platform. In fact, new challenges have emerged which are specifically related to the gig economy. Female workers are now affected by the inherent bias of algorithms. Moreover, due to the unequivocal propagation of ‘flexibility’ which is used as a weapon to glorify the gig economy; women are even more likely to be pushed into precarious work. The other prominent issues of gender inequality like the dynamics of intersectionality, the gender pay gap and hiring policies in traditional and digital platforms are also examined. Furthermore, the existing regulatory frameworks addressing these issues are discussed with the possibility of catering to the gender inequality issues in the gig economy through policy development. The article concludes with a reflection on the need for the EU to take immediate and efficacious policy measures in respect of female workers in the gig economy.
Women are overrepresented in informal employment in the Indian labour market. They also devote more time to unpaid care work than men do. The poor working conditions of women are attributable to this double burden of work. Due to the lack of regulatory measures to protect the interest of informal women workers along with rigid gender norms, women’s participation in paid work is drastically reduced. As far as unpaid care work is concerned, feminist economists have been striving to make such work visible for a long time now. There have been some developments in labour statistics, with time use surveys quantifying women’s paid and unpaid contributions to the economy. This article delves into the examination of unpaid care work in India with the help of the Indian government’s recent Time-use Survey. It attempts to study the connection between paid work and unpaid care work and its implications for the working conditions of women in India. Finally, it evaluates the ‘right to work’ as a possible solution by using the example of employment guarantee schemes in India.
The paper examines the importance of international labour standards for ESG reporting. International labour standards exist today for almost all working conditions. There are many reasons why ESG criteria should be based on these standards. This is already happening to some extent. However, the references to international labor standards should be expanded and the existing references deepened.