Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
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We develop a model that endogenizes the manager's choice of firm risk and of inside debt investment strategy. Our model delivers two predictions. First, managers have an incentive to reduce the correlation between inside debt and company stock in bad times. Second, managers that reduce such a correlation take on more risk in bad times. Using a sample of U.S. public firms, we provide evidence consistent with the model's predictions. Our results suggest that the weaker link between inside debt and company stock in bad times does not translate into a mitigation of debt-equity conflicts.