Universitätspublikationen
Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (1111)
- Report (75)
- Part of Periodical (57)
- Article (16)
- Conference Proceeding (3)
- Book (1)
- Periodical (1)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (1264) (remove)
Keywords
- monetary policy (30)
- household finance (17)
- Banking Union (14)
- ESG (14)
- regulation (14)
- ECB (13)
- Monetary Policy (13)
- systemic risk (13)
- COVID-19 (12)
- Liquidity (12)
Institute
- Center for Financial Studies (CFS) (1264) (remove)
Collateral, default risk, and relationship lending : an empirical study on financial contracting
(1999)
This paper provides further insights into the nature of relationship lending by analyzing the link between relationship lending, borrower quality and collateral as a key variable in loan contract design. We used a unique data set based on the examination of credit files of five leading German banks, thus relying on information actually used in the process of bank credit decision-making and contract design. In particular, bank internal borrower ratings serve to evaluate borrower quality, and the bank's own assessment of its housebank status serves to identify information-intensive relationships. Additionally, we used data on workout activities for borrowers facing financial distress. We found no significant correlation between ex ante borrower quality and the incidence or degree of collateralization. Our results indicate that the use of collateral in loan contract design is mainly driven by aspects of relationship lending and renegotiations. We found that relationship lenders or housebanks do require more collateral from their debtors, thereby increasing the borrower's lock-in and strengthening the banks' bargaining power in future renegotiation situations. This result is strongly supported by our analysis of the correlation between ex post risk, collateral and relationship lending since housebanks do more frequently engage in workout activities for distressed borrowers, and collateralization increases workout probability.
Multiple lenders and corporate distress: evidence on debt restructuring : [Version Juli 2002]
(2002)
In the recent theoretical literature on lending risk, the common pool problem in multi-bank relationships has been analyzed extensively. In this paper we address this topic empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that includes detailed credit-fie information on distressed lending relationships in Germany. In particular, it includes information on bank pools, a legal institution aimed at coordinating lender interests in borrower distress. We find that the existence of small bank pools increases the probability of workout success and that coordination costs are positively related to pool size. We identify major determinants of pool formation, in particular the distribution of lending shares among banks, the number of banks, and the severity of the distress shock to the borrower.
Die Pleitewelle in Deutschland steuert nach Angaben des Bundesverbandes Deutscher Inkasso-Unternehmen (BDIU) auf einen neuen Höchststand zu. Für 2003 erwartet der Verband bereits zum vierten Mal in Folge sowohl bei Unternehmens- als auch Verbraucherinsolvenzen Rekordmarken: Die für 2003 geschätzten 40 000 Unternehmenspleiten (zuzüglich weiterer 58 000 Pleiten von Selbstständigen und Privaten) mit einem zu erwartenden volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtschaden von über 50 Milliarden Euro tragen erheblich zur schlechten Stimmung in Deutschland bei. Diese Zahlen verdeutlichen auch, wie außerordentlich wichtig ein modernes Insolvenzrecht ist, das neben dem Gläubigerschutz auch der möglichen Sanierung eines Unternehmens Rechnung trägt.
Over-allotment arrangements are nowadays part of almost any initial public offering. The underwriting banks borrow stocks from the previous shareholders to issue more than the initially announced number of shares. This is combined with the option to cover this short position at the issue price. We present empirical evidence on the value of these arrangements to the underwriters of initial public offerings on the Neuer Markt. The over-allotment arrangement is regarded as a portfolio of a long call option and a short position in a forward contract on the stock, which is different from other approaches presented in the literature.
Given the economically substantial values for these option- like claims we try to identify benefits to previous shareholders or new investors when the company is using this instrument in the process of going public. Although we carefully control for potential endogeneity problems, we find virtually no evidence for a reduction in underpricing for firms using over-allotment arrangements. Furthermore, we do not find evidence for more pronounced price stabilization activities or better aftermarket performance for firms granting an over-allotment arrangement to the underwriting banks.
EFM Classification: 230, 410
Conference Reader zur gemeinsam von Athansios Orphanides (Federal Reserve Board, Washington D.C.), John C. Williams (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco), Heinz Hermann (Deutsche Bundesbank), und Volker Wieland (Center for Financial Studies and Goethe University Frankfurt) organisierten Konferenz, die vom 30. - 31. August, 2003 in Eltville stattgefunden hat. Inhaltsverzeichnis: * Volker Wieland (Director Center for Financial Studies): Foreword * Hans Georg Fabritius (Member of the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank): Opening Remarks * Charles Goodhart (Norman Sosnow Professor of Banking and Finance at the London School of Economics and External Member of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Commitee): After Dinner Speech * Paper Abstracts * List of Participants
This paper sets out to analyze the influence of different types of venture capitalists on the performance of their portfolio firms around and after IPO. We investigate the hypothesis that different governance structures, objectives, and track records of different types of VCs have a significant impact on their respective IPOs. We explore this hypothesis using a data set embracing all IPOs that have occurred on Germany's Neuer Markt. Our main finding is that significant differences among the different VCs exist. Firms backed by independent VCs perform significantly better two years after IPO as compared to all other IPOs, and their share prices fluctuate less than those of their counterparts in this period of time. On the contrary, firms backed by public VCs show relative underperformance. The fact that this could occur implies that market participants did not correctly assess the role played by different types of VCs.
The focus of the discussion at the conference on September 23, 2004 was on the long-term impact on capital markets and pension systems. The speakers tried to identify the direction and magnitude of potential changes as well as the likelihood of an eventual asset meltdown. The conference's objective was to combine insights from academia with those from the financial community in order to provide a more comprehensive outlook on capital market developments. Conference Reader Nr. 2005/01
The effects of public policy programmes which aim at internalising spill-overs due to successful innovation are analysed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard double-sided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analysing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programmes, ex ante grants and some public-private partnerships depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.
The effects of public policy programmes which aim at internalising spill-overs due to successful innovation are analysed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard double-sided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analysing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programmes, ex ante grants and some public-private partnerships depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.