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Open-end real estate funds are of particular importance in the German bankdominated financial system. However, recently the German open-end fund industry came under severe distress which triggered a broad discussion of required regulatory interventions. This paper gives a detailed description of the institutional structure of these funds and of the events that led to the crisis. Furthermore, it applies recent banking theory to open-end real estate funds in order to understand why the open-end fund structure was so prevalent in Germany. Based on these theoretical insights we evaluate the various policy recommendation that have been raised.
One of the dangers of harmonisation and unification processes taking place within the framework of the EU is that they may result in the codification of the lowest common denominator. This is precisely what is threatening to happen in respect of assignment. Referring the transfer of receivables by way of assignment to the law of the assignor’s residence, as article 13 of the Proposal does, would be opting for the most conservative solution and would for many Member States be a step backward rather than forward. A conflict rule referring assignment to the law of the assignor's residence is too rigid to do justice to the dynamic nature of assignments in cross-border transactions and it is unjustly one-sided. It offers no real advantages when compared to other conflict rules; it even has serious disadvantages which make the conflict rule unsuitable for efficient assignment-based cross-border transactions. It is not unconceivable that this conflict rule would even be contrary to the fundamental freedoms of the ECTreaty. The Community legislators in particular should be careful not to needlessly adopt rules which create insurmountable obstacles for cross-border business where choice-of-law by the parties would perfectly do. Community legislation has a special responsibility to create a smooth legal environment for single market transactions.
This paper investigates whether the stock market reacts to unsolicited ratings for a sample of S&P rated firms from January 1996 to December 2005. We first analyze the stock market reaction associated with the assignment of an initial unsolicited rating. We find evidence that this reaction is negative and particularly accentuated for Japanese firms. A comparison between S&P’s initial unsolicited ratings with previously published ratings of two Japanese rating agencies for a Japanese subsample shows that ratings assigned by S&P are systematically worse. Further, we find that the stock market does not react to the transition from an unsolicited to a solicited rating. Comparison of the upgrades in the sample with a matched-sample of upgrades of solicited ratings reveals that the price reactions are no different. In addition, abnormal returns are worse for firms whose rating remained unchanged after the solicitation compared to those for upgraded firms. Finally, we find that Japanese firms are less likely to receive an upgrade. Our findings suggest that unsolicited ratings are biased downwards, that the capital market therefore expects upgrades of formerly unsolicited ratings and punishes firms whose ratings remain unchanged. All these effects seem to be more pronounced for Japanese firms.
Stakeholderorientierung, Systemhaftigkeit und Stabilität der Corporate Governance in Deutschland
(2006)
Since the time of Germany’s belated industrialisation, corporate governance in Germany has been stakeholder oriented in the dual sense of attaching importance to the interests of stakeholders who are not at the same time shareholders, and of providing certain opportunities for these stakeholders to influence corporate decisions. Corporate governance is also systemic. It is a system of elements that are complementary to each other, and also consistent. In other word, it is composed of elements for which it is important that they fit together well, and in the German case these elements did fit together well until quite recently. Corporate governance as a system is itself an element of the German bank-based financial system at large and possibly even of the entire German business and economic system. Stakeholder orientation of governance is consistent with the general structure this system, and even represents one of its central elements. In retrospect, German corporate governance has also proved to be surprisingly stable. Its fundamental traits date back to the turn from the 19th to the 20th century. There are strong reasons to assume that the systemic features, that is, its complementarity and consistency, have greatly contributed to its past stability. Since about ten years now, there are growing tendencies to question the viability and stability of the German corporate governance system and even the financial system as a whole. One of the central topics in the new debate concerns the stakeholder orientation of the system, which some observers and critics consider as the main weakness of the “German model” under the increasing pressures of globalisation and European integration. As far as their development over time is concerned, systems of complementarity elements exhibit certain peculiarities: (1) They do not adjust easily to changing circumstances. (2) Changes concerning important individual elements, such as the stakeholder orientation of governance, tend to jeopardize the viability and the stability of the entire system. (3) While they appear to be stable, systems shaped by complementary may simply be rigid and tend to break under strong external pressure. “Breaking” means that a system undergoes a fundamental transformation. It seems plausible to assume that the German financial system is already in the middle of such a transformation. It is yet another consequence of its systemic character that this transformation is not likely to be a smooth and gradual process and that it will not lead to a “mixed model” but rather to the adoption of a capital market-based financial system as it prevails in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In such a system, corporate governance cannot be geared to catering to the interests of stakeholders, and an active role for them would not even make any economic sense.
Kapitalmarktorientierte Risikosteuerung in Banken : Marktwertsteuerung statt Marktzinsmethode
(2005)
In diesem Beitrag wird das Konzept der Marktzinsmethode als Grundlage der dualen Risikosteuerung von Kredit- und Marktpreisrisiken in Frage gestellt. Die Kreditrisiken einer Bank implizieren bonitätsinduzierte Marktpreisrisiken und bankspezifische Refinanzierungskosten. Während die bonitätsinduzierten Marktpreisrisiken in der dualen Risikosteuerung keine Berücksichtigung finden, werden die bankspezifischen Refinanzierungskosten zwar erkannt, aber bankintern nicht verursachungsgerecht zugeordnet. Das Grundmodell der Marktzinsmethode bietet keine Lösungsansätze zur Behebung dieser Probleme. Demgegenüber lassen sich die Fehlsteuerungsimpulse von vornherein durch eine konsequente Marktbewertung (Mark to Market) aller Finanzinstrumente vermeiden. Als Ausblick werden erste Überlegungen zur Implementierung einer umfassenden Marktwertsteuerung in Banken entwickelt und exemplarisch ein hierfür geeignetes Bewertungsmodell vorgestellt.
In this paper, we propose a model of credit rating agencies using the global games framework to incorporate information and coordination problems. We introduce a refined utility function of a credit rating agency that, additional to reputation maximization, also embeds aspects of competition and feedback effects of the rating on the rated firms. Apart from hinting at explanations for several hypotheses with regard to agencies' optimal rating assessments, our model suggests that the existence of rating agencies may decrease the incidence of multiple equilibria. If investors have discretionary power over the precision of their private information, we can prove that public rating announcements and private information collection are complements rather than substitutes in order to secure uniqueness of equilibrium. In this respect, rating agencies may spark off a virtuous circle that increases the efficiency of the market outcome.
Using data of US domestic mergers and acquisitions transactions, this paper shows that acquirers have a preference for geographically proximate target companies. We measure the ‘home bias’ against benchmark portfolios of hypothetical deals where the potential targets consist of firms of similar size in the same four-digit SIC code that have been targets in other transactions at about the same time or firms that have been listed at a stock exchange at that time. There is a strong and consistent home bias for M&A transactions in the US, which is significantly declining during the observation period, i.e. between 1990 and 2004. At the same time, the average distances between target and acquirer increase articulately. The home bias is stronger for small and relatively opaque target companies suggesting that local information is the decisive factor in explaining the results. Acquirers that diversify into new business lines also display a stronger preference for more proximate targets. With an event study we show that investors react relatively better to proximate acquisitions than to distant ones. That reaction is more important and becomes significant in times when the average distance between target and acquirer becomes larger, but never becomes economically significant. We interpret this as evidence for the familiarity hypothesis brought forward by Huberman (2001): Acquirers know about the existence of proximate targets and are more likely to merge with them without necessarily being better informed. However, when comparing the best and the worst deals, we are able to show a dramatic difference in distances and home bias: The most successful deals display on average a much stronger home bias and distinctively smaller distance between acquirer and target than the least successful deals. Proximity in M&A transactions therefore is a necessary but not sufficient condition for success. The paper contributes to the growing literature on the role of distance in financial decisions.
The paper examines challenges in effectively implementing the lender-of-last-resort function in the EU single financial market. Briefly highlighted are features of the EU financial landscape that could increase EU systemic financial risk. Briefly described are the complexities of the EU’s financial-stability architecture for preventing and resolving financial problems, including lender-of-last-resort operations. The paper examines how the lender-of-last-resort function might materialize during a systemic financial disturbance affecting more than one EU Member State. The paper identifies challenges and possible ways of enhancing the effectiveness of the existing architecture.