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“Institutional Overburdening” to a large extent was a consequence of the “Great Moderation”. This term indicates that it was a period in which inflation had come down from rather high levels. Growth and employment were at least satisfying and variability of output had substantially declined. It was almost unavoidable that as a consequence expectations on future actions of central banks and their ability to control the economy reached an unprecedented peak which was hardly sustainable. Institutional overburdening has two dimensions. One is coming from exaggerated expectations on what central banks can achieve (“expectational overburdening”). The other dimension is “operational overburdening” i.e. overloading the central bank with more and more responsibilities and competences.
n a contribution prepared for the Athens Symposium on “Banking Union, Monetary Policy and Economic Growth”, Otmar Issing describes forward guidance by central banks as the culmination of the idea of guiding expectations by pure communication. In practice, he argues, forward guidance has proved a misguided idea. What is presented as state of the art monetary policy is an example of pretence of knowledge. Forward guidance tries to give the impression of a kind of rule-based monetary policy. De facto, however, it is an overambitious discretionary approach which, to be successful, would need much more (or rather better) information than is currently available. In Issing's view, communication must be clear and honest about the limits of monetary policy in a world of uncertainty.
In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis that started in 2007, policymakers were forced to respond quickly and forcefully to a recession caused not by short-term factors, but rather by an over-accumulation of debt by sovereigns, banks, and households: a so-called “balance sheet recession.” Though the nature of the crisis was understood relatively early on, policy prescriptions for how to deal with its consequences have continued to diverge. This paper gives a short overview of the prescriptions, the remaining challenges and key lessons for monetary policy.
On November 8, 2013, several members of the British House of Lords’ Subcommittee A conducted a hearing at the ECB in Frankfurt, Germany, on “Genuine Economic and Monetary Union and its Implications for the UK”. Professors Otmar Issing and Jan Pieter Krahnen were called as expert witnesses.
The testimony began with a general discussion on the elements considered necessary for a functioning internal market. Do economic union and monetary union require a fiscal union or even a political union, beyond the elements of the banking union currently being prepared? In this context, also the critique of the German current account surplus and the international expectations that Germany stimulate internal demand to support growth in crisis countries, were discussed.
With regard to the monetary union, the members of the subcommittee asked for an assessment of how European nations and the banking industry would have fared in the banking crisis that followed the Lehman collapse, had there not been a common currency. Given the important role that the ECB has played in the course of the crisis management, the members further asked for an evaluation of the OMT-program of the ECB and also if the monetary union is in need of common debt instruments, in order to provide the ECB with the possibility of buying EU liabilities, comparable to the Fed buying US Treasury bonds. Finally, the dual role of the ECB for monetary policy and banking supervision was an issue touched on by several questions.
The financial crisis which started in 2007 has caused a tremendous challenge for monetary policy. The simple concept of inflation targeting has lost its position as state of the art. There is a debate on whether the mandate of a central bank should not be widened. And, indeed, monetary policy has been very accommodative in the last couple of years and central banks have modified their communication strategies by introducing forward guidance as a new policy tool. This paper addresses the consequences of these developments for the credibility, the reputation and the independence of central banks. It also comments on the recent debate among economists concerning the question whether the ECB's OMT program is compatible with its mandate.
This Policy White Paper assesses several main elements of ECB’s upcoming review of its monetary policy strategy, announced in January 2020. Four aspects of the review are discussed in detail: i) ECB’s definition of price stability and the arguments for and against inflation targeting; ii) the scope of ECB’s objectives, considering financial stability, employment and the sustainability of the environment; iii) an update of ECB’s economic and monetary analyses to assess the risks to price stability; iv) the ECB’s communication practice. Furthermore, an overview of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy and its last evaluation in 2003 is given.
Historically Central Bank Independence (CBI) was anything but the norm. CBI seems to contradict core principles of democracy. Most economists were also against CBI. After the Great Inflation of the 1970ies many empirical studies demonstrated that there is a strong negative correlation between the degree of CBI and the rate of inflation. In 1990 most major countries had endowed their central bank with the status of independence. Overburdening with elevated expectations and additional competences are threatening the reputation of central banks and undermining the case for CBI.
In his speech at the conference „The SNB and its Watchers“, Otmar Issing, member of the ECB Governing Council from its start in 1998 until 2006, takes a look back at more than twenty years of the conference series „The ECB and Its Watchers“. In June 1999, Issing established this format together with Axel Weber, then Director of the Center for Financial Studies, to discuss the monetary policy strategy of the newly founded central bank with a broad circle of participants, that is academics, bank economists and members of the media on a „neutral ground“. At the annual conference, the ECB and its representatives would play an active role and engage in a lively exchange of view with the other participants. Over the years, Volker Wieland took over as organizer of the conference series, which also was adopted by other central banks. In his contribution at the second conference „The SNB and its Watchers“, Issing summarizes the experience gained from over twenty years of the ECB Watchers Conference.