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Under a conventional policy rule, a central bank adjusts its policy rate linearly according to the gap between inflation and its target, and the gap between output and its potential. Under "the opportunistic approach to disinflation" a central bank controls inflation aggressively when inflation is far from its target, but concentrates more on output stabilization when inflation is close to its target, allowing supply shocks and unforeseen fluctuations in aggregate demand to move inflation within a certain band. We use stochastic simulations of a small-scale rational expectations model to contrast the behavior of output and inflation under opportunistic and linear rules. Klassifikation: E31, E52, E58, E61. July, 2005.
In the New-Keynesian model, optimal interest rate policy under uncertainty is formulated without reference to monetary aggregates as long as certain standard assumptions on the distributions of unobservables are satisfied. The model has been criticized for failing to explain common trends in money growth and inflation, and that therefore money should be used as a cross-check in policy formulation (see Lucas (2007)). We show that the New-Keynesian model can explain such trends if one allows for the possibility of persistent central bank misperceptions. Such misperceptions motivate the search for policies that include additional robustness checks. In earlier work, we proposed an interest rate rule that is near-optimal in normal times but includes a cross-check with monetary information. In case of unusual monetary trends, interest rates are adjusted. In this paper, we show in detail how to derive the appropriate magnitude of the interest rate adjustment following a significant cross-check with monetary information, when the New-Keynesian model is the central bank’s preferred model. The cross-check is shown to be effective in offsetting persistent deviations of inflation due to central bank misperceptions. Keywords: Monetary Policy, New-Keynesian Model, Money, Quantity Theory, European Central Bank, Policy Under Uncertainty
Research with Keynesian-style models has emphasized the importance of the output gap for policies aimed at controlling inflation while declaring monetary aggregates largely irrelevant. Critics, however, have argued that these models need to be modified to account for observed money growth and inflation trends, and that monetary trends may serve as a useful cross-check for monetary policy. We identify an important source of monetary trends in form of persistent central bank misperceptions regarding potential output. Simulations with historical output gap estimates indicate that such misperceptions may induce persistent errors in monetary policy and sustained trends in money growth and inflation. If interest rate prescriptions derived from Keynesian-style models are augmented with a cross-check against money-based estimates of trend inflation, inflation control is improved substantially.
The European Central Bank has assigned a special role to money in its two pillar strategy and has received much criticism for this decision. In this paper, we explore possible justifications. The case against including money in the central bank’s interest rate rule is based on a standard model of the monetary transmission process that underlies many contributions to research on monetary policy in the last two decades. Of course, if one allows for a direct effect of money on output or inflation as in the empirical “two-pillar” Phillips curves estimated in some recent contributions, it would be optimal to include a measure of (long-run) money growth in the rule. In this paper, we develop a justification for including money in the interest rate rule by allowing for imperfect knowledge regarding unobservables such as potential output and equilibrium interest rates. We formulate a novel characterization of ECB-style monetary cross-checking and show that it can generate substantial stabilization benefits in the event of persistent policy misperceptions regarding potential output. Such misperceptions cause a bias in policy setting. We find that cross-checking and changing interest rates in response to sustained deviations of long-run money growth helps the central bank to overcome this bias. Our argument in favor of ECB-style cross-checking does not require direct effects of money on output or inflation. JEL Classification: E32, E41, E43, E52, E58
The European Central Bank has assigned a special role to money in its two pillar strategy and has received much criticism for this decision. The case against including money in the central bank’s interest rate rule is based on a standard model of the monetary transmission process that underlies many contributions to research on monetary policy in the last two decades. In this paper, we develop a justification for including money in the interest rate rule by allowing for imperfect knowledge regarding unobservables such as potential output and equilibrium interest rates. We formulate a novel characterization of ECB-style monetary cross-checking and show that it can generate substantial stabilization benefits in the event of persistent policy misperceptions regarding potential output. JEL Classification: E32, E41, E43, E52, E58
Since 2014 the ECB has implemented a massive expansion of monetary policy including large-scale asset purchases and negative policy rates. As the euro area economy has improved and inflation has risen, questions concerning the future normalization of monetary policy are starting to dominate the public debate.
The study argues that the ECB should develop a strategy for policy normalization and communicate it very soon to prepare the ground for subsequent steps towards tightening. It provides analysis and makes proposals concerning key aspects of this strategy. The aim is to facilitate the emergence of expectations among market participants that are consistent with a smooth process of policy normalization.
The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022 has intensified the discussion of Europe’s reliance on energy imports from Russia. A ban on Russian imports of oil, natural gas and coal has already been imposed by the United States, while the United Kingdom plans to cease imports of oil and coal from Russia by the end of 2022. The German Federal Government is currently opposing an energy embargo against Russia. However, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action is working on a strategy to reduce energy imports from Russia. In this paper, the authors give an overview of the German and European reliance on energy imports from Russia with a focus on gas imports and discuss price effects, alternative suppliers of natural gas, and the potential for saving and replacing natural gas. They also provide an overview of estimates of the consequences on the economic outlook if the conflict intensifies.
Schätzwerte mittelfristiger Gleichgewichtszinsen mit der Methode nach Laubach und Williams (2003) werden inzwischen vielfach in der Diskussion um die Geld- und Fiskalpolitik zitiert. Unter anderem wurden sie von Summers (2014a) als Evidenz für eine säkulare Stagnation angeführt und von Yellen (2015) zur Rechtfertigung der Nullzinspolitik verwendet. In diesem Papier nehmen wir eine umfangreiche Untersuchung und Sensitivitätsanalyse dieser Schätzwerte für die Vereinigten Staaten, Deutschland und den Euro-Raum vor. Aufgrund der hohen Unsicherheit und Sensitivität, die mit den Schätzwerten mittelfristiger Gleichgewichtszinsen mit der Laubach-Williams-Methode und ähnlichen Ansätzen verbunden ist, sollten diese Schätzungen nicht den Ausschlag für entscheidende Weichenstellungen in der Geld- und Fiskalpolitik geben.
The currrent debate on monetary and fiscal policy is heavily influenced by estimates of the equilibrium real interest rate. Beyer and Wieland re-estimate the U.S. equilibrium rate with the methodology of Laubach and Williams and further modifications. They provide new estimates for the United States, the euro area and Germany and subject them to sensitivity tests. Beyer and Wieland conclude that due to the great uncertainty and sensitivity, the observed decline in the estimates is not a reliable indicator of a need for expansionary monetary and fiscal policy. Yet, if those estimates are employed to determine the appropriate monetary policy stance, such estimates are better used together with the consistent estimate of the level of potential output.
The debate on monetary and fiscal policy is heavily influenced by estimates of the equilibrium real interest rate. In particular, this concerns estimates derived from a simple aggregate demand and Phillips curve model with time-varying components as proposed by Laubach and Williams (2003). For example, Summers (2014a) refers to these estimates as important evidence for a secular stagnation and the need for fiscal stimulus. Yellen (2015, 2017) has made use of such estimates in order to explain and justify why the Federal Reserve has held interest rates so low for so long. First, we re-estimate the United States equilibrium rate with the methodology of Laubach and Williams (2003). Then, we build on their approach and an alternative specification to provide new estimates for the United States, Germany, the euro area and Japan. Third, we subject these estimates to a battery of sensitivity tests. Due to the great uncertainty and sensitivity that accompany these equilibrium rate estimates, the observed decline in the estimates is not a reliable indicator of a need for expansionary monetary and fiscal policy. Yet, if these estimates are employed to determine the appropriate monetary policy stance, such estimates are better used together with the consistent estimate of the level of potential output.