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The Judgement of the EGC in the Case T-122/15 – Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg - Förderbank v European Central Bank is the first statement of the European judiciary on the sub-stantive law of the Banking Union. Beyond its specific holding, the decision is of great importance, because it hints at the methodological approach the EGC will take in interpreting prudential banking regulation in the appeals against supervisory measures that fall in its jurisdiction under TFEU, arts. 256(1) subpara 1 and 263(4). Specifically, the case pertained to the scope of direct ECB oversight of significant banks in the euro area and the reassignment of this competence to national competent authorities (NCAs) in individual circumstances (Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Regulation, art. 6(4) subpara 2; SSM Framework Regulation, arts. 70, 71).
We study how the Eurosystem Collateral Framework for corporate bonds helps the European Central Bank (ECB) fulfill its policy mandate. Using the ECBs eligibility list, we identify the first inclusion date of both bonds and issuers. We find that due to the increased supply and demand for pledgeable collateral following eligibility, (i) securities lending market trading activity increases, (ii) eligible bonds have lower yields, and (iii) the liquidity of newly-issued bonds declines, whereas the liquidity of older bonds is unaffected/improves. Corporate bond lending relaxes the constraint of limited collateral supply, thereby making the market more cohesive and complete. Following eligibility, bond-issuing firms reduce bank debt and expand corporate bond issuance, thus increasing overall debt size and extending maturity.
What institutional arrangements for an independent central bank with a price stability mandate promote good policy outcomes when unconventional policies become necessary? Unconventional monetary policy poses challenges. The large scale asset purchases needed to counteract the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates have uncomfortable fiscal and distributional consequences and require central banks to assume greater risks on their balance sheets.
In his paper, Athanasios Orphanides draws lessons from the experience of the Bank of Japan (BoJ) since the late 1990s for the institutional design of independent central banks. He comes to the conclusion that lack of clarity on the precise definition of price stability, coupled with concerns about the legitimacy of large balance sheet expansions, hinders policy: It encourages the central bank to eschew the decisive quantitative easing needed to reflate the economy and instead to accommodate too-low inflation. The BoJ’s experience with the zero lower bound suggests important benefits from a clear definition of price stability as a symmetric 2% goal for inflation, which the Bank adopted in 2013.
“Institutional Overburdening” to a large extent was a consequence of the “Great Moderation”. This term indicates that it was a period in which inflation had come down from rather high levels. Growth and employment were at least satisfying and variability of output had substantially declined. It was almost unavoidable that as a consequence expectations on future actions of central banks and their ability to control the economy reached an unprecedented peak which was hardly sustainable. Institutional overburdening has two dimensions. One is coming from exaggerated expectations on what central banks can achieve (“expectational overburdening”). The other dimension is “operational overburdening” i.e. overloading the central bank with more and more responsibilities and competences.
The financial crisis which started in 2007 has caused a tremendous challenge for monetary policy. The simple concept of inflation targeting has lost its position as state of the art. There is a debate on whether the mandate of a central bank should not be widened. And, indeed, monetary policy has been very accommodative in the last couple of years and central banks have modified their communication strategies by introducing forward guidance as a new policy tool. This paper addresses the consequences of these developments for the credibility, the reputation and the independence of central banks. It also comments on the recent debate among economists concerning the question whether the ECB's OMT program is compatible with its mandate.
This Policy White Paper assesses several main elements of ECB’s upcoming review of its monetary policy strategy, announced in January 2020. Four aspects of the review are discussed in detail: i) ECB’s definition of price stability and the arguments for and against inflation targeting; ii) the scope of ECB’s objectives, considering financial stability, employment and the sustainability of the environment; iii) an update of ECB’s economic and monetary analyses to assess the risks to price stability; iv) the ECB’s communication practice. Furthermore, an overview of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy and its last evaluation in 2003 is given.
Trotz der von der EZB eingeleiteten Zinswende in der zweiten Jahreshälfte 2022 als späte Reaktion auf die deutlich unterschätzte Persistenz hoher Inflationsraten im Euroraum sind die Realzinsen sowohl in der Ex-post-Betrachtung als auch in der Ex-ante-Betrachtung keineswegs als restriktiv einzuschätzen. Die Banken haben allerdings recht rasch strengere Vergaberichtlinien beschlossen, und die Nachfrage im Wohnungsbau und bei den Hypothekarkrediten ist stark eingebrochen.
Die Autoren thematisieren die Bedeutung von Zahlungsstromeffekten bei Annuitätenkrediten und analysiert hier vor allem den sogenannten Front-Loading-Effekt. Danach führen höhere Nominalzinsen selbst bei vollständig antizipierten Inflationsraten und unveränderten Realzinsen zu starken finanziellen Zusatzbelastungen in den ersten Phasen der typischerweise langen Kreditlaufzeit. Derartige Liquiditätseffekte können die Zahlungsfähigkeit bzw. die Zahlungsbereitschaft der privaten Investoren empfindlich verringern. Dies gilt vor allem bei Darlehen in Form der Prozentannuität, da hier zusätzlich ein Laufzeitenverkürzungseffekt auftritt. Solche Darlehen sind in Deutschland recht populär.
Mit Blick auf die Zukunft sehen die Autoren auch eine reale Gefahr für den Bestand an Wohnungsbaukrediten, wenn es zu einer Refinanzierung des großen Bestands an billigen Wohnungsbaukrediten kommt, ein Risiko, das auch Auswirkungen auf die makroökonomische und finanzielle Stabilität hat.
Nicht nur die Geräuschkulisse des Brexits absorbierte ein Stück weit die Aufmerksamkeit für das Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofs (EuGH) zur Zulässigkeit des Anleihenkaufprogramms der EZB. Denn immerhin entschied Luxemburg damit über eine der nach wie vor seltenen Vorlagen aus Karlsruhe. Dazu mag auch beigetragen haben, dass seit der Stellungnahme des Generalanwalts Wathelet nicht mehr damit gerechnet wurde, dass der EuGH der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) einen sprichwörtlichen Strich durch die Rechnung machen würde. Dennoch ist das Urteil aus einigen Gründen bemerkenswert.
On 15 August 2017, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) referred the case against the European Central Bank’s policy of Quantitative Easing (QE) to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The author argues that this event differs in several aspects from the OMT case in 2015 – in content as well as in form. The BVerfG recognizes that it is a legitimate goal of the ECB’s monetary policy to bring inflation up close to 2%, and that the instrument employed for QE is one of monetary policy. However, it doubts whether the sheer volume of QE would not distort the character of the program as one of monetary policy. The ECJ will now have to clarify the extent to which the ECJ’s findings in its OMT judgment are relevant for QE as well as the standard of review applicable to monetary policy. The author raises the questions of whether the principle of democracy under German constitutional law can actually provide the standard by which the ECB is to be measured, and how tight judicial review could be exercised over the ECB without encroaching upon its autonomy in monetary policy matters – and thus upon the very essence of central bank independence.
When Christine Lagarde announced her first, moderate rescue package, she called upon member states to provide fiscal aid. But the markets showed to have lost confidence in fiscal policy. In the absence of strong monetary policy signals, the slide continued until Lagarde in her second attempt opened the floodgates.