Universitätspublikationen
Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (40)
- Part of Periodical (18)
Has Fulltext
- yes (58)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (58)
Keywords
- Financial Institutions (8)
- MREL (7)
- TLAC (7)
- bail-in (7)
- BRRD (6)
- Bail-in (6)
- Banking Resolution (4)
- Banking Supervision (4)
- Capital Markets Union (4)
- SRM (4)
- market discipline (4)
- prudential supervision (4)
- regulatory arbitrage (4)
- shadow banking (4)
- Banking Union (3)
- ECB (3)
- SSM (3)
- bank resolution (3)
- banking union (3)
- financial stability (3)
- Bank Resolution (2)
- Banking Regulation (2)
- CMDI (2)
- Deposit Insurance (2)
- Financial Sector (2)
- G-SIB (2)
- banking regulation (2)
- banking supervision (2)
- credit funds (2)
- crowdfunding (2)
- crowdinvesting (2)
- macro-prudential supervision (2)
- non-bank financial intermediation (2)
- principles-based regulation (2)
- real estate lending (2)
- securities regulation (2)
- "Event Study" (1)
- Abwicklungsinstrumente (1)
- Auctions (1)
- BaFin (1)
- Bailin (1)
- Bank Acquisition (1)
- Bank Capitalization (1)
- Bank Supervision (1)
- Bank's Balance Sheets (1)
- Bankenunion (1)
- Brexit (1)
- COVID-19 (1)
- Capital Markets (1)
- Complex Financial Instruments (1)
- Corporate Governance (1)
- Corporate Groups (1)
- Covid-19 (1)
- Creditor Protection (1)
- E.U. Corporate Law (1)
- EGC (1)
- ESG (1)
- ESM (1)
- EU economic and financial services legislation (1)
- EU market regulation (1)
- Economic Governance (1)
- Einlageverträge (1)
- European Integration (1)
- Financial Stability (1)
- Financial stability (1)
- Forbearance (1)
- Geopolitics (1)
- Germany Inc. (1)
- Group Interesterest (1)
- IPS (1)
- Institution-building (1)
- Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg (1)
- Minority Shareholder Protection (1)
- NCAs (1)
- Nachhaltigkeit (1)
- Niedrigzinsumfeld (1)
- Offenlegungspflichten (1)
- Regulatory Arbitrage (1)
- Regulierung (1)
- Related Party Transactions (1)
- Retail Challenge (1)
- SRB (1)
- SRF (1)
- Shareholder Rights Directive (1)
- Supervisory Relief Measures (1)
- Sustainable Finance (1)
- Tunneling (1)
- asset pricing (1)
- bank capital (1)
- bank sanctions (1)
- banking and treasury functions (1)
- banking resolution (1)
- banking separation (1)
- benchmarks (1)
- bureaucrats' incentives (1)
- capital maintenance (1)
- capital markets (1)
- climate change (1)
- climate risk (1)
- conflict of laws (1)
- contract law (1)
- corporate finance (1)
- corporate governance (1)
- cross-border insolvency (1)
- crowdlending (1)
- crowdsponsoring (1)
- deposit guarantee scheme (1)
- financial regulation (1)
- financial services (1)
- financial stablity (1)
- fintech (1)
- functional finance approach (1)
- green finance (1)
- group law (1)
- industrial organization (1)
- investor protection (1)
- labels (1)
- level playing field (1)
- management compensation (1)
- mandatory disclosure (1)
- market infrastructure (1)
- monetary penalties (1)
- national interest (1)
- negativer Zins (1)
- political economy (1)
- precautionary recapitalization (1)
- private benefits of control (1)
- private equity (1)
- private markets (1)
- private sector involvement (1)
- prohibition of proprietary trading (1)
- public markets (1)
- related party transactions (1)
- savings banks (1)
- say-on-pay (1)
- subordinated debt (1)
- sustainable finance (1)
- systemic risk (1)
- taxonomies (1)
- tunneling (1)
Institute
- Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE) (58) (remove)
Almost ten years after the European Commission action plan on building a capital markets union (CMU) and despite incremental progress, e.g. in the form of the EU Listing Act, the picture looks dire. Stock exchanges, securities markets, and supervisory authorities remain largely national, and, in many cases, European companies have decided to exclusively list overseas. Notwithstanding the economic and financial benefits of market integration, CMU has become a geopolitical necessity. A unified capital market can bolster resilience, strategic autonomy, and economic sovereignty, reduce dependence on external funding, and may foster economic cooperation between member states.
The reason for the persistent stand-still in Europe’s CMU development is not so much the conflict between market- and state-based integration, but rather the hesitancy of national regulatory and supervisory bodies to relinquish powers. If EU member states wanted to get real about CMU (as they say, and as they should), they need to openly accept the loss of sovereignty that follows from a true unified capital market. Building on economic as well as historical evidence, the paper offers viable proposals on how to design competent institutions within the current European framework.
This note outlines the case for speedy capital market integration and for the adoption of a common regulatory framework and single supervisory authority from a political economy perspective. We also show the alternative case for harmonization and centralization via regulatory competition, elaborating how competition between EU jurisdictions by way of full mutual recognition may lead to a (cost-)efficient and standardized legal framework for capital markets. Lastly, the note addresses the political economy conflict that underpins the implementation of both models for integrating capital markets. We point out that, in both cases, national authorities experience a loss of legislative and jurisdictional competence at the national level. We predict that any plan to foster a stronger capital market union, following an institution based or a market-based strategy, will face opposition from powerful national stakeholders.
The SVB case is a wake-up call for Europe’s regulators as it demonstrates the destructive power of a bank-run: it undermines the role of loss absorbing capital, elbowing governments to bailout affected banks. Many types of bank management weaknesses, like excessive duration risk, may raise concerns of bank losses – but to serve as a run-trigger, there needs to be a large enough group of bank depositors that fails to be fully covered by a deposit insurance scheme. Latent run-risk is the root cause of inefficient liquidations, and we argue that a run on SVB assets could have been avoided altogether by a more thoughtful deposit insurance scheme, sharply distinguishing between loss absorbing capital (equity plus bail-in debt) and other liabilities which are deemed not to be bail-inable, namely demand deposits. These evidence-based insights have direct implications for Europe’s banking regulation, suggesting a minimum and a maximum for a banks’ loss absorption capacity.
We contribute to the debate about the future of capital markets and corporate finance, which has ensued against the background of a significant boom in private markets and a corresponding decline in the number of firms and the amount of capital raised in public markets in the US and Europe.
Our research sheds light on the fluctuating significance of public and private markets for corporate finance over time, and challenges the conventional view of a linear progression from one market to the other. We argue instead that a more complex pattern of interaction between public and private markets emerges, after taking a long-term perspective and examining historical developments more closely.
We claim that there is a dynamic divide between these markets, and identify certain factors that determine the degree to which investors, capital, and companies gravitate more towards one market than the other. However, in response to the status quo, other factors will gain momentum and favor the respective other market, leading to a new (unstable) equilibrium. Hence, we observe the oscillating domains of public and private markets over time. While these oscillations imply ‘competition’ between these markets, we unravel the complementarities between them, which also militate against a secular trend towards one market. Finally, we examine the role of regulation in this dynamic divide as well as some policy implications arising from our findings.
Who should hold bail-inable debt and how can regulators police holding restrictions effectively?
(2023)
This paper analyses the demand-side prerequisites for the efficient application of the bail-in tool in bank resolution, scrutinises whether the European bank crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework is apt to establish them, and proposes amendments to remedy identified shortcomings.
The first applications of the new European CMDI framework, particularly in Italy, have shown that a bail-in of debt holders is especially problematic if they are households or other types of retail investors. Such debt holders may be unable to bear losses, and the social implications of bailing them in may create incentives for decision makers to refrain from involving them in bank resolution. In turn, however, if investors can expect resolution authorities (RAs) to behave inconsistently over time and bail-out bank capital and debt holders despite earlier vows to involve them in bank rescues, the pricing and monitoring incentives that the crisis management framework seeks to invigorate would vanish. As a result, market discipline would be suboptimal and moral hazard would persist. Therefore, the policy objectives of the CMDI framework will only be achieved if critical bail-in capital is not held by retail investors without sufficient loss-bearing capacity. Currently, neither the CMDI framework nor capital market regulation suffice to assure that this precondition is met. Therefore, some amendments are necessary. In particular, debt instruments that are most likely to absorb losses in resolution should have a high minimum denomination and banks should not be allowed to self-place such securities.
This study looks at potential windfall profits for the four banking acquisitions in 2023. Based on accounting figures, an FT article states that a total of USD 44bn was left on the table. We see accounting figures as a misleading analysis. By estimating marked-based cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), we find positive abnormal returns in all four cases which when made quantifiable, are around half of the FT’s accounting figures. Furthermore, we argue that transparent auctions with enough bidders should be preferred to negotiated bank sales.
This document was provided/prepared by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
To ensure the credibility of market discipline induced by bail-in, neither retail investors nor peer banks should appear prominently among the investor base of banks’ loss absorbing capital. Empirical evidence on bank-level data provided by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority raises a few red flags. Our list of policy recommendations encompasses disclosure policy, data sharing among supervisors, information transparency on holdings of bail-inable debt for all stakeholders, threshold values, and a well-defined upper limit for any bail-in activity. This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
This briefing paper describes and evaluates the law and economics of institution(al) protection schemes. Throughout our analysis, we use Europe’s largest such scheme, that of German savings banks, as paradigm. We find strengths and weaknesses: Strong network-internal monitoring and early warning seems to be an important contributor to IPS network success. Similarly, the geographical quasi-cartel encourages banks to build a strong client base, including SME, in all regions. Third, the growth of the IPS member institutions may have benefitted from the strictly unlimited protection offered, in terms of euro amounts per account holder. The counterweighing weaknesses encompass the conditionality of the protection pledge and the underinvestment risk it entails, sometimes referred to as blackmailing the government, as well as the limited diversification potential of the deposit insurance within the network, and the near-incompatibility of the IPS model with the provisions of the BRRD, particularly relating to bail-in and resolution. Consequently, we suggest, as policy guidance, to treat large IPS networks similar to large banking groups, and put them as such under the direct supervision of the ECB within the SSM. Moreover, we suggest strengthening the seriousness of a deposit insurance that offers unlimited protection. Finally, to improve financial stability, we suggest embedding the IPS model into a multi-tier deposit re-insurance scheme, with a national and a European layer. This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
European banks have substantial investments in assets that are
measured without directly observable market prices (mark-to-
model). Financial disclosures of these value estimates lack
standardization and are hard to compare across banks. These
comparability concerns are concentrated in large European
banks that extensively rely on level 3 estimates with the most
unobservable inputs. Although the relevant balance sheet
positions only represent a small fraction of these large banks’
total assets (2.9%), their value equals a significant fraction of core
equity tier 1 (48.9%). Incorrect valuations thus have a potential to
impact financial stability. 85% of these bank assets are under
direct ECB supervision. Prudential regulation requires value
adjustments that are apt to shield capital against valuation risk.
Yet, stringent enforcement is critical for achieving this objective.
This document was provided by the Economic Governance
Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
The great financial crisis and the euro area crisis led to a substantial reform of financial safety nets across Europe and – critically – to the introduction of supranational elements. Specifically, a supranational supervisor was established for the euro area, with discrete arrangements for supervisory competences and tasks depending on the systemic relevance of supervised credit institutions. A resolution mechanism was created to allow the frictionless resolution of large financial institutions. This resolution mechanism has been now complemented with a funding instrument.
While much more progress has been achieved than most observers could imagine 12 years ago, the banking union remains unfinished with important gaps and deficiencies. The experience over the past years, especially in the area of crisis management and resolution, has provided impetus for reform discussions, as reflected most lately in the Eurogroup statement of 16 June 2022.
This Policy Insight looks primarily at the current and the desired state of the banking union project. The key underlying question, and the focus here, is the level of ambition and how it is matched with effective legal and regulatory tools. Specifically, two questions will structure the discussions:
What would be a reasonable definition and rationale for a ‘complete’ banking union? And what legal reforms would be required to achieve it?
Banking union is a case of a new remit of EU-level policy that so far has been established on the basis of long pre-existing treaty stipulations, namely, Article 127(6) TFEU (for banking supervision) and Article 114 TFEU (for crisis management and deposit insurance). Could its completion be similarly carried out through secondary law? Or would a more comprehensive overhaul of the legal architecture be required to ensure legal certainty and legitimacy?
We investigate whether the bank crisis management framework of the European banking union can effectively bar the detrimental influence of national interests in cross-border bank failures. We find that both the internal governance structure and decision making procedure of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the interplay between the SRB and national resolution authorities in the implementation of supranationally devised resolution schemes provide inroads that allow opposing national interests to obstruct supranational resolution. We also show that the Single Resolution Fund (SRG), even after the ratification of the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the introduction of the SRF backstop facility, is inapt to overcome these frictions. We propose a full supranationalization of resolution decision making. This would allow European authorities in charge of bank crisis management to operate autonomously and achieve socially optimal outcomes beyond national borders.