Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
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When estimating misspecified linear factor models for the cross-section of expected returns using GMM, the explanatory power of these models can be spuriously high when the estimated factor means are allowed to deviate substantially from the sample averages. In fact, by shifting the weights on the moment conditions, any level of cross-sectional fit can be attained. The mathematically correct global minimum of the GMM objective function can be obtained at a parameter vector that is far from the true parameters of the data-generating process. This property is not restricted to small samples, but rather holds in population. It is a feature of the GMM estimation design and applies to both strong and weak factors, as well as to all types of test assets.
We study the many implications of the Eurosystem collateral framework for corporate bonds. Using data on the evolving collateral eligibility list, we identify the first inclusion dates of bonds and issuers and use these events to find that the increased supply and demand for pledgeable collateral following eligibility (a) increases activity in the corporate securities lending market, (b) lowers eligible bond yields, and (c) affects bond liquidity. Thus, corporate bond lending relaxes the constraint of limited collateral supply and thereby improves market functioning.
This paper empirically analyses whether post-global financial crisis regulatory reforms have created appropriate incentives to voluntarily centrally clear over-the-counter (OTC) derivative contracts. We use confidential European trade repository data on single-name sovereign credit default swap (CDS) transactions and show that both seller and buyer manage counterparty exposures and capital costs, strategically choosing to clear when the counterparty is riskier. The clearing incentives seem particularly responsive to seller credit risk, which is in line with the notion that counterparty credit risk (CCR) is asymmetric in CDS contracts. The riskiness of the underlying reference entity also impacts the decision to clear as it affects both CCR capital charges for OTC contracts and central counterparty clearing house (CCP) margins for cleared contracts. Lastly, we find evidence that when a transaction helps netting positions with the CCP and hence lower margins, the likelihood of clearing is higher.
Experiments are an important tool in economic research. However, it is unclear to which extent the control of experiments extends to the perceptions subjects form of such experimental decision situations. This paper is the first to explicitly elicit perceptions of the dictator and trust game and shows that there is substantial heterogeneity in how subjects perceive the same game. Moreover, game perceptions depend not only on the game itself but also on the order of games (i.e., the broader experimental context in which the game is embedded) and the subject herself. This highlights that the control of experiments does not necessarily extend to game perceptions. The paper also demonstrates that perceptions are correlated with game behavior and moderate the relationship between game behavior and field behavior, thereby underscoring the importance and relevance of game perceptions for economic research.
We use a structural VAR model to study the German natural gas market and investigate the impact of the 2022 Russian supply stop on the German economy. Combining conventional and narrative sign restrictions, we find that gas supply and demand shocks have large and persistent price effects, while output effects tend to be moderate. The 2022 natural gas price spike was driven by adverse supply
shocks and positive storage demand shocks, as Germany filled its inventories before the winter. Counterfactual simulations of an embargo on natural gas imports from Russia indicate similar positive price and negative output effects compared to what we observe in the data.
Mitigating climate change necessitates global cooperation, yet global data on individuals’ willingness to act remain scarce. In this study, we conducted a representative survey across 125 countries, interviewing nearly 130,000 individuals. Our findings reveal widespread support for climate action. Notably, 69% of the global population expresses a willingness to contribute 1% of their personal income, 86% endorse pro-climate social norms and 89% demand intensified political action. Countries facing heightened vulnerability to climate change show a particularly high willingness to contribute. Despite these encouraging statistics, we document that the world is in a state of pluralistic ignorance, wherein individuals around the globe systematically underestimate the willingness of their fellow citizens to act. This perception gap, combined with individuals showing conditionally cooperative behaviour, poses challenges to further climate action. Therefore, raising awareness about the broad global support for climate action becomes critically important in promoting a unified response to climate change.
This paper studies discrete time finite horizon life-cycle models with arbitrary discount functions and iso-elastic per period power utility with concavity parameter θ. We distinguish between the savings behavior of a sophisticated versus a naive agent. Although both agent types have identical preferences, they solve different utility maximization problems whenever the model is dynamically inconsistent. Pollak (1968) shows that the savings behavior of both agent types is nevertheless identical for logarithmic utility (θ = 1). We generalize this result by showing that the sophisticated agent saves in every period a greater fraction of her wealth than the naive agent if and only if θ ≥ 1. While this result goes through for model extensions that preserve linearity of the consumption policy function, it breaks down for non-linear model extensions.
SAFE Update June 2024
(2024)