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This paper provides a complete characterization of optimal contracts in principal-agent settings where the agent's action has persistent effects. We model general information environments via the stochastic process of the likelihood-ratio. The martingale property of this performance metric captures the information benefit of deferral. Costs of deferral may result from both the agent's relative impatience as well as her consumption smoothing needs. If the relatively impatient agent is risk neutral, optimal contracts take a simple form in that they only reward maximal performance for at most two payout dates. If the agent is additionally risk-averse, optimal contracts stipulate rewards for a larger selection of dates and performance states: The performance hurdle to obtain the same level of compensation is increasing over time whereas the pay-performance sensitivity is declining.
Agencies around the world are in the process of developing taxonomies and standards for sustainable (or ESG) investment products. A key assumption in our model is that of non-consequentialist private investors (households) who derive a "warm glow" decisional utility when purchasing an investment product that is labelled as sustainable. We ask when such labelling is socially beneficial even when the socialplanner can impose a minimum standard on investment and production. In a model of financial constraints (Holmström and Tirole 1997), which we close to include consumer surplus, we also determine the optimal labelling threshold and show how its stringency is affected by determinants such as the prevalence of warm-glow investor preferences, the presence of social network effects, or the relevance of financial constraints at the industry level.