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The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 declares Brazil as a Democratic State of Law. This formally democratic legal status has been facing difficulties when it comes to its material implementation. Brazilian legal procedures are still greatly influenced by the catholic heritage from Portugal in the times of colonization, translated in the present times into a strong moral set of dogmas that still reflects upon the legal production and interpretation in the country. Recently in Brazil, a debate brought to the Supremo Tribunal Federal, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, has evidenced the struggle between Ethics and Morality in the country’s legal scenario. The focus of the discussion was the possibility of abortion of anencephalic fetuses (in Brazil, abortion in considered a crime against life). In order to properly ground its decision, the Court invited scientists, doctors, members of feminist movements and representatives of certain religions to a public dialogue, in which both scientific-technical and purely moral-religious arguments were presented. Although these procedures encouraged and promoted a democratic and pluralistic legal debate, it seems like the crucial point of the discussion were not taken into account: the scientific character of Law. This is the object of the present manuscript: in order to ensure an intersubjective construction and application of Law, this must be perceived as an Applied Social Science and judges, lawyers, legislators and all other legal actors must proceed in a scientific way. To illustrate the theme, the specific case of abortion of anencephalic fetuses will be mentioned through the text.
Free riders play fair
(2012)
After the demise of the social contract theory, the argument from fair play, which employs the principle of fair play, has been widely acknowledged as one of the most promising ways of justifying political obligation. First, I articulate the most promising version of the principle of fair play. Then, I show that free riders play fair, that is, that their moral fault lies not in unfairness but in the violation of a rule by appealing to the example of three-in-a-boat. Finally, I conclude that even the most promising version is false because those who have accepted benefits from a social cooperative scheme do not owe an obligation of fair play.
In the intersection between law, science and technology lies the debate on the overcoming of the boundaries of the biological structure of the human being and its implications on the idea of human rights, on the concept of person and on the conception of equality – being the latter a fundamental tenet of a democracy.
Posthumanism assumes a biological inadequacy of the human body regarding the quantity, complexity and quality of information which it can muster. The same occurs with the needs of accuracy, speed or strength demanded by the contemporary environment. Under such perspective, the body is considered to be an inefficient structure, with a short lifespan, easy to break and hard to fix.
The body, always seen as the locus for the definition of human, emerges as the object of a commodification process that seeks to exonerate men from their burden - by declination towards a virtual existence, totally free and rational - or to enhance them with bionic devices or drugs.
This issue has already been the subject of attention by many scholars like Savulescu, Rodotà, Broston, Fukuyama and even Habermas.
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to seek, by criticism and revision of the positions on the foreseen problems of this process, an adequate theoretical approach on issues like the concept of person and its connection with the idea of human rights in order to promote the fundamental statement that all men are equal without disregard to the values of diversity and personal identity.
Until three years ago, ICT Technologies represented a main “subordinate clause” within the “grammar” of Participatory Budgeting (PB), the tool made famous by the experience of Porto Alegre and today expanded to more than 1400 cities across the planet. In fact, PB – born to enhance deliberation and exchanges among citizens and local institutions – has long looked at ICTS as a sort of “pollution factor” which could be useful to foster transparency and to support the spreading of information but could also lead to a lowering in quality of public discussion, turning its “instantaneity” into “immediatism,” and its “time-saving accessibility” into “reductionism” and laziness in facing the complexity of public decision-making through citizens’ participation. At the same time, ICTs often regarded Participatory Budgeting as a tool that was too-complex and too-charged with ideology to cooperate with. But in the last three years, the barriers which prevented ICTs and Participatory Budgeting to establish a constructive dialogue started to shrink thanks to several experiences which demonstrated that technologies can help overcome some “cognitive injustices” if not just used as a means to “make simpler” the organization of participatory processes and to bring “larger numbers” of intervenients to the process. In fact, ICTs could be valorized as a space adding “diversity” to the processes and increasing outreach capacity. Paradoxically, the experiences helping to overcome the mutual skepticism between ICTs and PB did not come from the centre of the Global North, but were implemented in peripheral or semiperipheral countries (Democratic Republic of Congo, Brazil, Dominican Republic and Portugal in Europe), sometimes in cities where the “digital divide” is still high (at least in terms of Internet connections) and a significant part of the population lives in informal settlements and/or areas with low indicators of “connection.” Somehow, these experiences were able to demystify the “scary monolithicism” of ICTs, showing that some instruments (like mobile phones, and especially the use of SMS text messaging) could grant a higher degree of connectivity, diffusion and accountability, while other dimensions (which could risk jeopardizing social inclusion) could be minimized through creativity. The paper tries to depict a possible panorama of collaboration for the near future, starting from descriptions of some of the above mentioned “turning-point” experiences – both in the Global North as well as in the Global South.
The main purpose of my article is to discuss what GMOs are, the controversies about this specific issue and the related regulations that are put forward by the authorities. GMOs are genetically altered organisms which have been widely produced and breeded in certain parts of the world. According to some experts, this special practice of agriculture emerged in order to put an end to famine and prevent food scarcity. As growing GMOs seems to be more convenient than the traditional farming, it is more eligible to produce food in large scale which will be a fine solution for food scarcity. However, there are some oppositions to the GMOs. It is strongly believed that the real causes of famine is not related to production, it is a problem of distribution of food. Moreover, patenting the seeds leads to an unstoppable control and dominance over food by the private enterprises. Therefore, the opponents state that the aims of these companies are solely financial gain and monopolisation in food production. Patenting the seeds is another arguable issue. It poses a great threat for the organic farmers since GMO seeds can contaminate the others through natural ways. This is not the only danger that organic farmers face with; thay can also be sued by the GMO producers for this unintended exposure to GMO seeds. Not only the diminishing of the variety of species but also the possible adverse effects of GMOs on human health create a debate between the two groups. These are not the only topics that are open to discussion. In addition to these, labelling the products creates a huge problem among the poorly educated consumers as they have not been clearly regulated in some countries. Hence, this subject having such a close connection to human health cannot be ignored by the law. In fact, a number of countries have enacted legislation in order to regulate this sensitive field. Turkey, having been dependent on the import of the agricultural goods for a period of time, has to join these countries with a recent legislation. All these contemporary issues for Turkey will be highlighted in my article.
In this paper, an analysis of Robert Frost’s poem Mending Wall is presented as a hermeneutical key to investigate and criticize two examples of the oblivion of the reasonable distinction and the reasonable relationship between ethics and law proposed by a new Brazilian private law movement called Escola do Direito Civil-Constitucional (The Private-Constitutional School of Thought). Those examples of unreasonable relationship between ethics and law are: 1) the right to be loved and 2) the right to get a private education without paying for it.
In this article the author, in the context of the fiftieth anniversary of H.L.A. Hart’s “The Concept of Law”, reconsiders the moderate indeterminacy of law thesis, which derives from the open texture of language. For that purpose, he intends: first, to analyze Hart’s moderate indeterminacy thesis, i.e. determinacy in “easy cases” and indeterminacy in “hard cases”, which resembles Aristotle’s "doctrine of the mean"; second, to criticize his moderate indeterminacy thesis as failing to embody the virtues of a center in between the vices of the extremes, by insisting that the exercise of discretion required constitutes an “interstitial” legislation; and, third, to reorganize an argument for a truly “mean” position, which requires a form of weak interpretative discretion, instead of a strong legislative discretion.
After the absurd terrorism and violence of the totalitarianism and bureaucratic administrative and legal systems of the 20th century it does not give any meaning to rationalize harm as meaningful evil that even though it is evil may have some importance for the development of the world towards the good. Rather, evil is incomprehensible and as radical and banal evil it challenges human rationality. This is indeed the case when we are faced with instrumental and rationalized administrative and political evil. Therefore, we must analyse the banality of evil in politics and in administration in order to understand the concept of evil. Moreover, as proposed by Hannah Arendt, we need to fight this evil with political thinking and social philosophy. The only way to deal with harm and wrongdoing is to return a concept of responsibility that is closely linked to reflective thinking. In this paper, we will on the basis of a discussion of the banality of evil explore this in relation to Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the administration of evil, as expressed by the personality of Adolf Eichmann. Finally, we will place this concept of administrative evil in Hannah Arendt’s general political philosophy.
In his works, Hans Kelsen elaborates several objections to the so-called “doctrine of natural law”, especially in his essay The Natural-Law Doctrine Before the Tribunal of Science. Kelsen argues that natural law theorists, searching for an absolute criterion for justice, try to deduce from nature the rules of human behavior. Robert P. George, in the essay Kelsen and Aquinas on the ‘Natural Law Doctrine’ examines his criticism and concludes that what Kelsen understands as the Natural-law doctrine does not include the natural law theory elaborated by Thomas Aquinas. In this paper, we will try to corroborate George’s theses and try to show how Aquinas’ natural law theory can be vindicated against Kelsens criticisms.
Die Auffassung des Rechts in Hegels Rechtsphilosophie weicht bekanntlich von dem ab, was üblicherweise unter „Recht“ verstanden wird. Schon deshalb sind Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts nicht einfach neben andere Werke zur Rechtstheorie zu stellen. Aber Hegels Bestimmung des Rechts ergänzt nicht nur das Recht äußerlich, sondern lässt es auf etwas gründen, das über es selbst deutlich hinausweist: auf jener Normativität, die er als Sittlichkeit bezeichnet. So ist Hegels Rechtsphilosophie nur als eine Sozialphilosophie der Sittlichkeit zu verstehen. Sie kann als die philosophische Selbstreflexion einer Gesellschaft verstanden werden, die sich selbst primär als durch das Recht bestimmt versteht, aber auf eine andere Form von Normativität bezogen ist.
In order to understand the impact of new technologies on the law through the science of law, it is essential to observe how Law researches are done. This paper pursues the following models of legal science: analytical (theory of formal rule); hermeneutics (interpretation theory) and empirical (decision theory) to appraise methodological procedures used in monograph researches in some Brazilian Law courses. This study was to detect which model of law science was used in the development of Law researches. The study was conducted, through Juris Doctors’ interviews. All of these respondents have written a monograph, which is a requirement to complete a Law course in Brazil. The main conclusions of this study were the following: 1) most of the monographs produced do not specify the methodology used for developing the work; 2) when the papers indicate the methodology used, the analytical model was prevalent. In these cases, the science of law appears as a systematization of rules for obtaining possible decisions. 3) Hermeneutic and empirical models were also used, but on a smaller scale. These researches revealed the inaccuracy of the methodological tools used to apprehend the reality. However, these strategies are significant to define the objects of study of law in the contemporary time. Answering the question about how Law researches are done in some Brazilian Law schools, this paper discusses the construction of classical models of science of law, which were taken as the theoretical framework of this work before the hypercomplex current problems.
Human rights and climate policy – toward a new concept of freedom, protection rights, and balancing
(2012)
Neither the scope of “protection obligations” which are based on fundamental rights nor the theory of constitutional balancing nor the issue of “absolute” minimum standards (fundamental rights nuclei, “Grundrechtskerne”), which have to be preserved in the balancing of fundamental rights, can be considered satisfactorily resolved–in spite of intensive, long-standing debates. On closer analysis, the common case law definitions turn out to be not always consistent. This is generally true and with respect to environmental fundamental rights at the national, European, and international level. Regarding the theory of balancing, for the purpose of a clear balance of powers the usual principle of proportionality also proves specifiable. This allows a new analysis, whether fundamental rights have absolute cores. This question is does not only apply to human dignity and the German Aviation Security Act, but even if environmental policy accepts death, e.g. regarding climate change. Overall, it turns out that an interpretation of fundamental rights which is more multipolar and considers the conditions for freedom more heavily–as well as the freedom of future generations and of people in other parts of the world–develops a greater commitment to climate protection.
This paper intends to discuss some contemporary issues on human rights and democracy related to the concept of justice. Is the set of individual rights that is assumed by western democracies really universal? If so, how are they supposed to be interpreted? On the other side if I take into account the “other” and pluralism in a serious way how to conciliate different concepts of justice? Taking Jacques Derrida’s approach of justice as its standpoint this paper aims to stress the difficulty to achieve a unique concept of justice as well as to think justice in the sphere of international law and the problem of ensuring human rights in the international order. Western democracies has becoming more and more multiethnic and multicultural and the set of rights that is at the center of the legal order has to be interpreted in a dialogical sense, one that assumes difference and plurality as its starting point. The plurality of conceptions of the good and the impossibility of establishing a unique concept of justice demands the re-creation of a democratic sphere where the dissent and the conflict could be experienced and, at the same time, the legal order needs to ensure individual and group rights against majority’s dictatorship. The main goal of this paper is to re-think the interpretation of law in a multicultural scenario in which it is not possible to have only one criteria of justice and difference and pluralism are envisaged are values themselves.
Human rights and the law: the unbreachable gap between the ethics of justice and the efficacy of law
(2012)
This paper explores the structure of justice as the condition of ethical, inter-subjective responsibility. Taking a Levinasian perspective, this is a responsibility borne by the individual subject in a pre-foundational, proto-social proximity with the other human subject, which takes precedence over the interests of the self. From this specific post-humanist perspective, human rights are not the restrictive rights of individual self-will, as expressed in our contemporary legal human rights discourse. Rights do not amount to the prioritisation of the so-called politico-legal equality of the individual citizen-subject animated by the universality of the dignity of autonomous, reasoned intentionality. Rather, rights enlivened by proximity invert this discourse and signify, first and foremost, rights for the other, with the ethical burden of responsibility towards the other.
The aim of this paper is to explore the case of the Spanish ‘indignants’ movement of May 2011 as an example of the structural changes occurring in the public sphere after the emergence of a new type of social movement characterized by the widespread use of the ICTs. First I focus on the ideological dimension of discourse of the ‘indignants’ movement, so as to reconstruct the protesters’ self-image. They thought that ICTs were playing a prominent role in a wider trend towards a regeneration of democracy, but they were rather misguided because they lack an accurate description of what really happened. In the second part of this paper I will challenge some features of my case study, emphasizing three basic elements of a democratic public sphere. I aim to call into question the idea that a ‘truly’ democratic public may be hosted by the emergent communicative environment.
We study the implications on compact star properties of a soft nuclear equation of state determined from kaon production at subthreshold energies in heavy-ion collisions. On one hand, we apply these results to study radii and moments of inertia of light neutron stars. Heavy-ion data provides constraints on nuclear matter at densities relevant for those stars and, in particular, to the density dependence of the symmetry energy of nuclear matter. On the other hand, we derive a limit for the highest allowed neutron star mass of three solar masses. For that purpouse, we use the information on the nucleon potential obtained from the analysis of the heavy-ion data combined with causality on the nuclear equation of state.
Brazil has one of the worst distributions of income in the world. The wealth of the richest 1% of the population is equal to that of the poorest 50%. Brazil has a greater concentration of wealth than ninety-five percent of the countries on which data is available. In the legal field, tax justice is based on the constitutional principle of the “ability to pay”, according to which taxes should be paid based on the economic capacity of the taxpayer. This principle first appeared in the Brazilian legal order in the 1946 Constitution, was excluded from the texts of 1967/69, and reappeared in § 1 of article 145 of the 1988 Constitution. The aim of this paper is to examine two possible grounds for the ability to pay principle (equal sacrifices and proportional sacrifices) to show how, in Brazil, the interpretations that seek to assign a positive content to the principle are limited to the horizons of a particular form of State associated with the theory of equal sacrifice. This theory for its turn is consistent with a theory of justice, under which no expense or charge levied by the government can alter the distribution of welfare produced by the market. As the application of the ability to pay principle is done within the limits of that horizon, as a consequence, this principle does not play an important role in the issue of reduction of inequality in Brazil.
Die exakte Positionierung von Intraokularlinsen in den Kapselsack ist von entscheidender Bedeutung für das postoperative visuelle Ergebnis nach Kataraktoperation oder refraktivem Linsenaustausch. Schon leichte Dezentrierungen können optische Aberrationen hervorrufen welche das Sehen der Patienten negativ beeinflussen. Besonders kommt dieses Phänomen bei sog. Premium Intraokularlinsen mit speziellen Optiken (asphärisch, torisch oder multifokal, sowie Kombinationen dieser) zum Tragen. Diese Optiken können Ihre gewünschte Wirkung nur bei exakter Positionierung entfalten. Eine postoperative Feinpositionierung ist nicht möglich, was die Ansprüche an den Operateur bei Implantation der Linsen erhöht. Minimalinvasive microinzisionelle Operationstechniken bieten heute gute Möglichkeiten, die Implantate exakt zu positionieren. Neben den Dezentrierungen können Intraokularlinsen auch dislozieren, beispielweise durch intra- oder postoperative Kapselrupturen, Linsenverziehungen oder auch Rotation der Implantate. Hier ist ein weiterer chirurgischer Eingriff von Nöten. Der Vortrag stellt dementsprechend verschiedene Videos und praktische Hinweise zur Handhabung postoperativer Linsendislokationen vor.
Alexander’s theory of the civil sphere can be placed in the context of development of sociology of law. However, Alexander draws not so much on sociological theories but rather on the approaches of philosophy of law, particularly the ideas of Fuller, Dworkin and Habermas. The civil sphere is presented by Alexander as the embodiment of Dworkin’s principal integrity. Locating law within civil morality Alexander reveals the similarity of his viewpoint to Dworkin’s position. Drawing on Fuller’s works Alexander singles out the procedural foundations of the democratic order. At the same time for Alexander the source of morality of law is not the legal system itself but a certain level of civil solidarity. Like Habermas, Alexander emphasizes the culturally embedded character of the legal norms. Alexander shares Habermas’s understanding of law as a regulative mechanism affecting all spheres of social life. However, Habermas is more sensitive to the danger of colonization of law by the imperatives of the economic and political subsystems. Alexander’s approach can be contrasted with Luhmann’s sociological theory of law. Alexander concentrates on interrelation and mutual penetration of the civil sphere and law while Luhmann regards law as an autonomous system following its own logic. While Alexander claims that his theory is rooted both in sociology and philosophy of law in fact his approach is closer to normative philosophy.
John Gray is the thinker who has reconstructed the main tenets of ethical pluralism inherent in the work of its initiator - Isaiah Berlin - and pointed to its consequences for political philosophy. In particular he singled out three levels of conflict in ethics identifiable in Berlin’s writings: among the ultimate values belonging to the same morality or code of conduct, among whole ways or styles of life and within goods or values which are themselves internally complex and inherently pluralistic.
It is the third, internal kind of conflict that proves to be the richest in implications.Because it undermines a whole constellation of contemporary liberal doctrines informed by the Kantian-Lockean tradition that conform to the legal paradigm. From the pluralist perspective such monumental theories (e.g. those of Rawls or Dworkin) are no longer sustainable due to the recognition that no ultimate value is immune to the phenomenon of incommensurability. Thus, irresolvable conflicts may also break out within the given regulative value.
Confronting ethical pluralism with general reflection on law has mostly negative consequences. Nevertheless, the incommensurability thesis sheds considerable light on certain legal disputes. This claim will be illustrated by interpreting from the pluralist perspective the controversy over the verdict by the European Tribunal of Human Rights of 3 November 2010 concerning hanging crosses in classrooms.
When judges are authorised to invalidate legal acts for being unconstitutional, the competence of the legislator is directly concerned. The question raises, if thus judges do not usurp legislative power. In the traditional doctrine of the separation of powers the parliament is the first power, based on its direct democratic legitimacy. Yet cancelling legal acts completely or partially does evoke more irritations in the public that could be expected. The people seem to have more confidence to the assumed impartiality of the judges than to the results of the parliamentary work which seems to be dominated by the struggles of the parties. The necessity of judicial review mainly is based on the consideration that individual rights even in an authentic democratic system may be violated by a legal act of the parliament. In this case constitutional courts have the very task to defend individual rights, principles of liberty and authentic equality. Therefore it is justified to speak of the “jurisdiction of liberty”, as the Italian constitutional expert Cappelletti has said. But also without such legitimacy in many countries the Courts intervene in the field of the legislator. The courts themselves discuss the limits of judicial interventions, emphasising themselves, that they have to respect the legislative decisions principally, but do not abide always by their own proclaimed principles. In Spanish recent publications it is spoken of the principle “in dubio pro legislatore”, (in case of doubt in favour the legislator), reminding of “in dubio pro reo”, in order to treat the legislative power not worse than the defendant in a criminal process..
Judicial review reflects the level of commitment between constitutionalism and democracy in contemporary States. Yet democracy as the sovereign government of the people implies a tension with constitutionalism as the rule of law. That is, people ruling themselves or the government by the people – majority government - is limited by the law of law making, the constitution. In Brazil, the improvement of judicial review is nowadays related to increase the number of decisions given by the Brazilian Supreme Court or rather to the capability of this latter in deciding a large number of constitutional lawsuits no matter the form and content of its arguments. For, the Court is nowadays driven by numbers and to accomplish its goals in terms of numbers (of decisions) it applies to technological solutions such as the digitalization of legal proceedings. It means that as many decision as Supreme Court issues -with the help of technology- the better it is. Relating the numbers of decisions issued by the Court to the improvement of Brazilian judicial review or Brazilian constitutionalism and democracy is a great mistake and a false statement as far as it does not face the main problem of the system, which is the lack of reasons of Supreme Court’s decision. The point is that, in this case, technology is just a tool –among others- in order to render legal proceedings faster yet not a qualitative sign of Supreme Court’s decisions.
Jurisprudence under the perspective of the new media and its effect on the communication of law
(2012)
Despite the law knowledge presumption, Jurisprudence has not always considered the effects introduced by the communication of law in the transition from the print to the electric revolution, using here concepts and ideas of McLuhan´s theory.
The use of Internet by Brazilian Courts (on line transmission of trials, the digital process, transformation of courts in source of news on what concerns their decisions) is an interesting example of how the new medium interferes in the substance of the message of law, since the movement of the messages must be considered to understand the epistemological domain of law. New elements are introduced by the new media and interact with the old meanings, concepts and processes of law and of the old media and can themselves bring new conflicts that are relevant to the comprehension of the complete and real dynamics of Law.
The process of finding evidence of what truthfully happened in a conflictive situation interests jurists and journalists but in different ways. When the work of journalists and judges are concerned the paradox is at stake. Both categories must tell a story about a conflict must listen to all involved, must inform what happened to the general public. Although both categories must use the freedom must use the freedom of speech their point of view about something with objectivity, their timing is different as well as the process and the effect of fulfilling their task. That question that should be made is what happen to law when it becomes the subject matter to the news in the world of full information? In what measurement journalists also pass judgements and how this affects the formal processes of law? The effort to answer these questions and the ones related to them is important to understand some of the problems that must be approached in order to establish the ways of law and of the mass media technological society.
It is a fact that mediation and other alternative dispute resolution means are becoming increasingly popular. Actually, governments are encouraging people to use them instead of going to Court, as they are quicker, cheaper and more informal than trials, and can be implemented using internet. The author focus on the analysis of the structure and purposes of mediation, in particular. The paper aims to discuss and understand what kind of justice, if any, is offered by alternative dispute resolution.
Fragestellung: Beurteilung der Korrektur des Astigmatismus mit der multifokalen torischen Intraokularlinsen (IOL) ReSTOR Toric (Alcon, Ft. Worth, USA) bei Kataraktoperation.
Methodik: Die Multicenterstudie umfasste Kataraktepatienten mit präoperativem Astigmatismus von ≥0,75 bis ≤2,5 dpt. die Patienten wurden einer bilateralen Implantation einer torischen multifokalen IOL zur Korrektur der Hornhautverkrümmung unterzogen. Die OP erfolgte ohne relaxierende limbale Inzisionen durch eine clear-cornea Inzision <3,0 mm. Prä- und postoperativ wurden für diese Subanalyse Autokeratometrie sowie subjektiver Astigmatismus von 39 Augen von 40 Patienten im Alter von 59,8±7,0 Jahren analysiert.
Ergebnisse: Präoperativ betrug der mittlere keratometrische Astigmatismus 1,43±0,57 dpt. Die mittlere Inzisionsgröße betrug 2,59±0,41 mm. 1 Monat postoperativ betrug der mittlere keratometrische Astigmatismus 1,51±0,95 dpt (25 Augen). Der Unterschied im keratometrischen Astigmatismus zwischen präoperativ und 1-Monat-postop betrug 0,57±0,96 dpt. Der präoperative subjektive Astigmatismus wurde signifikant von 0,32±0,33 dpt (25 Augen) auf 0,99±0,70 dpt reduziert. (39 Augen, p <0,0001).
Schlussfolgerung: Die Implantation der multifokale torischen IOL zeigt vorhersehbare postoperative Ergebnisse bei der Korrektur des Astigmatismus nach kataraktoperation.
It is a long discussed issue whether light scalar mesons have sizeable four-quark components. We present an exploratory study of this question using Nf = 2+1+1 twisted mass lattice QCD. A mixed action approach ignoring disconnected contributions is used to calculate correlatormatrices consisting of mesonic molecule, diquark-antidiquark and two-meson interpolating operators with quantum numbers of the scalar mesons a0(980) (1(0++)) and k (1/2(0+)). The correlation matrices are analyzed by solving the generalized eigenvalue problem. The theoretically expected free two-particle scattering states are identified, while no additional low lying states are observed. We do not observe indications for bound four-quark states in the channels investigated.
Einer der zahlreichen Vorträge von Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff beginnt folgendermaßen: "Herr Gerhardt hat mich eingeladen, etwas über die aktuelle Bedeutung von Hegels Rechtsphilosophie zu sagen. Nichts lieber als das. An der Aktualität der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie leide ich geradezu, und über das, woran man leidet, spricht man ja gern. Die Aktualität der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie zeigt sich mir darin, dass ich öfter an Hegel denken muss, als mir lieb ist. Ich muss so oft an ihn denken, weil in unserer öffentlichen Kultur das Hegelwidrige so präsent ist." ...
This paper aims to present the similarities and differences between Posner's defense of Law and Economics (LAE) and Holmes' pragmatism. The investigation is centered in the arguments of economic consequences of judicial decisions. Law and Economics tend to emphasize these arguments as a determinant characterization of legal pragmatism. These arguments involve some dilemmas: Is it possible to eliminate a rule, or reinterpret it according to the effect of its application in practical life? May these economic consequences serve as argument for a replacement of traditional interpretation? To what extent can we rule out the law with arguments of consequence? Despite the influence, LAE has some important differences with respect Holmes' legal pragmatism. Posner's LAE involves the economic principle of wealth maximization and its relations with utilitarianism and economic liberalism. Consequentialism in Holmes, by contrast, is based on a teleological interpretation of existing rules. It is important that the judge does not decide based on a specific economic theory. Also, legal pragmatism does not advocate abandoning the tenets of positivism that form the basis for the rule of law. Holmes defends a judicial restraint. Accordingly, the argument of consequence must have previous limits in precedents and statutes. However, both legal pragmatism and LAE are connected by the idea that the adaptation of the law to a reasonable end can not be absent from the canons of interpretation and adjudication.
Communist regimes in general and especially the one in Albania destroyed almost every aspect of political, social, cultural and economic life, including the notion of pluralism and intellectual elite of the country. In Albania, the transition into democracy in 90’ was done through extrication which means that the authoritarian government was weakened, but not as thoroughly as in a transition by defeat. As a consequence, the former Communist elite was able to negotiate crucial features of the transition and was very quickly transformed into the new pluralist political class. This position enabled the communist elite to be rehabilitated and together with the new emerged communist elite to remain a strong influential actor in new emerged democracy and de facto to run in continuance the country. The purpose of the new emerged communist elite to maintain control was favored inter alia by the absence of a new strong intellectual elite and was done merely by sharing the power among its members divided into different political parties and also by using the ‘pluralist’ law as a tool for social control over new emerging intellectual elites. The use of law as a tool for social control by the political class has severely damaged people's understanding and expectations on the law, its relations with the state as well as international community. Indeed, such experience of the use of law by the political class for its own narrow interests, has made people lose confidence in law and state as well as has severely weakened the law enforcement in the country. To conclude, the overall purpose of this paper would be the analysis of law in general and its understandings and development in a post-communist society such as Albania from different points of view.
The author will deal with the relationship between law and technology from the viewpoint of technology security standard. One of the relationships can be found in that law has been providing a security level of technology. They have been saying that law would often follow technology. Law is too slow to adapt the changing technology through the advancement of technology. Above all, information technology has an electronic rapidity and a legislation technology has a paper one. There might be a big estrangement between law and technology. However, law must provide a security standard of technology. The standard must be based on a relative security level. The relative level would premise on the ordinary, lawful and ethical use of technology. Most technology has been opened to the public without any technology impact assessment. Technology would have some defect, which the producers have overlooked. As a result, the users might often meet with the accidents caused on the defects.
Then law should provide a technology security standard to exclude the defects from the users’ viewpoint as secure as possible. The security standard must be reflected on the architecture standard of technology. The architecture standard may be a yardstick whether the creators can evade the responsibility for the accidents.
The standard would also premise on the ordinary, lawful and ethical use of technology. The ordinary use means that the users should use normally technology within the extent of the architecture standard. The ethical use means that the users should use technology being conscious of the defects in order to avoid accidents.
The relative security level may be the sum of the architecture standard and the ethical use of technology.
Are Kantian philosophy and its principle of respect for persons inadequate to the protection of environmental values? This paper answers this question by elucidating how Kantian ethics can take environmental values seriously. In the period that starts with the Critique of Judgment in 1790 and ends with the Metaphysics of Morals in 1797, the subject would have been approached by Kant in a different manner; although the respect that we may owe to non-human nature is still grounded in our duties to mankind, the basis for such respect stems from nature’s aesthetic properties, and the duty to preserve nature lies in our duties to ourselves. Compared to the “market paradigm”, as it is called by Gillroy (the reference is to a conception of a public policy based on a criterion of economic efficiency or utility), Kantian philosophy can offer a better explanation of the relationship between environmental policy and the theory of justice. Kantian justice defines the “just state” as the one that protects the moral capacities of its “active” citizens, as presented in the first Part of the Metaphysics of Morals. In the Kantian paradigm, the environmental risk becomes a “public” concern. That means it is not subsumed under an individual decision, based on a calculus.
This paper is aimed to re-elaborate questions and discuss them rather than presenting answers. It starts with the dialog concerning specific contributions of philosophy of language to Law, followed by the re-elaboration of some yet unanswered problems, as well as the discussion of possible paths for this issue.
Abstract of the German original article “Rechtssubjekte und Teilrechtssubjekte des elektronischen Geschäftsverkehrs“, to be published in S. Beck (ed.): Jenseits von Mensch und Maschine: Moralische und rechtliche Aspekte des Umgangs mit Robotern, Künstlicher Intelligenz und Cyborgs. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012.
As is well known, the 2nd Spanish Republic (1931-1936) was toppled by a military uprising which, after a cruel Civil War, set up an autocratic regime led by General Franco which lasted until his natural death in 1975. According to the contemporary theory of the legal system, a legal order exists on the sole condition that it is efficient in general terms and this was the case for both the Republic and the Dictatorship. In turn, the validity of the legal norms of all legal orders is based on its respective rules of recognition. Thus, neither the existence of the legal order nor the validity of its respective legal norms depends on moral considerations. In this paper, we call this affirmation into question on the base of the fact that the compensatory methods adopted from the Transition to Democracy show an evident concern to repair the damage of taking away a person’s basic rights (life, health, freedom, expression, association etc) although the Spanish Constitution, with its catalogue of fundamental rights was not in force at that time. But these measures would not have much sense if, as Raz says, there was no shared content which is common to all legal systems. Like Nino, we claim that one must discriminate between a democratic legal order and an autocratic one to establish the level of validity of its respective legal norms. Thus it can be assigned a presumption of justice to democratic norms. Finally, we state that the criteria to weigh up the justice or injustice of legal norms, as that of legal orders, takes root in the level of respect they show towards human rights.
In his new book, R. Dworkin advocates the unity of values thesis. He wants to circumscribe morality as a proper epistemological domain which is methodologically different from scientific inquiry. The epistemological independence of morality is supposed to be a consequence of the irreducible fact/value dichotomy. This paper sustains that unity of values thesis is methodologically correct; all moral reasoning must be a constructive interpretation of its meaning. However, that author fails to recognize that not every axiological interpretation implies moral consequences. From H. Putnam’s pragmatic realism, this paper intends to demonstrate that much of scientific inquiry relies on values interpretation, and that this kind of reasoning is morally neutral. Finally, it should be clear that epistemological choices in legal positivism – e.g. the decision on which aspects of social interaction are theoretically relevant – should not disturb the soundness of its argument nor should it be read as if it had moral implications. This paper concludes that positivist theories cannot be ruled out. Since the choice between descriptive and interpretative models requires a circular justification, legal theory is itself an activity governed by epistemic values interpretation. Likewise natural sciences, it can only be understood from an internal perspective. Accordingly, inclusive positivism holds the advantage of being more consilient than interpretivism, which is arguably parochial.
The increase in the volume of litigation verified since the 1990’s, having the Brazilian society as context, made the judiciary open itself to new technologies which facilitate the access to justice, as well as to a faster resolution of the demands. However, the intense insertion of technical rationalization in the process and decision operations by the judiciary, during the last years, led to a legalization supported by presuppositions of technical-instrumental regulation. According to the goal policy established by the CNJ, the annoyance of the instrumental rationality is present “with respect to purposes”, which demands, more and more, a mere fulfillment of previously instituted goals from the law operators. The matter is to know if the implementation of new technologies to solve the growing litigation coming from the complexity of societies is enough to adjust the Law to a post-conventional platform. If the social complexity implies resources coming from new technologies, it’s not certain that such technologies, on their own, satisfactorily answer a judicial model which, seen under the eyes of the post- conventional legitimacy and regulation, is adequate to complex societies. This illustrates that a judicial model, able to deal with the social plurality, must take into account not only the rules of instrumental rationality, but also the fundamental issues of communicative rationality. This current work intends to evaluate if the applicability of the instrumental rationality in the judiciary equally allows the law to extent the useful conditions of the communicative rationality to the consensual formation of will and opinion in the Democratic State of Law.
Der zweifache Urteilsspruch des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im Fall “Lautsi gegen Italien” hat sich zum Paradigma der Schwierigkeiten entwickelt, welche Europa bei der adäquaten Ansiedlung der Religion im öffentlichen Bereich erfährt. Die Lösung kann sich ändern, wenn, anstatt dem politischen Problem (wann ist die Ausübung von Macht erlaubt) einzuräumen, die Möglichkeit einer praktischen Vernunft und ihre Verträglichkeit mit dem religiösen Glauben zum Ausgangspunkt gemacht wird. Diese würde zweifelsfrei zu einer politischen Fragestellung zu einer Präsenz der Religion im öffentlichen Bereich einladen, die auf eine positive Laizität mehr Rücksicht nimmt, dabei den Laizismus ablehnt, der darauf drängt, die Rationalität zur Macht auch einen nicht kognitivistischen Code zu reduzieren.
The human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is currently ranked sixth in the worldwide causes of death [1]. One treatment approach is to inhibit reverse transcriptase (RT), an enzyme essential for reverse transcription of viral RNA into DNA before integration into the host genome [2]. By using non-nucleoside RT inhibitors (NNRTIs) [3], which target an allosteric binding site, major side effects can be evaded. Unfortunately, high genetic variability of HIV in combination with selection pressure introduced by drug treatment enables the virus to develop resistance against this drug class by developing point mutations. This situation necessitates treatment with alternative NNRTIs that target the particular RT mutants encountered in a patient.
Previously, proteochemometric approaches have demonstrated some success in predicting binding of particular NNRTIs to individual mutants; however a structurebased approach may help to further improve the predictive success of such models. Hence, our aim is to rationalize the experimental activity of known NNRTIs against a variety of RT mutants by combining molecular modeling, long-timescale atomistic molecular dynamics (MD) simulation sampling and ensemble docking. Initial control experiments on known inhibitor-RT mutant complexes using this protocol were successful, and the predictivity for further complexes is currently being evaluated. In addition to predictive power, MD simulations of multiple RT mutants are providing fundamental insight into the dynamics of the allosteric NNRTI binding site which is useful for the design of future inhibitors. Overall, work of this type is hoped to contribute to the development of predictive efficacy models for individual patients, and hence towards personalized HIV treatment options.
This is the Proceedings of the "International Conference on Motivation 2012" carried out by the Special Interest Group "Motivation and Emotion" of the European Association for Research on Learning and Instruction (EARLI) in cooperation with the German Institute for International Educational Research (DIPF) and the Goethe University Frankfurt. (DIPF/author).
This paper expands on the concept of legal machine which was presented first at IRIS 2011 in Salzburg. The research subjects are (1) the creation of institutional facts by machines, and (2)
multimodal communication of legal content to humans. Simple examples are traffic lights and vending machines. Complicated examples are computer-based information systems in organisations, form proceedings workflows, and machines which replace officials in organisations. The actions performed by machines have legal importance and draw legal consequences. Machines similarly as humans can be imposed status-functions of legal actors. The analogy of machines with humans is in the focus of this paper. Legal content can be communicated by machines and can be perceived by all of our senses. The content can be expressed in multimodal languages: textual, visual, acoustic, gestures, aircraft manoeuvres, etc. The concept of encapsulatation of human into machine is proposed. Herein humanintended actions are communicated through the machine’s output channel. Encapsulations can be compared with deities and mythical creatures that can send gods’ messages to people through the human mouth. This paper also aims to identify law production patterns by machines.
Although their applications have not yet extended widely due to their incipient state, nano-technologies and nano-medicines may be presumed to be at the origin of the next great technological revolution, foreseeably contributing to a new stage with respect to evolutions in mankind’s progress. Their possibilities are truly immense in enormously varied spheres, but the risks and uncertainties they engender are enormous too. Because access and use of the unceasingly increasing mega-quantity of information they generate will place further strain on the protection of personal life, privacy, the exercise of freedom, as well as the safeguarding of other fundamental principles and rights.
This paper traces the development of National Socialist cultural and legal policy towards the arts. It examines the role of censure in this development starting with Hitler's first attempts at power in the Weimar republic. It then looks more closely into aspects of the development of new policies in and after 1933 and their implementation in institutions of the totalitarian state. As the paper shows, policies were carried out within a legal framework that included parliament and constitutional law but they were often also accompanied by aggressive political actions. Racial and nationalistic ideologies were at the heart of the National Socialist discourse about culture. This discourse quickly established modernity as its principal enemy and saw modernist culture (in the broad sense of the word), and especially art criticism, as being under Jewish domination. True German Kultur was set against this; Hitler himself promoted German art both through exhibitions and through policies which included the removal of un-German art and the exclusion of writers and artists who did not conform the cultural ideal. As Jewish artists and intellectuals in modernist culture posed the greatest threat to the establishment of a new German culture, Nazi policies towards the arts embarked on a process of censure, exclusion and annihilation. The purpose of these policies was nothing less than the elimination of all modernist (Jewish and ‘degenerate’) culture and any memory of it.
We present and compare new types of algorithms for lattice QCD with staggered fermions in the limit of infinite gauge coupling. These algorithms are formulated on a discrete spatial lattice but with continuous Euclidean time. They make use of the exact Hamiltonian, with the inverse temperature beta as the only input parameter. This formulation turns out to be analogous to that of a quantum spin system. The sign problem is completely absent, at zero and non-zero baryon density. We compare the performance of a continuous-time worm algorithm and of a Stochastic Series Expansion algorithm (SSE), which operates on equivalence classes of time-ordered interactions. Finally, we apply the SSE algorithm to a first exploratory study of two-flavor strong coupling lattice QCD, which is manageable in the Hamiltonian formulation because the sign problem can be controlled.
Since 2007 the concept of open online courses came up leading to many discussions of this new format in blog posts and articles especially in the US and Canada. 2011, the first German open online course was started addressing the Future of Learning.
The article discusses the concept of open online courses, the experiences with the first German course, and gives some perspectives on further developments which partly were implemented in a new course that was just started in 2012.