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In more and more situations, artificially intelligent algorithms have to model humans’ (social) preferences on whose behalf they increasingly make decisions. They can learn these preferences through the repeated observation of human behavior in social encounters. In such a context, do individuals adjust the selfishness or prosociality of their behavior when it is common knowledge that their actions produce various externalities through the training of an algorithm? In an online experiment, we let participants’ choices in dictator games train an algorithm. Thereby, they create an externality on future decision making of an intelligent system that affects future participants. We show that individuals who are aware of the consequences of their training on the pay- offs of a future generation behave more prosocially, but only when they bear the risk of being harmed themselves by future algorithmic choices. In that case, the externality of artificially intelligence training induces a significantly higher share of egalitarian decisions in the present.
In a parsimonious regime switching model, we find strong evidence that expected consumption growth varies over time. Adding inflation as a second variable, we uncover two states in which expected consumption growth is low, one with high and one with negative expected inflation. Embedded in a general equilibrium asset pricing model with learning, these dynamics replicate the observed time variation in stock return volatilities and stock- bond return correlations. They also provide an alternative derivation for a measure of time-varying disaster risk suggested by Wachter (2013), implying that both the disaster and the long-run risk paradigm can be extended towards explaining movements in the stock-bond correlation.
This article compares the three initial safety nets spanned by the European Union in response to the Covid-19 crisis: SURE, the Pandemic Crisis Support, and the European Guarantee Fund. It compares their design regarding scope, generosity, target groups, implementation, the types of solidarity and conditionality, and asks how they reflect on core-periphery relations in the EU. The article finds that the most important factor in all three instruments is risk-sharing between member states, even though SURE and the EGF display elements of fiscal solidarity. Finally, the article shows that Euro crisis countries from the South are the main recipients of financial aid, while Central and East European countries receive significantly less assistance and core countries in the North and West have no need for them.