Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
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In diesem Beitrag wird ein Vorschlag vorgestellt, wie es trotz langfristiger Niedrigzinsen möglich ist, die vor 18 Jahren eingeführte Riester-Rente so umzugestalten, dass alle Beteiligten davon profitieren. Wird die Mindestauszahlung am Ende der Vertragslaufzeit nur für die Eigenbeiträge, nicht aber für die staatlichen Zulagen garantiert, können deutlich höhere Renditen erzielt werden. Unter dem Strich haben dann nicht nur Privatleute mehr Geld aus ihrer Altersvorsorge, sondern der Staat wird mehr Steuern einnehmen und die Anbieter haben mehr Spielraum für bedarfsgerechte Produktgestaltung.
The paper discusses the policy implications of the Wirecard scandal. The study finds that all lines of defense against corporate fraud, including internal control systems, external audits, the oversight bodies for financial reporting and auditing and the market supervisor, contributed to the scandal and are in need of reform. To ensure market integrity and investor protection in the future, the authors make eight suggestions for the market and institutional oversight architecture in Germany and in Europe.
Banks are not immune from COVID-19. The economic downturn may drive some banks to the point of non-viability (PONV). If so, is the resolution regime in the Euro-area ready to respond? No, for banks may not have the right amount of the right kind of liabilities to make bail-in work. That could lead to a banking crisis. The Euro area can avoid this risk, by arranging now for a recap later. This would plug the gap between what the failing bank has and what it would need to make bail-in work. To do so, banks would pay – possibly via the contributions they make to the Single Resolution Fund – a commitment fee to a European backstop authority for a mandatory, system-wide note issuance facility. This would compel each bank, as it approached or reached the PONV, to issue to the backstop, and the backstop to purchase from the bank, the obligations the failing bank needs in order to make bail-in work. Such obligations would take the form of “senior-most” non-preferred debt, and bail-in would stop with such debt. That would allow the SRB to use the bail-in tool to resolve the failed bank, reopen it and run it under a solvent wind-down strategy. That protects counterparties and customers and ensures the continuity of critical economic functions. It also keeps investors at risk and promotes market discipline. Above all, it preserves financial stability.
Inflation ist ein Konstrukt. Sie wird von unterschiedlichen Akteur*innen unterschiedlich wahrgenommen. Zum Teil passiert dies, weil Warenkörbe differieren, zum Teil weil Erwartungen unterschiedlich gebildet werden. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert die Heterogenität der Infl ation und ihrer Wahrnehmung und was dies für die Zielgröße der Zentralbankpolitik bedeutet.
Inflation ist ein Konstrukt. Sie wird von unterschiedlichen Akteuren unterschiedlich wahrgenommen. Zum Teil passiert dies, weil Warenkörbe differieren, zum Teil weil Erwartungen unterschiedlich gebildet werden. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert die Heterogenität der Inflation und ihrer Wahrnehmung und was dies für die Zielgröße der Zentralbankpolitik bedeutet.
The paper compares provision of public infrastructure via public-private partnerships (PPPs) with provision under government management. Due to soft budget constraints of government management, PPPs exert more effort and therefore have a cost advantage in building infrastructure. At the same time, hard budget constraints for PPPs introduce a bankruptcy risk and bankruptcy costs. Consequently, if bankruptcy costs are high, PPPs may be less efficient than public management, although this does not result from PPPs’ higher interest costs.
We develop a novel empirical approach to identify the effectiveness of policies against a pandemic. The essence of our approach is the insight that epidemic dynamics are best tracked over stages, rather than over time. We use a normalization procedure that makes the pre-policy paths of the epidemic identical across regions. The procedure uncovers regional variation in the stage of the epidemic at the time of policy implementation. This variation delivers clean identification of the policy effect based on the epidemic path of a leading region that serves as a counterfactual for other regions. We apply our method to evaluate the effectiveness of the nationwide stay-home policy enacted in Spain against the Covid-19 pandemic. We find that the policy saved 15.9% of lives relative to the number of deaths that would have occurred had it not been for the policy intervention. Its effectiveness evolves with the epidemic and is larger when implemented at earlier stages.