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Money is more than memory
(2014)
Impersonal exchange is the hallmark of an advanced society. One key institution for impersonal exchange is money, which economic theory considers just a primitive arrangement for monitoring past conduct in society. If so, then a public record of past actions — or memory — supersedes the function performed by money. This intriguing theoretical postulate remains untested. In an experiment, we show that the suggested functional equality between money and memory does not translate into an empirical equivalence. Monetary systems perform a richer set of functions than just revealing past behaviors, which proves to be crucial in promoting large-scale cooperation.
Since the early 1970s several studies have reported distal splenic artery embolization, better known as partial spleen embolization (PSE), as an efficacious treatment of portal hypertensive variceal bleeding and hypersplenism in cirrhosis.(1, 2) However, the effect of PSE on portal pressure is secondary to the induction of splenic infarction. Depending on both the infarct volume and possible infection, PSE can induce serious complications including death.(2, 3) On the other hand, proximal splenic artery embolization (PSAE), which mimics surgical splenic artery ligation, prevents large infarction of the spleen, favoring collateral perfusion of its intact distal vasculature.(3) For this, PSAE has been extensively preferred over PSE for reducing portal hyperflow and treating refractory ascites (RA) after whole or partial liver transplantation (LT).(3, 4) We report here a case of PSAE used to treat RA in a patient with cirrhosis not eligible for transjugular intrahepatic portosystemic shunt (TIPS) and LT.
We study the behavioral underpinnings of adopting cash versus electronic payments in retail transactions. A novel theoretical and experimental framework is developed to primarily assess the impact of sellers’ service fees and buyers’ rewards from using electronic payments. Buyers and sellers face a coordination problem, independently choosing a payment method before trading. In the experiment, sellers readily adopt electronic payments but buyers do not. Eliminating service fees or introducing rewards significantly boosts the adoption of electronic payments. Hence, buyers’ incentives play a pivotal role in the diffusion of electronic payments but monetary incentives cannot fully explain their adoption choices. Findings from this experiment complement empirical findings based on surveys and field data.