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The previously published list of Coleoptera holotypes in the Museo de Historia Natural, Noel Kempff Mercado (MNKM), Santa Cruz, Bolivia is updated to include those deposited in the Museo since then though the end of 2015. Literature citations for the original descriptions of each listed holotype are also provided along with summary comments regarding family composition and authorship of included species. Photographs of collector, authors, habitats, and major Bolivian type repositories are provided.
Descriptions or diagnoses are given for 36 species of New World Eremoleon including 12 new species:
Eremoleon attenuatus, E. durangoensis, E. jacumba, E. jamaica, E. inca, E. monagas, E. morazani, E. pygmaeus, E. samne, E. tanya, E. tepuyiensis and E. venezolanus. A neotype is designated for Hesperoleon atomarius Navás 1933.
The larvae of 25 species are described and keyed. Keys to the adults and larvae are given, and biological notes are provided. Twenty-five species were reared from larvae found in cave mouths, rock overhangs, or other less common habitats; for example, E. nigribasis were found in deep recesses of mammal burrows, E. gracile were reared from reptile holes in the ground, E. punctipennis were found in beetle frass beneath logs, and E. femoralis in small twig holes or abandoned termite galleries in termite frass. Many new bombyliid and chalcidid parasites are listed.
Die Empfehlung des Corporate Governance-Kodex (Ziff. 5.4.2), „dem Aufsichtsrat soll eine nach seiner Einschätzung angemessene Anzahl unabhängiger Mitglieder angehören“, wirft in der Praxis nach wie vor Fragen auf. Im Folgenden sollen einige Thesen zur Auslegung dieser Empfehlung aufgestellt werden. Eine rechtspolitische Auseinandersetzung mit ihr und Änderungsvorschläge sind an dieser Stelle nicht beabsichtigt.
André Prüm has asked me to talk about “La Théorie de l´organe” supposing that this is a German invention. Well, we cannot claim the authorship or copyright for that, but it is true that this doctrine is still dominating German doctrinal thinking in company law. Let me first look at the historical development and background of this theory and then ask for its actual meaning and practical consequences.
„Corporate groups are a fact of life“.1 This was the starting point for a group of renowned European experts to deliver a report on a possible Directive on corporate group law in 2000.2 We all know that no such Directive has been issued.3 However, these days a fresh group of eminent experts has started, among other things, to develop an initiative „on groups of companies“.4 One reason for a European regulation to take its time might be the enormous national differences in dealing with group situations. While some countries, notably the UK,5 rely on general company law to deal with corporate groups, others provide most detailed rules specifically for groups of companies.6 German law provides an example for the latter. Do we need a law of corporate groups? Most countries regulate one or another aspect of group law.7
This is probably most common for tax and for accounting law. Insolvency law will often take group situations into account and the same is true for labour law. Regulatory oversight for financial institutions or insurance companies usually includes a group dimension. Competition law necessarily does so as well. However, in what follows when we speak about „group law“ we will focus on regulation more specifically tuned to genuine questions of company law such as the protection of minority shareholders or creditors, the standards for managerial behavior and the „enabling“ function of legal structures.
Capital maintenance rules are part of a legal capital regime that consists of rules on raising capital and rules on maintaining it. The function of these rules is the protection of the corporation’s creditors. This is evidenced by the fact that in public as well as private companies the provisions on legal capital are not open to disapplication or variation even with unanimous shareholder consent. Thus, providing the company with a minimum of funding and ensuring equal treatment of shareholders are mere reflexes of creditor protection or, at best, ancillary purposes of legal capital. Legal capital is part of a corporation’s equity. The key feature of equity is that it ranks behind the claims of other stakeholders in the distribution of a corporation’s assets. Consequently, equity will also be the first part of a corporation’s funds to be depleted by losses. Capital maintenance rules seek to enforce this order of priority of different groups of stakeholders by restricting distributions to shareholders. Such restrictions are not unique to legal systems that have adopted a legal capital regime. A prominent example of a statute that has eliminated mandatory legal capital is the Delaware General Corporation Law. § 154 DCGL leaves it up to the directors to decide whether any part of the consideration received by the corporation for its shares shall be attributed to capital. Thus, a Delaware corporation need not have any stated capital. This has significant impact on the funds available for distribution to shareholders. Pursuant to § 170 (a) DGCL dividends may only be paid out of surplus or, in the absence of surplus, out of net profits of the current or the preceding fiscal year. § 154 DGCL defines surplus as the excess of a corporation’s net assets over the amount of its capital, and net assets as the amount by which total assets exceed total liabilities. A corporation without stated capital may, therefore, distribute all of its net assets to its shareholders and continue business without any equity on its balance sheet. This highlights the difference between the different approaches to creditor protection in Germany and the U.S. Both legal systems acknowledge the priority of creditors over shareholders in corporate distributions. However, German law seeks to give creditors additional comfort by requiring companies to raise and maintain additional layers of assets above and beyond those corresponding to the company’s liabilities that may not be depleted by way of distributions to shareholders. While private companies must merely raise and maintain their stated capital, public companies are required to raise and maintain additional equity accounts unavailable for distributions to shareholders such as the share premium account1 and the legal reserve.2
In recent years a number of objections have been raised against this concept of creditor protection. Critics argue that contractual arrangements are a more efficient means for protecting the interests of creditors.3 Capital maintenance does not prevent creditors from negotiating for more stringent protection of their claims such as collateral or financial covenants. It does, however, provide a minimum standard of protection for the benefit of creditors who lack the commercial experience or the bargaining power or who, like tort victims, are simply unable to negotiate for contractual safeguards. Capital maintenance ensures that their protection against excessive distributions does not depend on large creditors who are free to waive covenants that, in effect, benefit all creditors in exchange for individual arrangements that work exclusively in their favour.
Anleihen werden in der Regel in zahlreiche Teilschuldverschreibungen aufgespalten und diese an verschiedene Investoren verkauft. Dies begründet, der Zahl der umlaufenden Teilschuldverschreibungen entsprechend, jeweils unterschiedliche Schuldverhältnisse zwischen dem Emittenten und dem jeweiligen Investor. Hält ein Investor mehrere Teilschuldverschreibungen, so entstehen dementsprechend mehrere rechtlich voneinander zu unterscheidende Schuldverhältnisse mit gleichem Inhalt.1 Diese können jeweils ein unterschiedliches rechtliches Schicksal haben, z. B. getrennt voneinander übertragen werden. Sie können auch, von atypischen Gestaltungen abgesehen, je einzeln vom Gläubiger gekündigt werden, wenn die Anleihebedingungen insoweit keine Vorkehrungen treffen. Die folgenden Bemerkungen dazu befassen sich zunächst mit der umstrittenen Frage, ob auch eine Kündigung aus wichtigem Grund seitens eines Gläubigers gemäß §§ 490 Abs. 1, 314 BGB in Betracht kommt (im Folgenden I. - VII.)
Coccolithophores are an abundant phytoplankton group that exhibit remarkable diversity in their biology, ecology, and calcitic exoskeletons (coccospheres). Their extensive fossil record is testament to their important biogeochemical role and is a valuable archive of biotic responses to environmental change stretching back over 200 million years. However, to realise the potential of this archive requires an understanding of the physiological processes that underpin coccosphere architecture. Using culturing experiments on four modern coccolithophore species (Calcidiscus leptoporus, Calcidiscus quadriperforatus, Helicosphaera carteri and Coccolithus braarudii) from three long-lived families, we investigate how coccosphere architecture responds to shifts from exponential (rapid cell division) to stationary (slowed cell division) growth phases as cell physiology reacts to nutrient depletion. These experiments reveal statistical differences in cell size and the number of coccoliths per cell between these two growth phases, specifically that cells in exponential-phase growth are typically smaller with fewer coccoliths, whereas cells experiencing growth-limiting nutrient depletion have larger coccosphere sizes and greater numbers of coccoliths per cell. Although the exact numbers are species-specific, these growthphase
shifts in coccosphere geometry demonstrate that the core physiological responses of cells to nutrient depletion results in increased cell sizes and coccoliths per cell across four different coccolithophore families (Calcidiscaceae, Coccolithaceae, Isochrysidaceae, Helicosphaeraceae), a representative diversity of this phytoplankton group. Building on this, direct comparison of coccosphere geometries in modern and fossil coccolithophores enables a proxy for growth phase to be developed that allows growth responses to environmental change to be investigated throughout their evolutionary history. Our data also shows that changes in growth rate and coccoliths per cell associated with growth-phase shifts can substantially alter cellular calcite production. Coccosphere geometry is therefore a valuable tool for accessing growth information in the fossil record that provides unprecedented insights into the biotic responses of species to environmental change and its potential biogeochemical consequences.