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Using the negotiation process of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), this paper studies the way regulators form their positions on regulatory issues in the process of international standard-setting and the consequences on the resultant harmonized framework. Leveraging on leaked voting records and corroborating them using machine learning techniques on publicly available speeches, we construct a unique dataset containing the positions of banks and national regulators on the regulatory initiatives of Basel II and III. We document that the probability of a regulator opposing a specific initiative increases by 30% if their domestic national champion opposes the new rule, particularly when the proposed rule disproportionately affects them. We find the effect is driven by regulators who had prior experience of working in large banks – lending support to the private-interest theories of regulation. Meanwhile smaller banks, even when they collectively have a higher share in the domestic market, do not have any impact on regulators’ stand – providing little support to public-interest theories of regulation. Finally, we show this decision-making process manifests into significant watering down of proposed rules, thereby limiting the potential gains from harmonization of international financial regulation.
Supranational supervision
(2022)
We exploit the establishment of a supranational supervisor in Europe (the Single Supervisory Mechanism) to learn how the organizational design of supervisory institutions impacts the enforcement of financial regulation. Banks under supranational supervision are required to increase regulatory capital for exposures to the same firm compared to banks under the local supervisor. Local supervisors provide preferential treatment to larger institutes. The central supervisor removes such biases, which results in an overall standardized behavior. While the central supervisor treats banks more equally, we document a loss in information in banks’ risk models associated with central supervision. The tighter supervision of larger banks results in a shift of particularly risky lending activities to smaller banks. We document lower sales and employment for firms receiving most of their funding from banks that receive a tighter supervisory treatment. Overall, the central supervisor treats banks more equally but has less information about them than the local supervisor.
Bitcoin stands like no other cryptocurrency for the profound transformation of financial markets in the digital economy. While the last few months saw the free trade in goods struggle against trends towards protectionism, cryptocurrencies seemed to tear down one border after the other – physical, geographic, and legal ones alike. A libertarian’s wet dream. Blockchain presents itself as a fortress against state intervention, for whatever purpose. Finally, a technological, market-based solution would put an end to the problem of monetary policy, payment transactions, and make whole chunks of government regulation superfluous. ...
Virtual currencies have gained popularity as part of the digital transformation of the financial system. In particular stablecoins are becoming increasingly popular with consumers. The tokens, which are pegged to a value and - according to their name - promise price stability, pose significant risks from which consumers need to be protected. This article focuses first on consumerspecific risks (B.) and German consumer protection law and in particular on the applicability of a right of withdrawal from the acquisition of stablecoins (C.). Subsequently, the EU legislator’s effort to minimize price stability as well as transparency and exchangeability risks, the Markets in Crypto-assets Regulation (2023/1114), is examined in terms of its consumer protection instruments (D.).