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This note proposes a new set-up for the fund backing the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The proposed fund is a Multi-Tier Resolution Fund (MTRF), restricting the joint and several supranational liability to a limited range of losses, bounded by national liability at the upper and the lower end. The layers are, in ascending order: a national fund (first losses), a European fund (second losses), the national budget (third losses), the ESM (fourth losses, as a backup for sovereigns). The system works like a reinsurance scheme, providing clear limits to European-level joint liability, and therefore confining moral hazard. At the same time, it allows for some degree of risk sharing, which is important for financial stability if shocks to the financial system are exogenous (e.g., of a supranational macroeconomic nature). The text has four parts. Section A describes the operation of the Multi-Tier Resolution Fund, assuming the fund capital to be fully paid-in (“Steady State“). Section B deals with the build-up phase of the fund capital (“Build up“). Section C discusses how the proposal deals with the apparent incentive conflicts. The final Section D summarizes open questions which need further thought (“Open Questions“).
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, both resolution planning, i.e. contingency planning by both regulated institutions and public authorities in order to prepare their actions in financial crisis, and concepts for structural bank reform have been identified as possible solutions to ending “Too Big To Fail” and foster market discipline among bank owners, bank managers and investors in bank debt. Both concepts thus complement the global quest for reliable procedures and tools for bank resolution that would minimise systemic implications once large and complex financial institutions have reached the stage of insolvency. Given the complex task of orchestrating swift and effective resolution actions, especially with regard to cross-border banking groups and financial conglomerates, planning ahead in good times has since been widely recognised as crucial for enhancing resolvability. At least part of the impediments to resolution will be found in organisational, financial and legal complexity that has evolved in banks and groups over time. To remove these impediments, interference with existing corporate and group structures is all but inevitable. However, in both international standard setting and at the European Union level, issues related to resolution planning (within the context of bank resolution reform) and structural banking reforms to date have been discussed rather separately. This lack of consistency is questionable, given the obvious need to reconcile both approaches in order to facilitate effective implementation and enforcement especially with regard to large, complex banking groups. Based on an analysis both of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the SRM Regulation, this paper explores how these problems could be dealt with within the context of the European Banking Union.
The creation of the Banking Union is likely to come with substantial implications for the governance of Eurozone banks. The European Central Bank, in its capacity as supervisory authority for systemically important banks, as well as the Single Resolution Board, under the EU Regulations establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism, have been provided with a broad mandate and corresponding powers that allow for far-reaching interference with the relevant institutions’ organisational and business decisions. Starting with an overview of the relevant powers, the present paper explores how these could – and should – be exercised against the backdrop of the fundamental policy objectives of the Banking Union. The relevant aspects directly relate to a fundamental question associated with the reallocation of the supervisory landscape, namely: Will the centralisation of supervisory powers, over time, also lead to the streamlining of business models, corporate and group structures of banks across the Eurozone?
This paper analyzes the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability in the Banking Union. There is no uniform global model regarding the relationship between monetary policy-making on the one hand, and prudential supervision on the other. Before the crisis, EU Member States followed different approaches, some of them uniting monetary and supervisory functions in one institution, others assigning them to different, neatly separated institutions. The financial crisis has underlined that monetary policy and prudential supervision deeply affect each other, especially in case of systemic events. Even in normal times, monetary and supervisory decisions might conflict with each other. After the crisis, some jurisdictions have moved towards a more holistic approach under which monetary policy takes supervisory considerations into account, while supervisory decisions pay due regard to monetary policy.
The Banking Union puts prudential supervision in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB), the institution responsible for monetary policy. Nevertheless, at its establishment there was the political understanding that the ECB should follow a policy of meticulous separation in the discharge of its different functions. This raises the question whether the ECB may pursue a holistic approach to monetary policy and supervisory decision-making, respectively. On the basis of a purposive reading of the monetary policy mandate and the SSM Regulation, the paper answers this question in the affirmative. Effective monetary policy (or supervision) requires financial stability (or smooth monetary policy transmission). Moreover, without a holistic approach, the SSM Regulation is more likely to provoke the adoption of mutually defeating decisions by the Governing Board. The reputation of the ECB would suffer considerably under such a situation – in a field where reputation is of paramount importance for effective policy.
As any meticulous separation between monetary and supervisory functions turns out to be infeasible, the paper explores the reasons. Parting from Katharina Pistor’s legal theory of finance, which puts the emphasis on exogenous factors to explain the (non)enforcement of legal rules, the paper suggests a legal instability theorem which focuses on endogenous reasons, such as law’s indeterminacy, contextuality, and responsiveness to democratic deliberation. This raises the question whether the holistic approach would be democratically legitimate under the current framework of the ESCB. The idea of technocratic legitimacy that exempts the ECB from representative structures is effectively called into question by the legal instability theorem. This does not imply that the independence of the ECB should be given up, as there are no viable alternatives to protect monetary policy against the time inconsistency problem. Rather, any solution might benefit from recognizing the ECB in its mixed technocratic and political shape as a centerpiece of European integration and improving.
The Judgement of the EGC in the Case T-122/15 – Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg - Förderbank v European Central Bank is the first statement of the European judiciary on the sub-stantive law of the Banking Union. Beyond its specific holding, the decision is of great importance, because it hints at the methodological approach the EGC will take in interpreting prudential banking regulation in the appeals against supervisory measures that fall in its jurisdiction under TFEU, arts. 256(1) subpara 1 and 263(4). Specifically, the case pertained to the scope of direct ECB oversight of significant banks in the euro area and the reassignment of this competence to national competent authorities (NCAs) in individual circumstances (Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Regulation, art. 6(4) subpara 2; SSM Framework Regulation, arts. 70, 71).
In this exploratory article, we consider the future of Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank and develop a new approach to the topic: instead of a merger of DB and CB we propose to consider a partial merger of the IT and related back office functions in order to create the basis for an Open Banking platform in Germany. Such a platform would act as a cross-institutional infrastructure company in which the participating banks develop a common data and IT platform (while respecting the data protection regulations). Significant parts of the transaction processes would be pooled by the institutions and executed by the Open Banking platform. Moreover, the institutions remain legally independent and compete with each other at the level of products and services that are developed and produced using just this common data and IT platform – “national champions” would not be created.
But such an “Open Banking Platform” could become even the nucleus of a European Banking platform that could be competitive with existing global data platforms from the USA and China which are already offering financial services and are likely to expand their offerings in the foreseeable future. The proposed model of an open data platform for banks prevents the emergence of national champions and supports the main goal of the banking union: creation of a financial system, in which single banks can be resolved without provoking a systemic crisis and forcing taxpayers to finance bailouts.
Completing banking union
(2019)
To complete banking union, there should be a single European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) alongside the single supervisor and the single resolution authority. This would ensure uniformity across the Eurozone and facilitate the removal of barriers to the mobility of liquidity and capital within the single market. That in turn would promote efficiency in the banking sector and in the economy at large — just at the time that the EU needs to boost growth in order to remain competitive with the US and China.
The EDIS promise to promptly reimburse insured deposits at a failed bank in the Eurozone should be unconditional. But who will stand behind that commitment? Who is the “E” in EDIS? Is its promise credible, even in a crisis? If a deposit guarantee scheme fails to deliver what people expect, panic would very likely erupt. Instead of strengthening financial stability, deposit insurance could destroy it.
Yet this is the risk that current proposals pose. They create the impression that there will be a single deposit guarantee scheme. There will not. Instead, there will be a complex set of liquidity and reinsurance arrangements among Member State schemes.
These defects need to be remedied. To do so, we propose creating a European Deposit Insurance Corporation (EDIC) alongside national schemes. For banks that meet EDIC’s strict entry criteria and decide to become members, EDIC will promise to reimburse promptly — in the event the member bank fails — 100 cents on the euro in euro for each euro of insured deposits, regardless of the Eurozone Member State in which the bank is headquartered.
In effect, the single deposit guarantee scheme would be created via migration to EDIC rather than mutualisation of existing schemes. This would increase the mobility of capital and liquidity and lead to a convergence of interest rates across the Eurozone. That in turn will improve the effectiveness of monetary policy, foster integration and promote growth.
Discussions regarding the planned European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the missing third pillar of the European Banking Union, have been ongoing since the Commission published its initial legisla-tive proposal in 2015. A breakthrough in negotiations has yet to be achieved. The gridlock on EDIS is most commonly attributed to moral hazard concerns over insufficient risk reduction harboured on the side of northern member states, particularly Germany, due to the weak state of some other member states’ banking sectors. While moral hazard based on uneven risk reduction is helpful for explaining divergent member-state preferences on the scope of necessary risk reduction, this does not explain preferences on the institutional design of EDIS. In this paper, we argue that contrary to persistent differences on necessary risk reduction, preferences regarding the institutional design of EDIS have become more closely aligned. We analyse how preferences on EDIS developed in the key member states of Germany, France, and Italy. In all sampled countries, we find path-dependent benefits con-nected to the current design of national Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) that shifted preferences of the banking sector or significant subsectors in favour of retaining national DGSs. Overall, given that a compromise on risk-reduction can be accomplished, we argue that current preferences in these key member states provide an opportunity to implement EDIS in the form of a reinsurance system that maintains national DGSs in combination with a supranational fund.
Following the financial crash and the subsequent recession, European policymakers have undertaken major reforms regarding the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Yet, the success rate is mixed. Several reform proposals have either completely failed due to opposition forces or are still pending, sometimes for years. This article provides an overview of reforms in four major policy fields: financial stabilisation, economic governance, fiscal solidarity, and cooperative dissolution. Building on the conceptual foundation of policy analysis, it distinguishes between policy outputs and outcomes. Policy output refers to legislation being adopted or agreement on treaty changes, while policy outcomes depict the result from the implementation process.
This in-depth analysis provides evidence on differences in the practice of supervising large banks in the UK and in the euro area. It identifies the diverging institutional architecture (partially supranationalised vs. national oversight) as a pivotal determinant for a higher effectiveness of supervisory decision making in the UK. The ECB is likely to take a more stringent stance in prudential supervision than UK authorities. The setting of risk weights and the design of macroprudential stress test scenarios document this hypothesis. This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. It was originally published on the European Parliament’s webpage: www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2021/689443/IPOL_IDA(2021)689443_EN.pdf