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Nach den Ereignissen in Gaggenau liest und hört man allenthalben von den "rechtlichen Schwierigkeiten", die hinsichtlich Verboten von Redeauftritten ausländischer Politiker bestünden. In Gaggenau hat man originär sicherheitsrechtlich argumentiert: viel zu viele Leute, viel zu kleiner Parkplatz, Chaos vorprogrammiert. Ähnliches nun in Köln: zu großer Aufwand, zu kurzfristig, Chaos vorprogrammiert. Nehmen wir einmal an, es seien im Einzelfall tragfähige Begründungen gewesen. Dann stellt sich zugleich die Frage: Was kann man tun, wenn man den Auftritt eines ausländischen Vertreters untersagen will, obwohl der Parkplatz groß genug und die Polizei ausreichend gegen Ausschreitungen gewappnet ist? ...
We study the design features of disclosure regulations that seek to trigger the green transition of the global economy and ask whether such regulatory interventions are likely to bring about sufficient market discipline to achieve socially optimal climate targets.
We categorize the transparency obligations stipulated in green finance regulation as either compelling the standardized disclosure of raw data, or providing quality labels that signal desirable green characteristics of investment products based on a uniform methodology. Both categories of transparency requirements can be imposed at activity, issuer, and portfolio level.
Finance theory and empirical evidence suggest that investors may prefer “green” over “dirty” assets for both financial and non-financial reasons and may thus demand higher returns from environmentally-harmful investment opportunities. However, the market discipline that this negative cost of capital effect exerts on “dirty” issuers is potentially attenuated by countervailing investor interests and does not automatically lead to socially optimal outcomes.
Mandatory disclosure obligations and their (public) enforcement can play an important role in green finance strategies. They prevent an underproduction of the standardized high-quality information that investors need in order to allocate capital according to their preferences. However, the rationale behind regulatory intervention is not equally strong for all categories and all levels of “green” disclosure obligations. Corporate governance problems and other agency conflicts in intermediated investment chains do not represent a categorical impediment for green finance strategies.
However, the many forces that may prevent markets from achieving socially optimal equilibria render disclosure-centered green finance legislation a second best to more direct forms of regulatory intervention like global carbon taxation and emissions trading schemes. Inherently transnational market-based green finance concepts can play a supporting role in sustainable transition, which is particularly important as long as first-best solutions remain politically unavailable.
Die BaFin hat im August 2021 eine Richtlinie für nachhaltige Investmentvermögen vorgelegt. Diese soll regeln, unter welchen Voraussetzungen ein Fonds als „nachhaltig“, „grün“ o.ä. bezeichnet und vermarktet werden darf. Zwar sind aufsichtsrechtliche Maßnahmen, die darauf abzielen, die Qualität von Informationen zu Nachhaltigkeitscharakteristika von Finanzprodukten zu erhöhen, grundsätzlich zu begrüßen. Der Erlass der konsultierten Richtlinie ist jedoch nicht zu befürworten. Im Lichte der einschlägigen unionsrechtlichen Regelwerke und Initiativen ist unklar, welchen informationellen Mehrwert diese rein nationale Maßnahme schaffen soll. Ferner bleibt auf Grundlage des Entwurfs unklar, anhand welcher Maßstäbe die „Nachhaltigkeit“ eines Investmentvermögens beurteilt werden soll, sodass das primäre Regelungsziel einer verbesserten Anlegerinformation nicht erreicht würde.
Common ownership and the (non-)transparency of institutional shareholdings: an EU-US comparison
(2022)
This paper compares the extent of common ownership in the US and the EU stock markets, with a particular focus on differences in the ap- plicable ownership transparency requirements. Most empirical research on common ownership to date has focused on US issuers, largely relying on ownership data obtained from institutional investors’ 13F filings. This type of data is generally not available for EU issuers. Absent 13F filings, researchers have to use ownership records sourced from mutual funds’ periodic reports and blockholder disclosures. Constructing a “reduced dataset” that seeks to capture only ownership information available for both EU and US issuers, I demonstrate that the “extra” ownership information introduced by 13F filings is substantial. However, even when taking differences in the transparency situation into due account, common ownership among listed EU firms is much less pronounced than among listed US firms by any measure. This is true even if the analysis is limited to non-controlled firms.