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Money-back guarantees in individual pension accounts : evidence from the German pension reform
(2002)
The German Retirement Saving Act instituted a new funded system of supplementary pensions coupled with a general reduction in the level of state pay-as-you-go old-age pensions. In order to qualify for tax relief, the providers of supplementary savings products must offer a guarantee of the nominal value at retirement of contributions paid into these saving accounts. This paper explores how this "money-back" guarantee works and evaluates alternative designs for guarantee structures, including a life cycle model (dynamic asset allocation), a plan with a pre-specified blend of equity and bond investments (static asset allocation), and some type of portfolio insurance. We use a simulation methodology to compare hedging effectiveness and hedging costs associated with the provision of the money-back guarantee. In addition, the guarantee has important implications for regulators who must find an appropriate solvency system for such saving schemes. This version June 17, 2002 . Klassifikation: G11, G23, G28
Over-allotment arrangements are nowadays part of almost any initial public offering. The underwriting banks borrow stocks from the previous shareholders to issue more than the initially announced number of shares. This is combined with the option to cover this short position at the issue price. We present empirical evidence on the value of these arrangements to the underwriters of initial public offerings on the Neuer Markt. The over-allotment arrangement is regarded as a portfolio of a long call option and a short position in a forward contract on the stock, which is different from other approaches presented in the literature.
Given the economically substantial values for these option-like claims we try to identify benefits to previous shareholders or new investors when the company is using this instrument in the process of going public. Although we carefully control for potential endogeneity problems, we find virtually no evidence for a reduction in underpricing for firms using over-allotment arrangements. Furthermore, we do not find evidence for more pronounced price stabilization activities or better aftermarket performance for firms granting an over-allotment arrangement to the underwriting banks.