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In this article, I examine how open borders can serve the idea of global distributive justice by asking how or how not the existing practices of immigration to rich countries may contribute to global economic redistribution. There are two observations. First, migration is not the redistributive option that anyone has an equal access. In order to make use of migration as a means of global redistribution, rich countries need to provide a chance to migrate to those who cannot afford movement by themselves. Second, as long as brain-drain problems happen, what the perspective of global distributive justice requires is the compensation for some educational cost of raising professionals or some control of their movement. Immigration admissions largely focusing on getting highly skilled professionals may not serve the idea of global redistribution.
The revolution will be tweeted : how the internet can stimulate the public exercise of freedoms
(2012)
This article discusses how new technologies of communication, especially the Internet and, more specifically, social network services, can interfere in social interactions and in political relations. The main objective is to problematize the concept of public liberty and verify how the new technologies can promote the reoccupation of public spaces and the recovery of public life, in opposition to the tendency to valorize the private sphere, observed in the second half of the twentieth century. The theoretical benchmark adopted for the investigation is Hannah Arendt's theory about the exercise of fundamental political capacities in order to establish a public space of freedom, as presented in “On Revolution”. The “Praia da Estação” (“Station Beach”) case is chosen to test the hypothesis. In 2010 in the Brazilian city of Belo Horizonte, different individuals articulated a movement through blogs, Twitter and facebook, in order to protest against the Mayor’s act that banned the assembling of cultural events in one of the main public places of the city, the “Praça da Estação” (Station Square). By applying Arendt's concepts to the selected case, it is possible to demonstrate that the Internet can assume an important role against governmental arbitrariness and abuse of power, as it can stimulate the public exercise of fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of assembly and manifestation.
The role of experts grows in the present and that is, in part, justifiable: as complexity rises, the ones who deliberate feel the need of the help of those who have know-how in specific fields. The question that must be asked revolves around the type of expectations developed in modern societies regarding what experts can do. Though specialization is not a peculiarity of our time (the process can be observed since human beings became sedentary); it has presently gained specific characteristics. Two aspects of modern life are particularly significant on that matter: (i.) the fact that the economic system is based on excitation of new needs (and no longer on the demand for satisfaction of needs); (ii.) the growing pursuit for total administration of conflicts. These factors are constitutive of what Gadamer sees as a great threat to our civilization: the excessive emphasis given in our time to the human ability to adapt. A specific ability is demanded from individuals: the capability of making an apparatus functions properly. Less resistance and more adaptability is requested, and because of that, autonomous thought - that is, not determined by the function it has in a system – is devalued. The threat we currently face is that the abilities of a good technocrat become the only qualities demanded from those who are responsible for practical decisions (especially in politics and law). Teleological reason, that guides the activity of specialists (and requires know-how in a specific area and consists in choosing means to reach a previously established goal), should not substitute practical reason, as the former requires adaptability to experience (not to a plan that was previously established) and is grounded on solidarity. In order to discuss the limits of the activity of specialists, the paper looks back to phrónesis and the way ancient Greeks set boundaries - this exercise should help raising new questions revolving the matter.
Alexander’s theory of the civil sphere can be placed in the context of development of sociology of law. However, Alexander draws not so much on sociological theories but rather on the approaches of philosophy of law, particularly the ideas of Fuller, Dworkin and Habermas. The civil sphere is presented by Alexander as the embodiment of Dworkin’s principal integrity. Locating law within civil morality Alexander reveals the similarity of his viewpoint to Dworkin’s position. Drawing on Fuller’s works Alexander singles out the procedural foundations of the democratic order. At the same time for Alexander the source of morality of law is not the legal system itself but a certain level of civil solidarity. Like Habermas, Alexander emphasizes the culturally embedded character of the legal norms. Alexander shares Habermas’s understanding of law as a regulative mechanism affecting all spheres of social life. However, Habermas is more sensitive to the danger of colonization of law by the imperatives of the economic and political subsystems. Alexander’s approach can be contrasted with Luhmann’s sociological theory of law. Alexander concentrates on interrelation and mutual penetration of the civil sphere and law while Luhmann regards law as an autonomous system following its own logic. While Alexander claims that his theory is rooted both in sociology and philosophy of law in fact his approach is closer to normative philosophy.
Doctrines developed by the EFTA Court have placed considerable demands on national courts in the EFTA States. The Court now considers the EEA Agreement to form an “international treaty sui generis which contains a distinct legal order of its own.” It would thus seem that EEA law has transformed into an independent legal order, and subsequently has a claim to validity which emulates the self-legitimising presentation of the EU legal order. This, however, is not an empirically verifiable fact, but a particular understanding which arises when one adopts the viewpoint of the EFTA Court. EEA law takes place in a different realm when interpreted and applied in the national order: this realm is essentially a construction of the constitutional order. Case law shows that the Icelandic Supreme Court is far from accepting all EEA judge-made principles. This study will describe a context of legal pluralism by reference to the Icelandic legal system and its relationship with the EEA legal order. To illustrate the discussion, the most important case law relative to the interaction between Icelandic laws and EEA law will be considered in the light of legal pluralism - particularly the principles of contrapunctual law designed by Miguel Maduro. The paper argues that the Supreme Court’s internal domestic approach to the application of EEA law will inevitably become a source of fragmentation unless it takes place within an institutional framework of judicial tolerance and judicial dialogue.
The demarcation of authority between parents and the State regarding education of children has become an increasingly complex issue over the past three decades. During the same period the number of parents around the world choosing educational alternatives such as homeschooling has grown exponentially, causing significant legislative and jurisprudential shifts in the United States as well as other Western nations. If the State is responsible for education or has a significant interest therein, then it must have broad authority by which to prescribe the method, mechanism, and acceptable outcomes of education; it must also be able to review and enforce these desired outcomes. If parents, on the other hand, are responsible, then it is the State’s duty to defer to parents absent a compelling reason to interfere. A survey of the philosophical foundations from ancient to modern times demonstrates the tension between the State and parents in the realm of education; however, modern human rights norms contained in post-1945 international human rights documents provide explicit grounds on which the State must defer to parental choice in education.
H. L. A. Hart thought that a theory of law can be purely descriptive and called his theory a “descriptive sociology”. One of his great contributions to modern legal theory is his emphasis on the internal aspect of social rules. According to him, a theory of law can be built on the basis of the description of the participants’ view without sharing with it. This descriptivism is totally rejected by Dworkin, who propagates a theory that denies a sharp separation between a legal theory and its implications for adjudication. For Dworkin, a legal theory is only possible as a theory with “the internal, participants’ point of view”. Dworkin’s position implies a radicalization of legal theory that will transform the statement of an external point of view to that of an internal one. For Dworkin, the descriptivism bases on the sociological concept of law, which is an “imprecise criterial concept” and is “not sufficiently precise to yield philosophically interesting essential features.”Hart’s position is vulnerable because it takes an impure form of descriptivism that still draws a categorical distinction between fact and norm. This theoretical impurity results from the ambiguity of interpreting the internal aspect of rules. A strategy to rescue the Hart’s project is to radicalize his descriptivism with Luhmann's systems theory. Adapting the systems theoretical distinction between internal and external observation of law with all its implications for the explanation of the legal system and legal communications, Hart’s descriptivism finally attains its pure form, which is not only a distinctive paradigm of legal theory, but also possesses the potentialities to clarify its relationship to the legal theory based on the internal aspect of law.
Race has been a term avoided in the Swedish debates, while at the same time, protections with respect to unlawful discrimination on the basis of race or ethnic origins have not been vigilantly upheld by the courts. This paper looks at the treatment of race by the Swedish legislature, as well as the treatment by the courts, specifically the Labour Court, with respect to claims of unlawful discrimination in employment on the basis of ethnic origins, against the background of Critical Race Theory. The disparities between the intent of the legislature and the outcome of the cases brought to the Swedish courts can be in least in part explained through the lens of Critical Race Theory, particularly with respect to the liberal approach taken by the courts when applying the law.
Es wird eine Verbindung zwischen dem von Antiphon entwickelten infinitesimalen Berechnungsverfahren, der Theorie Verteilungsgerechtigkeit von Aristoteles, des Hebelgesetzes, der eben radialen Figuren und der Verteilung hergestellt.
Die Problemstellung stellt sich wie folgt dar: dem Kennenlernen der Gründe, die Antiphon mutmaßen ließ, die Exhaustionsmethode als ein Mittel der Bildung des Quadratur des Kreises anzusehen, Beziehungen von grundsätzlicher und historischer Art zwischen der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit und den Hebelgesetz herzustellen, ein Model der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit, basierend auf der modernen Mathematik der Verteilung, von multipler Partizipierung zu konstruieren.
Die Zielsetzungen sind:
Die These zu erstellen, dass die Exhaustionsmethode aus der Gerichtspraxis stammt; dass das Hebelgesetz und die Theorie der Proportionen von Eudoxos Modelle der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit von Aristoteles sind; weiter soll gezeigt werden, dass die ebene Verteilung der materiellen Partikel auch ein Modell der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit ist.
Das Modell der Mehrteiligkeit der Verteilung, das vorgestellt wurde, enthält zwei Arten von Freiheitsgraden, einen für den Wert der zu verteilenden Güter an jeweils einen der Beteiligten und einen zweiter Freiheitsgrad für die verschieden Ebene zwischen den Beteiligten im Falle der Ungleichheit.
Keywords: Exhaustionsmethode, Hebelgesetz, Verteilungsgerechtigkeit, Verteilung.
In order to understand the impact of new technologies on the law through the science of law, it is essential to observe how Law researches are done. This paper pursues the following models of legal science: analytical (theory of formal rule); hermeneutics (interpretation theory) and empirical (decision theory) to appraise methodological procedures used in monograph researches in some Brazilian Law courses. This study was to detect which model of law science was used in the development of Law researches. The study was conducted, through Juris Doctors’ interviews. All of these respondents have written a monograph, which is a requirement to complete a Law course in Brazil. The main conclusions of this study were the following: 1) most of the monographs produced do not specify the methodology used for developing the work; 2) when the papers indicate the methodology used, the analytical model was prevalent. In these cases, the science of law appears as a systematization of rules for obtaining possible decisions. 3) Hermeneutic and empirical models were also used, but on a smaller scale. These researches revealed the inaccuracy of the methodological tools used to apprehend the reality. However, these strategies are significant to define the objects of study of law in the contemporary time. Answering the question about how Law researches are done in some Brazilian Law schools, this paper discusses the construction of classical models of science of law, which were taken as the theoretical framework of this work before the hypercomplex current problems.
This article considers the Brazilian Legal System and the requirements of an act performed by public administration. To do so, it presents six main chapters. The first one considers Brazilian Constitution as it regards State form, legal and judicial systems. The second chapter presents the public administration stated in the Constitution. The requirements of a public administration act are presented in the third chapter. The improbity law, which determines how public administration acts should be performed, is presented on the fourth chapter. How one of the main judicial courts of Brazil has understood this law is the topic of the fifth chapter. The sixth chapter presents a proposal of how could be Phronesis used to solve misunderstandings about improbity in the Brazilian Legal System.
This paper aims to present the similarities and differences between Posner's defense of Law and Economics (LAE) and Holmes' pragmatism. The investigation is centered in the arguments of economic consequences of judicial decisions. Law and Economics tend to emphasize these arguments as a determinant characterization of legal pragmatism. These arguments involve some dilemmas: Is it possible to eliminate a rule, or reinterpret it according to the effect of its application in practical life? May these economic consequences serve as argument for a replacement of traditional interpretation? To what extent can we rule out the law with arguments of consequence? Despite the influence, LAE has some important differences with respect Holmes' legal pragmatism. Posner's LAE involves the economic principle of wealth maximization and its relations with utilitarianism and economic liberalism. Consequentialism in Holmes, by contrast, is based on a teleological interpretation of existing rules. It is important that the judge does not decide based on a specific economic theory. Also, legal pragmatism does not advocate abandoning the tenets of positivism that form the basis for the rule of law. Holmes defends a judicial restraint. Accordingly, the argument of consequence must have previous limits in precedents and statutes. However, both legal pragmatism and LAE are connected by the idea that the adaptation of the law to a reasonable end can not be absent from the canons of interpretation and adjudication.
This paper traces the development of National Socialist cultural and legal policy towards the arts. It examines the role of censure in this development starting with Hitler's first attempts at power in the Weimar republic. It then looks more closely into aspects of the development of new policies in and after 1933 and their implementation in institutions of the totalitarian state. As the paper shows, policies were carried out within a legal framework that included parliament and constitutional law but they were often also accompanied by aggressive political actions. Racial and nationalistic ideologies were at the heart of the National Socialist discourse about culture. This discourse quickly established modernity as its principal enemy and saw modernist culture (in the broad sense of the word), and especially art criticism, as being under Jewish domination. True German Kultur was set against this; Hitler himself promoted German art both through exhibitions and through policies which included the removal of un-German art and the exclusion of writers and artists who did not conform the cultural ideal. As Jewish artists and intellectuals in modernist culture posed the greatest threat to the establishment of a new German culture, Nazi policies towards the arts embarked on a process of censure, exclusion and annihilation. The purpose of these policies was nothing less than the elimination of all modernist (Jewish and ‘degenerate’) culture and any memory of it.
In his works, Hans Kelsen elaborates several objections to the so-called “doctrine of natural law”, especially in his essay The Natural-Law Doctrine Before the Tribunal of Science. Kelsen argues that natural law theorists, searching for an absolute criterion for justice, try to deduce from nature the rules of human behavior. Robert P. George, in the essay Kelsen and Aquinas on the ‘Natural Law Doctrine’ examines his criticism and concludes that what Kelsen understands as the Natural-law doctrine does not include the natural law theory elaborated by Thomas Aquinas. In this paper, we will try to corroborate George’s theses and try to show how Aquinas’ natural law theory can be vindicated against Kelsens criticisms.
Abstract of the German original article “Rechtssubjekte und Teilrechtssubjekte des elektronischen Geschäftsverkehrs“, to be published in S. Beck (ed.): Jenseits von Mensch und Maschine: Moralische und rechtliche Aspekte des Umgangs mit Robotern, Künstlicher Intelligenz und Cyborgs. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012.
Jurisprudence under the perspective of the new media and its effect on the communication of law
(2012)
Despite the law knowledge presumption, Jurisprudence has not always considered the effects introduced by the communication of law in the transition from the print to the electric revolution, using here concepts and ideas of McLuhan´s theory.
The use of Internet by Brazilian Courts (on line transmission of trials, the digital process, transformation of courts in source of news on what concerns their decisions) is an interesting example of how the new medium interferes in the substance of the message of law, since the movement of the messages must be considered to understand the epistemological domain of law. New elements are introduced by the new media and interact with the old meanings, concepts and processes of law and of the old media and can themselves bring new conflicts that are relevant to the comprehension of the complete and real dynamics of Law.
The process of finding evidence of what truthfully happened in a conflictive situation interests jurists and journalists but in different ways. When the work of journalists and judges are concerned the paradox is at stake. Both categories must tell a story about a conflict must listen to all involved, must inform what happened to the general public. Although both categories must use the freedom must use the freedom of speech their point of view about something with objectivity, their timing is different as well as the process and the effect of fulfilling their task. That question that should be made is what happen to law when it becomes the subject matter to the news in the world of full information? In what measurement journalists also pass judgements and how this affects the formal processes of law? The effort to answer these questions and the ones related to them is important to understand some of the problems that must be approached in order to establish the ways of law and of the mass media technological society.
A Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) is a systematic risk assessment tool, enabling organizations to maintain compliance with data protection regulations, to manage privacy risks and to provide public benefits through the success of privacy-by-design efforts. An actual practical implementation of a PIA framework has been realized in the context of RFID applications encompassing detailed steps for the PIA process; a first successful review has been completed. The PIA also allows to introduce a pro-active mitigation of privacy risks through technical and organizational controls. The better the precautionary measures realize the relevant privacy objectives, the less likely will occur with the PIA process afterwards. The recent proposal for a far-reaching revision of the EU Data Protection Directive envisages to state a specific requirement to implement a PIA process. Indeed, since risks for privacy and non-disclosure of personal data are different in not identical circumstances, the protection measures should also be different, i.e. technology should assist in trying to achieve the (at least) second-best solution for the implementation of the data protection regime by a PIA. Insofar, privacy rules can be individualized and matched with the concrete needs in the given environment.
Axiomatic method and the law
(2012)