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Exit strategies
(2010)
We study alternative scenarios for exiting the post-crisis fiscal and monetary accommodation using the model of Angeloni and Faia (2010), that combines a standard DSGE framework with a fragile banking sector, suitably modified and calibrated for the euro area. Credibly announced and fast fiscal consolidations dominate – based on simple criteria – alternative strategies incorporating various degrees of gradualism and surprise. The fiscal adjustment should be based on spending cuts or else be relatively skewed towards consumption taxes. The phasing out of monetary accommodation should be simultaneous or slightly delayed. We also find that, contrary to widespread belief, Basel III may well have an expansionary macroeconomic effect. Keywords: Exit Strategies , Debt Consolidation , Fiscal Policy , Monetary Policy , Capital Requirements , Bank Runs JEL Classification: G01, E63, H12
We assess, through VAR evidence, the effects of monetary policy on banks’ risk exposure and find the presence of a risk-taking channel. A model combining fragile banks prone to risk mis-incentives and credit constrained firms, whose collateral fluctuations generate a balance sheet channel, is used to rationalize the evidence. A monetary expansion increases bank leverage. With two consequences: on the one side this exacerbates risk exposure; on the other, the risk spiral depresses output, therefore dampening the conventional amplification effect of the financial accelerator.
The analyses of intersectoral linkages of Leontief (1941) and Hirschman (1958) provide a natural way to study the transmission of risk among interconnected banks and to measure their systemic importance. In this paper we show how classic input-output analysis can be applied to banking and how to derive six indicators that capture different aspects of systemic importance, using a simple numerical example for illustration. We also discuss the relationship with other approaches, most notably network centrality measures, both formally and by means of a simulated network.
We assess the effects of monetary policy on bank risk to verify the existence of a risk-taking channel - monetary expansions inducing banks to assume more risk. We first present VAR evidence confirming that this channel exists and tends to concentrate on the bank funding side. Then, to rationalize this evidence we build a macro model where banks subject to runs endogenously choose their funding structure (deposits vs. capital) and risk level. A monetary expansion increases bank leverage and risk. In turn, higher bank risk in steady state increases asset price volatility and reduces equilibrium output.
Exit strategies
(2014)
We study alternative scenarios for exiting the post-crisis fiscal and monetary accommodation using a macromodel where banks choose their capital structure and are subject to runs. Under a Taylor rule, the post-crisis interest rate hits the zero lower bound (ZLB) and remains there for several years. In that condition, pre-announced and fast fiscal consolidations dominate - based on output and inflation performance and bank stability - alternative strategies incorporating various degrees of gradualism and surprise. We also examine an alternative monetary strategy in which the interest rate does not reach the ZLB; the benefits from fiscal consolidation persist, but are more nuanced.
Discussions about the banking union have restarted. Its success so far is limited: national banking sectors are still overwhelmingly exposed to their own countries’ economies, cross border banking has not increased and capital and liquidity remain locked within national boundaries. The policy letter highlights that the current debate, centered on sovereign exposures and deposit insurance, misses critical underlying problems in the supervision and resolution frameworks. The ECB supervisors’ efforts to facilitate cross-border banking have been hampered by national ringfencing. The resolution framework is not up to its task: limited powers of the SRB, prohibitive access conditions and limited size of the Single Resolution Fund limit its effectiveness. A lack of a coherent European framework for insolvency unlevels the regulatory field and creates incentives to bypass European rules. The new Commission and European Parliament, with the new ECB leadership, provide a unique opportunity to address these shortcomings and make the banking union work.