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Over-allotment arrangements are nowadays part of almost any initial public offering. The underwriting banks borrow stocks from the previous shareholders to issue more than the initially announced number of shares. This is combined with the option to cover this short position at the issue price. We present empirical evidence on the value of these arrangements to the underwriters of initial public offerings on the Neuer Markt. The over-allotment arrangement is regarded as a portfolio of a long call option and a short position in a forward contract on the stock, which is different from other approaches presented in the literature.
Given the economically substantial values for these option- like claims we try to identify benefits to previous shareholders or new investors when the company is using this instrument in the process of going public. Although we carefully control for potential endogeneity problems, we find virtually no evidence for a reduction in underpricing for firms using over-allotment arrangements. Furthermore, we do not find evidence for more pronounced price stabilization activities or better aftermarket performance for firms granting an over-allotment arrangement to the underwriting banks.
EFM Classification: 230, 410
Conference Reader zur gemeinsam von Athansios Orphanides (Federal Reserve Board, Washington D.C.), John C. Williams (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco), Heinz Hermann (Deutsche Bundesbank), und Volker Wieland (Center for Financial Studies and Goethe University Frankfurt) organisierten Konferenz, die vom 30. - 31. August, 2003 in Eltville stattgefunden hat. Inhaltsverzeichnis: * Volker Wieland (Director Center for Financial Studies): Foreword * Hans Georg Fabritius (Member of the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank): Opening Remarks * Charles Goodhart (Norman Sosnow Professor of Banking and Finance at the London School of Economics and External Member of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Commitee): After Dinner Speech * Paper Abstracts * List of Participants
This paper sets out to analyze the influence of different types of venture capitalists on the performance of their portfolio firms around and after IPO. We investigate the hypothesis that different governance structures, objectives, and track records of different types of VCs have a significant impact on their respective IPOs. We explore this hypothesis using a data set embracing all IPOs that have occurred on Germany's Neuer Markt. Our main finding is that significant differences among the different VCs exist. Firms backed by independent VCs perform significantly better two years after IPO as compared to all other IPOs, and their share prices fluctuate less than those of their counterparts in this period of time. On the contrary, firms backed by public VCs show relative underperformance. The fact that this could occur implies that market participants did not correctly assess the role played by different types of VCs.
The focus of the discussion at the conference on September 23, 2004 was on the long-term impact on capital markets and pension systems. The speakers tried to identify the direction and magnitude of potential changes as well as the likelihood of an eventual asset meltdown. The conference's objective was to combine insights from academia with those from the financial community in order to provide a more comprehensive outlook on capital market developments. Conference Reader Nr. 2005/01
The effects of public policy programmes which aim at internalising spill-overs due to successful innovation are analysed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard double-sided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analysing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programmes, ex ante grants and some public-private partnerships depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.
The effects of public policy programmes which aim at internalising spill-overs due to successful innovation are analysed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard double-sided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analysing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programmes, ex ante grants and some public-private partnerships depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.