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Risiko muss wieder kosten
(2011)
Wie kann das Projekt gemeinsame Währung seine Glaubwürdigkeit wiederherstellen? Otmar Issing argumentiert, dass eine gemeinsame Währung ohne politische Union nur mit dem No-bail-out Prinzip funktionieren kann. Er warnt gleichzeitig davor, die politische Union nur als Mittel zur Krisenbewältigung voranzutreiben.
Großer Beifall
(2012)
Außerhalb Griechenlands herrscht die Ansicht vor, dass eine höhere Wettbewerbsfähigkeit gleichbedeutend ist mit Preissenkungen für Güter und Dienstleistungen. Angesichts der begrenzten Bereitschaft in Griechenland, Reformen umzusetzen, fordern die Gläubiger drastische Lohnkürzungen, um die Produktivität zu erhöhen und die öffentlichen Ausgaben zu senken. Doch mit einer Kürzungsrunde nach der anderen lässt sich Wettbewerbsfähigkeit nicht erreichen. Umfangreiche flächendeckende Lohnkürzungen reduzieren vielmehr die erwartete Produktivität, da sie die besten Arbeitnehmer vertreiben, dem Rest Anreize zur Produktivität nehmen und neue gute Leute fernhalten.
On January 29, 2014, EU Commissioner Barnier published a draft law proposing a ban for proprietary trading by big banks in Europe. In this opinion piece, published in a German newspaper on 30 January, 2014, Jan Pieter Krahnen, who was a member of the Liikanen Commission, argues that the proposal could prove to be effective in preventing systemic risk.
Ein Freibrief für die Notenbank bedeutet, genau genommen, die Bankrotterklärung des demokratischen Verfassungsstaates vor technokratischen Beliebigkeiten, schreibt Helmut Siekmann in diesem Namensbeitrag. Er betont, dass die Europäische Union eine unverzichtbare Einrichtung ist und ein echter Bundesstaat sein sollte. Sie sei aber im Wesentlichen (nur) ein Rechtskonstrukt, weshalb es umso wichtiger sei, dass die rechtlichen Regeln, auf denen sie beruht, genauestens beachtet werden.
Panel Sample Selection ModelsThe empirical evidence currently available in the literature regarding the effects of a country's IMF program participation on its output growth is rather inconclusive. In this paper we propose and estimate a panel data sample selection model featuring state dependence. As in this model the output growth effects of program participation can be conditional on the realization of a state variable (conditional pooling), our framework may reconcile previous empirical evidence based on models without state-dependent effects. We find that the effects of IMF program participation on output growth vary systematically with an index reflecting a country's institutional record, and that output growth effects of program participation are significantly positive only if the program participation is coupled with sufficient improvement of the institutional record.
Although oil price shocks have long been viewed as one of the leading candidates for explaining U.S. recessions, surprisingly little is known about the extent to which oil price shocks explain recessions. We provide the first formal analysis of this question with special attention to the possible role of net oil price increases in amplifying the transmission of oil price shocks. We quantify the conditional recessionary effect of oil price shocks in the net oil price increase model for all episodes of net oil price increases since the mid-1970s. Compared to the linear model, the cumulative effect of oil price shocks over course of the next two years is much larger in the net oil price increase model. For example, oil price shocks explain a 3% cumulative reduction in U.S. real GDP in the late 1970s and early 1980s and a 5% cumulative reduction during the financial crisis. An obvious concern is that some of these estimates are an artifact of net oil price increases being correlated with other variables that explain recessions. We show that the explanatory power of oil price shocks largely persists even after augmenting the nonlinear model with a measure of credit supply conditions, of the monetary policy stance and of consumer confidence. There is evidence, however, that the conditional fit of the net oil price increase model is worse on average than the fit of the corresponding linear model, suggesting much smaller cumulative effects of oil price shocks for these episodes of at most 1%.
Efforts to control bank risk address the wrong problem in the wrong way. They presume that the financial crisis was caused by CEOs who failed to supervise risk-taking employees. The responses focus on executive pay, believing that executives will bring non-executives into line—using incentives to manage risk-taking—once their own pay is regulated. What they overlook is the effect on non-executive pay of the competition for talent. Even if executive pay is regulated, and executives act in the bank’s best interests, they will still be trapped into providing incentives that encourage risk-taking by non-executives due to the negative externality that arises from that competition. Greater risk-taking can increase short-term profits and, in turn, the amount a non-executive receives, potentially at the expense of long-term bank value. Non-executives, therefore, have an incentive to incur significant risk upfront so long as they can depart for a new employer before any losses materialize. The result is an upward spiral in compensation—reducing an executive’s ability to set non-executive pay and the ability of any one bank to adjust compensation to reflect risk-taking and long-term outcomes. New regulation must address the tension between compensation and competition. Regulators should take account of the effect of competition on market-wide levels of pay, including by non-banks who compete for talent. The ability of non-executives to jump from a bank employer to another financial firm should also be limited. In addition, banks should be required to include a long-term equity component in non-executive pay, with subsequent employers being restricted from compensating a new employee for any losses she incurs related to her prior work.
We examine trust and trustworthiness of individuals with varying professional preferences and experiences. Our subjects study business and economics in Frankfurt, the financial center of Germany and continental Europe. In the trust game, subjects with a high interest in working in the financial industry return 25 percent less than subjects with a low interest. We find no evidence that the extent of professional experience in the financial industry has a negative impact on trustworthiness. We also do not find any evidence that the financial industry screens out less trustworthy individuals in the hiring process. In a prediction game that is strategically equivalent to the trust game, the amount sent by first-movers was significantly smaller when the second-mover indicated a high interest in working in finance. These results suggest that the financial industry attracts less trustworthy individuals, which may contribute to the current lack of trust in its employees.
In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis that started in 2007, policymakers were forced to respond quickly and forcefully to a recession caused not by short-term factors, but rather by an over-accumulation of debt by sovereigns, banks, and households: a so-called “balance sheet recession.” Though the nature of the crisis was understood relatively early on, policy prescriptions for how to deal with its consequences have continued to diverge. This paper gives a short overview of the prescriptions, the remaining challenges and key lessons for monetary policy.
n a contribution prepared for the Athens Symposium on “Banking Union, Monetary Policy and Economic Growth”, Otmar Issing describes forward guidance by central banks as the culmination of the idea of guiding expectations by pure communication. In practice, he argues, forward guidance has proved a misguided idea. What is presented as state of the art monetary policy is an example of pretence of knowledge. Forward guidance tries to give the impression of a kind of rule-based monetary policy. De facto, however, it is an overambitious discretionary approach which, to be successful, would need much more (or rather better) information than is currently available. In Issing's view, communication must be clear and honest about the limits of monetary policy in a world of uncertainty.
Die „Rente mit 63“ hat wieder einmal den Blick auf den Renteneintritt gerichtet. In der öffentlichen Debatte werden dabei zwei Ereignisse regelmäßig vermischt: das Ende des Arbeitslebens und der Beginn der Rentenzahlung. Dabei müssen beide nicht unmittelbar aufeinander folgen. Unter bestimmten Umständen kann es finanziell attraktiv sein, die staatliche Rente nicht sofort nach dem Ausstieg aus dem Erwerbsleben zu beantragen, sondern die Ausgaben bis zum späteren Rentenbeginn durch den Abbau von Finanzkapital zu finanzieren. Dieser Beitrag gibt einen kurzen Einblick in die neueste Studie von Olivia Mitchell, Andreas Hubener und Raimund Maurer zur Alterssicherung in den USA und stellt auch Berechnungen für Deutschland auf.
This European Policy Analysis discusses the need to strengthen the institutions underpinning the euro and makes several policy recommendations. The Stability and Growth Pact must be reinforced, have greater automaticity and entail graduated sanctions. Fiscal surveillance must be improved through the establishment of a European Fiscal Stability Agency. Finally, the European Financial Stability Facility must be made permanent.
How to be a good European...
(2010)
Unter der Überschrift "Ich kaufe griechische Staatsanleihen weil..." sollten Persönlichkeiten aus Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur kurz begründen, warum sie griechische Staatsanleihen gekauft haben bzw. kaufen werden--idealerweise unter Nachweis ihres finanziellen Engagements. Zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt kaufe ich keine griechischen Staatsanleihen...
At the upcoming G20 meetings the issue what can be done to avoid a repetition of the current deep financial crisis will again be debated. Much attention and criticism will be directed to central banks. That is unavoidable: central banks must never again permit the development of financial imbalances that are large enough to lead to the collapse of major parts of the financial system when they unwind. In the future, policy makers must “lean against the wind” and tighten financial conditions if they perceive that imbalances are forming, even if there is little hard data to rely on. And they must be mindful that the costs of acting too late can dwarf those of acting too early.
Der Deutsche Coprporate Governance Kodex soll das deutsche Corporate Governance System transparent und nachvollziehbar machen. Der Kodex stellt gesetzliche Vorschriften zur Leitung und Überwachung deutscher börsennotierter Gesellschaften dar und enthält international anerkannte Standards guter und verantwortungsvoller Unternehmensführung. Die Stellungnahme befasst sich mit von der Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex vorgebrachten Änderungsvorschlägen.
Dieser Text fasst eine Studie zusammen, die für das Bundesministeriums für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Verbraucherschutz verfasst wurde und sich mit dem Kundennutzen von Anlageberatung auseinandersetzt. Das erhebliche Potenzial von interessenskongruenter Anlageberatung wird aufgezeigt und die aktuell geringe Leistungstransparenz im Markt kritisiert. Es wird empfohlen, ein standardisiertes Vokabular für Depotrisiken einzuführen und den Zugang aller Anleger zu leicht verständlichen und vergleichbaren Informationen zu historischem Depotrisiko und historischer Deporendite sicherzustellen. Die Studie fokussiert auf Wertpapierberatung und damit zuvorderst auf jene Teilmenge von Verbrauchern, die über Anlagevermögen verfügen. Die Grundideen zu Leistungstransparenz und standardisiertem Risikovokabular lassen sich jedoch auch z.B. auf den Alterssicherungsmarkt übertragen.
In the event of a Greek exit from the Eurozone, the stronger members of the monetary union, especially Germany, face at least two risks: First, the debt of the Greek National Bank vis-à-vis the Eurosystem of central banks will most likely be lost. Secondly, the large flow of capital from Greece and other periphery countries to Germany will accelerate inflation.
We investigate the relationship between anchoring and the emergence of bubbles in experimental asset markets. We show that setting a visual anchor at the fundamental value (FV) in the first period only is sufficient to eliminate or to significantly reduce bubbles in laboratory asset markets. If no FV-anchor is set, bubble-crash patterns emerge. Our results indicate that bubbles in laboratory environments are primarily sparked in the first period. If prices are initiated around the FV, they stay close to the FV over the entire trading horizon. Our insights can be related to initial public offerings and the interaction between prices set on pre-opening markets and subsequent intra-day price dynamics.
he observed hump-shaped life-cycle pattern in individuals' consumption cannot be explained by the classical consumption-savings model. We explicitly solve a model with utility of both consumption and leisure and with educational decisions affecting future wages. We show optimal consumption is hump shaped and determine the peak age. The hump results from consumption and leisure being substitutes and from the implicit price of leisure being decreasing over time; more leisure means less education, which lowers future wages, and the present value of foregone wages decreases with age. Consumption is hump shaped whether the wage is hump shaped or increasing over life.
This paper provides a systematic analysis of individual attitudes towards ambiguity, based on laboratory experiments. The design of the analysis allows to capture individual behavior across various levels of ambiguity, ranging from low to high. Attitudes towards risk and attitudes towards ambiguity are disentangled, providing pure measures of ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity aversion is captured in several ways, i.e. as a discount factor net of a risk premium, and as an estimated parameter in a generalized utility function. We find that ambiguity aversion varies across individuals, and with the level of ambiguity, being most prominent for intermediate levels. Around one third of subjects show no aversion, one third show maximum aversion, and one third show intermediate levels of ambiguity aversion, while there is almost no ambiguity seeking. While most theoretical work on ambiguity builds on maxmin expected utility, our results provide evidence that MEU does not adequately capture individual attitudes towards ambiguity for the majority of individuals. Instead, our results support models that allow for intermediate levels of ambiguity aversion. Moreover, we find risk aversion to be statistically unrelated to ambiguity aversion on average. Taken together, the results support the view that ambiguity is an important and distinct argument in decision making under uncertainty.
Der Beitrag diskutiert den unlängst veröffentlichten Referentenentwurf eines Finanzstabilitätsgesetzes, der vorsieht, dass die Bundesbank ab 2013 ein Mandat zur makroprudenziellen Überwachung bekommt. Die Entscheidungen über die Vorschläge, die sich vor allem an die Bundesregierung oder an die Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (Bafin) richten dürften, wird ein neuer Ausschuss für Finanzstabilität beim Bundesfinanzministerium treffen. Der Autor befasst sich mit der Zusammensetzung dieses Ausschusses und mit den Instrumenten, die für die Umsetzung der Empfehlungen des Ausschusses zur Verfügung stehen.
The idea of appointing a non-national as Central Bank Governor remains surprisingly controversial. Nevertheless, given the skills required by the Governor in order to manage what no doubt are increasingly complex institutions, considering non-nationals makes good sense for at least two reasons. First, increasing the pool of candidates to include those with broader skills and backgrounds makes it easier to find a suitable person for the job. Second, non-nationals are less likely to be beholden to domestic pressure groups and could help better insulate the central bank from political pressures.
The exceptional circumstances in which the ECB has been operating in the past years are testing not only the currency union itself, but also its institutional design. While the Governing Council of the ECB was designed to mainly set interest rates optimally for the union as a whole, the recent crisis has expanded the tools of the ECB to include unconventional monetary policy actions that potentially increase the risk exposure of its balance sheet. Since each country would contribute to the losses according to its capital key, a different voting mechanism that takes into account the single country’s contribution to the ECB’s capital could be advisable.
SAFE Newsletter : 2014, Q2
(2014)
The European Commission's Green Paper "Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis" raises 38 questions regarding how the audit function could be enhanced in order to contribute to increased financial stability. The authors comment on these 38 questions, arguing that the general level of audit quality can be enhanced by extending the duties of care and by tightening the regulations on liability.
Das vornehmliche Ziel der OGAW Richtlinien ist es einen gemeinsamen europäischen Markt für Investment-Dienstleistungen auf Basis wohldefinierten Qualitätsstandards zu erreichen. Ein grenzüberschreitender Vertrieb eröffnet die Möglichkeit der Ausweitung von Geschäftsaktivitäten auf neue wirtschaftlich attraktive Absatzmärkte. Die Stellungnahme kommentiert die im Gesetzesentwurf vorgeschlagenen regulatorischen Instrumente vor dem Hintergrund verschiedener gegebener Kriterien.
This article discusses the effects of the countercyclical premium discussed in insurance supervision in the context of Solvency II. While the basic principle of introducing countercyclical elements into Solvency II is endorsed, the authors argue for a system based on market scenarios which would enforce stricter capital requirements in boom times and less strict requirements in times of crisis.
The European Commission's Green Paper "The EU corporate governance framework" raises 25 questions in order to assess the effectiveness of the current corporate governance framework for European companies. The authors contribute to the EU's consultation, respond to the 25 questions and comment on the suggestions set out in the Green Paper.
We study consumption-portfolio and asset pricing frameworks with recursive preferences and unspanned risk. We show that in both cases, portfolio choice and asset pricing, the value function of the investor/representative agent can be characterized by a specific semilinear partial differential equation. To date, the solution to this equation has mostly been approximated by Campbell-Shiller techniques, without addressing general issues of existence and uniqueness. We develop a novel approach that rigorously constructs the solution by a fixed point argument. We prove that under regularity conditions a solution exists and establish a fast and accurate numerical method to solve consumption-portfolio and asset pricing problems with recursive preferences and unspanned risk. Our setting is not restricted to affine asset price dynamics. Numerical examples illustrate our approach.
We study self- and cross-excitation of shocks in the Eurozone sovereign CDS market. We adopt a multivariate setting with credit default intensities driven by mutually exciting jump processes, to capture the salient features observed in the data, in particular, the clustering of high default probabilities both in time (over days) and in space (across countries). The feedback between jump events and the intensity of these jumps is the key element of the model. We derive closed-form formulae for CDS prices, and estimate the model by matching theoretical prices to their empirical counterparts. We find evidence of self-excitation and asymmetric cross-excitation. Using impulse-response analysis, we assess the impact of shocks and a potential policy intervention not just on a single country under scrutiny but also, through the effect on cross-excitation risk which generates systemic sovereign risk, on other interconnected countries.
Exit strategies
(2014)
We study alternative scenarios for exiting the post-crisis fiscal and monetary accommodation using a macromodel where banks choose their capital structure and are subject to runs. Under a Taylor rule, the post-crisis interest rate hits the zero lower bound (ZLB) and remains there for several years. In that condition, pre-announced and fast fiscal consolidations dominate - based on output and inflation performance and bank stability - alternative strategies incorporating various degrees of gradualism and surprise. We also examine an alternative monetary strategy in which the interest rate does not reach the ZLB; the benefits from fiscal consolidation persist, but are more nuanced.
We study the behavioral underpinnings of adopting cash versus electronic payments in retail transactions. A novel theoretical and experimental framework is developed to primarily assess the impact of sellers’ service fees and buyers’ rewards from using electronic payments. Buyers and sellers face a coordination problem, independently choosing a payment method before trading. In the experiment, sellers readily adopt electronic payments but buyers do not. Eliminating service fees or introducing rewards significantly boosts the adoption of electronic payments. Hence, buyers’ incentives play a pivotal role in the diffusion of electronic payments but monetary incentives cannot fully explain their adoption choices. Findings from this experiment complement empirical findings based on surveys and field data.
After initial temporary measures in support of Greece prooved insufficient to end the sovereign debt crisis, extensive countermeasures have ensued. The heads of state of the euro group have agreed to permanent support mechanims over the course of the past two years. In addition, the European Central Bank (ECB) has become involved in the assistance program. The article provides an overview of the various support mechanisms installed and cautions against the connected legal problems.
Die unkonventionellen Maßnahmen der EZB haben nicht nur zu Bilanz- und Reputationsrisiken geführt. Vielmehr haben sie auch die Grenzen der monetären Politik zur Verteilungs- und Finanzpolitik verwischt. Die Strukturen im Finanzsystem müssen durch ordnungspolitische Maßnahmen robuster gemacht werden.
In 2011 wurde der Preis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften der schwedischen Reichsbank im Gedenken an Alfred Nobel an die US-Ökonomen Thomas J. Sargent von der New York University und Chistopher A. Sims von Princeton University verliehen. Gerade deutsche Zeitungskommentare kritisierten die Forscher vielfach für die Verwendung „unrealistischer“ Annahmen wie Nutzenmaximierung und rationale Erwartungen. Diese Kritik verkennt den maßgeblichen Beitrag von Sargent und Sims zur Entwicklung der modernen Makroökonomik. Ihre empirischen Methoden sind heute Standardwerkzeuge der akademischen Forschung und werden auch von Ökonomen in Zentralbanken, Finanzministerien und internationalen Organisationen eingesetzt. Sie haben grundlegende neue Erkenntnisse ermöglicht, zum Beispiel über die Wirkungsweise der Geld- und Fiskalpolitik.
Das neue Kreditinstitute-Reorganisationsgesetz, das als Artikel 1 des Restrukturierungsgesetzes vom 9. Dezember 2010 erlassen worden ist, führt für deutsche Kreditinsitute eine Bankenabgabe ein. Die Abgabe soll als Mittel der Prävention und Intervention dienen, um Finanzkrisen vorzubeugen und zu bekämpfen. Der vorliegende Beitrag bewertet die deutsche Bankenabgabe nach verfassungsrechtlicher Zulässigkeit und nach ihrer Zweckerfüllung.
Prodigal Italy Greece Spain?
(2011)
Contrary to widely held perceptions, workers in the southern European states that are most afflicted by the sovereign debt crisis work hard. However, labor productivity in these countries lags far behind the EU average. Structural reforms to boost productivity should be at the top of the reform agenda.
In its decision of December 13, 2011, the Constitutional Court of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia ruled that a State Court of Auditors is granted by the constitution a broad scope of powers not only to control the immediate state administration but also entities outside the direct state administration, as far as they exercise financial responsibility for the state. This ruling may have serious implications for the capital guarantees extended by EU Member States to the newly established institutions on the European level, as for instance the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
Schlechte Erfahrungen
(2012)
Eine Transaktionssteuer auf Finanzgeschäfte würde weniger Geld einbringen, als viele ihrer Anhänger hoffen - und sie birgt gravierende ökonomische und juristische Risiken. Die Bundesregierung sollte sich der Belastungen durch eine Finanztransaktionssteuer bewusst sein – und sie nicht ohne Beteiligung der weltweit führenden Finanzplätze einführen. Eine internationale Einigung auf strengere Eigenkapitalvorschriften für Banken muss Vorrang haben.
This contribution draws on two recent publications in which the macroeconomic model data base (www.macromodelbase.com) is employed for model comparisons. The comparative approach is used to base policy analysis on a systematic evaluation of the different implications that a certain economic policy can have when submitted to different modeling approaches. In this manner, policy recommendations are more robust to modeling uncertainty. By extending the comparative approach to forecasting, the authors investigate the accuracy of different forecasting models and obtain more reliable mean forecasts.
Die Macht der Ratingagenturen beruht auch auf den vielen Gesetzen und Verordnungen, die eine Orientierung an den Ratings der drei großen Agenturen vorschreiben, sagt Wirtschaftsprofessor Reinhard Schmidt. Um die Macht der Ratingagenturen zu begrenzen, empfiehlt er viele dieser Regeln ersatzlos zu streichen.
Vermutlich schon bald wird sich die Politik mit der gesetzlichen Verankerung eines makroprudenziellen Mandats für die Deutsche Bundesbank befassen. Welche Ziele soll das Mandat beinhalten, die über die bereits bestehende Aufgabe der Bundesbank, zur Finanzstabilität im Euroraum beizutragen, hinausgehen? Welche Instrumente sollen bei der Ausübung des Mandats zum Einsatz kommen?
Rechtsbrüche im Euroraum
(2011)
Der Weg in die Knechtschaft
(2011)
Die Marktwirtschaft beruht auf dem Prinzip, dass sich die Akteure im Rahmen des gesetzlichen Regelwerkes frei entfalten können. Hier liegt die entscheidende Stärke eines marktwirtschaftlichen, freiheitlichen Systems. Millionen von Individuen erwägen, welche Aktivitäten welche Chance eröffnen. Kein anderes System ist in der Lage, das Potential auszuschöpfen, das in unzähligen Individuen steckt. Der Markt ist nun einmal das beste "Entdeckungsverfahren", wie Hayek erkannte. Wer im Rahmen der Spielregeln Erfolg hat, darf nach diesen Prinzipien den Gewinn behalten, muss aber auch für den Misserfolg haften.
Reforms or bankruptcy?
(2011)
Almost 20 Greek academic economists from renowned universities in Europe and the US have prepared a one-page statement regarding the Greek crisis. In their statement the economic experts call upon the Greek public to accept the economic program of structural reforms, privatization, efficient tax collection, and shrinking of the public sector proposed and financed by the EU partners and the IMF. Among the signatories are this year's Nobel Prize winner Christopher Pissarides and Michalis Haliassos, Director of the Center for Financial Studies and Professor for Macroeconomics and Finance at the House of Finance.
The bail-in puzzle
(2011)
Under the current conditions of a global financial crisis, notably in Europe’s banking industry, the governance role of bond markets is defunct. In fact, investors have understood that bank debt will almost always be rescued with taxpayers’ money. The widespread practice of government-led bank bailouts has thus severely corrupted the bond market, leading to the underestimation of risk and, as a consequence, the destruction of market discipline. Any feasible solution to the bank-debt-is-too-cheap problem will have to re-install true default risk for bank bond holders.
Stellungnahme zum Antrag der SPD-Fraktion auf Einführung einer Finanztransaktionssteuer in Europa
(2011)
Die Finanztransaktionssteuer ist kein geeignetes Instrument zur Verringerung systemischer Risiken, noch ein Mittel zur Vorbeugung einer Finanzkrise. Da sie zudem nur in Deutschland, Frankreich und einzelnen anderen Staaten eingeführt würde, wäre das Steueraufkommen, aufgrund von Steuerumgehung durch Verlagerung von Finanztransaktionen ins Ausland, gering.
Europa - wohin?
(2011)
Gemäß der Krönungstheorie der europäischen Währungsunion wurde der Euro eingeführt, um die Notwendigkeit gemeinsamen Regierens in der Europäischen Union allen vor Augen zu führen und so ein geordnetes Vorrücken zur europäischen Integration zu ermöglichen. In der gegenwärtigen Phase scheint indes politischer Opportunismus die Integration zu bestimmen.
Die große Herausforderung, um das systemische Risiko im Finanzsektor zu vermindern, besteht darin, kluge Finanzarchitektur zu etablieren, die gewährtleistet, dass ein verbindlicher Anteil von Bankanleihen außerhalb des Finanzsektors gehalten wird. Die Anleihegläubiger von außerhalb des Bankensektors müssen sich dadurch auszeichnen, dass sie kein Refinanzierungsrisiko haben, wenn sie eine plötzliche Verlussituation erleben.
Unternehmen und Ethik
(2010)
Die noch nicht völlig überwundene Finanzmarktkrise hat nicht nur den Gesetzgeber auf den Plan gerufen. Auch die Frage nach der Ethik der Akteure wird vielfach erörtert. Haben von Gier getriebene Finanzmarktakteure nicht nur Rechtsregeln, sondern auch ethische Normen, die Grundsätze des Wirtschaftens ehrbarer Kaufleute, gewissenlos beiseite geschoben, um sich zu bereichern? Wie läßt sich die Beachtung dieser Normen künftig sichern? Diese aktuelle Debatte soll Anlaß zu einigen allgemeineren Betrachtungen zum Thema „Unternehmen und Ethik“ sein.
This note proposes a new set-up for the fund backing the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The proposed fund is a Multi-Tier Resolution Fund (MTRF), restricting the joint and several supranational liability to a limited range of losses, bounded by national liability at the upper and the lower end. The layers are, in ascending order: a national fund (first losses), a European fund (second losses), the national budget (third losses), the ESM (fourth losses, as a backup for sovereigns). The system works like a reinsurance scheme, providing clear limits to European-level joint liability, and therefore confining moral hazard. At the same time, it allows for some degree of risk sharing, which is important for financial stability if shocks to the financial system are exogenous (e.g., of a supranational macroeconomic nature). The text has four parts. Section A describes the operation of the Multi-Tier Resolution Fund, assuming the fund capital to be fully paid-in (“Steady State“). Section B deals with the build-up phase of the fund capital (“Build up“). Section C discusses how the proposal deals with the apparent incentive conflicts. The final Section D summarizes open questions which need further thought (“Open Questions“).
Securities transaction tax in France: impact on market quality and inter-market price coordination
(2014)
The general concept of a Securities Transaction Tax is controversial among academics and politicians. While theoretical research is quite advanced, the empirical guidance in a fragmented market context is still scarce. Possible negative effects for market liquidity and market efficiency are theoretically predicted, but have not been empirically tested yet. In light of the agreement of eleven European member states to implement an STT, this study aims to give a comprehensive overview of the effects of the STT, introduced in France in 2012, on liquidity demand, liquidity supply, volatility and inter-market information transmission. The results show that the STT has led to a decline in liquidity demand, has had a detrimental effect on liquidity supply and negatively influences the inter-market information transmission efficiency. However, no effect on volatility can be observed.
Die Stellungnahme befasst sich mit einem wichtigen Aspekt der Offenlegung der Bezüge von Entscheidungsträgern im Bankensektor. Komplementär zu der Diskussion um die Veröffentlichung der Vergütung von Vorstandsmitgliedern börsennotierter Unternehmen ist auch auf Landeseben versucht worden, die Transparenz der Vergütung von Führungskräften kommunaler oder landeseigener Unternehmen zu erhöhen. Namentlich sind die Träger der Sparkassen durch den neuen § 19 Abs. 6 des Sparkassengesetzes von Nordrhein-Westfalen verpflichtet worden, darauf „hinzuwirken“, dass die „gewährten Bezüge jedes einzelnen Mitglieds des Vorstands, des Verwaltungsrates und ähnlicher Gremien unter Namensnennung“ veröffentlich werden. Diese Vorschrift ist jedoch weitgehend wirkungslos geblieben; nicht zuletzt weil das OLG Köln in einer einstweiligen Verfügung die Vorschrift mangels Gesetzgebungskompetenz des Landes als nichtig behandelt hat. In dieser Situation ist am 8. August 2013 der Vorschlag eines Gesetzes „zur Offenlegung der Bezüge von Sparkassenführungskräften im Internet“ durch die Fraktion der Piraten im Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen eingebracht worden. Der Entwurf ist Gegenstand der Stellungnahme, die Helmut Siekmann für den Haushalts- und Finanzausschuss des Landtags Nordrhein-Westfalen erstellt hat. Sie stellt maßgebend darauf ab, dass die Sparkassen als Anstalten des öffentlichen Rechts einen öffentlichen Auftrag zu erfüllen haben und den Grundsätzen des Verwaltungsorganisationsrechts unterliegen. Als Teil der (leistenden) Verwaltung müssen sie Transparenz- und Kontrollansprüchen der Bürger und ihren Repräsentanten in den Parlamenten genügen.
In the United States, on April 1, 2014, the set of rules commonly known as the "Volcker Rule", prohibiting proprietary trading activities in banks, became effective. The implementation of this rule took more than three years, as “proprietary trading” is an inherently vague concept, overlapping strongly with genuinely economically useful activities such as market-making. As a result, the final Rule is a complex and lengthy combination of prohibitions and exemptions.
In January 2014, the European Commission put forward its proposal on banking structural reform. The proposal includes a Volcker-like provision, prohibiting large, systemically relevant financial institutions from engaging in proprietary trading or hedge fund-related business. This paper offers lessons to be learned from the implementation process for the Volcker rule in the US for the European regulatory process.
Der vorliegende Artikel analysiert systematisch die Erreichung der MiFID-Ziele anhand der wissenschaftlichen Literatur. Ziel der MiFID ist es, die Rahmenbedingungen für einen effizienten und kostengünstigen Wertpapierhandel zu schaffen. Erreicht werden soll dies durch die Verschärfung des Wettbewerbs, die Integration der Märkte, die Offenlegung von Handelsintentionen und -geschäften sowie die Stärkung der rechtlichen Position der Investoren. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass die Förderung des Wettbewerbes als erfolgreich bewertet wird, aber die regulatorischen Möglichkeiten der Marktintegration nicht ausgeschöpft werden. Ferner wird die Forderung nach einheitlichen Transparenzbestimmungen für alle Ordermechanismen nur teilweise umgesetzt. Der Anleger erfährt letztlich gegenüber Finanzintermediären durch die MiFID keinen höheren Schutz.
Financial innovation is, as usual, faster than regulation. New forms of speculation and intermediation are rapidly emerging. Largely as a result of the evaporation of trust in financial intermediation, an exponentially increasing role is being played by the so-called peer to peer intermediation. The most prominent example at the moment is Bitcoin.
If one expects that shocks in these markets could destabilize also traditional financial markets, then it will be necessary to extend regulatory measures also to these innovations.
This policy letter provides an overview of the strengths, weaknesses, risks and opportunities of the upcoming comprehensive risk assessment, a euro area-wide evaluation of bank balance sheets and business models. If carried out properly, the 2014 comprehensive assessment will lead the euro area into a new era of banking supervision. Policy makers in euro area countries are now under severe pressure to define a credible backstop framework for banks. This framework, as the author argues, needs to be a broad, quasi-European system of mutually reinforcing backstops.
Fünf Jahre nach Beginn der Banken- und Staatsschuldenkrise („Finanzkrise“) kämpfen wir weiterhin mit den elementaren Problemen: Bei Märkten und Marktteilnehmern fehlt es an Stabilität und Vertrauen. Viele Banken stehen immer noch nicht auf eigenen Füßen und nehmen die ihnen in Europa traditionell zukommende zentrale Rolle für Wachstum und Entwicklung nicht wahr. Den guten Absichten, auf die sich die großen politischen Mächte während der ersten G-20 Treffen 2008 und 2009 verständigt hatten, ist eine Reihe von sinnvollen Ideen und Konzepten gefolgt. Die Voraussetzungen für einen grundlegenden reformerischen Erfolg sind somit gegeben – doch nun muss die Umsetzung folgen. Dazu bedarf es mutiger Entscheidungen. Im Jahr 2014 muss die europäische Politik gleich mehrere Weichen stellen. Der Bundesregierung kommt dabei die Schlüsselrolle zu. Sie muss den Mut haben zu radikaler Ordnungspolitik!
This article discusses the recent proposal for debt restructuring in the euro zone by Pierre Paris and Charles Wyplosz. It argues that the plan cannot realize the promised debt relief without producing moral hazard. Ester Faia revisits the Redemption Fund proposed in November 2011 by the German Council of Economic Experts and argues that this plan, up to date, still remains the most promising path towards succesful debt restructuring in Europe.
Das ursprüngliche Ziel des Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz war die Verringerung der Emissionen. Eigentlich hat die Politik bereits ein Instrument an der Hand, das dieses Ziel fokussiert und kostensparend erreichen kann: den Handel mit CO2-Zertifikaten. Der Autor argumentiert, dass das Nebeneinander von CO2-Handel und EEG höchst unproduktiv ist und schleunigst beendet werden sollte. Ein plausibleres Argument für den politischen Erfolg des EEG und das derzeitige Herumdoktern im Detail ist, dass die Politik mit dem EEG Industriepolitik betreiben und die Kosten auf zukünftige Parlamente und Generationen überwälzen kann.
On November 8, 2013, several members of the British House of Lords’ Subcommittee A conducted a hearing at the ECB in Frankfurt, Germany, on “Genuine Economic and Monetary Union and its Implications for the UK”. Professors Otmar Issing and Jan Pieter Krahnen were called as expert witnesses.
The testimony began with a general discussion on the elements considered necessary for a functioning internal market. Do economic union and monetary union require a fiscal union or even a political union, beyond the elements of the banking union currently being prepared? In this context, also the critique of the German current account surplus and the international expectations that Germany stimulate internal demand to support growth in crisis countries, were discussed.
With regard to the monetary union, the members of the subcommittee asked for an assessment of how European nations and the banking industry would have fared in the banking crisis that followed the Lehman collapse, had there not been a common currency. Given the important role that the ECB has played in the course of the crisis management, the members further asked for an evaluation of the OMT-program of the ECB and also if the monetary union is in need of common debt instruments, in order to provide the ECB with the possibility of buying EU liabilities, comparable to the Fed buying US Treasury bonds. Finally, the dual role of the ECB for monetary policy and banking supervision was an issue touched on by several questions.
In many cases, the dire situation of public finances calls into question the very soundness of sovereigns and prompts corrective actions with far-reaching consequences. In this context, European authorities responded with several measures on different fronts, for instance by passing the "Fiscal Compact", which entered into force on January 1, 2013. Of critical importance in this framework is the assessment of a country’s situation by way of statistical measures, in order to take corrective actions when called for according to the letter of the law. If these statistics are not correct, there is a risk of imposing draconian measures on countries that do not really need it.
Before the 2007–09 crisis, standard risk measurement methods substantially underestimated the threat to the financial system. One reason was that these methods didn’t account for how closely commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies were linked. As financial conditions worsened in one type of institution, the effects spread to others. A new method that more accurately accounts for these spillover effects suggests that hedge funds may have been central in generating systemic risk during the crisis.
Social impact bonds are a special type of bond whose purpose is to provide long term funds to projects with a social impact. Especially in the UK and in the US these bonds are increasingly being used to raise funds to finance government projects. Their return depends on the social improvements achieved. Especially in times of crisis, governments lack funds to prevent the social consequences of recessions. Faia argues that the European Union should develop an equivalent to the British Social Finance Ltd. to finance projects for social improvement.
Neither Northerners are willing to invest in a South they perceive as unwilling to undertake necessary structural reforms, nor are Southerners willing to invest in their countries in a climate of austerity and policy uncertainty imposed, in their view, by the North. This results in a vicious cycle of mistrust. However, as the author argues, big steps in the direction of reforms may provide just enough thrust to break out of this vicious cycle, propel southern countries – and especially Greece – to a much happier future, and promote the chances for more balanced economic performance in North and South.
Social Security rules that determine retirement, spousal, and survivor benefits, along with benefit adjustments according to the age at which these are claimed, open up a complex set of financial options for household decisions. These rules influence optimal household asset allocation, insurance, and work decisions, subject to life cycle demographic shocks, such as marriage, divorce, and children. Our model-based research generates a wealth profile and a low and stable equity fraction consistent with empirical evidence. We confirm predictions that wives will claim retirement benefits earlier than husbands, while life insurance is mainly purchased by younger men. Our policy simulations imply that eliminating survivor benefits would sharply reduce claiming differences by sex while dramatically increasing men’s life insurance purchases.
This paper makes a conceptual contribution to the effect of monetary policy on financial stability. We develop a microfounded network model with endogenous network formation to analyze the impact of central banks' monetary policy interventions on systemic risk. Banks choose their portfolio, including their borrowing and lending decisions on the interbank market, to maximize profit subject to regulatory constraints in an asset-liability framework. Systemic risk arises in the form of multiple bank defaults driven by common shock exposure on asset markets, direct contagion via the interbank market, and firesale spirals. The central bank injects or withdraws liquidity on the interbank markets to achieve its desired interest rate target. A tension arises between the beneficial effects of stabilized interest rates and increased loan volume and the detrimental effects of higher risk taking incentives. We find that central bank supply of liquidity quite generally increases systemic risk.
This paper explores consequences of consumer education on prices and welfare in retail financial markets when some consumers are naive about shrouded add-on prices and firms try to exploit it. Allowing for different information and pricing strategies we show that education is unlikely to push firms to disclose prices towards all consumers, which would be socially efficient. Instead, price discrimination emerges as a new equilibrium. Further, due to a feedback on prices, education that is good for consumers who become sophisticated may be bad for consumers who stay naive and even for the group of all consumers as a whole
This paper makes a conceptual contribution to the effect of monetary policy on financial stability. We develop a microfounded network model with endogenous network formation to analyze the impact of central banks' monetary policy interventions on systemic risk. Banks choose their portfolio, including their borrowing and lending decisions on the interbank market, to maximize profit subject to regulatory constraints in an asset-liability framework. Systemic risk arises in the form of multiple bank defaults driven by common shock exposure on asset markets, direct contagion via the interbank market, and firesale spirals. The central bank injects or withdraws liquidity on the interbank markets to achieve its desired interest rate target. A tension arises between the beneficial effects of stabilized interest rates and increased loan volume and the detrimental effects of higher risk taking incentives. We find that central bank supply of liquidity quite generally increases systemic risk.
This paper investigates the role of monetary policy in the collapse in the long-term real interest rates in the decade before the onset of the financial crisis using a sample of five advanced economies (United States, United Kingdom, the euro area, Sweden and Canada). The results from an estimated panel VAR with monthly data show that, while monetary policy shocks had negligible effects on long-term real interest rates, shocks to the long-term real interest rates had a one-to-one effect on the short nominal rate.
This paper empirically tests the role of bank lending tightening on non-financial corporate (NFC) bond issuance in the eurozone. By utilizing a unique data set provided by the ECB Bank Lending Survey, we capture the "pure" credit supply effect on corporate external financing. We find that tightened credit standards positively affect the NFC bond issuance: A 1pp increase in banks reporting considerable tightening on loans leads to around a 7% increase in firms' bond issuance in the eurozone. Focusing on a spectrum of aspects contributing to bank credit tightening, we document that banks' balance sheet constraints, as well as the perception of risk lead to significantly higher NFC bond issuance. In addition, we show that stricter lending conditions, such as wider margins, higher collateral requirements and covenants significantly increase NFC bond issuance volumes too. Furthermore, the impact of bank credit tightening on firms' bond issuance is particularly observable in core eurozone countries and not in peripheral countries. This is partially due to the underdeveloped of debt capital markets in the peripheral countries.
This paper investigates the determinants of value and growth investing in a large administrative panel of Swedish residents over the 1999-2007 period. We document strong relationships between a household’s portfolio tilt and the household’s financial and demographic characteristics. Value investors have higher financial and real estate wealth, lower leverage, lower income risk, lower human capital, and are more likely to be female than the average growth investor. Households actively migrate to value stocks over the life-cycle and, at higher frequencies, dynamically offset the passive variations in the value tilt induced by market movements. We verify that these results are not driven by cohort effects, financial sophistication, biases toward popular or professionally close stocks, or unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. We relate these household-level results to some of the leading explanations of the value premium.
We analyze the risk premium on bank bonds at origination with a special focus on the role of implicit and explicit public guarantees and the systemic relevance of the issuing institutions. By looking at the asset swap spread on 5,500 bonds, we find that explicit guarantees and sovereign creditworthiness have a substantial effect on the risk premium. In addition, while large institutions still enjoy lower issuance costs linked to the TBTF framework, we find evidence of enhanced market disciple for systemically important banks which face, since the onset of the financial crisis, an increased premium on bond placements.
We examine the impact of so-called "Crisis Contracts" on bank managers' risk-taking incentives and on the probability of banking crises. Under a Crisis Contract, managers are required to contribute a pre-specified share of their past earnings to finance public rescue funds when a crisis occurs. This can be viewed as a retroactive tax that is levied only when a crisis occurs and that leads to a form of collective liability for bank managers. We develop a game-theoretic model of a banking sector whose shareholders have limited liability, so that society at large will suffer losses if a crisis occurs. Without Crisis Contracts, the managers' and shareholders' interests are aligned, and managers take more than the socially optimal level of risk. We investigate how the introduction of Crisis Contracts changes the equilibrium level of risk-taking and the remuneration of bank managers. We establish conditions under which the introduction of Crisis Contracts will reduce the probability of a banking crisis and improve social welfare. We explore how Crisis Contracts and capital requirements can supplement each other and we show that the efficacy of Crisis Contracts is not undermined by attempts to hedge.
Banks can deal with their liquidity risk by holding liquid assets (self-insurance), by participating in interbank markets (coinsurance), or by using flexible financing instruments, such as bank capital (risk-sharing). We use a simple model to show that undiversifiable liquidity risk, i.e. the liquidity risk that banks are unable to coinsure on interbank markets, represents an important risk factor affecting their capital structures. Banks facing higher undiversifiable liquidity risk hold more capital. We posit that empirically banks that are more exposed to undiversifiable liquidity risk are less active on interbank markets. Therefore, we test for the existence of a negative relationship between bank capital and interbank market activity and find support in a large sample of U.S. commercial banks.
I analyze a critical illness insurance in a consumption-investment model over the life cycle. I solve a model with stochastic mortality risk and health shock risk numerically. These shocks are interpreted as critical illness and can negatively affect the expected remaining lifetime, the health expenses, and the income. In order to hedge the health expense effect of a shock, the agent has the possibility to contract a critical illness insurance. My results highlight that the critical illness insurance is strongly desired by the agents. With an insurance profit of 20%, nearly all agents contract the insurance in the working stage of the life cycle and more than 50% of the agents contract the insurance during retirement. With an insurance profit of 200%, still nearly all working agents contract the insurance, whereas there is little demand in the retirement stage.
I numerically solve realistically calibrated life cycle consumption-investment problems in continuous time featuring stochastic mortality risk driven by jumps, unspanned labor income as well as short-sale and liquidity constraints and a simple insurance. I compare models with deterministic and stochastic hazard rate of death to a model without mortality risk. Mortality risk has only minor effects on the optimal controls early in the life cycle but it becomes crucial in later years. A diffusive component in the hazard rate of death has no significant impact, whereas a jump component is desired by the agent and influences optimal controls and wealth evolution. The insurance is used to ensure optimal bequest such that there is no accidental bequest. In the absence of the insurance, the biggest part of bequest is accidental.
We explore the sources of household balance sheet adjustment following the collapse of the housing market in 2006. First, we use microdata from the Federal Reserve Board’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey to document that banks cumulatively tightened consumer lending standards more in counties that experienced a house price boom in the mid-2000s than in non-boom counties. We then use the idea that renters, unlike homeowners, did not experience an adverse wealth shock when the housing market collapsed to examine the relative importance of two explanations for the observed deleveraging and the sluggish pickup in consumption after 2008. First, households may have optimally adjusted to lower wealth by reducing their demand for debt and implicitly, their demand for consumption. Alternatively, banks may have been more reluctant to lend in areas with pronounced real estate declines. Our evidence is consistent with the second explanation. Renters with low risk scores, compared to homeowners in the same markets, reduced their levels of nonmortgage debt and credit card debt more in counties where house prices fell more. The contrast suggests that the observed reductions in aggregate borrowing were more driven by cutbacks in the provision of credit than by a demand-based response to lower housing wealth.
This paper solves a dynamic model of households' mortgage decisions incorporating labor income, house price, inflation, and interest rate risk. It uses a zero-profit condition for mortgage lenders to solve for equilibrium mortgage rates given borrower characteristics and optimal decisions. The model quantifies the effects of adjustable vs. fixed mortgage rates, loan-to-value ratios, and mortgage affordability measures on mortgage premia and default. Heterogeneity in borrowers' labor income risk is important for explaining the higher default rates on adjustable-rate mortgages during the recent US housing downturn, and the variation in mortgage premia with the level of interest rates.
SAFE Newsletter : 2014, Q1
(2014)
SAFE Newsletter : 2013, Q4
(2013)
In this paper, we study the effect of proportional transaction costs on consumption-portfolio decisions and asset prices in a dynamic general equilibrium economy with a financial market that has a single-period bond and two risky stocks, one of which incurs the transaction cost. Our model has multiple investors with stochastic labor income, heterogeneous beliefs, and heterogeneous Epstein-Zin-Weil utility functions. The transaction cost gives rise to endogenous variations in liquidity. We show how equilibrium in this incomplete-markets economy can be characterized and solved for in a recursive fashion. We have three main findings. One, costs for trading a stock lead to a substantial reduction in the trading volume of that stock, but have only a small effect on the trading volume of the other stock and the bond. Two, even in the presence of stochastic labor income and heterogeneous beliefs, transaction costs have only a small effect on the consumption decisions of investors, and hence, on equity risk premia and the liquidity premium. Three, the effects of transaction costs on quantities such as the liquidity premium are overestimated in partial equilibrium relative to general equilibrium.
Inflation differentials in the euro area have been persistent since the adoption of the single currency. This paper analyzes the impact of product and labor market regulation on inflation in a sample of 11 countries. The results show that, after the adoption of the euro, product market deregulation has a relevant and significant effect on the level of inflation, while higher labor market regulation increases the responsiveness of inflation to the output gap.
We propose an iterative procedure to efficiently estimate models with complex log-likelihood functions and the number of parameters relative to the observations being potentially high. Given consistent but inefficient estimates of sub-vectors of the parameter vector, the procedure yields computationally tractable, consistent and asymptotic efficient estimates of all parameters. We show the asymptotic normality and derive the estimator's asymptotic covariance in dependence of the number of iteration steps. To mitigate the curse of dimensionality in high-parameterized models, we combine the procedure with a penalization approach yielding sparsity and reducing model complexity. Small sample properties of the estimator are illustrated for two time series models in a simulation study. In an empirical application, we use the proposed method to estimate the connectedness between companies by extending the approach by Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) to a high-dimensional non-Gaussian setting.
Sondierungsstudie im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung: Die jüngste Finanzkrise und die darauf folgende Staatsschuldenkrise hat sowohl wirtschaftlich als auch gesellschaftlich tiefgreifende Spuren hinterlassen. Dabei wurden auch sehr deutliche Lücken in der Forschung offenbar. Ziel dieser Studie ist es, aufbauend auf dem aktuellen Forschungsstand weiteren Forschungsbedarf in den wesentlich mit Finanzkrisen verbundenen Bereichen aufzuzeigen. Es werden fünf Forschungsbereiche mit jeweiligen Unterthemen vorgeschlagen. Diese fünf Forschungsbereiche gehen unmittelbar aus der Struktur und den Mechanismen der Finanz- und Staatsschuldenkrise hervor. Dabei wird besonderes Augenmerk auf die wirtschafts- und regulierungspolitische Relevanz der Themen sowie dem Umstand getragen, dass die Beantwortung vieler der Fragen interdisziplinäre Zusammenarbeit erfordert.
Finanzkrisen sind inherent mit dem Bankenmodell verbunden. Aufgrund von Verbindungen der Banken untereinander können Probleme einzelner Institute auf andere Institute übertragen werden. Diese systemischen Risiken können das gesamte Finanzsystem destabilisieren. Das Finanzsystem nimmt durch die Kreditvergabe und Bereitstellung von Transaktionssystemen eine herausragende Stellung in einer Volkswirtschaft ein, wodurch stabilisierende Eingriffe der Politik notwendig werden können. Eingriffe zur Wiederherstellung von Stabilität können sehr kostspielig sein und, wie aktuell eindrucksvoll belegt, die stabilisierenden Staaten selbst destabilisieren. Die alternativen Eingriffe vorab betreffen neben der Geldpolitik vor allem regulatorische Eingriffe. Im besonderen sind die Corporate Governance von Finanzinstituten und die Informationsbereitstellung bzw. Transparenz innerhalb des Finanzsektors von Bedeutung. In den vergangen Jahren wuchs vor dem Hintergrund von Regulierung zudem ein paralleles Schattenbankensystems heran, das in seiner Bedeutung dem traditionellen Bankensystem nur unwesentlich nachsteht.
Zwar sind die groben Zusammenhänge und Auswirkungen in den einzelnen Bereichen bekannt, jedoch ist für ein tiefgreifendes Verständnis als Grundlage zur Vermeidung bzw. Eindämmung zukünftiger Krisen sowie zur Folgenabschätzung von Regulierung weitere Forschung unabdingbar.
Sovereign bond risk premiums
(2013)
Credit risk has become an important factor driving government bond returns. We therefore introduce an asset pricing model which exploits information contained in both forward interest rates and forward CDS spreads. Our empirical analysis covers euro-zone countries with German government bonds as credit risk-free assets. We construct a market factor from the first three principal components of the German forward curve as well as a common and a country-specific credit factor from the principal components of the forward CDS curves. We find that predictability of risk premiums of sovereign euro-zone bonds improves substantially if the market factor is augmented by a common and an orthogonal country-specific credit factor. While the common credit factor is significant for most countries in the sample, the country-specific factor is significant mainly for peripheral euro-zone countries. Finally, we find that during the current crisis period, market and credit risk premiums of government bonds are negative over long subintervals, a finding that we attribute to the presence of financial repression in euro-zone countries.
This paper takes a novel approach to estimating bankruptcy costs by inference from market prices of equity and put options using a dynamic structural model of capital structure. This approach avoids the selection bias of looking at firms in or near default and therefore permits theories of ex ante capital structure determination to be tested. We identify significant cross sectional variation in bankruptcy costs across industries and relate these to specific firm characteristics. We find that asset volatility and growth options have significant positive impacts, while tangibility and size have negative impacts. Our bankruptcy cost variable estimate significantly negatively impacts leverage ratios. This negative impact is in addition to that of other firm characteristics such as asset intangibility and asset volatility. The results provide strong support for the tradeoff theory of capital structure.
We study to what extent firms spread out their debt maturity dates across time, which we call "granularity of corporate debt." We consider the role of debt granularity using a simple model in which a firm's inability to roll over expiring debt causes inefficiencies, such as costly asset sales or underinvestment. Since multiple small asset sales are less costly than a single large one, firms may diversify debt rollovers across maturity dates. We construct granularity measures using data on corporate bond issuers for the 1991-2011 period and establish a number of novel findings. First, there is substantial variation in granularity in that many firms have either very concentrated or highly dispersed maturity structures. Second, our model's predictions are consistent with observed variation in granularity. Corporate debt maturities are more dispersed for larger and more mature firms, for firms with better investment opportunities, with higher leverage ratios, and with lower levels of current cash flows. We also show that during the recent financial crisis especially firms with valuable investment opportunities implemented more dispersed maturity structures. Finally, granularity plays an important role for bond issuances, because we document that newly issued corporate bond maturities complement pre-existing bond maturity profiles.
We consider an economy where individuals privately choose effort and trade competitively priced securities that pay off with effort-determined probability. We show that if insurance against a negative shock is sufficiently incomplete, then standard functional form restrictions ensure that individual objective functions are optimized by an effort and insurance combination that is unique and satisfies first- and second-order conditions. Modeling insurance incompleteness in terms of costly production of private insurance services, we characterize the constrained inefficiency arising in general equilibrium from competitive pricing of nonexclusive financial contracts.
We propose a new classification of consumption goods into nondurable goods, durable goods and a new class which we call “memorable” goods. A good is memorable if a consumer can draw current utility from its past consumption experience through memory. We construct a novel consumption-savings model in which a consumer has a well-defined preference ordering over both nondurable goods and memorable goods. Memorable goods consumption differs from nondurable goods consumption in that current memorable goods consumption may also impact future utility through the accumulation process of the stock of memory. In our model, households optimally choose a lumpy profile of memorable goods consumption even in a frictionless world. Using Consumer Expenditure Survey data, we then document levels and volatilities of different groups of consumption goods expenditures, as well as their expenditure patterns, and show that the expenditure patterns on memorable goods indeed differ significantly from those on nondurable and durable goods. Finally, we empirically evaluate our model’s predictions with respect to the welfare cost of consumption fluctuations and conduct an excess-sensitivity test of the consumption response to predictable income changes. We find that (i) the welfare cost of household-level consumption fluctuations may be overstated by 1.7 percentage points (11.9% points as opposed to 13.6% points of permanent consumption) if memorable goods are not appropriately accounted for; (ii) the finding of excess sensitivity of consumption documented in important papers of the literature might be entirely due to the presence of memorable goods.
There is mounting evidence that retail investors make predictable, costly investment mistakes, including underinvestment, naïve diversification, and payment of excessive fund fees. Over the past thirty-five years, however, participant-directed 401(k) plans have largely replaced professionally managed pension plans, requiring unsophisticated retail investors to navigate the financial markets themselves. Policy-makers have struggled with regulatory interventions designed to improve the quality of investment decisions without a clear understanding of the reasons for investor mistakes. Absent such an understanding, it is difficult to design effective regulatory responses. This article offers a first step in understanding the investor decision-making process. We use an internet-based experiment to disentangle possible explanations for inefficient investment decisions. The experiment employs a simplified construct of an employee’s allocation among the options in a retirement plan coupled with technology that enables us to collect data on the specific information that investors choose to view. In addition to collecting general information about the process by which investors choose among mutual fund options, we employ an experimental manipulation to test the effect of an instruction on the importance of mutual fund fees. Pairing this instruction with simplified fee disclosure allows us to distinguish between motivation-limits and cognition-limits as explanations for the widespread findings that investors ignore fees in their investment decisions. Our results offer partial but limited grounds for optimism. On the one hand, within our simplified experimental construct, our subjects allocated more money, on average, to higher-value funds. Furthermore, subjects who received the fees instruction paid closer attention to mutual fund fees and allocated their investments into funds with lower fees. On the other hand, the effects of even a blunt fees instruction were limited, and investors were unable to identify and avoid clearly inferior fund options. In addition, our results suggest that excessive, naïve diversification strategies are driving many investment decisions. Although our findings are preliminary, they suggest valuable avenues for future research and important implications for regulation of retail investing.
The substantial variation in the real price of oil since 2003 has renewed interest in the question of how to forecast monthly and quarterly oil prices. There also has been increased interest in the link between financial markets and oil markets, including the question of whether financial market information helps forecast the real price of oil in physical markets. An obvious advantage of financial data in forecasting oil prices is their availability in real time on a daily or weekly basis. We investigate whether mixed-frequency models may be used to take advantage of these rich data sets. We show that, among a range of alternative high-frequency predictors, especially changes in U.S. crude oil inventories produce substantial and statistically significant real-time improvements in forecast accuracy. The preferred MIDAS model reduces the MSPE by as much as 16 percent compared with the no-change forecast and has statistically significant directional accuracy as high as 82 percent. This MIDAS forecast also is more accurate than a mixed-frequency realtime VAR forecast, but not systematically more accurate than the corresponding forecast based on monthly inventories. We conclude that typically not much is lost by ignoring high-frequency financial data in forecasting the monthly real price of oil.
Model case procedures have some fundamentals in common with collective redress in civil law countries. This is particularly true in the field of investor protection which is highly regulated and marked by resulting enforcement failures, which led the German legislator to the enactment of the KapMuG and its recent amendment which highlight exemplary elements of model case procedure. A survey of the ongoing activities of the European Union in the area of collective redress and of its repercussions on the member state level therefore forms a suitable basis for the following analysis of the 2012 amendment of the KapMuG. It clearly brings into focus a shift from sector-specific regulation with an emphasis on the cross-border aspect of protecting consumers towards a “coherent approach” strengthening the enforcement of EU law. As a result, regulatory policy and collective redress are two sides of the same coin today. With respect to the KapMuG such a development brings about some tension between its aim to aggregate small individual claims as efficiently as possible and the dominant role of individual procedural rights in German civil procedure. This conflict can be illustrated by some specific rules of the KapMuG: its scope of application, the three-tier procedure of a model case procedure, the newly introduced notification of claims and the new opt-out settlement under the amended §§ 17-19.
We propose the realized systemic risk beta as a measure for financial companies’ contribution to systemic risk given network interdependence between firms’ tail risk exposures. Conditional on statistically pre-identified network spillover effects and market as well as balance sheet information, we define the realized systemic risk beta as the total time-varying marginal effect of a firm’s Value-at-risk (VaR) on the system’s VaR. Statistical inference reveals a multitude of relevant risk spillover channels and determines companies’ systemic importance in the U.S. financial system. Our approach can be used to monitor companies’ systemic importance allowing for a transparent macroprudential supervision.