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The European Commission recently put forward a proposal for a regulation to amend and strengthen the 2009 version of the EU's rules on the regulation of credit rating agencies ("CRA3"). Among other things, Art. 35a of the draft proposal introduces strict liability for rating agencies. This liability proposal is at odds with the aim to strengthen competition in the rating sector and could have a chilling effect on capital markets. The paper analyses existing rules on civil liability of rating agencies under different legal systems. Subsequently, the provision under Art. 35a of the Draft Proposal is examinded more closely. Suggestions on possible improvemts of the proposal are made.
The financial crisis which started in 2007 has caused a tremendous challenge for monetary policy. The simple concept of inflation targeting has lost its position as state of the art. There is a debate on whether the mandate of a central bank should not be widened. And, indeed, monetary policy has been very accommodative in the last couple of years and central banks have modified their communication strategies by introducing forward guidance as a new policy tool. This paper addresses the consequences of these developments for the credibility, the reputation and the independence of central banks. It also comments on the recent debate among economists concerning the question whether the ECB's OMT program is compatible with its mandate.
The IMFS Interdisciplinary Study 2/2013 contains speeches of Michael Burda (Humboldt University ), Benoît Coeuré (European Central Bank), Stefan Gerlach (Bank of Ireland and former IMFS Professor), Patrick Honohan (Bank of Ireland), Sabine Lautenschläger (Deutsche Bundesbank), Athanasios Orphanides (MIT) and Helmut Siekmann as well as Volker Wieland.
In den vergangenen Jahrzehnten wurden hohe Garantieverzinsungen in den Lebensversicherungsverträgen vereinbart. Dauert die herrschende Niedrigzinsphase noch einige Jahre an, wird es für einige Lebensversicherungsunternehmen schwierig werden, die gegebenen Langzeitgarantien über ihre Kapitalanlage zu erwirtschaften. Der Gesetzgeber sollte festlegen, dass Versicherungskunden nur an Bewertungsreserven beteiligt werden, die eine Höhe übersteigen, die zur Gewährleistung eines intergenerativen Risikoausgleichs notwendig ist. Weiterhin sollten Versicherungskunden nur an Bewertungsreserven beteiligt werden, die aus Kapitalanlagen entstehen, die nicht festverzinsliche Wertpapiere umfassen.
Beispiele klimabedingter Risiken werden verschiedenen Risikoklassen zugeordnet. Risiken lassen sich nicht nur als systemische Risiken erfassen, sondern auch danach unterscheiden, wie gut sich der wahrscheinliche Schadensfall und das wahrscheinliche Schadensausmaß kalkulieren lässt. Für ein besseres Verständnis des Risikos wird hier insbesondere der Einfluss des Klimawandels auf die Entwicklung des Risikos und seine Einschätzung betrachtet. Für diese erste Entfaltung des Verständnisses klimabedingter Risiken wird vergleichend die Typisierung des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen herangezogen.
Basel III and CEO compensation in banks: pay structures as a regulatory signal : [March 6, 2013]
(2013)
This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on managerial compensation. We argue that excessive risk taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate governance failures within banks. The idea of the proposed regulation is to utilize the compensation scheme to drive a wedge between the interests of top management and shareholders to counteract shareholder risk-shifting incentives. The decisive advantage of this approach compared to existing regulation is that the regulator does not need to be able to properly measure the bank investment risk, which has been shown to be a difficult task during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
We show that market discipline, defined as the extent to which firm specific risk characteristics are reflected in market prices, eroded during the recent financial crisis in 2008. We design a novel test of changes in market discipline based on the relation between firm specific risk characteristics and debt-to-equity hedge ratios. We find that market discipline already weakened after the rescue of Bear Stearns before disappearing almost entirely after the failure of Lehman Brothers. The effect is stronger for investment banks and large financial institutions, while there is no comparable effect for non-financial firms.
Euro area data show a positive connection between sovereign and bank risk, which increases with banks’ and sovereign long run fragility. We build a macro model with banks subject to incentive problems and liquidity risk (in the form of liquidity based banks’ runs) which provides a link between endogenous bank capital and macro and policy risk. Our banks also invest in risky government bonds used as capital buffer to self-insure against liquidity risk. The model can replicate the positive connection between sovereign and bank risk observed in the data. Central bank liquidity policy, through full allotment policy, is successful in stabilizing the spiraling feedback loops between bank and sovereign risk.