Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
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In diesem Beitrag wird ein Vorschlag vorgestellt, wie es trotz langfristiger Niedrigzinsen möglich ist, die vor 18 Jahren eingeführte Riester-Rente so umzugestalten, dass alle Beteiligten davon profitieren. Wird die Mindestauszahlung am Ende der Vertragslaufzeit nur für die Eigenbeiträge, nicht aber für die staatlichen Zulagen garantiert, können deutlich höhere Renditen erzielt werden. Unter dem Strich haben dann nicht nur Privatleute mehr Geld aus ihrer Altersvorsorge, sondern der Staat wird mehr Steuern einnehmen und die Anbieter haben mehr Spielraum für bedarfsgerechte Produktgestaltung.
Die „Rente mit 63“ hat wieder einmal den Blick auf den Renteneintritt gerichtet. In der öffentlichen Debatte werden dabei zwei Ereignisse regelmäßig vermischt: das Ende des Arbeitslebens und der Beginn der Rentenzahlung. Dabei müssen beide nicht unmittelbar aufeinander folgen. Unter bestimmten Umständen kann es finanziell attraktiv sein, die staatliche Rente nicht sofort nach dem Ausstieg aus dem Erwerbsleben zu beantragen, sondern die Ausgaben bis zum späteren Rentenbeginn durch den Abbau von Finanzkapital zu finanzieren. Dieser Beitrag gibt einen kurzen Einblick in die neueste Studie von Olivia Mitchell, Andreas Hubener und Raimund Maurer zur Alterssicherung in den USA und stellt auch Berechnungen für Deutschland auf.
Der Koalitionsvertrag 2021 sieht eine generationengerechte Absicherung des Rentenniveaus durch eine teilweise aus Haushaltsmitteln finanzierte Kapitaldeckung vor. Um dieses Ziel zu verwirklichen, wird hier die Einführung einer Generationenrente ab Geburt vorgeschlagen. Dabei wird aus Haushaltsmitteln ein Betrag von € 5.000 für jedes Neugeborene nach Grundsätzen des professionellen Anlagemanagements am globalen Kapitalmarkt angelegt. Konzeptionell soll sich diese Generationenrente am Modell der Basisrente(§10 Abs. 1 Nr. 2 b EStG) orientieren, d.h. die akkumulierten Gelder sind weder beleihbar, vererbbar noch übertragbar und können frühestens ab Alter 63 zugunsten einer lebenslangen Monatsrente verwendet werden. Unsere Berechnungen zeigen, dass durch die hier vorgeschlagene Generationenrente unabhängig vom Verlauf der individuellen Erwerbsbiographie, Altersarmut für die vom demographischen Wandel besonders betroffenen zukünftigen Generationen vermieden wird.
Do required minimum distribution 401(k) rules matter, and for whom? Insights from a lifecylce model
(2021)
Tax-qualified vehicles helped U.S. private-sector workers accumulate $25Tr in retirement assets. An often-overlooked important institutional feature shaping decumulations from these retirement plans is the “Required Minimum Distribution” (RMD) regulation, requiring retirees to withdraw a minimum fraction from their retirement accounts or pay excise taxes on withdrawal shortfalls. Our calibrated lifecycle model measures the impact of RMD rules on financial behavior of heterogeneous households during their worklives and retirement. We show that proposed reforms to delay or eliminate the RMD rules should have little effects on consumption profiles but more impact on withdrawals and tax payments for households with bequest motives.
Dynamics of life course family transitions in Germany: exploring patterns, process and relationships
(2023)
This paper explores dynamics of family life events in Germany using discrete time event history analysis based on SOEP data. We find that higher educational attainment, better income level, and marriage emerge as salient protective factors mitigating the risk of mortality; better education also reduces the likelihood of first marriage whereas, lower educational attainment, protracted period, and presence of children act as protective factors against divorce. Our key finding shows that disparity in mean life expectancies between individuals from low- and high-income brackets is observed to be 9 years among males and 6 years among females, thereby illustrating the mortality inequality attributed to income disparities. Our estimates show that West Germans have low risk of death, less likelihood of first marriage, and they have a high risk of divorce and remarriage compared to East Germans.
Social Security rules that determine retirement, spousal, and survivor benefits, along with benefit adjustments according to the age at which these are claimed, open up a complex set of financial options for household decisions. These rules influence optimal household asset allocation, insurance, and work decisions, subject to life cycle demographic shocks, such as marriage, divorce, and children. Our model-based research generates a wealth profile and a low and stable equity fraction consistent with empirical evidence. We confirm predictions that wives will claim retirement benefits earlier than husbands, while life insurance is mainly purchased by younger men. Our policy simulations imply that eliminating survivor benefits would sharply reduce claiming differences by sex while dramatically increasing men’s life insurance purchases.
This Chapter explores how an environment of persistent low returns influences saving, investing, and retirement behaviors, as compared to what in the past had been thought of as more “normal” financial conditions. Our calibrated lifecycle dynamic model with realistic tax, minimum distribution, and Social Security benefit rules produces results that agree with observed saving, work, and claiming age behavior of U.S. households. In particular, our model generates a large peak at the earliest claiming age at 62, as in the data. Also in line with the evidence, our baseline results show a smaller second peak at the (system-defined) Full Retirement Age of 66. In the context of a zero-return environment, we show that workers will optimally devote more of their savings to non-retirement accounts and less to 401(k) accounts, since the relative appeal of investing in taxable versus tax-qualified retirement accounts is lower in a low return setting. Finally, we show that people claim Social Security benefits later in a low interest rate environment.
Many nations incentivize retirement saving by letting workers defer taxes on pension contributions, imposing them when retirees withdraw their funds. Using a dynamic life cycle model, we show how ‘Rothification’ – that is, taxing 401(k) contributions rather than payouts – alters saving, investment, consumption, and Social Security claiming patterns. We find that taxing pension contributions instead of withdrawals leads to delayed retirement, somewhat lower lifetime tax payments, and relatively small reductions in consumption. Indeed, the two tax regimes generate quite similar relative inequality metrics: the relative consumption inequality ratio under TEE is only four percent higher than in the EET case. Moreover, results indicate that the Gini measures are also strikingly similar under the EET and the TEE regimes for lifetime consumption, cash on hand, and 401(k) assets, differing by only 1-4 percent. While tax payments are higher early in life under the TEE regime, they are slightly lower in the long run. Moreover, higher EET tax payments are also accompanied by higher volatility. We therefore find few reasons for policymakers to favor either tax approach on egalitarian or revenue-enhancing grounds.
Implications of money-back guarantees for individual retirement accounts: protection then and now
(2019)
In the wake of the financial crisis and continued volatility in international capital markets, there is growing interest in mechanisms that can protect people against retirement account volatility. This paper explores the consequences for savers’ wellbeing of implementing market-based retirement account guarantees, using a life cycle consumption and portfolio choice model where investors have access to stocks, bonds, and tax-qualified retirement accounts. We evaluate the case of German Riester plans adopted in 2002, an individual retirement account produce that includes embedded mandatory money-back guarantees. These guarantees influenced participant consumption, saving, and investment behavior in the higher interest rate environment of that era, and they have even larger impacts in a low-return world such as the present. Importantly, we conclude that abandoning these guarantees could enhance old-age consumption for over 80% of retirees, particularly lower earners, without harming consumption during the accumulation phase. Our results are of general interest for other countries implementing default investment options in individual retirement accounts, such as the U.S. 401(k) defined contribution plans and the Pan European Pension Product (PEPP) recently launched by the European Parliament.
Given rising life expectations around the world, it seems that old-age pension benefits will need to be cut and pension contributions boosted in many nations. Yet our research on old-age system reforms does not require raising mandatory retirement ages or contributions. Instead, we offer ways to enhance incentives for people to work longer and delay retirement. There are good reasons to incentivize older people to work longer and delay retirement. These include rising longevity, the shrinking workforce, and emerging evidence indicating that working longer can be associated with better mental and physical health for many people. Nevertheless, old age Social Security systems in many nations find that people tend to claim benefits early, usually leading to reduced benefits.In the United States, for instance, a majority of Americans claim their Social Security benefits at the earlier feasible age, namely 62, even though their monthly benefits would be 75% higher if they waited until age 70. To test whether this is the result of people underweighting the economic value of higher lifetime benefit streams, we examine whether people would claim later and work longer if they were rewarded with a lump sum instead of a higher lifetime benefit stream for deferring. Two arguments have been offered to explain early claiming. One is that workers claim early to avoid potentially “forfeiting” their deferred benefits should they die too soon (Brown et al., 2016). A second explanation is that many people underweight the economic value of lifetime benefit streams (Brown et al., 2017). This latter rationale motivates the present study.
We designed and fielded an experimental module in the 2014 HRS which seeks to measure older persons’ willingness to voluntarily defer claiming of Social Security benefits. In addition we evaluate the stated willingness of older individuals to work longer, depending on the Social Security incentives offered to delay claiming their benefits. Our project extends previous work by analyzing the results from our HRS module and comparing findings from other data sources, which included very much smaller samples of older persons. We show that half of the respondents would delay claiming if no work requirement were in place under the status quo, and only slightly fewer, 46 percent, with a work requirement. We also asked respondents how large a lump sum they would need with or without a work requirement. In the former case, the average amount needed to induce delayed claiming was about $60,400, while when part-time work was required, the average was $66,700. This implies a low utility value of leisure foregone of only $6,300, or about 10 percent of older households’ income.
People who delay claiming Social Security receive higher lifelong benefits upon retirement. We survey individuals on their willingness to delay claiming later, if they could receive a lump sum in lieu of a higher annuity payment. Using a moment-matching approach, we calibrate a lifecycle model tracking observed claiming patterns under current rules and predict optimal claiming outcomes under the lump sum approach. Our model correctly predicts that early claimers under current rules would delay claiming most when offered actuarially fair lump sums, and for lump sums worth 87% as much, claiming ages would still be higher than at present.
Most defined contribution pension plans pay benefits as lump sums, yet the US Treasury has recently encouraged firms to protect retirees from outliving their assets by converting a portion of their plan balances into longevity income annuities (LIA). These are deferred annuities which initiate payouts not later than age 85 and continue for life, and they provide an effective way to hedge systematic (individual) longevity risk for a relatively low price. Using a life cycle portfolio framework, we measure the welfare improvements from including LIAs in the menu of plan payout choices, accounting for mortality heterogeneity by education and sex. We find that introducing a longevity income annuity to the plan menu is attractive for most DC plan participants who optimally commit 8-15% of their plan balances at age 65 to a LIA that starts paying out at age 85. Optimal annuitization boosts welfare by 5-20% of average retirement plan accruals at age 66 (assuming average mortality rates), compared to not having access to the LIA. We also compare the optimal LIA allocation versus two default options that plan sponsors could implement. We conclude that an approach where a fixed fraction over a dollar threshold is invested in LIAs will be preferred by most to the status quo, while enhancing welfare for the majority of workers.
Dieser Artikel behandelt das Zusammenspiel von staatlich organisierten sozialen Sicherungssystemen und der privaten Eigenvorsorge durch Vermögensbildung als Grundpfeiler der sozialen Marktwirtschaft in Deutschland. Die jährlichen Ausgaben der verschiedenen staatlichen Sicherungssysteme belaufen sich auf rund ein Drittel des erwirtschafteten Bruttosozialprodukts, wobei die umlagefinanzierten Alterssicherungssysteme für die Arbeitsnehmer den größten Anteil ausmachen. Sachvermögen in Form von selbst genutzten Wohnungen sowie Finanzvermögen in Form von Bankeinlagen und Ansprüche gegen private Versicherungen machen den größten Anteil der Eigenversorge aus. Aufgrund des niedrigen Zinsniveaus sowie des demografischen Wandels der Gesellschaft wird die Eigenvorsorge durch Anlagen an den internationalen Wertpapiermärkten sowohl für Selbständige als auch Arbeitsnehmer immer bedeutender.
Das vornehmliche Ziel der OGAW Richtlinien ist es einen gemeinsamen europäischen Markt für Investment-Dienstleistungen auf Basis wohldefinierten Qualitätsstandards zu erreichen. Ein grenzüberschreitender Vertrieb eröffnet die Möglichkeit der Ausweitung von Geschäftsaktivitäten auf neue wirtschaftlich attraktive Absatzmärkte. Die Stellungnahme kommentiert die im Gesetzesentwurf vorgeschlagenen regulatorischen Instrumente vor dem Hintergrund verschiedener gegebener Kriterien.
The paper discusses an additional reform proposal for enhancing Social Security solvency which reframes the existing debate in a different light. In our research, we focus on incentives to prolong working years and to delay benefits claiming as a way of sustaining Social Security. Specifically, we analyze how the offer of a budget-neutral, actuarially fair lump sum payment - instead of the current delayed retirement credit – would encourage people to delay claiming their OASI benefits and work longer. The results of our research will be useful for policymakers, namely in (1) measuring who would delay claiming benefits if offered a lump sum instead of higher annuity payments, (2) examining how long they would wait, and (3) how much longer, if at all, they would continue working in the interim.
This paper investigates whether exchanging the Social Security delayed retirement credit, currently paid as an increase in lifetime annuity benefits, for a lump sum would induce later claiming and additional work. We show that people would voluntarily claim about half a year later if the lump sum were paid for claiming any time after the Early Retirement Age, and about two-thirds of a year later if the lump sum were paid only for those claiming after their Full Retirement Age. Overall, people will work one-third to one-half of the additional months, compared to the status quo. Those who would currently claim at the youngest ages are likely to be most responsive to the offer of a lump sum benefit.