Refine
Year of publication
- 2013 (2) (remove)
Document Type
- Article (1)
- Part of a Book (1)
Has Fulltext
- yes (2)
Keywords
- Die Leiden des jungen Werthers (1)
- Evolutionspsychologie (1)
- Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von (1)
- Illusion (1)
- Kulturelle Evolution (1)
- Rezeption (1)
- Selbstmord (1)
- Ästhetik (1)
This contribution outlines the evolutionary history of aesthetic illusion, drawing on both its biological and its cultural evolution. Unlike other 'biocultural' accounts of human behaviour, however, the present considerations strictly distinguish between these two processes by resorting to the system-theoretical reformulation of evolutionary theory as offered by Niklas Luhmann. After introducing the theoretical framework, two core elements of aesthetic illusion are described as biological predispositions: the ability to become 'illuded' (as deriving from a biological adaptation for play behaviour in mammals) and the ability to take an interpretive, quasi-communicative attitude toward artifacts (which might be a by-product of the human capacity for symbolic cognition). Particular emphasis is given to the competency for cognitive metarepresentation which emerged together with play and other capacities in fundamentally intelligent animals, and which, in combination with the evolution of language in the human species, has developed into a complex cognitive apparatus called 'scope syntax' by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby. In the last part of the present article several cultural processes are pointed out which have influenced the cultural concepts that, as a cognitive 'scope' tag, guide the experience of aesthetic illusion, the most important among them being the idea of autonomous art as brought about in Western modernity.
In recent introductions to German literary studies one reads that the publication of Goethe's "The Sorrows of Young Werther" was followed by a veritable wave of suicides among its readers. However, according to two studies that have collected and reexamined the few hints we have about such alleged cases the story of the suicide wave seems to be a myth rather than an accurate historical account. Why, then, do we still spread this myth? First, I outline a number of cognitive predispositions that might be responsible for the intuitive plausibility of the suicide story. Second, I try to explain why even in academic writing we often succumb to these cognitive tendencies. I propose that our discipline suffers by generally undervaluing empiricism and that this calls for revision.