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Trust between parties should drive contract design: if parties were suspicious about each others’ reaction to unplanned events, they might agree to pay higher costs of negotiation ex ante to complete contracts. Using a unique sample of U.S. consulting contracts and a negative shock to trust between shareholders/managers (principals) and consultants (agents) staggered across space and over time, we find that lower trust increases contract completeness. Not only the complexity but also the verifiable states of the world covered by contracts increase after trust drops. The results hold for several novel text-analysis-based measures of contract completeness and do not arise in falsification tests. At the clause level, we find that non-compete agreements, confidentiality, indemnification, and termination rules are the most likely clauses added to contracts after a negative shock to trust and these additions are not driven by new boilerplate contract templates. These clauses are those whose presence should be sensitive to the mutual trust between principals and agents.
Compliance with prevailing accounting standards is induced if the expected disadvantage due to sanctions imposed if non-compliance is detected outweighs the advantage of noncompliant accounting choices. The expected disadvantage materialises the threat potential of sanctions imposed by an enforcement agency. The capital market mechanism unfolds an important threat potential if companies expect an adverse share price reaction suite to enforcement actions. Enforcement agencies in turn can make use of this capital market related sanction by releasing information on defections to the market after the settlement of an investigation. The present contribution analyses the capital market reaction on accounting standards enforcement activities of the British Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP). After a brief introduction into the legal basis and working procedure of the Panel, the analysis of its activities will serve a dual purpose: firstly, the significance of capital market related sanctions for the overall enforcement regime will be elaborated upon. Secondly, the extent to which capital market related sanctions accomplish their function within the overall enforcement regime will be assessed empirically. The results of the empirical analysis suggest that the capital market related sanctioning by the FRRP may not unfold a sufficient threat potential which is a prerequisite for compliance enhancement.