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Axiomatic method and the law
(2012)
This paper seeks to analyse the debate on equality between women and men found in the claims against the subjects related to Education for Citizenship. These claims were resolved in the Spanish Supreme Court and High Courts of the Autonomous Communities. In this debate, there is a strong rejection of antidiscrimination law assumptions, namely that the different roles and social roles of women and men have a cultural and social base and it is unnatural, as evidenced by the concept of gender. But many appellants and judgments defend the difference between women and men as if it was informed and legitimated on human nature. Hence gender is considered an ideology, that is, a category of analysis by means of which the reality of true human nature can be concealed or distorted. But these arguments are opposed to recent legal reforms since they are questioning its normative value, by prioritizing certain moral principles against these laws. We are talking about the Organic Law for Effective Equality between Women and Men, the Law on Integrated Protection Measures against Gender Violence and the Law on Education. However their arguments are not fully justified.
The normative position of the judiciary under the traditional conception of democracy as self-legislation by the people is too weak to protect in an effective way the rights of suspects in the global War on Terror. Drawing on arguments elaborated by Hans Kelsen and Karl Popper, we shall attempt to devise in this paper an alternative democracy conception that could serve as a much more solid foundation for the judicial branch of government in a democratic state. Through this jurisprudential strategy, we hope to be able to maintain the balance of normative power among the Trias Politica, which, in turn, may contribute to the preservation of the legal rights of every person during the struggle against terrorists.
This paper intends to discuss some contemporary issues on human rights and democracy related to the concept of justice. Is the set of individual rights that is assumed by western democracies really universal? If so, how are they supposed to be interpreted? On the other side if I take into account the “other” and pluralism in a serious way how to conciliate different concepts of justice? Taking Jacques Derrida’s approach of justice as its standpoint this paper aims to stress the difficulty to achieve a unique concept of justice as well as to think justice in the sphere of international law and the problem of ensuring human rights in the international order. Western democracies has becoming more and more multiethnic and multicultural and the set of rights that is at the center of the legal order has to be interpreted in a dialogical sense, one that assumes difference and plurality as its starting point. The plurality of conceptions of the good and the impossibility of establishing a unique concept of justice demands the re-creation of a democratic sphere where the dissent and the conflict could be experienced and, at the same time, the legal order needs to ensure individual and group rights against majority’s dictatorship. The main goal of this paper is to re-think the interpretation of law in a multicultural scenario in which it is not possible to have only one criteria of justice and difference and pluralism are envisaged are values themselves.
The bare life and (the) modern law : a journey to some key concepts or conceptions of Agamben
(2012)
This text is imitating a journey which tries to explore what is completely unknown. It starts Homo Sacer and traces some key concepts namely der Muselmann, bare life, state of exception, sovereignty and nihilism in law. Doing so, it hopes to reach a general picture of biopolitics or biopower according to Agamben. So, first part of this text generally tries to clarify some fundamental concepts or conceptions in order to use them for its aim. The second part suggests an alternative reading of Agamben, centered around his concept of der Muselmann which is the ultimate figure defined by Primo Levi and Agamben chooses the term because of its resemblance to or representation of Homo Sacer. Der Muselmann was a derogatory term in its origin and very meaning has still been unclear today. So, the second part tries to clarify the meaning of der Muselmann (and unbaptized babies) from a different outlook, not from outside but inside of the referred concept. It tries to show a Muslim’s image of a non Muslim world in order to reveal what are the very meanings of sovereignty, law and biopolitics. So at the end of the journey, this text hopes to reach a different picture of modern life and a modern law.
Abstract/Keywords: Theory of communicative action, ontology of the sentence, systems, subsystems, role, function, crime of breach of duty, compensation, general and special prevention, rule of law, breach of communicative rationality, institutional rivalry and competition for organization, lord of the fact, the duty of guarantor, facticity and validity, counterfactual assertion, public use of reason, prosecution, transcendental ego, self, idealism, voyage, cognitive subject, object of knowledge, hermeneutics of criminal conduct and public servant
Free riders play fair
(2012)
After the demise of the social contract theory, the argument from fair play, which employs the principle of fair play, has been widely acknowledged as one of the most promising ways of justifying political obligation. First, I articulate the most promising version of the principle of fair play. Then, I show that free riders play fair, that is, that their moral fault lies not in unfairness but in the violation of a rule by appealing to the example of three-in-a-boat. Finally, I conclude that even the most promising version is false because those who have accepted benefits from a social cooperative scheme do not owe an obligation of fair play.
In assessing the aftermath of the fraudulent presidential election of 2009 in Iran, one question has received less critical analysis than other complexities of this event: What can explain the remarkable non-violent character of the Green Movement in Iran? I propose that the answer, inter alia, lies with the following three learning experiences: 1) The experience of loss brought about by the Iran/Iraq war; 2) the experience of relative opening during Khatami’s presidency; and 3) the experience of modernization of faith in the work of the post-Islamist thinkers that aimed to make political Islam compatible with democracy. Together, these learning processes fostered a new mode of thinking that is civil and non-violent in character.
What is it that makes the subject of bioethics autonomous? The problem that this research tries to clarify is What is it that makes the subject of bioethics autonomous? This question is answered from an applied ethics, bioethics. This article will show a new methodological approach to study the subject of bioethics.
The principal objetives of this research that is presented here, are related to the relationship between: 1) Autonomy and information; 2) Autonomy and responsability; 3) Autonomy and freedom; and 4) Autonomy and social ties or social links.
The rule of law is unique establishment that had taken place in historical context, as politico-legal edifice of capitalist society. To the extent that any legal system was established in historical context, its form and functioning are cannot be channelled by reflections or professional commitments of lawyers and legal philosophers. The rule of law emerged in certain conditions that we say “classical liberalism”, of power allocation where we diversify political power and legal power in the milieu of political society, enunciated as republic or commonwealth. Contrary to earlier forms of legal order, capitalism was unique that its super structure was articulated according to the pivotal role of legal machinery. There was an actual equilibrium between legal and political domains that they moderately matched with public and private dichotomy. After monopoly capitalism, social setting of liberalism was dramatically incurred some major modifications which were firstly dislocation of liberal individual, incited by monopoly capital and secondly, political achievement of the working classes obtained political equality, as drastic consequence of mass society. Hence, the rule of law altered as depoliticsation of democratised mass society, instead of modus vivendi of liberal individuals, which demarcated the rule of law according to welfare society or sozialrechtsstaat. The neo-liberal globalisation after 1980’s, republican model of political society faded away that it has been transformed by transnational capital where markets, hierarchies, regionalism and communal settings crosscut inner equilibrium between politics and law. Finally, the newborn articulation of power structure undermined necessary basement of the rule of law.
This paper expands on the concept of legal machine which was presented first at IRIS 2011 in Salzburg. The research subjects are (1) the creation of institutional facts by machines, and (2)
multimodal communication of legal content to humans. Simple examples are traffic lights and vending machines. Complicated examples are computer-based information systems in organisations, form proceedings workflows, and machines which replace officials in organisations. The actions performed by machines have legal importance and draw legal consequences. Machines similarly as humans can be imposed status-functions of legal actors. The analogy of machines with humans is in the focus of this paper. Legal content can be communicated by machines and can be perceived by all of our senses. The content can be expressed in multimodal languages: textual, visual, acoustic, gestures, aircraft manoeuvres, etc. The concept of encapsulatation of human into machine is proposed. Herein humanintended actions are communicated through the machine’s output channel. Encapsulations can be compared with deities and mythical creatures that can send gods’ messages to people through the human mouth. This paper also aims to identify law production patterns by machines.
In this article I advance an account of human rights as individual claims that can be justified within the conceptual framework of social contract theories. The contractarian approach at issue here aims, initially, at a justification of morality at large, and then at the specific domain of morality which contains human rights concepts. The contractarian approach to human rights has to deal with the problem of universality, i.e. how can human rights be ‘universal’? I deal with this problem by examining the relationship between moral dispositions and what I call ‘diffuse legal structure’.
Communist regimes in general and especially the one in Albania destroyed almost every aspect of political, social, cultural and economic life, including the notion of pluralism and intellectual elite of the country. In Albania, the transition into democracy in 90’ was done through extrication which means that the authoritarian government was weakened, but not as thoroughly as in a transition by defeat. As a consequence, the former Communist elite was able to negotiate crucial features of the transition and was very quickly transformed into the new pluralist political class. This position enabled the communist elite to be rehabilitated and together with the new emerged communist elite to remain a strong influential actor in new emerged democracy and de facto to run in continuance the country. The purpose of the new emerged communist elite to maintain control was favored inter alia by the absence of a new strong intellectual elite and was done merely by sharing the power among its members divided into different political parties and also by using the ‘pluralist’ law as a tool for social control over new emerging intellectual elites. The use of law as a tool for social control by the political class has severely damaged people's understanding and expectations on the law, its relations with the state as well as international community. Indeed, such experience of the use of law by the political class for its own narrow interests, has made people lose confidence in law and state as well as has severely weakened the law enforcement in the country. To conclude, the overall purpose of this paper would be the analysis of law in general and its understandings and development in a post-communist society such as Albania from different points of view.
Die brasilianische Verfassung hat ein System detaillierter materieller und prozessualer Rechte etabliert und damit die richterliche Kontrolle hoheitlicher Akte in fast allen politisch relevanten Bereichen ermöglicht. Auf dem Gebiet der ökologischen und sozialen Rechte, wo eine intensive Positivierung individueller und kollektiver Ansprüche stattgefunden hat, ist die wachsende Judizialisierung der staatlichen Programme nicht als übertriebene Einmischung der Gerichte in politische Fragen anzusehen, sondern fördert die Ausbildung des gesellschaftlichen Bewusstseins. Die Gesetzestexte enthalten kaum konkrete materielle Anforderungen oder Richtlinien zur Gewichtung von Gütern und Werten, sondern setzen lediglich Verbote fest oder regeln die föderativen Zuständigkeiten bzw. das Verwaltungsverfahren. Deswegen kann die Genehmigung umweltgefährdender Aktivitäten kaum auf der Grundlage dogmatisch abgeklärter Rechtsbegriffe erfolgen. Die fachliche Qualifikation vieler Verwaltungsbeamter und Richter entspricht noch nicht den Herausforderungen einer korrekten Gesetzesauslegung. Die akademische Diskussion konzentriert sich derweilen auf Themen wie die philosophische Hermeneutik, Semiotik oder Systemtheorie und unterschätzt dabei die Wichtigkeit des juristischen Methodenkanons, weswegen es ihr nicht gelingt, den Praktikern gangbare Direktiven zur Herstellung richtiger und gut begründeter Entscheidungen anzubieten. Nötig ist daher eine mehr pragmatisch orientierte Debatte über den angemessenen Gebrauch der traditionellen und modernen Methoden und Techniken der Rechtsfindung, um die dogmatische Basis des Umweltrechts in Brasilien zu stärken und es an das Modell eines Umweltstaats heranzuführen.
Democratic rule of law has been struggling with the occurring problem of pluralism of values. It is therefore still faced with the dilemma of ordering the relationship of law and ethics, namely with the question whether in the issue of legal solutions the priority is granted to ethics or to law. In the case of dominance of the positivist paradigm, it is all the more important because the ethical issue is marginalized in it. It turns out that the same authority, deciding on similar issues, at the junction of two areas: ethics and law, can make mutually contradictory decisions: once giving priority to ethics, whereas - at different times - to positive law. On a closer analysis, this contradiction proves illusory because under the guise of protection of a positive paradigm, the hidden fact is that the axiological decision underlies the resolution concerning law. This decision protects the values that have priority in the scale of preferential value of decision-making body. The example considered in the article concerns the interface between ethical and legal norms against selected rulings of the Constitutional Court. The doubts that arise in this context may be in future avoided or perhaps, if necessary, resolved by adopting a two-aspect model of legal norm. This model in its vertical approach has an evaluative element. This allows to deem the seemingly contradictory decision in similar cases as justified one. It also shows that in practice the rightness of the resolution takes precedence both over ethics as well as over law.
The concept of biopolitics has its origin on the Michel Foucault works developped since 1975 to 1979. In this period, the author introduced the foundations for a new approach about the modern government, based in both crescent enpowerment on individuals and the control of populations. The theme has attracted the attentions of some critical political studies, with many practical uses. However, I believe there is not enough consolidation about biopolitics as a concept and a comprehensive theory of the new political mechanisms. This uncertainness is more evident when the very role of Law is questioned in a biopolitical model, due to the archaic nature that Foucault gives to it. So the aim of the paper is to identify the theorical comprehension of biopolitics in a contemporary author as Giorgio Agamben to demonstrate his oppositions and proximities from the original idea of Michel Foucault. I propose that Agamben has the same difficulties of Foucault to deal with legal theory and Law inside biopolitics. Nevertheless, after a critical review on the works of this two authors, my conclusion is that a settlement of the concepts of Law and biopolitics depends of the surpassing of the Foucaldian version of Law as sovereignity, a clear delimitation of a common core between the authors and their differences and the research and affirmation of the concept of Law in Agamben, more well-refined than Foucault's one.
E-democracy as the frame of networked public discourse : information, consensus and complexity
(2012)
The quest for democracy and the political reflection about its future are to be understood nowadays in the horizon of the networked information revolution. Hence, it seems difficult to speak of democracy without speaking of e-democracy, the key issue of which is the re-configuration of models of information production and concentration of attention, which are to be investigated both from a political and an epistemological standpoint. In this perspective, our paper aims at analyzing the multi-agent dimension of networked public discourse, by envisaging two competing models of structuring this discourse (those of dialogue and of claim) and by suggesting to endorse the epistemic idea of complementarity as a guidance principle for elaborating a form of partnership between traditional and electronic media.
Judicial review reflects the level of commitment between constitutionalism and democracy in contemporary States. Yet democracy as the sovereign government of the people implies a tension with constitutionalism as the rule of law. That is, people ruling themselves or the government by the people – majority government - is limited by the law of law making, the constitution. In Brazil, the improvement of judicial review is nowadays related to increase the number of decisions given by the Brazilian Supreme Court or rather to the capability of this latter in deciding a large number of constitutional lawsuits no matter the form and content of its arguments. For, the Court is nowadays driven by numbers and to accomplish its goals in terms of numbers (of decisions) it applies to technological solutions such as the digitalization of legal proceedings. It means that as many decision as Supreme Court issues -with the help of technology- the better it is. Relating the numbers of decisions issued by the Court to the improvement of Brazilian judicial review or Brazilian constitutionalism and democracy is a great mistake and a false statement as far as it does not face the main problem of the system, which is the lack of reasons of Supreme Court’s decision. The point is that, in this case, technology is just a tool –among others- in order to render legal proceedings faster yet not a qualitative sign of Supreme Court’s decisions.
The main Question of this paper is: how can we tackle the global warming in accordance with the economical growth especially in emerging countries?
K. W. Kapp, “The Social Costs of Private Enterprise” (1950), defines the social costs as direct or indirect damages which are not compensated by the producer, but added to the third parties. An example might be the disaster of the BP plant in April 2010, in which the polluter can hardly cover all the damages so as to make the seawater clean, to regenerate the harmed natural lives and to recover the jobs and the everyday life of the residents on site.
The Club of Rome, “The Limits to Growth” (1972), makes us aware of the five conditions which set the limits to growth: population, industrialization, pollution, consumption of food and natural resources, which tendentiously increase in a exponential progression. The GDP growth 10% a year means that it will be 2.59 times as large in ten years, whereas technology could resolve problematic concerning five elements at highest in arithmetical progression.
Remarkable would be that the modern industrial civilization has brought social damages in form of global warming. Developed nations have not payed for it yet. All the people in the world should have right to economical growth at any rate, which would however be limited by those five conditions. Conclusion: the developed nations should give up the consumption lifestyle for the sake of equal right of every citizen in the world to reasonable standard of living.
The development of laboratory animal science and animal care of legislation and the consummation
(2012)
Laboratory animal science is the use of non-human animals in experiments to obtain new knowledge and new technologies in biomedical research and testing. In order to develop science and technology, the human carried out a large number of animal experiments, these experiments greatly expanded the vision of related research field, and make a great contribution to human beings. Meanwhile, animal experiments also bring us a certain extent of negative effects. Countries around the world have adopted legislative measures to regulate behavior of animal experiments, but in the process of legislation and enforcement are not wholly satisfactory. On the basis of present situation of laboratory animal science and existing problems, with the comparison of animal welfare act between Europe and China, the author puts forward the ideas of perfecting experimental animals’ laws and its enforcement proposals.
Biopower, governmentality, and capitalism through the lenses of freedom: a conceptual enquiry
(2012)
In this paper I propose a framework to understand the transition in Foucault’s work from the disciplinary model to the governmentality model. Foucault’s work on power emerges within the general context of an expression of capitalist rationality and the nature of freedom and power within it. I argue that, thus understood, Foucault’s transition to the governmentality model can be seen simultaneously as a deepening recognition of what capitalism is and how it works, but also the recognition of the changing historical nature of the actually existing capitalisms and their specifically situated historical needs. I then argue that the disciplinary model should be understood as a contingent response to the demands of early capitalism, and argue that with the maturation of the capitalist enterprise many of those responses no longer are necessary. New realities require new responses; although this does not necessarily result in the abandonment of the earlier disciplinary model, it does require their reconfiguration according to the changed situation and the new imperatives following from it.
This work intends to analysis the philosophy of history and to discuss the consequences of this death to the Critical Theory. The concept of reason and the devices of democracy and human rights are discussed in a revision of the historical debate about the end of history operates the life in the interior of the modern society, especially about the intellectual condition at the information society.
Making use of United Nations (U.N.) materials and documents, Anja Matwijkiw and Bronik Matwijkiw argue that the organization – in 2004 – converted to a stakeholder jurisprudence for human rights. However, references to “stakeholders” may both be made in the context of narrow stakeholder theory and broad stakeholder theory. Since the U.N. does not specify its commitment by naming the theory it credits for its conversion, the authors of the article embark on a comparative analysis, so as to be able to try the two frameworks for fit. The hypothesis is that it is the philosophy and methodology of broad stakeholder theory that best matches the norms and strategies of the U.N. While this is the case, certain challenges nevertheless present themselves. As a consequence of these, the U.N. has to – as a minimum – take things under renewed consideration.
The improvement of accident prevention technology in many fields of social life has spurred new challenges to the doctrinal tools of fault and strict based civil liability in the law of torts. Amid these challenges lies the identification of the proper scope of the respective criteria of liability in a changing factual environment, their suitability as doctrinal tools, as well as their actual application to concrete cases given the amount of information which would be needed to render adequate judgments. Precedents and old laws should be assessed with caution, taking into account the tacit cost-benefit analysis embedded in them, for they may or may not serve the interests of welfare maximization in an environment with constantly renewed accident prevention technology.
As is well known, the 2nd Spanish Republic (1931-1936) was toppled by a military uprising which, after a cruel Civil War, set up an autocratic regime led by General Franco which lasted until his natural death in 1975. According to the contemporary theory of the legal system, a legal order exists on the sole condition that it is efficient in general terms and this was the case for both the Republic and the Dictatorship. In turn, the validity of the legal norms of all legal orders is based on its respective rules of recognition. Thus, neither the existence of the legal order nor the validity of its respective legal norms depends on moral considerations. In this paper, we call this affirmation into question on the base of the fact that the compensatory methods adopted from the Transition to Democracy show an evident concern to repair the damage of taking away a person’s basic rights (life, health, freedom, expression, association etc) although the Spanish Constitution, with its catalogue of fundamental rights was not in force at that time. But these measures would not have much sense if, as Raz says, there was no shared content which is common to all legal systems. Like Nino, we claim that one must discriminate between a democratic legal order and an autocratic one to establish the level of validity of its respective legal norms. Thus it can be assigned a presumption of justice to democratic norms. Finally, we state that the criteria to weigh up the justice or injustice of legal norms, as that of legal orders, takes root in the level of respect they show towards human rights.
Introduction: aims and points of departure. 1. The problem of the knowledge of law: whether previous general rules may support a casuistic decision. 2. The problem of legal ethics: whether there are autonomous rights, which do not depend on positive law. 3. The ways of modern dogmatics to deal with these problems. 4. The question remains the same.
From chaos to chaos theory, from the primordial perception of the world as disorderly to the scientific research of disorder a long distance has been covered. This path implies openness of mind and scientific boldness which connect mythological perceptions of the world with philosophical and scientific interpretations of phenomena throughout the world in a quite distinctive way resting on the creation of a model and application of computing. Owing to this, for the first time instead of asking What awaits us in the future? we can ask What can be done in the future? and get a reliable scientific answer to the question.
In reconsideration of the composition and operation of European law, it is the description of its underlying mentality that may cast best light on the query whether European law is the extension of domestic laws or a sui generis product. As to its action, European law is destructive upon the survival of traditions of legal positivism, for it recalls post modern clichés rather. Like a solar system with planets, it is two-centred from the beginning, commissioning both implementation and judicial check to member states. As part of global post modernism, a) European law stems from artificial reality construction freed from particular historical experience and, indeed, anything given hic et nunc. By its operation, b) it dynamises large structures and sets in motion that what is chaos itself. It is owing to reconstructive human intent solely that any outcome can at all be seen as fitting to some ideal of order, albeit neither operation nor daily management strives for implementing any systemicity. This is the way in which the European law becomes adequate reflection of the underlying (macro) economic basis, which it is to serve as superstructure. Accordingly, c) the entire construct is operated (as integrated into one well-working unit) within the framework of an artificially animated dynamism. With its “order out of chaos” philosophy it assures member states’ standing involvement and competition, achieving a flexibly self-adapting (and unprecedentedly high degree of) conformity.
Die Hauptthese dieses Papers geht von dem Konzept der normativen Verfassung der Nachkriegzeit aus und setzt sich kritisch mit dem Konzept des 19. Jahrhunderts „Verfassungswandlung“ auseinander. Das Konzept des Verfassungswandels ist mit der Verfassungsdemokratie inkompatibel. Statt von einem Verfassungswandel zu sprechen, sollte man die Entwicklung des Sinns der Normen in der Zeit als dynamische Interpretation bezeichnen.
There is an increasing interest in incorporating significant citizen participation into the law-making process by developing the use of the internet in the public sphere. However, no well-accepted e-participation model has prevailed. This article points out that, to be successful, we need critical reflection of legal theory and we also need further institutional construction based on the theoretical reflection.
Contemporary dominant legal theories demonstrate too strong an internal legal point of view to empower the informal, social normative development on the internet. Regardless of whether we see the law as a body of rules or principles, the social aspect is always part of people’s background and attracts little attention. In this article, it is advocated that the procedural legal paradigm advanced by Jürgen Habermas represents an important breakthrough in this regard.
Further, Habermas’s co-originality thesis reveals a neglected internal relationship between public autonomy and private autonomy. I believe the co-originality theory provides the essential basis on which a connecting infrastructure between the legal and the social could be developed. In terms of the development of the internet to include the public sphere, co-originality can also help us direct the emphasis on the formation of public opinion away from the national legislative level towards the local level; that is, the network of governance.1
This article is divided into two sections. The focus of Part One is to reconstruct the co-originality thesis (section 2, 3). This paper uses the application of discourse in the adjudication theory of Habermas as an example. It argues that Habermas would be more coherent, in terms of his insistence on real communication in his discourse theory, if he allowed his judges to initiate improved interaction with the society. This change is essential if the internal connection between public autonomy and private autonomy in the sense of court adjudication is to be truly enabled.
In order to demonstrate such improved co-original relationships, the empowering character of the state-made law is instrumental in initiating the mobilization of legal intermediaries, both individual and institutional. A mutually enhanced relationship is thus formed; between the formal, official organization and its governance counterpart aided by its associated ‘local’ public sphere. Referring to Susan Sturm, the Harris v Forklift Systems Inc. (1930) decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the field of sexual harassment is used as an example.
Using only one institutional example to illustrate how the co-originality thesis can be improved is not sufficient to rebuild the thesis but this is as much as can be achieved in this article.
In Part Two, the paper examines, still at the institutional level, how Sturm develops an overlooked sense of impartiality, especially in the derivation of social norms; i.e. multi-partiality instead of neutral detachment (section 4). These two ideas should be combined as the criterion for impartiality to evaluate the legitimacy of the joint decision-making processes of both the formal official organization and ‘local’ public sphere.
Sturm’s emphasis on the deployment of intermediaries, both institutional and individual, can also enlighten the discourse theory. Intermediaries are essential for connecting the disassociated social networks, especially when a breakdown of communication occurs due to a lack of data, information, knowledge, or disparity of value orientation, all of which can affect social networks. If intermediaries are used, further communication will not be blocked as a result of the lack of critical data, information, knowledge or misunderstandings due to disparity of value orientation or other causes.
The institutional impact of the newly constructed co-originality thesis is also discussed in Part Two. Landwehr’s work on institutional design and assessment for deliberative interaction is first discussed. This article concludes with an indication of how the ‘local’ public sphere, through e-rulemaking or online dispute resolution, for example, can be constructed in light of the discussion of this article.
Principles can be directly expressed by law or may be found in jurisprudence, philosophy or literature. Often the principles are contradictory, as in the case of transparency and the taboo of state information disclosure. At the individual level, transparency and taboo, the sense and purpose of privacy may compliment each other. Moreover the rise of cyberspace has blurred the distinction between privacy and public. The taboo is widening. The development of the internet and of the social networks can alter the once apparently stable legal situation, bringing a new dynamic into play in both state and individual spheres. In the context of the internet it is as though the secret workings of the state are projected on its "walls and facades", reminding us of Plato's "Myth of the Cave". As Plato described, disillusionment and reflexive defensiveness can follow.
In the intersection between law, science and technology lies the debate on the overcoming of the boundaries of the biological structure of the human being and its implications on the idea of human rights, on the concept of person and on the conception of equality – being the latter a fundamental tenet of a democracy.
Posthumanism assumes a biological inadequacy of the human body regarding the quantity, complexity and quality of information which it can muster. The same occurs with the needs of accuracy, speed or strength demanded by the contemporary environment. Under such perspective, the body is considered to be an inefficient structure, with a short lifespan, easy to break and hard to fix.
The body, always seen as the locus for the definition of human, emerges as the object of a commodification process that seeks to exonerate men from their burden - by declination towards a virtual existence, totally free and rational - or to enhance them with bionic devices or drugs.
This issue has already been the subject of attention by many scholars like Savulescu, Rodotà, Broston, Fukuyama and even Habermas.
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to seek, by criticism and revision of the positions on the foreseen problems of this process, an adequate theoretical approach on issues like the concept of person and its connection with the idea of human rights in order to promote the fundamental statement that all men are equal without disregard to the values of diversity and personal identity.
Der zweifache Urteilsspruch des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im Fall “Lautsi gegen Italien” hat sich zum Paradigma der Schwierigkeiten entwickelt, welche Europa bei der adäquaten Ansiedlung der Religion im öffentlichen Bereich erfährt. Die Lösung kann sich ändern, wenn, anstatt dem politischen Problem (wann ist die Ausübung von Macht erlaubt) einzuräumen, die Möglichkeit einer praktischen Vernunft und ihre Verträglichkeit mit dem religiösen Glauben zum Ausgangspunkt gemacht wird. Diese würde zweifelsfrei zu einer politischen Fragestellung zu einer Präsenz der Religion im öffentlichen Bereich einladen, die auf eine positive Laizität mehr Rücksicht nimmt, dabei den Laizismus ablehnt, der darauf drängt, die Rationalität zur Macht auch einen nicht kognitivistischen Code zu reduzieren.
When judges are authorised to invalidate legal acts for being unconstitutional, the competence of the legislator is directly concerned. The question raises, if thus judges do not usurp legislative power. In the traditional doctrine of the separation of powers the parliament is the first power, based on its direct democratic legitimacy. Yet cancelling legal acts completely or partially does evoke more irritations in the public that could be expected. The people seem to have more confidence to the assumed impartiality of the judges than to the results of the parliamentary work which seems to be dominated by the struggles of the parties. The necessity of judicial review mainly is based on the consideration that individual rights even in an authentic democratic system may be violated by a legal act of the parliament. In this case constitutional courts have the very task to defend individual rights, principles of liberty and authentic equality. Therefore it is justified to speak of the “jurisdiction of liberty”, as the Italian constitutional expert Cappelletti has said. But also without such legitimacy in many countries the Courts intervene in the field of the legislator. The courts themselves discuss the limits of judicial interventions, emphasising themselves, that they have to respect the legislative decisions principally, but do not abide always by their own proclaimed principles. In Spanish recent publications it is spoken of the principle “in dubio pro legislatore”, (in case of doubt in favour the legislator), reminding of “in dubio pro reo”, in order to treat the legislative power not worse than the defendant in a criminal process..
Human rights and climate policy – toward a new concept of freedom, protection rights, and balancing
(2012)
Neither the scope of “protection obligations” which are based on fundamental rights nor the theory of constitutional balancing nor the issue of “absolute” minimum standards (fundamental rights nuclei, “Grundrechtskerne”), which have to be preserved in the balancing of fundamental rights, can be considered satisfactorily resolved–in spite of intensive, long-standing debates. On closer analysis, the common case law definitions turn out to be not always consistent. This is generally true and with respect to environmental fundamental rights at the national, European, and international level. Regarding the theory of balancing, for the purpose of a clear balance of powers the usual principle of proportionality also proves specifiable. This allows a new analysis, whether fundamental rights have absolute cores. This question is does not only apply to human dignity and the German Aviation Security Act, but even if environmental policy accepts death, e.g. regarding climate change. Overall, it turns out that an interpretation of fundamental rights which is more multipolar and considers the conditions for freedom more heavily–as well as the freedom of future generations and of people in other parts of the world–develops a greater commitment to climate protection.
Das Verhältnis zwischen Literatur und Verfassungsrecht, zwischen Produzenten und Vermittlern literarischer Kunst einerseits und dem Bundesverfassungsgericht andererseits, ist schwierig. Verantwortlich dafür sind nicht die Beteiligten, sondern grundlegende systemische Differenzen. Wo literarische Kunst Rätsel aufgibt oder aufgeben darf, muss das Recht Rätsel ausschließen, den Zweifel zum Schweigen bringen. Wo die Literatur mit Mehrdeutigkeit spielen kann, ihre Interpretation in permanenter Fluktuation begriffen, unerschöpflich und deshalb auch unabschließbar ist, müssen Gerichte am Ende eines Verfahrens systembedingt unausweichlich zu einer Entscheidung gelangen.
Große Rohstoffvorräte lagern in den Entwicklungsländern, doch ihre Ausbeutung führt in diesen
Ländern oft weder zu steigendem Wirtschaftswachstum noch zu verbesserten Lebensverhältnissen
der Bevölkerung. Von der Milliarde der ärmsten Menschen lebt fast ein Drittel in
den rohstoffreichen Ländern. Kann das transnationale Rohstoffrecht dazu beitragen, dass die
Verteilung gerechter abläuft und nicht nur die Investoren und Konsumenten der Nordhemisphäre
und der Schwellenländer von den Rohstoffen der Welt profitieren? Die Juniorprofessorin
Isabel Feichtner untersucht die Verteilungsgerechtigkeit im Rohstoffrecht.
Die Welt wird kleiner. Moderner Verkehr und moderne Kommunikation lassen die Kontinente enger zusammenrücken. Die Staaten verlieren mehr und mehr Funktionen an supranationale Organisationen und Konzerne; vielerorts ist gar die Rede vom nahen Ende der Nationalstaaten und ihrer Epoche. In einem großen Teil Europas jedenfalls hat die Einführung des Euro vor einem guten Jahr diesen Souveränitätsverlust, der für Währungen, Zölle und vieles andere längst zuvor vollzogen worden war, auch sinnlich erfahrbar gemacht.
Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen : zur Idee eines interdisziplinären Forschungsprogramms
(2010)
Ein geistes- und sozialwissenschaftliches Forschungsprogramm betritt mit der These, dass wir in einer Zeit tiefgreifender sozialer Veränderungen leben, kein Neuland. Ein thematischer Fokus auf die Frage der Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen mit Bezug auf die entsprechenden Verschiebungen, Umbrüche und Konflikte in verschiedenen Gesellschaften und auf transnationaler Ebene bringt dagegen etwas Neues und Wichtiges ans Licht. Das ist jedenfalls unsere Überzeugung.
Nach den Worten des Bundesverfassungsgerichts ist die Gewaltenteilung ein tragendes Organisationsprinzip des Grundgesetzes (BVerfGE 3, S. 225 ff. [247]). Keine Gewalt darf ein von der Verfassung nicht vorgesehenes Übergewicht über die andere Gewalt erhalten (BVerfGE 9, S. 268 ff. [279]). Wo in der deutschen Verfassungswirklichkeit im Verhältnis zwischen Exekutive und Judikative solche Organisationsstrukturen von zureichender Wirkungskraft zu finden sind, stellt das Bundesverfassungsgericht nicht klar. Die allein mit rechtswissenschaftlichen Instrumentarien nicht zu klärende Frage, ob die Bundesrepublik Deutschland bereits Organisationsstrukturen besitzt, die ein psychosoziales Übergewicht der Exekutive über die Rechtsprechung ausschließen, begegnet bei näherer Betrachtung der Verfassungswirklichkeit in Deutschland (Kapitel III., Schwerpunkt der Dissertation) erheblichen Zweifeln. Die nach dem Ende des 2. Weltkriegs vorgefundene und bis heute in ihrer Grundstruktur unveränderte Verwaltung der Dritten Gewalt durch die Exekutive entspricht nicht den Zielen des Gewaltenteilungsprinzips. Ein Prinzip ist eine Einsicht, ein Ziel und eine Handlungsregel, die methodisch am Anfang eines theoretischen Aufbaus oder Systems von Handlungsorientierungen steht. Montesquieu umschreibt die seinem Gewaltenteilungsprinzip zu Grunde liegende anthropologische Einsicht mit den Worten: „Eine ewige Erfahrung lehrt jedoch, dass jeder Mensch, der Macht hat, dazu getrieben wird, sie zu missbrauchen. Er geht immer weiter, bis er an Grenzen stößt. Wer hätte das gedacht: Sogar die Tugend hat Grenzen nötig“. Die deutsche Verfassungswirklichkeit der Rechtsprechung kennt keine Schutzgrenzen gegenüber der Exekutive. Es gibt keine Organisationsstrukturen, die subtile Übergriffe der vollziehenden Gewalt auf die Rechtsprechung von vornherein objektiv unmöglich machten. Deutschland begnügt sich mit Appellen an die mit der Justizverwaltung betrauten Regierungsmitglieder (i.d.R. Justizminister) und an die ihnen nachgeordneten Staatsorgane (z.B. Gerichtspräsidenten); sie hofft auf deren Rechtstreue und Augenmaß. Deutschland folgt dem Hoffnungsprinzip, nicht dem Gewaltenteilungsprinzip. Das im Grundgesetz festgeschriebene Prinzip der Gewaltenteilung organisatorisch umzusetzen, ist ein Ziel und eine Handlungsregel und damit eine vom Grundgesetz gestellte Aufgabe (a.M. BVerfGE 55, S. 372 ff. [388]). Die der Dreiteilung der Staatsgewalten (Art. 20 II 2 GG) vorausgehende anthropologische Einsicht Montesquieus ist überdies einer der bei der Auslegung des Grundgesetzes anzulegenden Maßstäbe. Der Wortlaut des Art. 92 erster Halbsatz GG ist die an die Spitze des Abschnitts „IX. Die Rechtsprechung“ gestellte Bestätigung der Grundentscheidung des Art. 20 II 2 GG für die Gewaltenteilung. Er bringt den Willen des Grundgesetzes zum Ausdruck, dass in der Verfassungswirklichkeit Deutschlands die rechtsprechende Gewalt in einer organisatorisch gleich wirkungsvollen Weise den Richtern anvertraut sein möge wie die gesetzgebende Gewalt den Parlamentsabgeordneten.
Von einem darwinschen Standpunkt aus kritisiere ich, dass zwar viele Bausteine geliefert werden, es jedoch an einem Fundament fehlt, auf welchem mit diesen Steinen zu bauen sei. Die Begriffe „Recht“ und „Verhalten“ seien durchgängig unbefriedigend, wenn überhaupt, defi-niert. Unrecht und Normbruch würden nicht hinlänglich unterschieden. Das Verhältnis von Sein und Sollen bleibe unklar. Schließlich seien durchgängig Ausbeutung, Unterdrückung und Manipulation von Präferenzen kein Thema. Die psychoanalytische Perspektive der „gesellschaftlichen Produktion von Unbewusstheit“ (Erdheim) fehle gänzlich.
Ich kritisiere die Konzeption Amstutz’ aus einer Perspektive, die eine kulturelle Evolution im strikten Sinne als gegeben ansieht. Gemessen daran verspielt Amstutz den Nutzen evolutionären Denkens, indem er sich nur metaphorisch auf Evolution bezieht, ohne zugleich seinen Rechtsbegriff zu entwickeln. Das führt zu wissenschaftlich unbefriedigenden Aussagen, zumal saltationistische, quasi-lamarckistische und gruppenselektionistische Modelle genutzt werden, die weder für die biologische noch die kulturelle Evolution brauchbar sind.
Ich setze voraus, dass Erfordernisse auf Wissenschaft beinhalten: (1) nicht-physische Ursachen für physische Wirkungen auszuschließen; (2) auch unbewiesene Annahmen und ungeprüfte Dogmen auszuschließen; (3) politisch autonom zu sein; (4) sich auf eine methodische Grundlage zu stützen und (5) im Rahmen der sog. vertikalen Konzeptintegration' zu arbeiten. Ich zeige, dass Strafrechtsdogmatik und Kriminologie, wenn sie Gesellschaft, Recht und die Verbindungen zwischen ihnen beschreiben, Subjekte behaupten, die es nicht gibt. Sie entkleiden Objekte ihrer natürlichen Qualitäten und schreiben ihnen außernatürliche Qualitäten zu. Außerdem behaupten sie Mittel im Kontext dieser Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehungen, die magisch sind, weil ihnen nachvollziehbare natürliche Wirkungen fehlen.
One of the current trends in international law scholarship is the question of which influences specific legal cultures have on the understanding of international law. This contribution will trace the conditions of a German perspective and analyse the debate against the background of positive law. We will try to assess what the debate adds to the general theory of international law, how it fits into demands of legitimacy of international governance, and whether it contributes to a sensible reconstruction of current law. Furthermore, we try to develop our own perspective that matches the system of international law and is plausible in terms of international legal theory. For that purpose, we will first take It is probably in this context that the contention has to be understood that the ongoing debate on the constitutionalisation of public international law is particularly European, if not German. Whether or not this is the case is difficult to investigate with a lawyer’s tools. However, the idea that international law is the constitution of mankind has found many adherents in German legal writings. This contribution will trace the conditions of a German perspective and analyse the debate against the background of positive law. We will try to assess what the debate adds to the general theory of international law, how it fits into demands of legitimacy of international governance, and whether it contributes to a sensible reconstruction of current law. Furthermore, we try to develop our own perspective that matches the system of international law and is plausible in terms of international legal theory. For that purpose, we will first take up the debate and find its place in the landscape of international legal theory. In this context, we try to shed light on the central concepts used or presupposed when constitutionalisation is discussed by German-speaking scholars (see below, section B). Furthermore, we will discuss structures in positive law which are used as arguments in the debate (section C). Finally, we will try to give an account of constitutionalisation in terms of both sources doctrine and legal theory (section D), before drawing conclusions from the discussion (section E).
Entwicklungsvölkerrecht
(2008)
Als einer von wenigen deutschen Völkerrechtlern hat sich Michael Bothe über einen längeren Zeitraum hinweg mit Fragen der rechtlichen Gestaltung des Nord-Süd-Verhältnisses beschäftigt. Im Zentrum seines Interesses stand und steht dabei die nach wie vor ungelöste Frage nach der Rolle, die das Recht hier einnehmen kann; insbesondere ist weiterhin nicht ausgemacht, ob es in der Lage ist, mit der Aussicht auf Befolgung Regeln für die Lösung von Verteilungsfragen vorzugeben, aber auch eine Bindung der sogenannten Entwicklungsländer an Globalziele des Umweltschutzes und der Ressourcenerhaltung zu erreichen. Um sich einer Antwort nähern zu können muss es gelingen, die Bindungswirkung der auf diesem Feld seit jeher vagen, eher prinzipiellen und häufig nicht im Sinne des klassischen Völkerrechts verbindlichen Regeln mit juristischen Begriffen zu erfassen. Der Völkerrechtswissenschaft ist damit die Aufgabe gestellt, Rechtsbeziehungen des Nord-Süd-Verhältnisses in die Kategorien der Lehre von den Völkerrechtssubjekten, der Internationalen Organisationen, der Rechtsquellen und der Durchsetzung zu bringen.
Rezensionen zu: Bonfils, Henry ; Fauchille, Paul : Manuel de droit international public : (droit des gens); destiné aux étudiants des facultés de droit et aux aspirants aux fonctions diplomatiques et consulaires / Henry Bonfils; Paul Fauchille [Hrsg.] ; 6. éd., rev. et mise au courant, contenant le commentaire des actes des conférences de la paix de 1899 et de 1907 et de la déclaration navale de Londres du 26 février 1909 / par Paul Fauchille ; Paris : Rousseau, 1912 Fiore, Pasquale ; Antoine, Charles F. : Le droit international codifié et sa sanction juridique ; Trad. de l'italien, Paris : Pedone : 1911 : II, 893 S., nouvelle édition Nys, Ernest : Le droit international, Les principes, les théories, les faits. Nouvelle édition, tome I-III, Bruxelles : (Moens Frère et Soeur) M. Weissenbruch imprimeur du roi : 1912 Oppenheim, Lassa : International Law, London ; New York : Longmans, Green and Co : 1912, 2nd edition tome I, v. 1. Peace
Rezension zu: Das Werk vom Haag. Unter Mitwirkung von v. Bar, Fleischmann, Kohler, Lammasch, v. Liszt, Meurer, Niemeyer, Nippold, v. Ullmann und Wehberg, herausgegegen von Walter Schücking, Professor an der Universität Marburg, Associe de l'Institut de droit international. Erster Band: Schücking, Der Staatenverband der Haager Konferenzen. Zweiter Band: Wehberg, Das Problem eines internationalen Staatengerichtshofes. Müinchen und Leipzig. Verlag von Duncker & Humblot 1912.
Rezension zu: Rheinurkunden. Sammlung zwischenstaatlicher Vereinbarungen, landesrechtlicher Ausführungsverordnungen und sonstiger wichtiger Urkunden über die Rheinschiffahrt seit 1803, veranstaltet von der Zentralkommissionfür die Rheinschiffahrt mit Zustimmung der Regierungen von Baden, Bayern, Elsass-Lothringen, Hessen, Niederland und Preußen. I. Teil (1803-1860) Nr. 1-300, II. Teil (1860-1918) Nr. 301-670. s'Gravenhaage, Martinus Nijhoff, München, Dunker u. Humblot, 1918 (in zwei Sprachen: deutsch und holländisch).
Rezension zu: 1. Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the President transmitted to Congress, December 8, 1908. Washington, Government Printing Office 1912. 2. Berichte des russischen Ministeriums des Auswärtigen (H3BnCTIHMHHHCTEPCTBAHHOCTPAHHBIX'hДль). Petersburg 1912.