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This is the 13. article in our series Trouble on the Far-Right.
The environment for populist radical right (PRR) parties in Europe is favourable. Both the refugee crisis as well as the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels have ostensibly fuelled further xenophobic and anti-Islam sentiments among European publics, on the basis of which PRR parties have been shown to build their support. Recent elections in Europe have indeed seen good results for parties with an outspoken xenophobic message, the victories in March 2016 for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the German regional elections and two far right parties (SNS and L’SNS) in the Slovak national elections being cases in point. Opinion polls in countries such as France and the Netherlands look equally promising for PRR parties. Even though not all European countries have witnessed the successful mobilisation of the PRR, it is fair to conclude that this party family is going strong. It would be too quick to conclude, however, that PRR parties only thrive on the recent salience of the immigration issue.
This is the 15. article in our series Trouble on the Far-Right.
Germany’s political culture currently faces a shift to the right as anti-immigrant violence and attacks on refugee camps are on the brink of becoming a daily routine. The populist party Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) did achieve successes in every recent federal state election. Through their success politics gained a new political quality. Anti-immigrant groups such as PEGIDA in Dresden regularly mobilize hundreds and sometimes thousands of people. The increased number of refugees that came to Germany in 2015 is instrumentalized to fuel racism and to spread nationalist sentiments...
This is the twelth article in our series Trouble on the Far-Right.
In 2008 and 2009, a group of Hungarian right-wing extremists committed a series of attacks on random members of the Roma community. Six people were killed, including a five-year-old, and another five were injured. The trial of the four suspects lasted two-and-a-half years, and the verdict was passed in August 2013. Director Eszter Hajdú filmed the trial and condensed it to create an oppressive Kammerspielfilm starring the cold-blooded suspects, an irritable judge and the victims’ families. Without any commentary, Hajdú recorded the drawn-out and sometimes chaotic trial from the cramped courtroom’s public gallery. A small static camera shows the judge’s point of view, while close-ups highlight the emotions of the people touched by the crime. Sometimes we see the protagonists outside the courtroom, for example during the reconstruction at the crime scene. At the start of the trial, the victims and next of kin assume there will be justice, and they have faith that the Hungarian authorities will protect them. But will the extremists be found guilty? The widespread anti-Roma sentiment in Hungarian society, and the bungling (intentional or otherwise) on the part of the police give them reason to fear they will not...
This is the tenth article in our series Trouble on the Far-Right.
How can a racist party that was getting less than 0.2% of the vote for years, enter parliament with 18 MPs? How can a party that promotes violence, hate, sexism and murders amplify its reach after each pogrom? How can Golden Dawn remain the third political power in Greece for four years? And what’s in the mind of a Golden Dawner?...
This is the ninth article in our series Trouble on the Far-Right.
Since around 1990, the state of the Austrian far right1 has been characterized by the strength of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ – Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, more precisely translated as Freedomite Party of Austria2) and the relative weakness of extra-parliamentarian far right activism. Far from a mere coincidence, these two features are to be understood as closely linked: the FPÖ’s electoral successes have brought far right causes and talking points unto the political center stage on a national level, given them ample media coverage and made street militancy increasingly pointless. Insofar, the Austrian far right spectrum could – at least until recently – be described as a photographic negative of the situation in Germany: successful party politics, weak bottom-up mobilizations and a comparatively low incidence of street violence. Currently, however, the long held hopes of German right-wingers for a party both in the mold, and strength, of the FPÖ are apparently being fulfilled by the emergence of the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Conversely, both legal and illegal street activism have been on the rise in Austria in recent years, particularly since the start of the asylum crisis in Europe. Numerous violent incidents were reported in 2015, including a minimum of 25 attacks on housing facilities for asylum seekers.
This is the eighth article in our series Trouble on the Far-Right.
Trouble’s brewing for the European Union – also in Finland, where the next country-wide elections will see several new, EU-hostile nationalist groups attempt to establish themselves on the political map. At the same time, Finnish Fascism is seeking to entrench and normalize itself into a respectable part of the political framework.
With disaffection growing, the time appears to be ripe. As Heikki Hiilamo, professor of social policy in Helsinki University notes, Finland has been particularly hard hit by the most recent economic downturn. The middle and lower classes are seeing their expectations fade into uncertainty, as globalization is bringing new and intangible threats in the form of vanishing jobs. Finland is heading towards increasing social inequality, with the reality of the educated and the employed drifting further apart from “globalization’s losers”. With no self-evident owner in sight, the accumulating political capital is attracting radical nationalist utilizers...
Bei dem letzten Update des Genocide Alert Monitors wurde in sozialen Medien wiederholt darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass fast sämtliche Massenverbrechen angeblich in muslimischen Staaten stattfänden. Der Islam wurde von den Kommentatoren als gewalttätige Religion bezeichnet und Muslime hauptverantwortlich für die über 21.000 im 1. Quartal 2016 getöteten Menschen gemacht. Anlass genug, die erfassten Situationen auf religiöse Identitäten von Tätern und Opfern zu analysieren...
Indignados and occupy: channeling political dissatisfaction through an anti-institutional approach
(2016)
This is the fourth post in the blog series „Movements and Institutions“.
Between 2011 and 2012 many public spaces in global North were indefinitely occupied by people dissatisfied with the political system. The origin of this dissatisfaction, however, is not clear. This article rejects that the origin was either a popular longing for direct democracy or for an end to neoliberalism. It problematizes the frequent assumption that voting is a proper way to account for the will of the people: The manifestation of thousands of Indignados and Occupiers pointed to the idea that elections are not a sufficient method for expressing political will. This article goes further to suggest that voting is not a neutral method either.
Given the current Middle Eastern scenario, one may reasonably hold the argument that the on-going turmoil in the Middle East owes its burden equally to the Machiavellian Anglo-American policies in the region and the harrowing failure of the Muslim governments/leaderships in the Middle East to rationally respond to those challenges. But are there any dimensions beyond religion?
The dualism of movements and institutions. A structurational approach towards the two concepts
(2016)
In studies of social mobilization, the distinction between institutions and organizations is often as blurry as the instant of time from which on we can actually speak of a proper movement. Using the idea of a `duality of structure’ as a starting point, this article suggests a way of fixing the boundaries: a brief analysis of the South African Landless People’s Movement demonstrates the merit of conceiving of movements as aggregate actors with shared common objectives and common norms, which institutionalize particular modes of cooperation by purposefully drawing on existing institutions in order to shape functioning internal structures.
Obgleich die Disziplin der internationalen Beziehungen global sein will, bleibt sie allzu häufig von westlichen Wissenschaftlern dominiert. Doch wie kann internationale Politik anders gedacht werden? Welche Perspektiven ergeben sich auch für westliche WissenschaftlerInnen aus einem Perspektivwechsel? Und welche Herausforderungen bringt dies mit sich?
This is the 18. article in our series Trouble on the Far-Right.
When it comes to change in social environments, a parable of philosopher Charles Handy gets pulled out quickly. If you drop a frog in boiling water, it jumps out immediately; but placed in cold water slowly warming up, it acclimates itself and falls to sleep, unaware of being boiled alive. The parable reminds us of the perceptional relativity of change: Within communities creeping developments cause habituation, abrupt breaks an arousing shock. In terms of social movements this truism becomes apparent in a double way: On the one hand, erupting crises may destabilize social orders and create the necessary space for dissident actors to gain momentum – while they would fail to mobilize outside the scenario of an anxious community gasping for a new guarantor of order. On the other hand, the rise of a dissident actor with unconventional performances may work as a shock triggering withdrawal reflexes in the broader society – while dissidents with relative habitual sentiments can find resonance in communities disappointed by the ruling order.
Does this perspective offer a potential to explain the rise of far right movements in Europe? Let’s examine it by the example of Germany where, in the last two years, far right actors have experienced a remarkable gain in political acceptance – on the streets, in the booths and in the talk shows. In this case, it could be argued that their success in protest and electoral mobilizations as well as their disproportionate high presence in the media rests on communication politics that effect a normalization of far right positions previously disreputed in public discourse. Through this creeping habituation by society, they are able to gain momentum in situations of crisis, producing themselves successfully as a legitimate agent of the “anxious citizens” disappointed by the government. To test this little argument, a finger exercise in frame analysis seems to be proper, a tool common in social movement studies to explain why certain ideas in certain contexts are potent to mobilize audiences – and are not in others.
Dies ist der 17. Artikel in unserer Blogreihe Trouble on the Far-Right.
Um eines gleich deutlich zu machen: Über rechtsradikale Tendenzen in der Ukraine zu schreiben ist ein Drahtseilakt. Schließlich ist die Debatte in einen größeren Kontext eingebettet: Seit den Ereignissen auf dem Maidan 2014 und dem anschließenden Regime-Change erheben pro-russische Medien die sachlich schwer begründbare Beschuldigung, dass der Westen den Charakter der „faschistischen Junta in Kiew“ verkenne. Auf der anderen Seite bagatellisieren einige Publikationen die real existierenden rechten Umtriebe in der Ukraine beträchtlich. So handelt man sich schnell den Vorwurf ein, wahlweise „die faschistischen Ukrainer“ zu protegieren oder sich „den imperialistischen Russen“ anzubiedern. An dieser Stelle bleibt die notwendige Aufgabe Meinungen von Fakten zu trennen.
Die bedeutendste Kraft der parlamentarischen Rechten in der Ukraine ist die „Freiheitspartei“ Swoboda. Ihre Beteiligung an der Übergangsregierung nach den Maidan-Protesten galt einigen Beobachtern als Beweis für einen Rechtsruck in der Ukraine. Mittlerweile verfügt diese Partei nicht einmal mehr über eine parlamentarische Fraktion. Wie ist es dazu gekommen? Welche Dynamiken stehen dahinter? Ist letztendlich alles in trockenen Tüchern und die Gefahr von rechts gebannt?
This is the 20. article in our series Trouble on the-Far-Right.
Just a few days ago during a parliamentary session, a Kurdish deputy was violently attacked and injured by members of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP). As if to support Charles Tilly’s statement that ‘political violence occurs when actors have few opportunities, yet enough resources to mobilize for violence’1, many groups in Turkey are currently involved in a battle against Kurdish, Alevi or left Turkish citizens. The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in a political stalemate, uses military and police, but also the Nationalist Movement Party’s (MHP) youth organization Grey Wolves as well as Islamist militias like Esedullah Timleri (Arabic for: Lions of Allah) have increasingly resorted to violence as tool of action.
Political violence has been a central characteristic of the Turkish far right, which largely resembles street-based mobilization in Western Europe. Despite the common ultra-nationalist ideology, the Gülen Movement (GM) stands out. AKP’s former “soft-power instrument” now appears to be the only reasonable and non-violent player among all of these self-named animal groups. Since the power struggle escalated between Erdoğan and Fethullah Gülen in 2013, the GM has been seen as a victim of Erdoğan’s repressive measures, instead of making itself conspicuous by using violence. How can we explain this exception?
Nachkriegsländer gehören zu den schwierigsten politischen Arenen. Die Herausforderungen bestehen nicht nur darin, diese Länder dabei zu unterstützen Kriege zu beenden und neue Gewaltausbrüche zu verhindern, sondern vielmehr zu einem friedlichen Zusammenleben zurückzukehren. In diesem Zusammenhang ist in den letzten Jahren das Interesse vieler Wissenschaftler als auch vieler internationaler Akteure gestiegen, das mögliche Potential des nachhaltigen Managements natürlicher Ressourcen zu nutzen um Friedensprozesse zu unterstützen. Die Hoffnung liegt dabei darin, dass eine gute Regierungsführung („Good Governance“) und insbesondere die nachhaltige Entwicklung und Nutzung von Ressourcen wie Wasser, Wald oder landwirtschaftlichen Flächen, Kooperation zwischen Konfliktparteien ermöglichen und dabei zum Neustart der internen Beziehungen beitragen. Die wachsende Bedeutung des Zusammenspiels zwischen der Entwicklung von Frieden und Umweltschutz sowie der nachhaltigen Nutzung von Ressourcen wurde erst kürzlich durch die Ziele nachhaltiger Entwicklung der Vereinten Nationen bestätigt....
French far right activism experienced tremendous changes in recent years. Besides traditional far right party politics, new patterns of street-based mobilization attract especially action-oriented youths. This trend is epitomized by the growing popularity of the Bloc Identitaire (official name; shortened to “Identitaires”). Its ideology rests on the idea that there exists a struggle between different political families in order to become the legitimate representative of the people, and that the extreme right is winning this struggle. Behind the scenes, the recurring idea of the Bloc Identitaires is to occupy a cultural and “meta-political” territory that was once the monopoly of the left. Their aim is that they are gradually associated with the only possible alternative to change the world. They try to frame a maximum of popular needs and present themselves as substitutes for when the economy and the state will be bankrupt. So you can eat the food of the Identitaires, drink their beer (the “Desouchière”), buy their clothes, listen to their music or read their books and thus participate in financing the movement...
Dies ist der 25. Artikel in unserer Blogreihe Trouble on the Far-Right.
Ein Mädchen auf einem Fahrrad. Weiße Bluse, schwarzer langer Rock, weiße Socken, schwarze Schuhe. Sie fährt durch eine idyllische, friedlich wirkende, sommerliche Landschaft. Unter dem Foto steht: „Revolt against the modern world – justnationalistgirls“.
Eine Demonstration. Einzig bengalische Feuer erleuchten die Dunkelheit. Schemenhaft erkennt man eine Frau, die auf eine gefährlich anmutende Menge zugeht. Sie wirkt stark. Unter dem Foto steht: „The night’s still young – justnationalistgirls“.
Dass rechte Bewegungen Facebook zur Mobilisierung nutzen, ist bekannt. Auch die extrem rechte Facebookseite justnationalistgirls, die knapp 9000 Nutzer*innen liken, transportiert extrem rechte Inhalte, jedoch ungleich subtiler verpackt, als es auf so manch dezidiert neonazistischer Facebookseite der Fall ist. Justnationalistgirls und ähnliche Seiten reproduzieren auf den ersten Blick, scheinbar harmlos, eine idealisierte Vorstellung von Mädchen und jungen Frauen, die ihr heimisches Idyll beschützen möchten. Die im April 2014 gegründete Seite hat sich vor allem in Frankreich, Deutschland, Österreich, Polen und den USA eine Anhänger*innenschaft erarbeitet. Die generelle Botschaft ist nicht offensichtlich erkennbar. Mit Sicherheit gesagt werden kann jedoch, dass justnationalistgirls mindestens zwei, scheinbar widersprüchliche Weiblichkeitsbilder verbreitet, welche in den meisten rechten Gruppen oder Bewegungen Anklang finden: Zum einen die traditionelle Rolle der Frau als Mutter der Nation, zum anderen die der Kämpferin neben dem Mann im „nationalen Befreiungskampf“.
Die folgenden Einschätzung sowie daraus resultierende Handlungsempfehlungen formuliere ich aus meiner Erfahrung in der politischen Bildungsarbeit. Justnationalistgirls ist ein Türöffner zu extrem rechtem Gedankengut. Selbstredend ist der Einstieg in die organisierte und gegebenenfalls militante, extrem rechte Szene weitaus vielschichtiger und nicht nur auf das Besuchen einer bestimmten Internetseite zurückführbar. Inhalte, wie sie auf justnationalistgirls veröffentlicht werden, stellen allerdings ein niedrigschwelliges Einstiegsangebot dar, dem eine demokratische, politische Bildung dringend etwas entgegensetzen muss. In erster Linie gehört dazu die Förderung der Fähigkeit zum Hinterfragen und Dekonstruieren extrem rechter Ideen und Parolen. Betrachtet man das Publikum, welches die Inhalte von justnationalistgirls teilt, liest oder mit „gefällt mir“-markiert, fällt auf, dass es sich vor allem um Jugendliche und junge Erwachsene handelt. „Besonders Jugendliche auf der Suche nach Orientierung sind dafür empfänglich, wenn es erstmal unverfänglich aussieht.“, sagt Simone Rafael von der Amadeu-Antonio-Stiftung.
Im Folgenden soll der Frage nachgegangen werden, welche Weiblichkeitsbilder durch justnationalistgirls transportiert und anhand dieser Handlungsempfehlungen formuliert werden, an denen sich eine Form von politischer Bildung als Rechtsextremismusprävention orientieren kann. Justnationalistgirls soll hier als ein Beispiel für viele Formen versteckter rechter oder rassistischer Inhalte in sozialen Medien gesehen werden, welche vor allem von Akteur*innen politischer Bildung mehr Aufmerksamkeit erhalten sollten.
This is the 23. article in our series Trouble on the Far-Right.
ccording to several observers new waves of refugees’ arrivals could increase the popularity of far right organizations.1 In these interpretations electoral and political support should be promoted by societal resonance of ethnocentric discourses. Recent data from the Eurobarometer illustrates that in EU-member states migration from non-EU countries is now considered to be the most important concern that the Union is facing. This is a sudden shift with respect to the results of the 2013 Eurobarometer where – in the middle of the euro crisis – EU citizens seemed to be more concerned about the economy and unemployment. I propose to place the magnifying glass on the arguments developed by these organizations by focusing on the least researched members of the far right family: nonparty organizations. After introducing CasaPound Italia (CPI) it will be discussed what fuels its anti-migrant’s discourse by highlighting continuities and changes with respect to classic nativist far right rhetoric. Digging into the arguments is crucial to getting a better assessment of their potential appeal especially in a favorable context...