Exzellenzcluster Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen
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Criminal law exceptionalism, or so I suggest, has turned into an ideology in German and Continental criminal law theory. It rests on interrelated claims about the (ideal or real) extraordinary qualities and properties of the criminal law and has led to exceptional doctrines in constitutional criminal law and criminal law theory. It prima facie paradoxically perpetuates and conserves the criminal law, and all too often leads to ideological thoughtlessness, which may blind us to the dark sides of criminal laws in action.
China, the United States, and the European Union have spoken of a global competition surrounding Artificial Intelligence (AI). There is widespread talk of an ‘AI Arms Race’. But what is the nature of this race? We argue that the arms race metaphor does not capture the dynamics of global competition in the AI sector. Instead, we propose the notion of a ‘geopolitical innovation race’ for technological leadership in a networked global economy. Based on an analysis of government documents, we find that actors (1) are open to both zero-sum and positive-sum approaches in AI development, (2) organise actor networks differently based on national innovation cultures, (3) prioritise economics and status next to security concerns, and (4) are open to how AI should be interpreted. Referring to the competitive race of AI research and development, the three technopoles perpetuate the geopoliticisation of innovation and intertwine security and economic interests.
Everybody is talking about the Internet. But don't we all move in filter bubbles and just read fake news? Are we going to let bots tell us what to think? Can data monopolies no longer be broken? And is the global South finally lost? No, no, no - and no. And yet "Internet myths", i.e. misconceptions about the impact and reality of the Internet and Internet-based communication, are very popular. However, there is a great deal of Internet research expertise and solid empirical research in Germany and around the world that could clear up the myths. A book is intended to remedy this situation by providing fact-based, descriptive and practical information. It is edited by Dr. Matthias C. Kettemann and Dr. Stephan Dreyer and financed by the Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy.
How do international organizations (IOs) govern transnational challenges? Most theories maintain that IOs exercise authority to govern. What these authority-focused accounts tend to overlook, however, are instances of de facto governance. Especially in emerging, contested, and crisis-ridden issue areas, authority has often not been established or become unsettled. Yet, IOs govern here, too. Take the example of migration and asylum: This policy field is characterized by institutional and policy gaps. During the crisis at Europe’s border in 2015–2016, IOs governed mixed movements nonetheless. Through organizing collective action on the ground, they not only created direct regulative impacts on the lives of people on the move (the final addressees of international politics) but also defined what mixed migration means as a global policy concern. I draw on practice theory and fieldwork at the European external border in Greece to draw attention to governing modes that operate at a very low institutional threshold. I propose a minimal conception of governance that shifts attention from authority sources to governing effects to account for such governance forms. This re-conceptualization makes the study of how IOs govern outside their established authority, in concrete geographical places, possible.
Some realists in political theory deny that the notion of feasibility has any place in realist theory, while others claim that feasibility constraints are essential elements of realist normative theorising. But none have so far clarified what exactly they are referring to when thinking of feasibility and political realism together. In this article, we develop a conception of the realist feasibility frontier based on an appraisal of how political realism should be distinguished from non-ideal theories. In this realist framework, political standards are feasible if they meet three requirements: they are (i) politically intelligible, (ii) contextually recognisable as authoritative, and (iii) contestable. We conclude by suggesting that our conception of realist feasibility might be compatible with utopian demands, thereby possibly finding favour with realists who otherwise refuse to resort to the notion of feasibility.
The European Union's (EU's) legitimacy is currently under pressure from what is widely perceived as a populist challenge. Populists charge the EU as being undemocratic, unrepresentative, technocratic, and tied to the interests of the elite; as serving neither the will nor the interests of the people; and as simultaneously paying too little attention to the concerns of its member states while also being only timidly cosmopolitan. These claims have stimulated a debate among scholars in the social sciences on what populism is, and on the legitimacy of populists' claims. Scholars have often described populist stances as illiberal and antidemocratic (Mudde, 2004; Müller, 2017; Urbinati, 2019a) and criticized them for their antipluralistic attitude (Galston, 2018). This paper aims to assess the normative and conceptual cogency of these diverse claims...
Many democracies use geographic constituencies to elect some or all of their legislators. Furthermore, many people regard this as desirable in a noncomparative sense, thinking that local constituencies are not necessarily superior to other schemes but are nevertheless attractive when considered on their own merits. Yet, this position of noncomparative constituency localism is now under philosophical pressure as local constituencies have recently attracted severe criticism. This article examines how damaging this recent criticism is, and argues that within limits, noncomparative constituency localism remains philosophically tenable despite the criticisms. The article shows that noncomparative constituency localism is compelling in the first place because geographic constituencies foster partisan voter mobilisation, and practices of constituency service help to sustain deliberation among constituents and within the legislature and promote the realisation of equal opportunity for political influence. The article further argues that it is unwarranted to criticise geographic constituencies for being biased against geographically dispersed voter groups, for causing vote-seat disproportionality, and for being vulnerable to gerrymandering. The article also discusses the criticisms that local constituencies may pose risks of inefficiency and injustice in resource allocation decisions, may lead legislators to neglect the common good, and may limit citizens’ control over the political agenda. Whilst conceding that these objections may be valid, the article argues that they do not outweigh the diverse and normatively weighty considerations speaking in favour of noncomparative constituency localism. Finally, the article’s analysis is defended against several variants of the charge that it exaggerates the benefits of geographic constituencies.
One of the central assumptions of global governance is that "problems without borders" require collaboration among multiple stakeholders to be managed effectively. This commitment to multistakeholderism, however, is not a functional imperative but the product of potentially contested agency recognition in the past. As such, we contend that a reconstruction of agency dynamics must be at the core of understanding global governance since global governors. We draw on a relational framework to lay out the basics of how to reconstruct the agency of global governors as it emerges through relations. Through these relations, entities-in-the-making advance agency claims or are ascribed agency by relevant others. Equally important from a relational perspective are recognition acts, which those claims trigger. We theorize in this paper that different types of agency claims paired with different recognition dynamics determine the outcome as to who is accepted to "sit at the table" for a particular issue. This theorization is required to (a) better understand current manifestations of global governance in their historical emergence and (b) discuss conditions of agency from a normative perspective to determine who should be the global governors of our time.