Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
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Despite a number of helpful changes, including the adoption of an inflation target, the Fed’s monetary policy strategy proved insufficiently resilient in recent years. While the Fed eased policy appropriately during the pandemic, it fell behind the curve during the post-pandemic recovery. During 2021, the Fed kept easing policy while the inflation outlook was deteriorating and the economy was growing considerably faster than the economy’s natural growth rate—the sum of the Fed’s 2% inflation goal and the growth rate of potential output.
The resilience of the Fed’s monetary policy strategy could be enhanced, and such errors be avoided with guidance from a simple natural growth targeting rule that prescribes that the federal funds rate during each quarter be raised (cut) when projected nominal income growth exceeds (falls short) of the economy’s natural growth rate. An illustration with real-time data and forecasts since the early 1990s shows that Fed policy has not persistently deviated from this simple rule with the notable exception of the period coinciding with the Fed’s post-pandemic policy error.
What are the aggregate and distributional consequences of the relationship be-tween an individual’s social network and financial decisions? Motivated by several well-documented facts about the influence of social connections on financial decisions, we build and calibrate a model of stock market participation with a social network that emphasizes the interplay between connectivity and network structure. Since connections to informed agents help spread information, there is a pivotal role for factors that determine sorting among agents. An increase in the average number of connections raises the average participation rate, mostly due to richer agents. A higher degree of sorting benefits richer agents by creating clusters where information spreads more efficiently. We show empirical evidence consistent with the importance of connectivity and sorting. We discuss several new avenues for future research into the aggregate impact of peer effects in finance.
Central banks sowing the seeds for a green financial sector? NGFS membership and market reactions
(2024)
In December 2017, during the One Planet Summit in Paris, a group of eight central banks and supervisory authorities launched the “Network for Greening the Financial Sector” (NGFS) to address challenges and risks posed by climate change to the global financial system. Until 06/2023 an additional 69 central banks from all around the world have joined the network. We find that the propensity to join the network can be described as a function in the country’s economic development (e.g., GDP per capita), national institutions (e.g., central bank independence), and performance of the central bank on its mandates (e.g., price stability and output gap). Using an event study design to examine consequences of network expansions in capital markets, we document that a difference portfolio that is long in clean energy stocks and short in fossil fuel stocks benefits from an enlargement of the NGFS. Overall, our results suggest that an increasing number of central banks and supervisory authorities are concerned about climate change and willing to go beyond their traditional objectives, and that the capital market believes they will do so.
In this study, we unpack the ESG ratings of four prominent agencies in Europe and find that (i) each single E, S, G pillar explains the overall ESG score differently,(ii) there is a low co-movement between the three E, S, G pillars and (iii) there are specific ESG Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) that are driving these ratings more than others. We argue that such discrepancies might mislead firms about their actual ESG status, potentially leading to cherry-picking areas for improvement, thus raising questions about the accuracy and effectiveness of ESG evaluations in both explaining sustainability and driving capital toward sustainable companies.
Wir untersuchen die regulatorischen Änderungen in der EU, die die Transparenz bei nachhaltigen Investitionen erhöhen sollen. Durch eine Untersuchung der Unterschiede zwischen ESG-Ratingagenturen bewerten wir Herausforderungen für Standardisierung und Konsens von Ratings. Unsere Analyse unterstreicht die Dringlichkeit klarerer ESG-Ratings für eine nachhaltige Invesitionslandschaft.
We delve into the EU's regulatory changes aimed at boosting transparency in sustainable investments. By examining disparities among ESG rating agencies, we assess how these differences challenge standardization and consensus. Our analysis underscores the critical need for clearer ESG assessments to guide the sustainable investment landscape.
We create an alternative version of the present utility value formula to explicitly show that every store-of-value in the economy bears utility-interest (non-pecuniary income) for ist holder regardless of possible interest earnings from financial markets. In addition, we generalize the well-known welfare measures of consumer and producer surplus as present value concepts and apply them not only for the production and usage of consumer goods and durables but also for money and other financial assets. This helps us, inter alia, to formalize the circumstances under which even a producer of legal tender might become insolvent. We also develop a new measure of seigniorage and demonstrate why the well-established concept of monetary seigniorage is flawed. Our framework also allows us to formulate the conditions for liability-issued money such as inside money and financial instruments such as debt certificates to become – somewhat paradoxically – net wealth of the society.
In times of crisis, insurance companies may invest into riskier assets to benefit from expected price recoveries. Using daily stock market data for 34 European insurers, I investigate how a stock market contraction, as experienced during the Covid-19 pandemic, affects insurers’ decision on the allocation of their corporate bond portfolio. I find that insurers shift their portfolio holdings pro-cyclically towards lower credit risk assets in the first month of the market contraction. As the crisis progresses, I find evidence for counter-cyclical investment behavior by insurers, which can neither be explained by credit rating downgrades of held bonds nor by hedging with CDS derivatives. The observed counter-cyclical investment behavior of insurers could be beneficial for the financial system in attenuating price declines, but excessive risk-taking by insurance companies over longer periods can also reinforce stress in the system.
In its first ten years (2014-2023), the banking union was successful in its prudential agenda but failed spectacularly in its underlying objective: establishing a single banking market in the euro area. This goal is now more important than ever, and easier to attain than at any time in the last decade. To make progress, cross-border banks should receive a specific treatment within general banking union legislation. Suggestions are made on how to make such regulatory carve-out effective and legally sound.