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Sobre la libertad política
(1998)
Este artículo presenta un argumento en favor de un concepción intersubjetivista de la libertad política constituida por cinco diferentes nociones de autonomía: moral, ética, legal, política y social. Más allá de las nociones estrictamente liberales o comunitarias, negativas o positivas, el concepto de libertad política incluye todas aquellas libertades que los ciudadanos, en tanto continentes y usuarios autónomos de la libertad, pueden conceder y garantizar de forma recíproca y general. Así, en la base de este concepto reposa un principio de justiticación moral y política.
Immer wieder sieht man sich – einer Zeitreise gleich – heutzutage rückversetzt in die trüben Zeiten religiöser Konfrontationen, denkt man an die Diskussionen über Pläne zum Bau von Moscheen, die Regensburger Rede des Papstes, Karikaturen in dänischen Zeitungen oder Kopftücher von Lehrerinnen. Und so ist es ganz folgerichtig, dass der ehrwürdige Begriff der Toleranz allerorten bemüht wird, um konfliktentschärfend zu wirken. Gleichwohl fällt auf, dass häufig jede der streitenden Parteien ihn für sich reklamiert. Was also heißt »Toleranz« genau?
Os limites da tolerância
(2009)
Este artigo apresenta os elementos constitutivos do conceito de tolerância e discute duas concepções diferentes do termo, como permissão e como respeito moral, que expressam modos diversos de demarcar os limites da tolerância. A tolerância é apresentada como um conceito que, para ganhar algum conteúdo, depende normativamente de um direito à justificação baseado na idéia de um uso público da razão segundo o qual as práticas e as instituições político-jurídicas que determinam a vida social dos cidadãos devem ser justificáveis à luz de normas que eles não podem recíproca e genericamente rejeitar.
Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen : zur Idee eines interdisziplinären Forschungsprogramms
(2010)
Ein geistes- und sozialwissenschaftliches Forschungsprogramm betritt mit der These, dass wir in einer Zeit tiefgreifender sozialer Veränderungen leben, kein Neuland. Ein thematischer Fokus auf die Frage der Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen mit Bezug auf die entsprechenden Verschiebungen, Umbrüche und Konflikte in verschiedenen Gesellschaften und auf transnationaler Ebene bringt dagegen etwas Neues und Wichtiges ans Licht. Das ist jedenfalls unsere Überzeugung.
Ernst Bloch pointed out in a particularly emphatic way that the concept of human dignity featured centrally in historical struggles against different forms of unjustified rule, i.e. domination – to which one must add that it continues to do so to the present day. The “upright gait,” putting an end to humiliation and insult: this is the most powerful demand, in both political and rhetorical terms, that a “human rights-based” claim expresses. It marks the emergence of a radical, context-transcending reference point immanent to social conflicts which raises fundamental questions concerning the customary opposition between immanent and transcendent criticism. For within the idiom of demanding respect for human dignity, a right is invoked “here and now,” in a particular, context-specific form, which at its core is owed to every human being as a person. Thus Bloch is in one respect correct when he asserts that human rights are not a natural “birthright” but must be achieved through struggle; but in another respect this struggle can develop its social power only if it has a firm and in a certain sense “absolute” normative anchor. Properly understood, it becomes apparent that these social conflicts always affect “two worlds”: the social reality, on the one hand, which is criticized in part or radically in the light of an ideal normative dimension, on the other. For those who engage in this criticism there is no doubt that the normative dimension is no less real than the reality to which they refuse to resign themselves. Those who critically transcend reality always also live elsewhere.
The title I have chosen seems to signal a tension, even a contradiction, in a number of respects. Democracy appears to be a form of political organisation and government in which, through general and public participatory procedures, a sufficiently legitimate political will is formed which acquires the force of law. Justice, by contrast, appears to be a value external to this context which is not so much linked to procedures of “input” or “throughput” legitimation but is understood instead as an output- or outcome-oriented concept. At times, justice is even understood as an otherworldly idea which, when transported into the Platonic cave, merely causes trouble and ends up as an undemocratic elite project. In methodological terms, too, this difference is sometimes signalled in terms of a contrast between a form of “worldly” political thought and “abstract” and otherworldly philosophical reflection on justice. In my view, we are bound to talk past the issues to be discussed under the heading “transnational justice and democracy” unless we first root out false dichotomies such as the ones mentioned. My thesis will be that justice must be “secularised” or “grounded” both with regard to how we understand it and to its application to relations beyond the state.
Den Menschen als vernunftbegabtes Wesen, als animal rationale, zu begreifen heißt, ihn als rechtfertigendes Wesen anzusehen. Die Vernunft ist die Fähigkeit, sich anhand rechtfertigender Gründe in der Welt zu orientieren. Denn „ratio, raison, reason bedeutet“, wie Tugendhat hervorhebt, „ebenso sehr ‚Grund‘ wie ‚Vernunft‘. Das Vermögen der Vernunft ist die Fähigkeit, für seine Meinungen und für seine Handlungen Rede und Antwort stehen zu können; lat. rationem reddere, griech. logon didonai.“ Dieses Rede-und-Antwort-Stehen ist eine soziale Praxis kulturell und historisch situierter Wesen, die einerseits frei sind, ihre Gründe zu wählen und zu prüfen, andererseits aber daran gebunden, welche Gründe ihnen zur Verfügung stehen und welche als gut oder rechtfertigend gelten. Der Raum der Gründe ist ein Raum der Rechtfertigungen, die nicht nur Einzelhandlungen, sondern auch komplexe Handlungsordnungen, also soziale Verhältnisse und politische Institutionen, legitimieren.
Menschen sind aber auch erzählende Wesen. Der Raum der Gründe, in dem sie sich orientieren, ist kein nackter Raum einzelner Sätze oder gar Normen, sondern bevölkert von Narrativen.
Noumenal Power
(2014)
In political or social philosophy, we speak about power all the time. Yet the meaning of this important concept is rarely made explicit, especially in the context of normative discussions. But as with many other concepts, once one considers it more closely, fundamental problems arise, such as whether a power relation is necessarily a relation of subordination and domination. In the following, I suggest a novel understanding of what power is and what it means to exercise it.
Professor Dr. Karl-Otto Apel, Emeritus für Philosophie an der Goethe-Universität, ist am 15. Mai 2017 im Alter von 95 Jahren an seinem Wohnort in Niedernhausen im Taunus gestorben. Er war einer der wichtigsten Philosophen seiner Zeit und hat die Philosophie in Deutschland und weit darüber hinaus nachhaltig geprägt.
Allen Buchanan argues that a particular set of false factual beliefs, especially when part of a comprehensive ideology, can lead persons to develop ‘morally conservative’ convictions that stand in the way of realising justice even though these persons have a ‘firm grasp of correct principles of justice and a robust commitment to their realisation’. In my remarks, I raise some questions concerning the core argument: How ‘firm’ can a grasp of principles of justice be if a person is blind to the realities of injustice? And how ‘sincerely committed’ to justice can such an injustice-insensitive person be? Alternatively: How firm is that grasp or commitment if one has a radically pessimistic view about human nature so that one does not believe that (egalitarian) justice can or could ever be realised? Secondly, I ask: If such ideologies or false beliefs are in play in reproducing injustice, do they not also ‘mask’ existing injustices?
This paper challenges widespread assumptions in trust research according to which trust and conflict are opposing terms or where trust is generally seen as a value. Rather, it argues that trust is only valuable if properly justified, and it places such justifications in contexts of social and political conflict. For these purposes, the paper suggests a distinction between a general concept and various conceptions of trust, and it defines the concept as a four-place one. With regard to the justification of trust, a distinction between internal and full justification is introduced, and the justification of trust is linked to relations of justification between trusters and trusted. Finally, trust in conflict(s) emerges were such relations exist among the parties of a conflict, often by way of institutional mediation.
Am 18. Juni wird Jürgen Habermas, der die Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften der Goethe-Universität nachhaltig geprägt hat, 95 Jahre alt, und dazu sendet unsere wissenschaftliche Community, der er nach wie vor aktiv angehört, die herzlichsten Glückwünsche. Bis heute ist Habermas’ wissenschaftliche und intellektuelle Stimme national und international eine der meistgehörten, und wir wünschen von Herzen, dass es noch lange so bleiben möge.