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Eurobonds zur Bewältigung der europäischen Krise? : Wegweisung zu einer modernen Entwicklungsunion
(2011)
Die aktuelle Debatte um den Umgang mit der Verschuldung Griechenlands und anderer EWU Staaten berührt die Grundlagen europäischer Wirtschaftspolitik. Die nächsten Schritte sind wohl abzuwägen, um über eine unmittelbare Kriseneindämmung hinaus eine langfristige Stabilisierung der wirtschaftlichen und politischen Strukturen in der Eurozone zu erreichen.
Eine funktionsfähige Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion hat ihren Preis. Sie ist aber auch von großem Nutzen, gerade für Deutschland und die wettbewerbsstarken Regionen, die insbesondere vom einheitlichen Binnenmarkt und der monetären Stabilität profitieren. Das rechtfertigt zugleich
eine Unterstützung ökonomisch schwächerer Mitglieder der Union durch die stärkeren. Historisch waren Währungsunionen ohne einen derartigen minimalen fiskalischen Ausgleich nicht dauerhaft. Deshalb sind, wenn man die Währungsunion aufrechterhalten will, zwei Extrempositionen - keine Transfers, um keinen Preis ebenso wie deren Gegenteil: jedwedes Defizit wird bedingungslos finanziert - nicht zielführend. Ein kompletter Haftungsausschluss (no bail-out) ist nicht glaubwürdig, solange unabweisbare Schuldenschnitte von insolventen Staaten oder Regionen (wegen Überschuldung) nicht möglich sind, weil sie innerhalb eines stark integrierten Bankenmarktes potentiell unkontrollierbare Rückwirkungen auslösen. Andererseits liefe die unkonditionierte, dauerhafte Finanzierung regionaler Ungleichgewichte auf Transfervolumina hinaus, die eine Überforderung der Transfergeber darstellten. Sie führte vor allem zu einer Perpetuierung der Probleme, weil Anreize zur letztlich unabdingbaren Anpassung fehlten. Damit bleiben zur Schaffung der Voraussetzungen einer funktionsfähigen Währungsunion nur Optionen, die zwischen den Polen liegen.
This Policy Letter presents a proposal for designing a program of government assistance for firms hurt by the Coronavirus crisis in the European Union (EU). In our recent Policy Letter 81, we introduced a new, equity-type instrument, a cash-against-tax surcharge scheme, bundled across firms and countries in a European Pandemic Equity Fund (EPEF). The present Policy Letter 84 focuses on the principles and conditions relevant for the operationalization of a EPEF. Our proposal has several desirable features. It: a) offers better risk sharing opportunities, augmenting the resilience of businesses and EU economies; b) is need-based, thereby contributing to an effective use of resources; c) builds on conditions and credible controls, addressing adverse selection and moral hazard; d) is accessible to smaller and medium-sized firms, the backbone of Europe’s economy; e) applies Europe-wide uniform eligibility criteria, strengthening support among member states; f) is a scheme of limited duration, reducing (perceived) government interference in businesses; g) creates a template for a growth-oriented public policy, aligning public and private sector interests; and h) builds on the existing institutional infrastructure and requires minimal legislative adjustments.
This policy letter adds to the current discussion on how to design a program of government assistance for firms hurt by the Coronavirus crisis. While not pretending to provide a cure-all proposal, the advocated scheme could help to bring funding to firms, even small firms, quickly, without increasing their leverage and default risk. The plan combines outright cash transfers to firms with a temporary, elevated corporate profit tax at the firm level as a form of conditional payback. The implied equity-like payment structure has positive risk-sharing features for firms, without impinging on ownership structures. The proposal has to be implemented at the pan-European level to strengthen Euro area resilience.
The spreading of the Covid-19 virus causes a reduction in economic activity worldwide and may lead to new risks to financial stability. The authors draw attention to the urgency of the targeted mitigation strategies on the European level and suggest taking coordinated action on the fiscal side to provide liquidity to affected firms in the corporate sector. Otherwise, virus-related cashflow interruptions could lead to a new full-blown banking crisis. Monetary policy measures are unlikely to mitigate cash liquidity shortages at the level of individual firms. Coordinated action at European level is decisive to prevent markets from losing confidence in the resilience of banks, particularly in countries with limited fiscal capacity. In contrast to the euro crisis of 2011, the cause of the current crisis does not lie in the financial markets; therefore, the risk of moral hazard for banks or states is low.
With the second wave of the Covid-19 pandemic in full swing, banks face a challenging environment. They will need to address disappointing results and adverse balance sheet restatements, the intensity of which depends on the evolution of the euro area economies. At the same time, vulnerable banks reinforce real economy deficiencies. The contribution of this paper is to provide a comparative assessment of the various policy responses to address a looming banking crisis. Such a crisis will fully materialize when non-performing assets drag down banks simultaneously, raising the specter of a full-blown systemic crisis. The policy responses available range from forbearance, recapitalization (with public or private resources), asset separation (bad banks, at national or EU level), to debt conversion schemes. We evaluate these responses according to a set of five criteria that define the efficacy of each. These responses are not mutually exclusive, in practice, as they have never been. They may also go hand in hand with other restructuring initiatives, including potential consolidation in the banking sector. Although we do not make a specific recommendation, we provide a framework for policymakers to guide them in their decision making.
Studies employing micro price data to examine the extent of international goods market integration tend to find that borders induce arbitrage-impeding transaction costs which contribute to segment national markets. Analyzing household scanner price data from the three euro area countries Belgium, Germany and Netherlands, we document that Belgian households living in the vicinity of the border to Netherlands pay almost 10% more for the same good as their Dutch counterparts. German consumers on the other hand face prices that are on average up to around 3% smaller than those in the neighboring Netherlands. Counterfactual evidence for within-country price discontinuities provides no evidence of any existing border effects. The induced costs of crossing national borders amount to at least 13%. We also find evidence on border discontinuities in various household preference characteristics (such as demand elasticities and goods valuation) and household shopping patterns such as shopping frequencies.
The global financial crisis (as well as the European sovereign debt crisis) has led to a substantial redesign of rules and institutions – aiming in particular at underwriting financial stability. At the same time, the crisis generated a renewed interest in properly appraising systemic financial vulnerabilities. Employing most recent data and applying a variety of largely only recently developed methods we provide an assessment of indicators of financial stability within the Euro Area. Taking a “functional” approach, we analyze comprehensively all financial intermediary activities, regardless of the institutional roof – banks or non-bank (shadow) banks – under which they are conducted. Our results reveal a declining role of banks (and a commensurate increase in non-bank banking). These structural shifts (between institutions) are coincident with regulatory and supervisory reforms (implemented or firmly anticipated) as well as a non-standard monetary policy environment. They might, unintendedly, actually imply a rise in systemic risk. Overall, however, our analyses suggest that financial imbalances have been reduced over the course of recent years. Hence, the financial intermediation sector has become more resilient. Nonetheless, existing (equity) buffers would probably not suffice to face substantial volatility shocks.