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Alexander’s theory of the civil sphere can be placed in the context of development of sociology of law. However, Alexander draws not so much on sociological theories but rather on the approaches of philosophy of law, particularly the ideas of Fuller, Dworkin and Habermas. The civil sphere is presented by Alexander as the embodiment of Dworkin’s principal integrity. Locating law within civil morality Alexander reveals the similarity of his viewpoint to Dworkin’s position. Drawing on Fuller’s works Alexander singles out the procedural foundations of the democratic order. At the same time for Alexander the source of morality of law is not the legal system itself but a certain level of civil solidarity. Like Habermas, Alexander emphasizes the culturally embedded character of the legal norms. Alexander shares Habermas’s understanding of law as a regulative mechanism affecting all spheres of social life. However, Habermas is more sensitive to the danger of colonization of law by the imperatives of the economic and political subsystems. Alexander’s approach can be contrasted with Luhmann’s sociological theory of law. Alexander concentrates on interrelation and mutual penetration of the civil sphere and law while Luhmann regards law as an autonomous system following its own logic. While Alexander claims that his theory is rooted both in sociology and philosophy of law in fact his approach is closer to normative philosophy.
John Gray is the thinker who has reconstructed the main tenets of ethical pluralism inherent in the work of its initiator - Isaiah Berlin - and pointed to its consequences for political philosophy. In particular he singled out three levels of conflict in ethics identifiable in Berlin’s writings: among the ultimate values belonging to the same morality or code of conduct, among whole ways or styles of life and within goods or values which are themselves internally complex and inherently pluralistic.
It is the third, internal kind of conflict that proves to be the richest in implications.Because it undermines a whole constellation of contemporary liberal doctrines informed by the Kantian-Lockean tradition that conform to the legal paradigm. From the pluralist perspective such monumental theories (e.g. those of Rawls or Dworkin) are no longer sustainable due to the recognition that no ultimate value is immune to the phenomenon of incommensurability. Thus, irresolvable conflicts may also break out within the given regulative value.
Confronting ethical pluralism with general reflection on law has mostly negative consequences. Nevertheless, the incommensurability thesis sheds considerable light on certain legal disputes. This claim will be illustrated by interpreting from the pluralist perspective the controversy over the verdict by the European Tribunal of Human Rights of 3 November 2010 concerning hanging crosses in classrooms.
When judges are authorised to invalidate legal acts for being unconstitutional, the competence of the legislator is directly concerned. The question raises, if thus judges do not usurp legislative power. In the traditional doctrine of the separation of powers the parliament is the first power, based on its direct democratic legitimacy. Yet cancelling legal acts completely or partially does evoke more irritations in the public that could be expected. The people seem to have more confidence to the assumed impartiality of the judges than to the results of the parliamentary work which seems to be dominated by the struggles of the parties. The necessity of judicial review mainly is based on the consideration that individual rights even in an authentic democratic system may be violated by a legal act of the parliament. In this case constitutional courts have the very task to defend individual rights, principles of liberty and authentic equality. Therefore it is justified to speak of the “jurisdiction of liberty”, as the Italian constitutional expert Cappelletti has said. But also without such legitimacy in many countries the Courts intervene in the field of the legislator. The courts themselves discuss the limits of judicial interventions, emphasising themselves, that they have to respect the legislative decisions principally, but do not abide always by their own proclaimed principles. In Spanish recent publications it is spoken of the principle “in dubio pro legislatore”, (in case of doubt in favour the legislator), reminding of “in dubio pro reo”, in order to treat the legislative power not worse than the defendant in a criminal process..
Judicial review reflects the level of commitment between constitutionalism and democracy in contemporary States. Yet democracy as the sovereign government of the people implies a tension with constitutionalism as the rule of law. That is, people ruling themselves or the government by the people – majority government - is limited by the law of law making, the constitution. In Brazil, the improvement of judicial review is nowadays related to increase the number of decisions given by the Brazilian Supreme Court or rather to the capability of this latter in deciding a large number of constitutional lawsuits no matter the form and content of its arguments. For, the Court is nowadays driven by numbers and to accomplish its goals in terms of numbers (of decisions) it applies to technological solutions such as the digitalization of legal proceedings. It means that as many decision as Supreme Court issues -with the help of technology- the better it is. Relating the numbers of decisions issued by the Court to the improvement of Brazilian judicial review or Brazilian constitutionalism and democracy is a great mistake and a false statement as far as it does not face the main problem of the system, which is the lack of reasons of Supreme Court’s decision. The point is that, in this case, technology is just a tool –among others- in order to render legal proceedings faster yet not a qualitative sign of Supreme Court’s decisions.
Jurisprudence under the perspective of the new media and its effect on the communication of law
(2012)
Despite the law knowledge presumption, Jurisprudence has not always considered the effects introduced by the communication of law in the transition from the print to the electric revolution, using here concepts and ideas of McLuhan´s theory.
The use of Internet by Brazilian Courts (on line transmission of trials, the digital process, transformation of courts in source of news on what concerns their decisions) is an interesting example of how the new medium interferes in the substance of the message of law, since the movement of the messages must be considered to understand the epistemological domain of law. New elements are introduced by the new media and interact with the old meanings, concepts and processes of law and of the old media and can themselves bring new conflicts that are relevant to the comprehension of the complete and real dynamics of Law.
The process of finding evidence of what truthfully happened in a conflictive situation interests jurists and journalists but in different ways. When the work of journalists and judges are concerned the paradox is at stake. Both categories must tell a story about a conflict must listen to all involved, must inform what happened to the general public. Although both categories must use the freedom must use the freedom of speech their point of view about something with objectivity, their timing is different as well as the process and the effect of fulfilling their task. That question that should be made is what happen to law when it becomes the subject matter to the news in the world of full information? In what measurement journalists also pass judgements and how this affects the formal processes of law? The effort to answer these questions and the ones related to them is important to understand some of the problems that must be approached in order to establish the ways of law and of the mass media technological society.
It is a fact that mediation and other alternative dispute resolution means are becoming increasingly popular. Actually, governments are encouraging people to use them instead of going to Court, as they are quicker, cheaper and more informal than trials, and can be implemented using internet. The author focus on the analysis of the structure and purposes of mediation, in particular. The paper aims to discuss and understand what kind of justice, if any, is offered by alternative dispute resolution.
Fragestellung: Beurteilung der Korrektur des Astigmatismus mit der multifokalen torischen Intraokularlinsen (IOL) ReSTOR Toric (Alcon, Ft. Worth, USA) bei Kataraktoperation.
Methodik: Die Multicenterstudie umfasste Kataraktepatienten mit präoperativem Astigmatismus von ≥0,75 bis ≤2,5 dpt. die Patienten wurden einer bilateralen Implantation einer torischen multifokalen IOL zur Korrektur der Hornhautverkrümmung unterzogen. Die OP erfolgte ohne relaxierende limbale Inzisionen durch eine clear-cornea Inzision <3,0 mm. Prä- und postoperativ wurden für diese Subanalyse Autokeratometrie sowie subjektiver Astigmatismus von 39 Augen von 40 Patienten im Alter von 59,8±7,0 Jahren analysiert.
Ergebnisse: Präoperativ betrug der mittlere keratometrische Astigmatismus 1,43±0,57 dpt. Die mittlere Inzisionsgröße betrug 2,59±0,41 mm. 1 Monat postoperativ betrug der mittlere keratometrische Astigmatismus 1,51±0,95 dpt (25 Augen). Der Unterschied im keratometrischen Astigmatismus zwischen präoperativ und 1-Monat-postop betrug 0,57±0,96 dpt. Der präoperative subjektive Astigmatismus wurde signifikant von 0,32±0,33 dpt (25 Augen) auf 0,99±0,70 dpt reduziert. (39 Augen, p <0,0001).
Schlussfolgerung: Die Implantation der multifokale torischen IOL zeigt vorhersehbare postoperative Ergebnisse bei der Korrektur des Astigmatismus nach kataraktoperation.
It is a long discussed issue whether light scalar mesons have sizeable four-quark components. We present an exploratory study of this question using Nf = 2+1+1 twisted mass lattice QCD. A mixed action approach ignoring disconnected contributions is used to calculate correlatormatrices consisting of mesonic molecule, diquark-antidiquark and two-meson interpolating operators with quantum numbers of the scalar mesons a0(980) (1(0++)) and k (1/2(0+)). The correlation matrices are analyzed by solving the generalized eigenvalue problem. The theoretically expected free two-particle scattering states are identified, while no additional low lying states are observed. We do not observe indications for bound four-quark states in the channels investigated.
Einer der zahlreichen Vorträge von Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff beginnt folgendermaßen: "Herr Gerhardt hat mich eingeladen, etwas über die aktuelle Bedeutung von Hegels Rechtsphilosophie zu sagen. Nichts lieber als das. An der Aktualität der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie leide ich geradezu, und über das, woran man leidet, spricht man ja gern. Die Aktualität der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie zeigt sich mir darin, dass ich öfter an Hegel denken muss, als mir lieb ist. Ich muss so oft an ihn denken, weil in unserer öffentlichen Kultur das Hegelwidrige so präsent ist." ...
This paper aims to present the similarities and differences between Posner's defense of Law and Economics (LAE) and Holmes' pragmatism. The investigation is centered in the arguments of economic consequences of judicial decisions. Law and Economics tend to emphasize these arguments as a determinant characterization of legal pragmatism. These arguments involve some dilemmas: Is it possible to eliminate a rule, or reinterpret it according to the effect of its application in practical life? May these economic consequences serve as argument for a replacement of traditional interpretation? To what extent can we rule out the law with arguments of consequence? Despite the influence, LAE has some important differences with respect Holmes' legal pragmatism. Posner's LAE involves the economic principle of wealth maximization and its relations with utilitarianism and economic liberalism. Consequentialism in Holmes, by contrast, is based on a teleological interpretation of existing rules. It is important that the judge does not decide based on a specific economic theory. Also, legal pragmatism does not advocate abandoning the tenets of positivism that form the basis for the rule of law. Holmes defends a judicial restraint. Accordingly, the argument of consequence must have previous limits in precedents and statutes. However, both legal pragmatism and LAE are connected by the idea that the adaptation of the law to a reasonable end can not be absent from the canons of interpretation and adjudication.
Communist regimes in general and especially the one in Albania destroyed almost every aspect of political, social, cultural and economic life, including the notion of pluralism and intellectual elite of the country. In Albania, the transition into democracy in 90’ was done through extrication which means that the authoritarian government was weakened, but not as thoroughly as in a transition by defeat. As a consequence, the former Communist elite was able to negotiate crucial features of the transition and was very quickly transformed into the new pluralist political class. This position enabled the communist elite to be rehabilitated and together with the new emerged communist elite to remain a strong influential actor in new emerged democracy and de facto to run in continuance the country. The purpose of the new emerged communist elite to maintain control was favored inter alia by the absence of a new strong intellectual elite and was done merely by sharing the power among its members divided into different political parties and also by using the ‘pluralist’ law as a tool for social control over new emerging intellectual elites. The use of law as a tool for social control by the political class has severely damaged people's understanding and expectations on the law, its relations with the state as well as international community. Indeed, such experience of the use of law by the political class for its own narrow interests, has made people lose confidence in law and state as well as has severely weakened the law enforcement in the country. To conclude, the overall purpose of this paper would be the analysis of law in general and its understandings and development in a post-communist society such as Albania from different points of view.
The author will deal with the relationship between law and technology from the viewpoint of technology security standard. One of the relationships can be found in that law has been providing a security level of technology. They have been saying that law would often follow technology. Law is too slow to adapt the changing technology through the advancement of technology. Above all, information technology has an electronic rapidity and a legislation technology has a paper one. There might be a big estrangement between law and technology. However, law must provide a security standard of technology. The standard must be based on a relative security level. The relative level would premise on the ordinary, lawful and ethical use of technology. Most technology has been opened to the public without any technology impact assessment. Technology would have some defect, which the producers have overlooked. As a result, the users might often meet with the accidents caused on the defects.
Then law should provide a technology security standard to exclude the defects from the users’ viewpoint as secure as possible. The security standard must be reflected on the architecture standard of technology. The architecture standard may be a yardstick whether the creators can evade the responsibility for the accidents.
The standard would also premise on the ordinary, lawful and ethical use of technology. The ordinary use means that the users should use normally technology within the extent of the architecture standard. The ethical use means that the users should use technology being conscious of the defects in order to avoid accidents.
The relative security level may be the sum of the architecture standard and the ethical use of technology.
Are Kantian philosophy and its principle of respect for persons inadequate to the protection of environmental values? This paper answers this question by elucidating how Kantian ethics can take environmental values seriously. In the period that starts with the Critique of Judgment in 1790 and ends with the Metaphysics of Morals in 1797, the subject would have been approached by Kant in a different manner; although the respect that we may owe to non-human nature is still grounded in our duties to mankind, the basis for such respect stems from nature’s aesthetic properties, and the duty to preserve nature lies in our duties to ourselves. Compared to the “market paradigm”, as it is called by Gillroy (the reference is to a conception of a public policy based on a criterion of economic efficiency or utility), Kantian philosophy can offer a better explanation of the relationship between environmental policy and the theory of justice. Kantian justice defines the “just state” as the one that protects the moral capacities of its “active” citizens, as presented in the first Part of the Metaphysics of Morals. In the Kantian paradigm, the environmental risk becomes a “public” concern. That means it is not subsumed under an individual decision, based on a calculus.
This paper is aimed to re-elaborate questions and discuss them rather than presenting answers. It starts with the dialog concerning specific contributions of philosophy of language to Law, followed by the re-elaboration of some yet unanswered problems, as well as the discussion of possible paths for this issue.
Abstract of the German original article “Rechtssubjekte und Teilrechtssubjekte des elektronischen Geschäftsverkehrs“, to be published in S. Beck (ed.): Jenseits von Mensch und Maschine: Moralische und rechtliche Aspekte des Umgangs mit Robotern, Künstlicher Intelligenz und Cyborgs. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012.
As is well known, the 2nd Spanish Republic (1931-1936) was toppled by a military uprising which, after a cruel Civil War, set up an autocratic regime led by General Franco which lasted until his natural death in 1975. According to the contemporary theory of the legal system, a legal order exists on the sole condition that it is efficient in general terms and this was the case for both the Republic and the Dictatorship. In turn, the validity of the legal norms of all legal orders is based on its respective rules of recognition. Thus, neither the existence of the legal order nor the validity of its respective legal norms depends on moral considerations. In this paper, we call this affirmation into question on the base of the fact that the compensatory methods adopted from the Transition to Democracy show an evident concern to repair the damage of taking away a person’s basic rights (life, health, freedom, expression, association etc) although the Spanish Constitution, with its catalogue of fundamental rights was not in force at that time. But these measures would not have much sense if, as Raz says, there was no shared content which is common to all legal systems. Like Nino, we claim that one must discriminate between a democratic legal order and an autocratic one to establish the level of validity of its respective legal norms. Thus it can be assigned a presumption of justice to democratic norms. Finally, we state that the criteria to weigh up the justice or injustice of legal norms, as that of legal orders, takes root in the level of respect they show towards human rights.