Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
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Stinginess was yesterday
(2020)
Geiz war gestern
(2020)
In Deutschland ist die Wohneigentumsquote innerhalb der OECD am zweitniedrigsten. Eine wichtige Rolle spielt dabei die Wohnungspolitik, die hierzulande Anreize für das Mieten schafft. Neue Studien zeigen, dass eine veränderte Politik die Wohneigentumsquote erhöhen und die Vermögensungleichheit verringern könnte.
The case for corona bonds
(2020)
Corona bonds are feasible and important to preserve the European project. We set out a number of principles that might serve as a blueprint for the European institutions. Importantly, Corona bonds could be issued through a new public law entity and include all the safeguards required for the protection of the fundamental values of the EU. This proposal is pragmatic in the sense that it facilitates the choice European leaders have to make now; necessary to secure the resilience of the European Union. The political risks are significantly higher now than in 2010. The gargantuan challenge of tackling the combined impact of climate change, migration, digitalization, geopolitical shifts, and the spread of autocracy, requires leadership and joint action by the Council and the Eurogroup.
The spreading of the Covid-19 virus causes a reduction in economic activity worldwide and may lead to new risks to financial stability. The authors draw attention to the urgency of the targeted mitigation strategies on the European level and suggest taking coordinated action on the fiscal side to provide liquidity to affected firms in the corporate sector. Otherwise, virus-related cashflow interruptions could lead to a new full-blown banking crisis. Monetary policy measures are unlikely to mitigate cash liquidity shortages at the level of individual firms. Coordinated action at European level is decisive to prevent markets from losing confidence in the resilience of banks, particularly in countries with limited fiscal capacity. In contrast to the euro crisis of 2011, the cause of the current crisis does not lie in the financial markets; therefore, the risk of moral hazard for banks or states is low.
This policy letter adds to the current discussion on how to design a program of government assistance for firms hurt by the Coronavirus crisis. While not pretending to provide a cure-all proposal, the advocated scheme could help to bring funding to firms, even small firms, quickly, without increasing their leverage and default risk. The plan combines outright cash transfers to firms with a temporary, elevated corporate profit tax at the firm level as a form of conditional payback. The implied equity-like payment structure has positive risk-sharing features for firms, without impinging on ownership structures. The proposal has to be implemented at the pan-European level to strengthen Euro area resilience.
Capital in the corona crisis
(2020)
Die Coronakrise und die Eindämmungspolitik der Nationalstaaten hat gravierende wirtschaftliche Folgen. Nicht alle EU-Mitgliedsstaaten sind in gleicher Weise gewappnet und manche werden derzeit heftiger von der Coronakrise getroffen als andere. Eine Möglichkeit, europäische Solidarität zu organisieren, ist die Ausgabe von Gemeinschaftsanleihen, so genannter Corona-Bonds. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert das Für und Wider der Corona-Bonds und ihrer Alternativen: Weder Gemeinschaftsanleihen noch eine Ausweitung des EZB-Engagements sollten das Mittel der Wahl sein. Wir plädieren vielmehr für direkte, auf europäischer Ebene koordinierte Transferzahlungen an bedürftige Mitgliedsstaaten.
The coronavirus has led to a human tragedy, but it need not end up in an economic catastrophe.
In Southern Europe there are signs of a silver lining: the growth rate of the total number of deaths attributed to the coronavirus has been decreasing for weeks in Italy and Spain.
While the effect of the connement measures aim at limiting the spread of the virus is at best uncertain, the economic and social costs of a prolonged lockdown are much less ambiguous and potentially huge. Importantly, these costs can be very unequally distributed.
We argue that it is therefore time to start thinking about how to gradually unlock these countries, and we make some suggestions along this line starting with large-scale testing and continuous re-testing as the most useful pre-condition.
We extend the canonical income process with persistent and transitory risk to shock distributions with left-skewness and excess kurtosis, to which we refer as higher- order risk. We estimate our extended income process by GMM for household data from the United States. We find countercyclical variance and procyclical skewness of persistent shocks. All shock distributions are highly leptokurtic. The existing tax and transfer system reduces dispersion and left-skewness of shocks. We then show that in a standard incomplete-markets life-cycle model, first, higher-order risk has sizable welfare implications, which depend crucially on risk attitudes of households; second, higher-order risk matters quantitatively for the welfare costs of cyclical idiosyncratic risk; third, higher-order risk has non-trivial implications for the degree of self-insurance against both transitory and persistent shocks.
We report the results of a longitudinal intervention with students across five universities in China designed to reduce online consumer debt. Our research design allocates individuals to either a financial literacy treatment, a self-control training program, or a zero-touch control group. Financial education interventions improve test scores on general financial literacy but only marginally affect future online borrowing. Our self-control treatment features detailed tracking of spending and borrowing activity with a third-party app and introspection about individuals' consumption with a counselor. These sessions reduce future online borrowing, delinquency charges, and borrowing for entertainment reasons - and are driven by the male subjects in the sample. Our results suggest that self-regulation can affect financial behavior in e-commerce platforms.
We use data from a German online brokerage and a survey to show that retail investors sharply reduce risk-taking in response to nearby firm bankruptcies, which are not pre- dictive of returns. The effects on trading are spatially highly concentrated, immediate and not persistent. They seem to operate through more pessimistic expected returns and increased risk aversion and do not reflect wealth effects or changes in background risks. Investors learn about bankruptcies through immediate coverage in local newspapers. Our findings suggest that non-informative local experiences that make downside risks of stock investment more salient contribute to idiosyncratic short-term fluctuations in trading.
This paper studies the impact of financial sector size and leverage on business cycles and risk-free rates dynamics. We model a general equilibrium productive economy where financial intermediaries provide costly risk mitigation to households by pooling the idiosyncratic risks of their investment activities. We find that leverage amplifies variations of intermediaries’ relative size, but may also mitigate the business cycle. Moreover, it makes risk-free rates pro-cyclical. Households benefit the most when the financial sector is neither too small, thus avoiding high consumption fluctuations and costly mitigation, nor too big, so that fewer resources are lost after intermediation costs.
Zur Reform der Einlagensicherung: Elemente einer anreizkompatiblen Europäischen Rückversicherung
(2020)
Bankeinlagen bis 100.000 Euro sind de jure überall im Euroraum gleichermaßen vor Verlusten geschützt. De facto hängt der Wert dieser gesetzlichen Haftungszusage unter anderem von der Ausstattung des nationalen Sicherungsfonds und der relativen Größe des Bankensektors in einer Volkswirtschaft ab. Um die Homogenität des Einlagenschutzes zu gewährleisten und die Bankenunion zu vollenden, bedarf es einer einheitlichen europäischen Einlagensicherung. Die bestehende implizite Risikoteilung im Euroraum ist ordnungspolitisch nicht wünschenswert. Ferner kann eine explizite und glaubwürdige Zweitsicherung Fehlanreize zur Übernahme exzessiver Risiken verhindern, bevor es zum Schadensfall kommt. Daher plädiert dieser Beitrag für ein zweistufiges, streng subsidiär organisiertes Rückversicherungsmodell: Nationale Erstversicherungen würden einen festgeschriebenen Teil, die europäische Rückversicherung nachrangig den Rest der Deckungssumme besichern. Die Rückversicherung gewährt diese Liquiditätshilfen in Form von Kassenkrediten. Weil die Haftung auf nationaler Ebene verbleibt, werden Risiken geteilt aber nicht vergemeinschaftet. Marktgerechte Prämien müssen nicht nur das individuelle Risikogewicht einer Bank sondern auch länderspezifische Risikofaktoren berücksichtigen. Zuletzt braucht der Rückversicherer umfangreiche Aufsichtsrechte, um die Zahlungsfähigkeit der Erstversicherer mit Hinblick auf die nationalen Haftungspflichten jederzeit sicherzustellen.
We show that High Frequency Traders (HFTs) are not beneficial to the stock market during flash crashes. They actually consume liquidity when it is most needed, even when they are rewarded by the exchange to provide immediacy. The behavior of HFTs exacerbate the transient price impact, unrelated to fundamentals, typically observed during a flash crash. Slow traders provide liquidity instead of HFTs, taking advantage of the discounted price. We thus uncover a trade-o↵ between the greater liquidity and efficiency provided by HFTs in normal times, and the disruptive consequences of their trading activity during distressed times.
This paper presents causal evidence of the effects of boardroom networks on firm value. We exploit exogenous variation in network centrality arising from a ban on interlocking directorates of Italian financial and insurance companies. We leverage this shock to show that firms that become more central in the network as a result of the shock experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement date. We find that information dissemination plays a central role: results are driven by firms that have higher idiosyncratic volatility, low analyst coverage, and more uncertainty surrounding their earnings forecasts. We also find that firms benefit more from boardroom centrality when they are more central in the input-output network, as this reinforces information complementarities, or when they are less central in the cross-ownership network, as well as when they suffer from low profitability and low growth opportunities. Network centrality also results in higher compensation for board directors.
Using an original dataset on professional networks of directors sitting on the boards of large US corporations, we examine how personal relationships are used by firms to improve job match quality in the high-skill segment of the labor market. Analyzing explicit social connection data between new hires and recruiters, we are able to test predictions of well established job referral models. We find that referred executive directors have a fifteen percent longer tenure than their non-referred counterparts. Referred executive directors also tend to be similar to their referrers on multiple dimensions, giving support to network homophily hypotheses.
We study whether and how time preferences change over the life cycle, exploiting representative long-term panel data. We estimate the age patterns of discount rates from age 25 to 80. In order to identify age effects, we have to disentangle them from cohort and period factors. We address this identification problem by estimating individual fixed effects models, where we substitute period effects with determinants of time preferences that depend on calendar years. We find that discount rates decrease with age and the decline is remarkably linear over the life cycle.
This paper provides an overview of how to use "big data" for economic research. We investigate the performance and ease of use of different Spark applications running on a distributed file system to enable the handling and analysis of data sets which were previously not usable due to their size. More specifically, we explain how to use Spark to (i) explore big data sets which exceed retail grade computers memory size and (ii) run typical econometric tasks including microeconometric, panel data and time series regression models which are prohibitively expensive to evaluate on stand-alone machines. By bridging the gap between the abstract concept of Spark and ready-to-use examples which can easily be altered to suite the researchers need, we provide economists and social scientists more generally with the theory and practice to handle the ever growing datasets available. The ease of reproducing the examples in this paper makes this guide a useful reference for researchers with a limited background in data handling and distributed computing.
We introduce Implied Volatility Duration (IVD) as a new measure for the timing of uncertainty resolution, with a high IVD corresponding to late resolution. Portfolio sorts on a large cross-section of stocks indicate that investors demand on average about seven percent return per year as a compensation for a late resolution of uncertainty. In a general equilibrium model, we show that `late' stocks can only have higher expected returns than `early' stocks if the investor exhibits a preference for early resolution of uncertainty. Our empirical analysis thus provides a purely market-based assessment of the timing preferences of the marginal investor.